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ABSTRACT 
Theory and practice promulgate public private partnerships (PPPs) as a new procurement option for 
unlocking public infrastructure investment gaps in both developed and emerging economies. However, 
the contribution of PPPs towards improving public service delivery, especially for emerging economies, 
remains low due to poor governance. Given that Uganda recently adopted PPPs to develop road 
infrastructure, this study investigated the PPP environment in Uganda in order to establish the best 
approaches of governing PPPs for sustainable road infrastructure development. To achieve this, both 
national and international, and theoretical and practical perspectives were employed through qualitative 
research methodology with six interrelated objectives. 
Objective one sought to investigate the understanding and contribution of public infrastructure and PPPs 
through a review of literature. Findings indicated that PPPs are understood through the lenses of 
partnership relationships, contractual obligations and project lifecycle functions. Furthermore, PPPs 
have enormous benefits but are conditional upon the effective management of problems associated with 
them. Finally, based on public sector perspective, PPPs fit within the theoretical underpinnings of new 
public governance, public value, and new public service, and to a lesser extent new public management. 
The second objective reviewed literature and analysed documents to investigate the key elements of a 
PPP governance structure. Findings showed key elements of PPP governance structure to include best 
practices, critical success factors, PPP maturity trajectory, and stakeholder and risk management. 
Thirdly, literature was reviewed to investigate the international PPPs experiences and road practices. 
Lessons for Uganda included financial challenges and how governments have responded, the tolling 
practices and policies employed to ensure affordability and profitability of PPP roads, and the PPP road 
project examples with successes and failures for each and why such situations had to occur.   
Like the second objective, a review of literature and analysis of documents were undertaken to 
investigate the road reforms and their impact on road performance, and the PPP legal frameworks in 
Uganda for objective four and five respectively. Findings indicated that the past road subsector reforms 
have had limited effect on road infrastructure improvement and development because of lack of 
resource capacities and compromised governance systems and practices. In addition, results showed the 
existence of various legal policies supporting PPPs, though certain critical legal and policy frameworks 
are either non-existent, outdated, and with major inadequacies or both.  
Lastly, individual interviews were conducted to investigate the suitability of PPPs for road infrastructure 
development in Uganda. Thirty interviewees were used, and findings indicated a high motivation for 
PPP adoption but with limited understanding and awareness of PPPs, low PPP readiness levels with 
several challenges, and vast PPP opportunities but with many obstacles. Based on the aforementioned 
problems, respondents suggested critical success factors and best practices for effective management of 
PPP road projects. 
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The findings from the six objectives resulted in the construction of a suitable PPP assessment and 
management governance model for road infrastructure development in Uganda. The development of 
the model was mainly informed by findings from the empirical study (i.e. objective 6), and 
supplemented with findings from the five literature and documentary analysis objectives in order to 
create robustness in the model. The effective application of the model is anticipated to remedy the 
current and future PPP road infrastructure development and governance problems. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die teorie en praktyk verkondig openbare-privaat vennootskappe (PPP’s) as ’n nuwe verkrygingsopsie 
vir die ontsluiting van beleggingsgapings in openbare infrastruktuur, in sowel ontwikkelde as 
opkomende ekonomieë. Vanweë swak beheer-en-bestuur bly die bydrae van PPP’s tot die verbetering 
van openbare dienslewering, veral in opkomende ekonomieë, egter gering. Aangesien Uganda onlangs 
PPP’s vir die ontwikkeling van padinfrastruktuur aanvaar het, ondersoek hierdie studie die PPP-
omgewing in Uganda om die beste benaderings tot die bestuur-en-beheer van PPP’s vir volhoubare 
padinfrastruktuurontwikkeling te bepaal. Om dit te bereik, is nasionale en internasionale, asook 
teoretiese en praktiese perspektiewe gebruik vir ’n kwalitatiewe navorsingsmetodologie aan die hand 
van ses onderling verbandhoudende doelstellings. 
Doelstelling een was daarop gemik om insig in en die bydrae van openbare infrastruktuur en PPP’s aan 
die hand van ’n literatuuroorsig te ondersoek. Die bevindings het aangedui dat PPP’s deur die lense van 
vennootskapsverhoudinge, kontraktuele verpligtinge en projeklewensiklusfunksies verstaan word. 
Verder bied PPP’s enorme voordele, maar dit hang nou saam met die effektiewe bestuur van die 
verbandhoudende probleme. Laastens pas PPP’s, vanuit die perspektief van die openbare sektor, binne 
die teoretiese onderbou van nuwe openbare beheer-en-bestuur, openbare waarde, en nuwe openbare 
diens, en in ’n mindere mate nuwe openbare bestuur. 
Die tweede doelstelling was gemik op ’n literatuurhersiening en die ontleding van dokumente met die 
oog op ’n ondersoek na die sleutelelemente van ’n PPP-beheer-en-bestuur-struktuur. Bevindings het 
aangedui sleutelelemente van ’n PPP-beheer-en-bestuur-struktuur behels onder meer beste praktyke, 
kritiese suksesfaktore, die PPP-volwassenheidsbaan, asook belangegroep- en risikobestuur. Derdens is 
die literatuur hersien met die oog op die ondersoek van internasionale PPP’s se ervarings en 
padpraktyke. Lesse vir Uganda was onder meer finansiële uitdagings en die reaksies van regerings, die 
tolpraktyke en -beleide wat gebruik is om bekostigbaarheid en winsgewendheid van PPP-paaie te 
verseker, en voorbeelde van die PPP-padprojek, met suksesse en mislukkings vir elkeen, asook die redes 
waarom sodanige situasies moes plaasvind. 
Soos vir die tweede doelstelling is ’n oorsig van die literatuur en ’n ontleding van dokumente onderneem 
om die padhervormings en die impak daarvan op padprestasie, sowel as die PPP se regsraamwerke in 
Uganda vir doelstellings vier en vyf te ondersoek. Bevindings het getoon dat vorige 
padsubsektorhervormings ’n beperkte uitwerking op padinfrastruktuurverbetering en -ontwikkeling 
gehad het vanweë ’n gebrek aan hulpbronkapasiteit en gekompromitteerde beheer-en-bestuurstelsels en 
-praktyke. Daarbenewens dui die resultate daarop dat verskeie regsbeleide bestaan wat PPP’s 
ondersteun, ofskoon bepaalde kritiese regs- en beleidsraamwerke óf ontbreek, verouderd is en 
aansienlike tekortkominge openbaar, óf albei. 
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Laastens is individuele onderhoude gevoer om die geskiktheid van PPP’s vir die ontwikkeling van 
padinfrastruktuur in Uganda te ondersoek. Dertig deelnemers is ondervra, en die bevindings dui op 
aansienlike motiverings vir PPP-aanvaarding, maar met beperkte insig in en bewustheid rakende PPP’s, 
lae PPP-gereedheidsvlakke met verskeie uitdagings, en groot PPP-geleenthede, maar met baie 
hindernisse. Gegewe die genoemde probleme het die respondente kritiese suksesfaktore en beste 
praktyke vir effektiewe bestuur van PPP-padprojekte voorgestel. 
Die bevindings uit die ses doelstellings het gelei tot die daarstelling van ’n geskikte PPP-assesserings- 
en beheer-en-bestuursmodel vir die ontwikkeling van padinfrastruktuur in Uganda. Die ontwikkeling 
van die model is hoofsaaklik ingelig deur bevindings uit die empiriese studie (dit wil sê doelstelling 6), 
en is aangevul met bevindings uit die vyf literatuur- en dokumentêre ontledingsdoelwitte ten einde 
robuustheid in die model te skep. Die effektiewe toepassing van die model kan die huidige en 
toekomstige probleme met PPP-padinfrastruktuurontwikkeling en PPP-beheer-en-bestuur verbeter. 
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF 
UGANDA 
Uganda is a landlocked country in the Eastern part of the African continent occupying a total area of 
241,550.7 square kilometres, and borders South Sudan to the North, Kenya to the East, Tanzania to the 
South, Rwanda to the South West, and Democratic Republic of Congo to the West. The country’s  
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) stood at 3.9% and about 7%, for the financial year (F/Y) 2017/2018 
and for the last two decades respectively (National Budget Speech F/Y 2018/2019; World Bank, 2017:vi 
& 42;), and annual inflation averages 7%  recovering from  0.3% GDP and 240% inflation rate of 1986 
(Ggoobi, 2016:7). Household poverty reduced from 56% in 1993 to 31.8% (by international standard 
of US$ 1.9 per day) and 19.7% (by the National poverty line standard of less than a dollar) by 2016 
(World Bank, 2017:21; Ggoobi, 2016:8). Furthermore, life expectancy improved from 45.7 to 60.3 
years for males and 50.5 to 64.3 years for females, between 1991 and 2015 (World Health Organisation-
WHO, 2017). 
Notwithstanding Uganda’s improvement in economic and social outlooks over the years, public 
infrastructure as a locomotive for development has an annual investment and financing gap of US$1.4 
billion (bn) (about 6% of GDP) and US$0.4 million (m) respectively, and loses approximately 
US$300m in infrastructure inefficiencies and US$1.2bn in transport costs annually (World Bank, 
2017:22&24; Kyamugambi, 2017:27). Compared with the best and average performing economies of 
the world, Uganda underperforms at about 50% and 25% in public investment respectively (Roehler, 
Charaoui, Darcy, Khasiani & Navarro, 2017:10). Against this backdrop, and given that the government 
envisages to “transform the country from a peasant to a modern and prosperous society by 2040” 
(Uganda Vision 2040: xiv), this study argues that Uganda can only realize such development aspirations 
through sustainable public infrastructure investment practices, especially in road infrastructure.  
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Byamugisha and Basheka (2016:2) reviewed three empirical studies; one conducted on 136 countries 
that included African countries, the other two on Japan and China respectively, and concluded that the 
volume and quality of physical infrastructure positively affect growth. Globally, as Tachiwou and 
Hamadou (2011:132) noted, countries that have efficiently constructed and expanded their road 
infrastructure have had tremendous improvement in economic growth, development and social welfare. 
As such, road infrastructure development through its direct and indirect effects has a bearing on 
sustainable development (Tripathi & Gautam, 2010:135).  
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Although roads are the main means of transport in Africa, a huge road infrastructure deficit exists on 
the continent (Ondiege, Moyo & Verdier-chouchane, 2013: 82). For instance, in 2011, 52.8% of 
Africa’s road network was unpaved, making it difficult for people to easily access social services such 
as education, health and to engage in economic activities such as agriculture, industrial production, 
tourism and trade (Ondiege et al., 2013: 82). Aigbavboa, Liphadzi and Thwala (2014:101) commend 
public private partnerships (PPPs) for having the potential of “alleviating infrastructure backlogs in 
developing countries”. In a study titled “(de) politicization dynamics in PPPs”, Willems and Van 
Dooren (2016:203) refer to PPPs as a new and neutral procurement modality for delivering public 
services. This involves greater private sector participation in designing, constructing, financing, 
operating and maintaining greenfield public infrastructure or operating brownfield facilities to satisfy 
public needs (Bayliss & Van Waeyenberge, 2018: 577; Alinaitwe & Ayesiga, 2013:2). As a policy 
instrument, therefore, PPPs reform procurement and service delivery for public agencies to leverage 
from private sector resources and efficiencies (Farquharson, Torres de Mästle & Yescombe, 2011; 
Yakubu & Anigbogu, 2016:61). In return, the public sector obviously extends business to private 
companies, but also supports the private sector in difficult business times, especially during credit 
market failures and stock market downturns (Hodge, 2009:11). 
In Uganda, the road sub sector provides the most dominant transport mode carrying over 90% of the 
country’s passenger and freight traffic, and works as the only means of transport for the rural 
communities (World Bank, 2014). Recognising the critical role the road sub sector plays towards 
economic and social development, over the years, the government has prioritised road infrastructure 
development during national budget sector allocations. For instance, in the F/Ys 2014/2015, 2015/2016, 
2016/2017, 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 the transport sector was allocated 15.9% (UGX 2,389.37 bn), 
18.2% (3,328.79 bn), 18.7% (3823.8 bn), 20.8% (4,587.3bn), and 20.3% (4,786.62 bn) of the national 
budget respectively. As the budget for the transport sector remains the biggest and keeps increasing, in 
turn other sectors experience budget cuts. Annually, about 87% of the transport sector budget is 
channelled towards the development and maintenance of roads (computed from the Ministry of Works 
and Transport Sector Budget Framework Paper F/Y 2017/18: 1-2). 
Despite the government’s prioritization of road sub sector investment, most of the road infrastructure 
remains substandard, unaffordable, inaccessible, costly, dissatisfying, and with high levels of accidents 
and travel times (Foster & Ranganathan, 2012; World Bank, 2014; Muhwezi & Ahimbisibwe, 2015:77). 
The slow development of the road infrastructure has often been attributed to government’s budgetary 
constraints and procurement obstructions (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development-
MFPED, 2015). For instance, ordinary road projects experience; 
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 delays in terms of completion or procuring a contractor due to administrative reviews, non-
compliance with design requirements and court cases (Uganda National Roads Authority-
UNRA, 2014; Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority-PPDA, 2014; 
Ministry of Works and Transport-MOWT, 2015). 
 poor workmanship and abandonment of construction works due to awarding contracts to 
incompetent contractors or construction firms having multiple running contracts with both 
UNRA and Local Government agencies (Uganda Debt Network, 2013).  
 mismanagement of funds evidenced by unnecessary requests for extra funding and the payment 
for activities that are never executed (Office of the Auditor General-OAG Annual reports, 2010 
& 2011). 
 inadequate funding and low absorption of funds allocated for road infrastructure development 
(Achola, 2016: 1-12), and  
 corruption scandals. A case in point, in the F/Y 2014/2015, the government lost UGX 18 bn, 
UGX 350 bn, UGX 250 bn and UGX 250 bn meant for the construction of Kanoni-Sembabule, 
Entebbe-Zana Express highway, Mukono-Katosi and Kawempe-Kafu roads respectively 
(Uganda National NGO Forum, 2015). 
 
In line with the above assertions, to Bogere, Kabasweka, Kayabwe and Achola (2014:35) most of the 
road development problems in Uganda have a link with procurement. Quantitatively, Uganda loses 
about UGX 300bn in procurement malpractices (Global Witness, 2010, as cited in Mawejje & Bategeka, 
2013:21), and globally, procurement bribes alone have been found to inflate contract values or item 
prices by 10-15% ( Kenny, 2006:5). Since the World Bank (2012) maintains that Uganda spends over 
55% of the national budget on procurement, it makes sense to state that a well-managed procurement 
system is central to solving most of the road development deficiencies in the country. 
 
In an effort to address infrastructure development challenges, the Government of Uganda enacted the 
PPP Policy and the PPP Act in 2010 and 2015 respectively. The PPP system is an alternative 
procurement option to the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act of 2003 (as amended 
2014). Public private partnership reforms, according to Siemiatycki (2013:6-7) include competitive 
contracting and performance based contracts, private sector involvement in policy formulation, staff 
secondments and private sector contracting, increased flexibility in labour contracts, raising private 
capital to finance public investments, and treating service users as customers. This is in addition to 
transferring of infrastructure planning and provision to agencies that function more like private 
businesses, and employing independent regulators to oversee industry competitiveness, pricing, and 
service quality. Following the enactment of a PPP policy and Act, a pipeline of six PPP pioneer road 
projects was proposed, though with an ambitious construction completion time of 2022 (Kasaija, 2015). 
Martin, Lawther, Hodge and Greve (2013:15) assert that “the application of PPPs for transport 
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infrastructure development is a generally accepted tool of governance in many countries”. Critical to 
Uganda would be drawing lessons from the experiences of other nations (Rao & Vokolkova, 2007).  
Given that PPP is one of options available to governments in the delivery of public infrastructure, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat provides assessment criteria for determining the appropriateness of a project 
as a PPP (Yong, 2010). First, does the project offer value for money to the public sector? Second, does 
the project economics add up and is it bankable? Third, is a PPP enabling environment available? 
Fourth, is the sector of the economy suitable for PPPs? Fifth, is the proposed infrastructure of strategic 
importance to the country? Based on such criteria, the success of a PPP project is fundamentally 
dependent on the maturity of a country’s PPP operating environment. As such, the market structure of 
a sector must create conditions for the private sector to operate, regulatory bodies should be competent 
to provide effective safeguards, and public authorities should be skilled to prepare a pipeline of bankable 
PPP projects (World Bank Group, 2012). In addition, there must exist credible institutions and effective 
regulations to foster sound business practice, effective contract enforcement, innovation and market 
competition, strong legal systems, a stable and clear policy environment, and good capital markets 
(McKibbin & Henckel, 2010). 
Building on the above narrations, the adoption of PPPs for developing road infrastructure tasks the 
Ugandan government to fast track compliance with best practices. Without a doubt, proven practices 
deliver desired performance to the government, and reasonable returns to the private companies 
(Airoldi, Chua, Gerbert, Justus & Rilo, 2013:8). Ong’olo (2006) suggests PPP best practices to be 
transparency, public accountability, public management, sustainable development, dispute resolution, 
and safety and security. Martin et al. (2013) recommended that PPP best practices are found in the 
functions, size and complexity of the project, structured process, stakeholder consultation and support, 
dedicated PPP Units, risk assessment and allocation, value for money analysis, special purpose vehicle, 
project financing, procurement, and contracting. Further to this, according to Rothballer and Kim 
(2013:3), PPP projects should be selected and prioritized based on: a country’s vision and long-term 
plans, a rigorous project preparation process, a life-cycle economic valuation, a bankable feasibility 
study, a balanced risk allocation and regulation, and a conducive enabling environment. 
Since the government of Uganda does not have enough resources and competencies to meet the 
necessary road investment for the current and future generation, the involvement of the private sector 
through long-term partnership arrangements may sustainably bridge these gaps. However, Eggers and 
Startup (2006:2) warn that “without taking the PPP as a true partnership, and adopting a tailored 
approach that suits the relative uncertainty and scale of the projects at hand, governments are likely to 
repeat the errors of those before them”. The implication is that the Republic of Uganda may realize its 
road development ambitions, if it progressively improves PPP environment, makes best use of the 
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available public service delivery models, and continues to innovate and learn from the successes and 
failures in the country and beyond. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Mixed reactions have been raised about the relevance of PPP arrangements as a procurement model for 
delivering public infrastructure globally (Boardman, Greve & Hodge, 2015:442; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 
2017:113). Some studies indicate that PPP projects are delivered on time and in budget, and are cheaper 
than conventional projects (Allen Consulting Group, 2007:32; Hodge & Greve, 2009:35; Babatunde, 
2015:4; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2016:174-179). Meanwhile others suggest that PPP projects underperform 
compared to conventional projects, because they are often delivered beyond budget and completion 
time, and increase public debt and taxes for the citizens (Hodge & Greve, 2009:35; Ball, Heafey & 
King, 2007:307; Hodge & Greve, 2010:12; Blanc-Brude, Goldsmith & Valila, 2006:33; Romero, 
2015:6; Babatunde, 2015:4; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2016:174-179).  The cited studies, which are a 
collection of empirical research conducted mainly in countries from Africa, Europe and the United 
States of America (USA), confirm the existence of a mixed performance and view of PPPs. 
In light of the findings from studies above, it becomes difficult to predict the trend Uganda is likely to 
follow as it adopts PPP mechanisms to develop road infrastructure. Villanueva (2015:133) attributes 
uncertainties and compromised PPP performance to: complex PPP project matters and contracts; 
numerous roles government adopts in PPP arrangements; the fact that PPPs is one option to choose 
among other service delivery alternatives; differing PPP agendas of the private and public partners; the 
long term contracts (“incomplete contracts” problem); and, the democratic aspects of participation, 
transparency, accountability and control which have not been institutionally resolved. This study, 
therefore, seeks to investigate both the international and national PPP environments to suggest the best 
PPP governance approaches for developing road infrastructure in Uganda.  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The critical question being addressed by this study is how can Uganda govern public private 
partnerships to ensure sustainable road infrastructure development? 
1.5 RESEARCH AIM 
To construct a suitable Public Private Partnership governance model for developing road infrastructure 
in Uganda. 
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1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 To provide an overview on the understanding and contribution of infrastructure development 
and public private partnership; 
 To analyse the key elements of an effective public private partnership governance structure for 
infrastructure development; 
 To evaluate international public private partnership experiences and practices in the road sub 
sector; 
 To examine the impact of road sub sector reforms on road infrastructure performance in 
Uganda; 
 Discuss the legal and policy frameworks that support public private partnership road investment 
projects and programs in Uganda; 
 To empirically investigate the suitability of the public private partnership environment of 
Uganda for road infrastructure development. 
1.7 SIGNIFANCE OF THE STUDY 
Firstly, the study will assist policy makers in developing and implementing effective institutional, 
regulatory, legal and market frameworks for PPP undertakings in the road sub sector in Uganda.  
Secondly, the study bridges the knowledge gap in the existing PPP literature since little research has 
been written about PPPs in Uganda. Most importantly, among the few scholars that focus on PPPs in 
Uganda, such as Alinaitwe (2005 & 2013), Ndandiko (2006 & 2010); and Nsasira, Basheka and Oluka 
(2013), none has comprehensively analysed the PPP environment or developed a suitable PPP 
governance model for Uganda’s road sub sector.  Therefore, the provision of recommendations out of 
a comprehensive analysis of Uganda’s PPP environment and a suitable PPP governance model for 
developing road infrastructure in Uganda, become the two major contributions of this study.  
Thirdly, much of the debate on road infrastructure development has mainly focussed on how to raise 
funding for infrastructure projects while neglecting the broader public governance dimensions 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-OECD, 2015:1). This study uses the public 
governance approach through the PPP lens to bridge the aforementioned gap.  
Fourthly, the study advances the PPP phenomenon as a procurement model - a perspective that has 
outrightly been missing and limited in literature and practice respectively, because they (PPPs) have 
often been viewed from the perspectives of urban regeneration, public policy, infrastructure, 
development, language game, moral regeneration, and financing. 
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1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section provides, at a glance, a summary of how the research was conducted, but a more 
comprehensive description of the research methodology employed to undertake and accomplish the 
study is provided in chapter 7.  
With the intention of providing answers to the research question and objectives highlighted in sections 
1.4 and 1.6 respectively, and in order to achieve the research aim (highlighted in section 1.5) to address 
the problem (described in section 1.3), it was indeed very important to choose an appropriate research 
methodology.  The study adopted an exploratory research design, which necessitated the collection and 
analysis of data to be qualitatively executed. Three data collection methods, namely interviewing, 
literature review and documentary analysis were used. For both literature review and documentary 
analysis methods theoretical sampling was used to determine the most appropriate documents to use for 
the study, while the interviewing of respondents had to be purposively/or and conveniently conducted.   
Upon completion of collecting data, the data had to be analysed. The data collected through literature 
review and documentary analysis was manually analysed using the systematic analysis approach, while 
data from interviews was electronically analysed (with ATLAS ti software) using the content analysis 
approach. In order to make sense of the data collected and analysed, both deductive and inductive 
reasoning (i.e. abductive logic) were employed alongside ontological, epistemological, axiological and 
rhetorical research philosophies. Finally, the aforementioned processes culminated into “a suitable 
public private partnership assessment and management governance model for developing road 
infrastructure in Uganda” which was constructed based on the findings from the interviews (i.e. 
empirical chapter), and supplemented with findings from literature review and documentary analysis 
chapters. 
1.9 LAYOUT OF THE DISSERTATION  
Chapter 1: Introduction of the study 
This chapter covers the background to the study, problem statement, research aim, research question, 
objectives of the study, significance of the study, and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2: An Overview of Infrastructure Development and Public Private Partnerships 
The chapter reviewed literature on the understanding of infrastructure development, PPPs, the 
contribution of PPPs to infrastructure development, and analysed theories relevant to PPPs. 
Chapter 3: Key Elements of an Appropriate Public Private Partnership Governance Structure 
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This chapter critically examines PPP best practices (PPP principles), critical success factors, stakeholder 
management, risk management, and PPP maturity. 
Chapter 4: PPP International Experiences and Practices in the Road Sub Sector 
This chapter evaluates international PPP road cases, examine the management of PPP operations in 
other countries, analyses tolling in the road sector and discuss the effects of the financial crisis on PPP 
performance. 
Chapter 5: The Evolution of the Road Sub Sector and Future of Public Private Partnership 
Projects in Uganda  
This chapter provides the overview of road development in Uganda, the state of the roads and the 
physical performance of the sub sector and a brief description of the pioneer PPP road projects lined up 
for future implementation. Finally, it assesses the road reforms and their impact on the state and 
performance of the road sub sector. 
Chapter 6: Legal and Policy Frameworks Applicable to Public Private Partnership Road Projects 
in Uganda 
The chapter discusses pure PPP legal and policy frameworks, and other legal and policy frameworks 
(which are road specific or generic in nature) that support PPP arrangements. 
Chapter 7: Research Methodology 
The chapter provides a description of the research design, approaches, data collection methods, 
procedures, research instruments, data analysis and presentation, and covers the analysis of the 
demographic features of the respondents.  
Chapter 8: Presentation and Discussion of the Findings of the Empirical Study 
The chapter investigates the suitability of the public private partnership environment of Uganda for road 
infrastructure development. Presentation and discussion of the findings were conducted concurrently in 
the chapter. 
Chapter 9: Constructing a suitable public private partnership governance model for developing 
road infrastructure in Uganda 
A suitable public private partnership assessment and management governance model was developed 
based mainly on the findings from the interviews, and supplemented with findings from the review of 
literature and analysis of documents. Finally, the applicability of the developed model was discussed. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion and Recommendations 
The chapter provides an overview of the research contribution, summary of findings, recommendations, 
limitations, conclusion, and areas for further research.
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2 CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT AND 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the last three decades, the governments’ monopoly in the development of public infrastructure has 
been broken. Currently, many countries are facing budgetary constraints and pressure from the public 
to expand and improve public facilities and services (Shetterly, Duan, Krishnamoorthy, Kronenburg & 
Loutzenhiser, 2012: 997). According to Airoldi et al. (2013), globally there is a $1-1.5 trillion annual 
gap against the necessary $4 trillion annual infrastructure investment up to 2030. This necessitates 
governments to collaborate with the private sector in order to bridge the financial and management 
gaps. Among the models of private sector involvement such as, contracting-out, privatization and PPP, 
the latter has been highly recommended for public infrastructure development. In both developed and 
developing countries, it has increasingly become common practice to undertake road construction, 
financing, maintenance and operations through PPP arrangements.  However, this is a new approach to 
Uganda, since previously, the government relied heavily on the use of government funds and capital 
financing from intergovernmental organisations.  
With the current government’s resolve and support for PPPs in the country, the overall aim of this study 
is to construct a suitable PPP governance model for developing road infrastructure in Uganda. In 
particular, this chapter seeks to address the first objective of the study, which is about “the 
understanding and contribution of PPPs for infrastructure development”. The discussion of the chapter 
positions infrastructure development (specifically roads) in the African context, broadly critiques PPPs 
and suggests appropriate theories for the governance of PPPs in the provision of public services. The 
chapter is organised in four main themes: public infrastructure development for service delivery, PPPs 
for infrastructure development, theoretical perspectives in the governance of public service provision, 
and the analysis of the common themes. The main themes of this chapter are unpacked as follows. 
2.2 PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT FOR SERVICE DELIVERY 
This section presents the meaning of public infrastructure, and explores public infrastructure investment 
in Africa with a key focus on infrastructure investment gap and the impact of road infrastructure on 
service delivery. 
2.2.1 Understanding of Public Infrastructure 
Public infrastructure refers to facilities that support the effective functioning of a nation’s economic and 
social activities (Yescombe, 2007:1). Public infrastructure can either be economic infrastructure, which 
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is essential for day-to-day economic activities such as transportation facilities (for road, rail, water, air) 
and utility networks (for water, sewage, electricity), or social infrastructure, which is essential for the 
structure of society such as schools, hospitals, libraries and prisons (Yescombe, 2007:1). Each of the 
two infrastructure categories can be either “hard” or “soft” in nature, where hard infrastructure refers to 
provision of physical facilities such as roads, and soft infrastructure refers to provision of services such 
as street cleaning and lighting, transporting, and traffic lights control (Yescombe, 2007:1). From a very 
different orientation, Byamugisha and Basheka (2016:2) refer to soft infrastructure as also including 
“policies, regulatory and institutional frameworks, governance mechanisms, systems and procedures, 
social networks, transparency and accountability, financing and procurement systems”. 
Mainly for social and political reasons, public infrastructure development becomes a sole mandate of 
the public sector (government), while the private sector only participates behind the scenes because of 
market failures and lack of profitability (unless executed as a PPP) (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016:96). 
Key features that differentiate public infrastructures from other forms of infrastructure include: they are 
natural monopolies; they are associated with positive and negative spill overs; they require heavy 
investment in both capital, sunk and running costs; it is difficult or undesirable to exclude non-payers 
from using them; they are indispensable facilities  that support  a wide range of products and services; 
they provide integrated and networked services that bind economic and social activities together 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2004:27-29; OECD & ITF, 2008:17; Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016:96). As 
aforementioned, in the recent past the private sector has gained greater responsibility in the development 
of public infrastructure through PPP arrangements. A public infrastructure qualifies for PPPs if it: is a 
fixed investment (with a long duration in construction and operation); requires a high initial investment; 
is only financially viable over a long period, and; the public sector is the guarantor but the provider is 
the private sector (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016:96).  
In summary, apart from Byamugisha and Basheka’s conceptualisation of soft infrastructure, and for 
purposes of maintaining consistency about the understanding of public infrastructure, we adopt 
Yescombe’s (2007) definition together with  Sarmento and Renneboog (2016), Grimsey and Lewis 
(2004), and OECD and ITF’s (2008) descriptions throughout the study. After having provided a clear 
meaning of public infrastructure, how it differs from other types of infrastructure, and what qualifies a 
public infrastructure for PPPs, the next subsection provides a brief presentation on public infrastructure 
investment in Africa. 
2.2.2 Public Infrastructure Investment in Africa 
While Africa needs approximately US$93 billion annually for infrastructure investment in order to meet 
its growth and development goals (Ondiege et al., 2013:70), its  actual annual infrastructure investment 
stands at US$45 billion (Draper, Grant, Kingombe, & Willem te Velde, 2011:4). As such, Africa is the 
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least productive and competitive continent of the world (Ondiege et al., 2013:69), largely because of 
inadequate and underdeveloped infrastructure. For instance, only 30 % and 34% of Africa’s population 
have access to electricity and roads respectively, compared with the 70-90% for electricity and 50% for 
roads in other developing continents (Ondiege et al., 2013:76). Africa’s most pronounced development 
challenge relates to an inclination to constructing new over the maintenance of existing infrastructure, 
yet “investing in the maintenance of existing facilities bear more fruits over spending on creating new 
facilities” (Sharma & Vohra, 2009:76). Given that, “without adequate maintenance, infrastructure 
deteriorates quickly and becomes unsustainable” (Ondiege et al., 2013:70), it explains why EU 
countries spend about 70% of public investment on maintenance and upgrade of past infrastructure 
investments (OECD, 2015:4). Therefore, African countries should transition from practicing corrective 
measures to more proactive/ preventive infrastructure development and maintenance means. 
This subsection presented Africa’s infrastructure gap and the main causes of this deficiency. The next 
subsection discusses the impact of road infrastructure in Africa. 
2.2.3 The Impact of Road Infrastructure on Service Delivery in the African Context 
Road infrastructure is critical for sustainable development, and provides a major means of transport for 
passengers and freight across the world. On average, roads account for over 90% of total freight and 
passenger movement in Africa (Biau, Dahou & Homma, 2008:3). Roads in Africa are a primary link 
between urban and rural areas, not only to boost trade, industrialisation and agricultural productivity, 
but also for social services accessibility. In this regard, road network has a positive impact on economic 
and social development. According to Sharma & Vohra (2009:76), for each additional US$0.02 million 
investment in roads, 123.8 people would be raised above the poverty line. Good roads increase both the 
number of new firms and the market size of a location resulting in lower prices and higher productivity. 
For example, a new rural road from Daleti to Oda Bildingulu in Ethiopia provided incentives for 
farmers, which increased sesame production six fold over the F/Ys 2003/04-2007/08 (Ondiege et al., 
2013:74). The implication is that improved and well maintained road networks minimise damage, 
spoilage and mishandling of in transit goods (Ferrantino, 2009:6), and reduce traffic congestion, user 
transport charges and vehicle operating costs, travel duration, and support safe and efficient movements 
(Sharma & Vohra, 2009:85). Good roads also encourage increased investment in both commercial and 
personal vehicles (Ferrantino, 2009:6). This increases supply of agricultural and industrial products in 
urban and rural areas respectively, thereby reducing commodity prices and facilitating productivity and 
living standards.  
On the other hand, poor road maintenance increases vehicle operating costs and makes maintenance of 
existing roads in the long run economically inefficient. Ferrantino (2009:6) argues that, “a paved road 
maintained at regular intervals for 15 years would cost about US$60,000 per km while if it is allowed 
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to deteriorate over the same period it would cost about US$200,000 per km to recover it”. In Africa, 
there is too much overloading of trucks, which raises the maintenance costs and shortens the life 
expectancy of roads. For instance, in Uganda, the overloading rates are close to 55% (Ondiege et al., 
2013:83). Africa’s road infrastructure is underdeveloped and poorly maintained compared to other 
developing countries. The neglect of effective maintenance of road infrastructure in Africa has not only 
become a continental but also a global concern. Out of the 2 million kilometres of Africa’s roads only 
27.6% are paved (against 43% for South Asia) (Biau et al., 2008:3). 
The poor state of the roads increases operational costs and production losses. For instance, a survey 
conducted in Kinshasa showed that transportation costs were on average two times greater on earth-
surfaced roads than on paved roads (Biau et al., 2008:3), while, in Ghana, about 15-20% of the fruits 
delivered by out-growers on feeder roads are rejected by nucleus farms due to in transit caused damages 
(Ferrantino, 2009:6). The underdevelopment of the road network has also resulted in severe traffic 
congestion and accidents. According to Ondiege et al. (2013:84) traffic congestion is estimated to cause 
direct loss of time and productivity at an annual cost of US$19 billion in Lagos, US$0.89 billion in Dar 
es Salaam, and US$0.57 billion in Nairobi. In 2016, the world health organisation (WHO) estimated 
that about 1.2 million people die and 50 million are seriously injured each year in road traffic accidents. 
For example, Uganda has one of the worst road safety records in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average 
rate of 45 fatalities per 10,000 vehicles (Ondiege et al., 2013:83).  
In addition, accessibility to the road network is uneven, with rural areas largely underserved (Ondiege 
et al., 2013:82), since 70% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) rural population lives more than 2 km away 
from an all-weather road (Wohl, 2009:1). This makes the use of motorized vehicles socially and 
economically unfeasible, especially during the rainy seasons. For example, in Chad, during the rainy 
season, teachers and students cannot get to schools and the sick have difficulty reaching the limited 
medical facilities because of poor quality roads (Jabara, 2009:7). More so, when road infrastructure is 
not user friendly, drivers tend to take alternative routes that often require longer travel times (Wohl, 
2009:5), something that not only creates delivery delays but also increases overall transport costs. The 
prolonged delivery problem is further exacerbated by the very low maximum driving speed, as vehicles 
slow down to avoid potholes or navigate uneven terrain (Wohl, 2009:5).  
Given Africa’s road infrastructure development challenges outlined above, we argue that facilitating 
collaborative relationships between government and the private sector through PPPs is an attractive 
alternative to increase and improve the provision of infrastructure facilities and services (Shendy, 
Kaplan & Mousley, 2011: ix; United Nations, 2011:1). This introduces innovative sources of funding 
and better competencies for public investment and infrastructure management. Therefore, the next 
section discusses the PPPs as a means for public infrastructure development. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 14 
 
2.3  PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT 
Starting from the early 1990s, to date PPPs continue to gain popularity in the development of public 
infrastructure due to the consistent public sector fiscal constraints, management reforms, and the 
changing role of government in service provision from “an active state to an enabling state” (Reim, 
2009:2). This form of public service delivery transforms government departments from being owners 
and operators of public infrastructure, to becoming procurers of services from the private sector through 
long-term contracts that clearly stipulate the responsibilities of each party (Kalpana, 2014a:5). Based 
on this background, this section presents the understanding of PPPs from various definitions and strands 
in literature, and discusses the contribution of PPPs and their challenges in the development of public 
infrastructure. This section serves two main objectives: 
 To provide concrete meaning to what PPPs are in order to avoid their misconstruction in 
research and policy arenas; and 
 To argue that the positive contribution of PPPs can only be realized if the operational challenges 
are suppressed. 
2.3.1 Understanding of PPPs through Definitions 
With enormous literature available about PPPs, there is still a lot of ambiguity on what PPPs really are. 
This subsection interrogates the different PPP definitions and suggests key issues that can assist in 
providing effective meaning to the PPP concept. As the saying goes, “no one size fits all”, the suggested 
common elements for defining PPP may not wholly apply to each type of PPP, but provide a 
benchmarking standard upon which the assigning of wrong meaning to PPPs in both research and policy 
undertakings can be avoided.  The details of the PPP interrogation follows below.  
Farquharson et al. (2011:11)  defines PPPs as “long-term contracts between the public entity and the 
private firm, where the private sector party usually agrees to; design and build, expand, or upgrade the 
public sector infrastructure; assume substantial financial, technical, and operational risks; receive a 
financial return through payments over the life of the contract from users or the public sector, or from 
a combination of the two; and  usually return the infrastructure to public sector ownership at the end of 
the contract”. This definition signifies that: 
 Project tasks must be bundled into a single or bigger contracts in order for the private partner 
to bear substantial project risks and management responsibilities; 
 Projects together with their contracts must have a long life span;  
 Payment to the private partner must come from direct users of the facilities or, where deemed 
necessary, by the government itself; 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 15 
 
 Project contracts need to explicitly state how the transfer of infrastructure ownership and 
responsibilities should be handled at the end of the contract. 
 
To Koppenjan (2005:137) PPPs are a form of structured cooperation between public and private parties 
in the planning, construction and/or exploitation of infrastructural facilities in which they share or 
reallocate risks, costs, benefits, resources and responsibilities in a specific project. However, 
Koppenjan’s definition is criticised for being function-specific and disregarding informal and long-term 
relationships, and failing to draw a line between organisational and inter-organisational objectives, 
values and visions within PPP policy networks (Hodge & Greve, 2007:546; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 
2011:3). Koppenjan’s definition was later strengthened by Zhang, Gao, Feng and Sun (2015:499) who 
viewed PPP as “a long-term contractual arrangement for the cooperation and coordination of 
government, investors, contractors, end users, and all other stakeholders that are involved in both the 
institutional environment and organizational processes throughout the whole development and 
operation cycle”. This implies effective collaborations cannot take place in short-term contracts, and 
“rules for good order” at both macro and micro levels are a prerequisite for PPP arrangements. 
According to Grant (1996, as cited in Alinaitwe & Ayesiga, 2013:2) cooperation (as suggested by Zhang 
et al. above) must be based on the best expertise of each partner to deliver clearly defined public needs. 
With a similar perspective, Roberts and Siemiatycki (2015:781) and Kalpana (2014a:17) argue that, the 
essence of any partnership oratory is in the notion of “collaborative advantage”, where individuals from 
multiple organisations and disciplines work together to achieve results that cannot be realized in the 
absence of combined efforts. Consequently, effective PPPs enable accessibility to key hard resources 
(money, materials) or soft resources (managerial and technical skills, information, contacts, credibility, 
legitimacy and political support) that may be lacking or insufficient within one actor’s reserves to 
achieve public service objectives (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011:4).  However, critics of PPPs argue 
that, though governments recognise the need for mutual commitment and cooperation in their PPP 
policy documents, in practice, PPPs are always transformed into “contracting out schemes” since 
private partners are rarely allowed to innovate beyond the explicit contract provisions (Teisman & Klijn, 
2002:204; Roberts & Siemiatycki, 2015:781-782). More so, the interdependence between partners 
outside the formal contract is minimal (Hodge & Greve, 2010; Teisman & Klijn, 2002). This results in 
loss of flexibility, yet PPP partners are expected to respect and adapt to changes in the operational 
environment in order to mitigate against negative significant impacts on the way public services have 
to be provided over time (Boardman et al., 2015).  
On the basis of their long-term nature and future uncertainty, PPP contracts remain incomplete, hence 
requiring effective partnership behaviour among all the partners to facilitate continued commitment. 
This is in agreement with Williamson (1985), and Hodge and Greve’s (2007) argument that, “not 
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everything can be written into a detailed contract under long term transaction commitments”. As such, 
PPPs working arrangements should be based on mutual commitment over and above what is expressed 
in any contract (Bovaird, 2004:200). Upholding such partnership behaviour enables improved provision 
of public infrastructure and services through mutual objectives, devising ways of resolving disputes 
through team approach, and enlisting the support of all parties for continuous improvement, measuring 
progress and sharing gains. 
From the discussion above, we concur with the postulation of Zhang et al. (2015:498) that integrating 
contractual, partnership and function specific perspectives is an effective way of defining the PPP 
concept. The contractual perspective focuses mainly on formal and legal dimensions of the relationship 
that binds the government and private sector together. The partnership perspective emphasizes the social 
dimension of the relationship that is characterised with mutuality, commitment and trust. The function-
specific perspective is task-oriented and uses the project lifecycle approach in executing and shifting 
(fully or partially) some of the project activities such as financing, designing, constructing, maintenance 
and operation from the public to private partners.  
In summary, common elements that define PPPs are public and private sector (inter-organisational) 
interactions, risk and responsibility sharing or shifting, competitive dialogue, bundling of construction 
and operation, partnership based long-term contracts in a project setting, output and outcome based 
specifications that encourage innovation, institutional systems and organisational processes, service 
delivery objectives/purpose, payment mechanism (through users and government), and use of private 
finance in the development of public infrastructure and service provision. In addition to the PPP 
understanding made in this subsection, the next subsection will provide meaning to the PPP phenomena 
in a different but supplementary manner, by examining how different scholarly materials categorise 
PPPs.  
2.3.2 Understanding of Public Private Partnerships through Literature Classifications 
This sub-section presents the understanding of the PPP concept from various perspectives that appear 
in literature. A perspective “in this context is not a specific type of research with a specific methodology, 
ontology and epistemology, rather it refers to general patterns and tendencies in literature” (Weihe, 
2008:430). As Wettenhall (2003:98) posited, “there have been previous efforts at classifying PPP 
arrangements but there is much more to be done”. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to discuss 
eight PPP strands that provide meaning to the PPP terminology from various research collections to 
enable future researchers, policy makers and practitioners to use and apply PPPs effectively. Below is 
the outline and discussion of each PPP perspectives.  
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2.3.2.1 The urban regeneration perspective 
The urban regeneration approach focuses on urban economic and social revitalization through 
cooperation between private businesses and local governments (Weihe, 2008:431). Partnerships of this 
nature begin with business transactions between companies or business leaders and are later extended 
to include the public and third sector actors, who collaboratively work together to respond to urban 
crises such as high unemployment, high crime rates, poor sanitation and a deteriorating revenue base 
(Weihe, 2008:431). However, sharing of the roles among the partners may vary on a case-by-case basis. 
The features of co-production, risk-sharing, and principal-principal relationships (Weihe, 2008:432) 
mainly define this type of partnership. Interactions among partners result from mutual interests rather 
than force, since each participant is viewed as a principal, suggesting an arrangement of equals. This is 
very different from the dominant Principal-Agent partnership behaviour, where parties often act 
opportunistically. However, this perspective has two major weaknesses. Firstly, literature remains silent 
on how cooperation in a principal-principal relationship is executed, whether it is through contractual 
or non-contractual arrangements or both. Secondly, it over assumes that PPPs only work for urban areas, 
yet they equally apply to all geographical public service delivery points. 
2.3.2.2 The policy perspective 
Unlike the Urban regeneration approach that focusses on specific collaborative projects, the Policy 
approach focusses on describing and analysing the institutional set up of public private cooperation in 
different policy fields (Weihe, 2008:432). According to Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011:6) and 
Osborne (2000:1) PPPs have become governance tools that seek to design, advocate for, coordinate and 
monitor public policies at sectoral, national, and/or global levels.  While the designing and 
implementation of PPP policies should be based on equity and pluralist representation, opportunities 
for all, commitment, participation and transparency, according to Khanom (2009:12) these are often 
undermined by selfish interests of politicians, lobbying groups and bureaucrats, especially in developing 
countries. According to Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2011:6) an effective PPP policy is one that is 
specific on: the expertise and experience of partners; the state-society interest intermediation; 
responsiveness of the policy to particular societal groups; the ability to build consensus among policy 
constituencies; institutional relationships of different parties; and the legitimacy and ‘standing’ of the 
partners (i.e. whom do they speak for and with what authority?).  
In summary, the PPP policy perspective focusses on policy design, policy networks, and the appropriate 
roles of public and private sector players in different policy settings. The approach seems to be more 
inclined towards PPP policies that have state, national, central and local government impacts.  
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2.3.2.3 The infrastructure perspective 
Infrastructure approach is associated with PPP arrangements, where the private parties participate in the 
provision of public infrastructure and the delivery of public infrastructure-based services (Grimsey & 
Lewis, 2004:2, as cited in Weihe, 2008:432).  Infrastructure PPPs “bring together governments and the 
private sector to design, finance, build, and operate infrastructure such as highways, ports, sewage and 
waste treatment facilities, telecommunications and electricity generation” (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 
2011:6) to improve the provision of public services.  
The approach employs deregulation principles “to address the underinvestment in public assets to 
secure the long-term future of public services” (Ghobadian, Gallear, O’Reagan, & Viney, 2004:6). 
Although for a long time, infrastructure PPPs were being applied to only economic infrastructure 
(motorways, bridges, tunnels), they have now been extended to social infrastructure such as schools, 
hospitals, prisons and waste management (Grimsey & Lewis 2004:7, as cited in Weihe, 2008:434). 
However, this PPP perspective has been criticised for limiting government flexibility, and increasing 
inefficiency and investment spending. For instance, Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff (2011:6) argues that, 
financing of public infrastructure through user fees denies the poor and marginalised the right to access 
public services.  
2.3.2.4 The development perspective 
Proponents of this perspective view PPPs as a means of reducing poverty, social deprivation, corruption 
and environmental degradation to enable nations to achieve global development goals at sectoral, 
community, local and central government levels (Weihe, 2008:434). For instance, The Global Fund (a 
partnership initiative between governments, civil society, the private sector and communities) raises 
and invests nearly US$4 billion per annum to support programs aimed at fighting diseases such as 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in affected poor countries (The Global Fund, 2016).  From the United 
Nations’ sustainable development goal 17 “partnership for goals”, it is very clear that the world can 
achieve its development agenda mainly through partnerships and cooperation. In Canada, for instance, 
between 2003 and 2012, the delivery of public infrastructure through PPPs is estimated to have created 
517,000 fulltime jobs, $32.2 billion in total income, $48.2 billion in total GDP, and $92.1 billion in total 
economic output (Casady, 2016:9). As such, PPPs support the broader societal objective of socio-
economic development (Hodge, 2009:11-12). This perspective is mainly promoted by the third sector 
actors, especially intergovernmental organisations for the development of poor countries. 
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2.3.2.5 The language game perspective  
According to Hodge and Greve (2007:547-548) and Linder (1999) the PPP phenomenon has become a 
language game with multiple grammars attached to its meaning. Scholars that share similar sentiments 
with the aforementioned writers, describe PPPs thus: “a practice of advancing the same policy but under 
a different and more-catchy name” (Greve, 2003:60); “just a fashionable word” (Kalpana, 2014b:12), 
“it’s the latest chapter in the privatization book (Hodge, 2004), and “a privatization masquerade” 
(Kalpana, 2014a:10). In essence, promoters of the language game perspective suggest that governments 
name public projects PPPs when in reality they are implementing “contracting-out or privatization” 
contracts (Hodge & Greve, 2005a:7; Kalpana, 2014a:10). This often happens with governments that 
become unpopular because of gross mismanagement in contracting out or privatization of public 
facilities. In addition, the PPP language game has led governments in different countries to visualize 
PPPs in a conflicting and misleading manner. For example, “in Australia, PPPs and privatization are 
completely different policies, while in the UK, the HM treasury 2003 equates PPPs to privatisation” 
(Hodge & Greve, 2010:10). This example indicates how PPP policies can be classified to suit local 
political objectives and obscure meaning (e.g. the aforementioned UK example) rather than clarify and 
sharpen the understanding of the PPP phenomenon. No wonder PPPs have nowadays become a favorite 
expression when describing new institutional and contractual arrangements for governments (Hodge & 
Greve, 2009:34). 
In conclusion, though the language game debate is critical in framing our understanding of PPPs, 
researchers and governments should be cautious with how they approach PPPs. It is obvious that PPP 
advocates will promote the policy positives while omitting the policy negatives, and the reverse is true 
for PPP adversaries. For instance, Hodge (2004:39) assert that PPP supporters assume PPPs are “a 
marriage made in heaven”. This is in agreement with Kalpana’s (2014b:13) argument that PPPs provide 
“public sector services efficiently and inexpensively, reduce pressure on government budgets, 
strengthen monitoring and accountability, and evoke business and investor confidence”. Finally, in all 
honesty, we have to categorically state in this study that, while Sarmento and Renneboog (2016:97&99) 
crown privatisation a “public procurement modality” as well as insinuations of “PPPs for infrastructure 
privatization” by  Li (2017:3), rather than being a public service delivery modality, in no way and by 
no means can privatization be a procurement modality. 
2.3.2.6 The procurement management perspective  
While literature has paid little or no attention to this perspective, in practice PPPs are real procurement 
management modalities.  Scholars that have attempted to view PPP as a procurement only stop at either 
capturing the “word” procurement in the term PPP (e.g. “PPP procurement” or “PPP procurement 
option/alternative/modality”) or defining it as a procurement phenomenon.  Examples of such scholars 
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include: Farquharson et al. (2016); Alinaitwe and Ayesiga (2013); Allen Consulting Group (2007); 
Willems and Van Dooren (2016); Sarmento and Renneboog (2016); and Martin et al. (2013). The 
current study seeks to go further than a mere “definition” or just “wording” to advance through 
justification “PPPs as a procurement management perspective”, and as “one of the most critical 
approaches” of PPP arrangements. 
Since the 1980s, for some time now governments have been transforming the provision of public 
services through procurement devolutions. First was the direct government provisioning mode 
succeeded by outsourcing (public procurement), and more recently PPPs. None of the three 
aforementioned procurement modes replaces the other, though direct government provisioning seems 
to be slowly phasing out in preference for public procurement. While PPPs has taken shape, its usage 
remains low compared to public procurement because of the stringent and fundamental conditions that 
compel its use. Notwithstanding the dominance of public procurement, according to Reim (2009:3), 
PPPs remain a superior procurement mechanism to public procurement and direct government 
provisioning. This resonates with Weihe’s (2008:433) assertion that, public procurement is less 
appropriate for developing complex and large public infrastructure facilities. Similarly, PPPs are 
principally less appealing to small and low investment procurements. In summary, small and low 
investment projects are more suitable for public procurement whereas big and heavy investment 
projects would be more suitable for PPPs. 
In view of the above, PPPs are “now a new and extended way of procuring public services” that  replace 
or complement outsourcing or privatization (Weihe, 2008:433; Linder, 1999:43;  Hodge & Greve, 
2007:545) in solving service delivery challenges beyond the full capacity of government. Uniquely, 
PPPs “alter business-government relations from the ethos of command and control regulation to trust 
and cooperation, from solving differences through litigation to negotiations, and from being adversaries 
to collaborators” (Linder, 1999:47), since each party is expected to extend different value to the 
partnership. Such interactions promote sharing of knowledge, skills, responsibilities and risks in a 
mutually acceptable and beneficial manner, unlike other procurement modalities. Subsequently, this 
inspires confidence in the private sector and propels public officers beyond the confines of outsourcing 
to promote private business growth.  
From a public sector perspective, the ultimate goal for any PPP project concept is to procure a private 
sector contractor. The rest of the other project aspirations only come in to complement or are part of the 
procured contracts. Therefore, without procuring a private partner (contract), no PPP project exists, and 
consequently, no financing, designing, maintenance and operation tasks would be executed. In fact, 
according to Sarmento and Renneboog (2016:97) the various PPP forms - that is, Build Transfer Operate 
(BTO), Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO), Design Own Operate (BOO), etc., are “different 
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procurement systems”. To make procurement realizable public officers must develop commercially 
attractive projects to have private for profit companies invest their capital and expertise in the 
development of public infrastructure.  Finally, the main benefits of the PPP procurement mechanism to 
government include: minimised government financing and tax burdens, kickbacks and patronage; and 
public officers become more entrepreneurial, flexible and innovative in addressing public service 
delivery challenges (Linder, 1999). Conversely, in the private sector, instead of companies competing 
against one another, they rather jointly work together (e.g. under the special purpose vehicle (SPV) 
arrangement). 
2.3.2.7 The moral regeneration perspective 
Government provisioning is known for treating both the providers and recipients of public services 
harshly, since it conveys individual and community entitlements and privileges, or sanctions and 
punishments, based on either monetary or political support rather than eligibility (Linder, 1999:44). 
Linder (1999:44) believes change for the better can be engineered through properly organized PPP 
efforts. As a result, development of public infrastructure or service provision need to be moved towards 
market inspired traits of self-reliance, self-initiative, hard work, integrity, prudence, creative problem 
solving and participation in property holding and commercial enterprise. Furthermore, PPPs can relieve 
government of some of the project administrative responsibilities by moving public sector workforce 
to a more disciplined private sector labour market. Therefore, PPPs can serve as a means for effectively 
deregulating employment relations for unorganized work force (Supiot, 1996). Linder (1999:45) argues 
that the commercialization of public services is “less fraught with moral judgments and are thus less 
corrosive to the human spirit”. Hence, allowing public servants to act like private sector managers has 
a valuable ethical effect. In conclusion, though government provisioning promotes virtues as well, PPP 
arrangements are the ones that foster virtues of the markets that are critical in addressing public service 
delivery governance problems. 
2.3.2.8 The financial arrangements perspective 
Many definitions for PPPs indicate financing as one of the key components that motivates governments 
to involve the private sector in the development of public infrastructure (Blondal, 2005; Webb & Paul, 
2002; Savas, 2000; Evans, 2003; Campbell, 2001). For example, Campbell (2001, as cited in Khanom, 
2009:152) partly defines PPPs as projects for financing public infrastructure. Khanom (2009:5) suggest 
that PPP procurement systems (e.g. Build Operate Transfer-BOT, BOO, and DBFO, etc.) each present 
a unique financing option for projects. For example, with the DBFO PPP model, the private sector takes 
up all the financing responsibilities for the designing, construction, maintenance and operation of 
infrastructure projects until the expiry of the concession period. In return, the private sector receive 
income from the operation of the developed infrastructure through government payments or direct user 
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charges such as road tolls. However, to make private sector financing initiatives realizable, public sector 
entities must structure projects that are attractive for private sector investment. In reality, PPP 
arrangements have become interventions for reducing pressure on government budget to deliver public 
infrastructure sooner than later (Linder, 1999:45; Khanom, 2009:5). To conclude, PPPs are a financing 
tool to the private sector through revenue collection during the operation stage, and to the public sector 
by leveraging private funding for public infrastructure development and service provision. As such, the 
private sector uses PPPs for profit making, while the public sector’s main interest is in improving service 
delivery.  
In summary of the issues discussed in this subsection, the eight PPP perspectives advanced cover a wide 
range of governance issues with different focus group territories, characteristics, mechanisms, and each 
with shared or different accountability implications. The aforementioned PPP perspectives enable 
researchers and policy makers to appreciate the different formal/contract structures, actors, objectives, 
significance, contexts and culture that shape the PPP understanding, and their unique, complementary 
and, at times, overlapping governance roles in public service delivery. Most importantly, the study 
introduces a new PPP perspective of procurement management to literature. The next subsection 
analyses the contribution of PPPs in the development of public infrastructure.   
2.3.3 The Contribution of Public Private Partnerships in the Development of Public 
Infrastructure  
Governments around the world make appealing policy promises when embracing PPP as one of the 
models for delivering public services (Eggers and Startup, 2006:1). In Uganda, for instance, the 
objectives for undertaking PPPs include cost effective delivery, good quality services, clear customer 
focus, enhanced incentives and service diversity, better asset utilisation, and delivery of more projects 
and wider economic benefits (Republic of Uganda, 2010:5). Using an economic perspective, the World 
Bank Group (2012:7) argues that, because governments largely depend on private sector financing and 
direct user fees to develop and pay for the operation of public infrastructure, PPPs can therefore free up 
cash and other resources to support other government priority areas. This minimises direct borrowing 
and accelerates infrastructure development than what the government alone would achieve by using 
public funds and long-term borrowing. However, Siemiatycki (2013:4) argues that the governments’ 
motivations for PPPs have varied by jurisdiction and evolved over time. This is in agreement with 
Weihe’s (2008: 439-440) notion that, in the early conception, the macroeconomic argument was that 
PPPs would enable the public sector to access finance for capital investment, but lately the rationale has 
changed to risk transfer and value for money. According to Ong’olo (2006), for the public sector to 
achieve maximum performance, the PPP contracts should provide necessary flexibility and incentives 
to the private party. This is in line with the Commonwealth Secretariat, which argues that having the 
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right commercial incentives in place enables proper maintenance of the assets being used over the 
contract period (Yong, 2010).  
Furthermore, in a study titled “anatomy of public private partnerships”, Sarmento and Renneboog 
(2016) elaborately assess the contribution of PPPs from the public sector perspective. In their 
assessment of PPP contribution, they highlight the advantages and disadvantages together with a 
reason(s) qualifying each of them; see table 2.1 below. 
Table 2.1. Advantages and disadvantages of public private partnerships for the public         
sector 
Source: Sarmento and Renneboog (2016:102) 
Based on the table 2.1 above, the key benefits of PPPs to government include: no or less direct capital 
expenditure is made by government during the construction and maintenance of the facility; private 
sector bears substantial project risks and responsibilities compared to government; payment for the 
infrastructure is spread over a long period of time, say 20-30 years; ownership of the physical 
infrastructure remains with government during the contract period; and, at the end of the contract the 
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infrastructure is often returned to the public sector at no fees. On the other hand, PPPs can be 
unsustainable to government when: several PPP projects are undertaken simultaneously (i.e. causing 
liquidity and affordability constraints); government policies change over time (especially with change 
of governments); investment and financing decisions are mismatched, user fees are hiked because of 
poorly drafted or managed contracts; and partners prioritize opportunistic behaviour e.g. private 
providers bidding  lower prices to beat competition but with an ill-motive of renegotiating later for a 
higher pay. 
Notwithstanding the enormous benefits aforementioned, like any other public service delivery modality 
and referring to Sarmento and Renneboog’s suggestions in table 2.1 above, PPPs are not immune to 
challenges/risks. As such, the public sector must effectively manage PPP processes, both from its own 
side as well managing the private partners to realize the full benefits of implementing PPPs.  Based on 
this preamble, the remaining part of this subsection provides additional challenges/risks and some 
mitigation measures of PPPs from three empirical studies. In a study titled “Strategic infrastructure-
steps to prepare and accelerate public private partnerships”, Rothballer and Kim (2013:17) highlight 
and describe general challenges to PPP arrangements; as provided in table 2.2 below.  
Table 2.2. General public private partnership challenges 
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Source: Rothballer and Kim (2013:17) 
In addition to challenges described in table 2.2 above,  Rothballer and Kim (2013:18) further assert that 
PPP projects fail due to  lack of an integrated strategic plan and long-term project pipeline, opaque and 
slow tendering, opportunistic regulation and termination, weak financial structure and low operational 
performance, stakeholder resistance, inadequate risk mitigation and misaligned incentives, lack of 
preparation funding and rigorous project preparation process, low local financial market and local 
industry development, insufficient revenue sources and lack of market soundness, biased value for 
money analysis, overbidding and  renegotiation, and macroeconomic shocks. 
Given that the Unit of inquiry of the overall study investigates PPPs for the road infrastructure 
development, the remaining two studies provide PPP challenges for transport and more specifically 
road projects. Soomro and Zhang (2013a) conducted a study on 35 PPP transport projects, the majority 
of which were roads, and established several failures for PPP projects, as provided in table 2.3 below. 
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Table 2.3. Public private partnership challenges based on project lifecycle approach 
 
Stage one: Feasibility 
 Inadequate technical feasibility assessment. 
 Poor economic and financial feasibility 
assessment. 
 Unrealistic demand predictions and 
projections during project feasibility 
assessment. 
 
 
 
 
Stage two: Procurement and tendering 
 Incorrect public sector benchmarking. 
 Inaccurate cost estimation. 
 Non-competitive tendering. 
 Weak scrutiny/concessionaire selection 
procedures 
 Selection of unsuitable concessionaire 
 Financial problems with concessionaire at 
early stages of the project post tendering and 
negotiation stage 
 Inappropriate risk allocation between 
partners 
 Demand of higher subsidies/guarantees by 
concessionaire at early stages of the project 
 Vague contract document descriptions 
 Unfair privileges/rights to concessionaire  
 Shifting pricing control to concessionaire 
Stage three: Project construction 
 Delayed acquisition of land 
 Slow and hindered project progress 
 Inadequate project monitoring 
 Delayed approvals and actions by public 
officials 
 Cost overruns 
 Poor quality works by concessionaires 
 Lack of coordination with parallel projects 
during project construction 
 Poor corporate governance in project 
company 
Stage four: Project operation 
 Traffic demand lower than expectations 
 Customer/market confidence damage 
 Project’s inability of market competition 
 Ineffective commercial/business strategies 
 Negative attitude of public sector official in 
solving project problems 
 Conflicts between public and private 
partners 
 Unfair toll pricing strategies 
 Legal proceedings due to conflicts between 
partners 
Source: Soomro and Zhang (2013a:119) 
While individual responsibility is vital in managing some of the PPP transport project issues, according 
Soomro and Zhang (2013a:118-121) lack of shared responsibility leads to inappropriate risk allocation, 
delayed land acquisition, slow and hindered project progress, cost overruns, lower traffic demand, 
enforcement of unfair toll pricing, and expensive legal proceedings, to mention but a few.  
Finally, in the last unique study titled “risk management in motorway PPP projects”, Carbonara, 
Costantino, Gunnigan and Pellegrino (2015) delineate external and internal projects risks, as well as 
provide mitigation measures per risk, as demonstrated in table 2.4 below. 
Table 2.4. Public private partnership risks and mitigation measure per risk for roads 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 27 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 28 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 29 
 
 
Source: Carbonara et al. (2015:168-170) 
With table 2.4 above, the risk category 1-8 represents internal project risks, and the 9-11 risk category 
contains external risks. While external risks cut across the entire stages of the project, internal risks are 
mainly specific to each project stage.   
In summary, this subsection (2.3.3) has provided an elaborate critique of the contribution of PPPs to the 
public sector, with an emphasis on benefits, and challenges as well as challenges/risks mitigation 
measures. In essence, the section serves to argue that while PPPs have numerous benefits without 
managing associated challenges, failure is inevitable. The next section discusses the theories applicable 
to effective management of PPPs operations. 
2.4 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC SERVICE 
PROVISION 
Several theories such as the game, principal-agent, incentive, institutional, stakeholder, networking, 
property rights, market failure, and transaction cost economics have been used to explain PPPs. Such 
aforementioned theories and many others carry a more general view of PPPs; as such, they lack the 
rigour or the required emphasis of public sector perspective of service delivery. Therefore, this study 
introduces five theories: the traditional public administration (TPA), the new public management 
(NPM), the new public service (NPS), the public value (PV), and the new public governance (NPG) 
theories as the most suitable paradigms for public service management. Nevertheless, the other theories, 
such as those mentioned in the first sentence of this section, where found relevant, their philosophical 
foundations were used to provide balanced phenomenological arguments in the study.  
Based on the above positions, the purpose of this section is to discuss each of the five selected theories 
of public governance aforementioned, and thereafter propose, with justification or otherwise, the most 
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appropriate/relevant theories that underpin the PPP phenomenon for effective public service delivery - 
as provided in the subsections below.  
2.4.1 Traditional Public Administration Theory 
TPA theory  focuses on the effectiveness of the policy making process and the extent to which public 
policy implementation addresses aspirations of the existing public policies (Osborne, 2010:415). 
According to Xu, Sun and Si (2015:15), in countries with inefficient market mechanisms and an 
immature third sector, the government serves as the absolute leader in the arrangement of the political 
system and allocation of public goods. Ironically, the government is expected to meet all the social and 
economic needs of the citizenry without considering the “real” public needs. Such a public system of 
governance is too radical, in that if the centre has a problem, the whole system collapses (Xu et al., 
2015:16). Subsequently, as government failures surpass market failures, open and competitive private 
sector participation becomes the best option (Byamugisha & Basheka, 2016:9). From such deductions, 
it is eminent that TPA is not suitable for PPPs in both theoretical advancements and practice.  
Demystifying the inapplicability of TPA theory to public private partnerships 
With this theory, the public sector disassociates itself from partnership relationships with the service 
provider and the receiver. As such, participation of the private sector or citizens in the provision of 
public services is transactional in nature and is at arm’s length level. The existence of cooperation 
between the government, citizens and the private firms is almost non-existent, in that, away from the 
time of actual transacting or service provision, there is no relationship to be maintained. Therefore, TPA 
aims at fostering top-down governance structures, where public service provision is a full responsibility 
of public managers who are only accountable to politicians through constitutional powers for oversight, 
appointment, budgeting and legislation. Under such governance systems, the public managers do not 
serve the interests of the broader society but aim at pleasing a small group of elected officials who, 
illogically, pay allegiance to their political parties’ positions or advance personal political agendas at 
the expense of the citizens’ wellbeing. Actually, as Willems and Van Dooren (2016:202) put it, TPA 
produces short-sighted and unstable public policies designed to satisfy the selfish concerns of powerful 
and well-organized interest groups (of course in crime), bureaucrats inclusive.  
2.4.2 New Public Management Theory 
In response to the inadequacies and bureaucratic nature of TPA emerged the NPM theory, which 
introduces the methods of business or enterprise management to government (Xu et al., 2015:15). As 
Peters (2010:40) puts it, the delivery of public service through bureaucratic processes is not only 
“clumsy, ineffective but also unresponsive”.  However, developing countries have not yet substantially 
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replaced TPA with NPM practices because most government functions continue to be vertically 
executed (Mongkol, 2011:39; Xu et al., 2015:12). NPM reforms broadly aim at improving public 
services through a dual “government - market” structure (Mongkol, 2011:35) where government 
contributes capital to outsource  public goods and services from the private sector. Summarily, NPM 
practices pay more attention to the relationship between the government and the market (Bonina & 
Cordella, 2009:2; Bao, Wang, Larsen & Morgan, 2012:445; Xu et al., 2015), thus, “privileging the 
private over the public sector, the individual over the community, the consumer over the citizen, 
competition over collaboration, passive commodity consumption over active social participation, and 
personal choice over community responsibility” (Benington, 2007:2-5).  
Demystifying the relevance of NPM theory to public private partnerships 
The public sector focuses on formulating policies and controlling the way public services are provided 
by the private for profit organizations through specific performance indicators, monitoring and market 
based mechanisms. Public private partnership arrangements are purely based on commercial lines with 
the objective of achieving value for money by integrating some or all of the public infrastructure project 
tasks into a single long-term contract endorsed through a competitive tendering process. This mainly 
applies to PPP Operate and Maintain (O&M) concessions. Because of the open and competitive 
procurement methods used, PPPs enable facility users (i.e. only direct users) to not only participate in 
the processes of public policy definition, but also to influence the type and quality of service delivered. 
The efficiency of NPM to PPPs is two-fold. First, because of the longevity of the PPP contracts, the 
private sector is able to make reasonable returns since the initial heavy investment expenses are 
compensated by the reduced future maintenance and operational costs. Second, the public sector is able 
to transfer most of the responsibilities and risks to more capable, experienced and skilled private firms 
whose payment is dependent on making the physical infrastructure available and operating the same 
facility to provide the desired service.  However, where turnkey contracts or special purpose vehicle 
arrangements are not used, the NPM philosophy becomes more applicable to conventional procurement 
(public procurement) rather than PPPs. 
2.4.3 New public service theory 
NPS theory is a movement built on the norms and practices that emphasize democracy and citizenship 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015:664), and is a governance system that places the citizens at the center of 
managing public affairs (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000:550). Government is expected to “play an active 
role in creating arenas in which citizens, through discourse, can articulate shared values and develop a 
collective sense of the public interest” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007:66) rather than government 
“attempting to control or steer society in new directions” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015:669). As such, 
citizens expect public service to meet standards of;:convenience (accessible and available), security 
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(safe and confident), reliability (correct and on time), personal attention (working with  citizens to meet 
their needs), problem-solving approach (working with citizens to solve society problems), fairness 
(services provided in a way that is equitable to all), fiscal responsibility (use of money responsibly), 
and citizen influence (citizens influencing the quality of service they receive from the government) 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007:61). 
Denhardt and Denhardt (2007:4) argue that the NPS movement, “is now being manifested in the way 
we interact with political leaders, in the way we engage with citizens, and in the way we bring about 
positive changes in our organizations and communities”. However, “for public servants to act as if their 
version of public interest is somehow superior to the perspectives and values of citizens, elected 
officials, interest groups, and political parties is undemocratic and unethical” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 
2007:80). Instead, public administrators need to “focus on creating opportunities for citizenship by 
forging trusting relationships with members of the public” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015:665), while 
avoiding “quick fixes to problems derived from individual choices” (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015:668).  
In the process, citizens learn more about government and government learns more about citizens 
(Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007:155). This in turn, increases citizens’ trust and willingness to pay for civic 
investments, and the government getting energised to ensure that contractors maintain efficient 
processes, high quality, competitive costs, and citizen satisfaction (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015:669).         
Demystifying the relevance of NPS theory to public private partnerships 
New public service focuses public service provision on complying with public interests through 
collaborative relationships, shared responsibilities and common understanding of public issues, and 
active involvement of citizens in government activities (Robinson, 2015:11). New public service 
practices ensure that PPPs meet the collective public interests, since public servants are given the 
mandate to develop innovative ways of strengthening citizen engagement in finding solutions to societal 
problems. The public managers are expected to pursue the implementation of PPP policy through 
brokering, negotiation and resolving complex service delivery problems in partnership with the citizens. 
Furthermore, the accountability of public servants extends beyond elected officials to incorporate a 
wider set of accountability relationships with citizens and communities (Robinson, 2015:10). The key 
role of government is to provide an environment in which PPPs can address society’s service delivery 
needs through dialogue, open, flexible, accountable, accessible, and transparent means and structures. 
2.4.4 Public Value Theory 
Public value is value that is “consumed” collectively by the citizenry rather than individually by clients 
(Alford & Hughes, 2008:2). Spano (2009:330) points out that “everything has a value when somebody 
is willing to face a sacrifice to get it, because he/she believes that the potential benefits outnumber the 
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sacrifices”. At a society level, public values provide “normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits 
and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled, (b) the obligations of citizens to 
society, state, and one another, and (c) the principles on which governments and policies should be 
based” (Bozeman, 2007:13). Therefore, public value is a rigorous way of resolving democratic deficits, 
judging the viability of projects, decision making, and of defining, measuring and improving 
performance (Rutgers, 2015:29; Sufna & Fernand, 2015:1-3). Resultantly, PV delivers both democratic 
values (equity, honesty and fairness), and the managerial values (efficiency and effectiveness) in the 
performance of tasks (Bonina & Cordella, 2009:2). 
Based on the above deductions, PV practices maximise citizen welfare by remedying market failures of 
negative externalities, natural monopolies and imperfect information, and increases trust for and 
legitimacy of the government (Alford & Hughes, 2008:2-3; Talbot, 2008:18). Such translate into (a) 
generation of economic activities and employment, (b) improved social capital, social cohesion, social 
relationships, social meaning and cultural identity, individual and community well-being, (c) improved 
democratic dialogue, active participation and citizen engagement, and (d) improved sustainable 
development and reduced public “bads” such as pollution, waste and global warming (Benington, 
2007:11-12). Notwithstanding the aforementioned benefits, PV is criticised for focusing on achieving 
and measuring medium to long-term targets, yet governments that are dictated by the electoral cycles 
tend to focus on the short term targets. However, this can be contained given that public servants have 
a responsibility to focus on long-term public value (Benington, 2007:17), but on condition that they 
(public servants) do not engage in partisan politics but rather confine themselves to “program politics” 
because the real political environment can limit their autonomy in service delivery (Alford & Hughes, 
2008:5). 
Demystifying the relevance of PV theory to public private partnerships 
Like the New public service theory, public value theory promotes accountability of public 
organizations, not only to their political masters, but to the citizens as well.  It moves beyond political 
democracy that limits itself to the ballot box, to a level where public managers have the capacity to 
satisfy citizens’ preferences through administrative structures that are more sensitive to local conditions 
(Blaug, Horner & Lekhi, 2006:6). For PPPs to positively influence service delivery, public institutions 
need to listen to, shape and inform the preferences of the public via deliberative engagement, better 
information and educational initiatives, which are more transparent and visionary, rather than just give 
the public what it wants at a particular time (Blaug, Horner & Lekhi, 2006:59). This is possible, only if 
public managers have the capacity and use innovative means to influence institutions, politicians and 
citizens to positively respond to the refined public preferences. Based on Coats’ (2006:40) suggestions, 
public managers can ensure PPPs deliver value to the public through increasing the quantity and quality 
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of public activities for the resources expended, reducing the costs (in terms of money or authority) used 
to achieve current levels of service, making public organisations better able to identify and respond to 
citizens’ aspirations, enhancing fairness with which public sector organisations operate, and increasing 
the continuing capacity of the organisations to respond and innovate. 
One of the important tools for advancing public value paradigm in a real PPP environment is the “Public 
Value Scorecard” developed by Meynhardt (2012:23-24). It is an effective management tool for 
assessing the viability of proposed PPP projects and evaluating the appropriateness of project 
implementation decisions using the chance and risk approach. Because the tool assesses and evaluates 
the various PPP operational structures and system environments while making a tradeoff  among five 
dimensions of, namely, profitability, usefulness, decency, positive experience and political 
realism/acceptance, the tool ensures that PPPs’ policies and management strategies are politically 
legitimate, operationally feasible and sustainable, ethically acquiescent, and valuably adequate to 
citizens and the private actors. 
In summary, the PV approach: provides tools to demonstrate why public money should be or how it 
was spent on PPPs; improves  the quality of decision making by contributing to evidence based 
solutions; challenges a purely technocratic or expert-led performance approach; makes full use of the 
knowledge and experience of service users and citizens; educates the public about the dilemmas facing 
politicians and public managers and the limits of what can possibly be offered; and ensures effective 
management of political risks (Coyle & Woolard, 2010:11). 
2.4.5 New Public Governance Theory 
NPG is a mode of practice that is more adapted to the modern government of public affairs (Xu et al., 
2015:11). It agitates for sustainability of public policy, public services, public service organisations, 
societal and environmental concerns (Osborne, 2010:413) by creating transparent activities, processes 
and open structures that are more socially responsive (Patapas, Raipa & Smalskys, 2014:28). It views 
management of public affairs from several strands of socio-political governance, public policy 
governance, administrative governance, contract governance, corporate governance, metagovernance, 
decentred governance and network governance (Osborne, 2010:6-7; Rhodes, 1996:653; Rhodes, 
2016:6-7). The theory is centred on the effective management of institutional and external environment 
pressures that can enable and constrain public policy implementation and delivery of public services 
within a plural and pluralist system (Osborne, 2010:415).  A plural system is where multiple 
interdependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services, and a pluralist system is where 
multiple processes inform the policy-making system. Within governance systems “problem solving is 
not the preserve of a central authority able to impose solutions on subordinate agencies and individuals, 
but the result of the interaction of a plurality of actors, who often have different interests, values, 
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cognitive orientations, and power resources” (Koenig-Archibugi, 2003:319). As Kooiman (1993:4) 
states, “no single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to solve complex, 
dynamic and diversified problems; no single actor has sufficient overview to make the application of 
needed instruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential to dominate unilaterally in 
a particular governing model”. 
New public governance practices appreciate that there is a shift from direct forms of governance to a 
process of governance exercised through plurality of actors, sites, spatial scales, and processes, with an 
increasing reliance by government on informal forms of power and influence rather than on formal 
authority alone (Kennett, 2010:25). This enables the development of more “joined up” strategies and 
“people centred” approaches in which different levels of government work together in closer 
partnership with other public, private, voluntary and informal community organisations to promote 
more devolved “self-sustaining systems of improvement” for the community well-being and 
satisfaction (Benington, 2007:3). 
Demystifying the relevance of NPG theory to public private partnerships 
NPG practices focus on how rules and norms are increasingly co-created and co-regulated by state, 
citizens and non-state actors through autonomy and authority sharing to deliver public services. NPG 
encourages the provision of public service through PPPs based on joint collaboration and governance 
led networks to enable actual interaction, horizontal power relations, close organisational relations, 
trust, reputation, reciprocity, mutual interdependence and joint decision-making (Stelling, 2014:11; 
Mauri & Muccio, 2012:51). Accordingly “PPPs have become an ongoing reconfiguration of authority 
in the world of politics” (Stelling, 2014:12-13). This assertion is justified by the current governance and 
management systems that promote coexistence of institutional, contractual and informal network 
structures in which citizens, government, private sector and civil society organizations are given an 
opportunity to collectively direct and participate in the provision of public services. This prompts PPP 
operations to be coordinated within well-networked organizational structures, managerial and 
institutional strategies that are directed towards the achievement of universally determined service 
delivery outcomes. In fact, the co-production and co-regulation initiatives advanced by the new public 
governance approach enable public service stakeholders to exchange more information and use each 
other’s knowledge to generate more innovative and better PPP products and policy outputs for complex 
societal problems (Klijn, 2010a:73). 
In conclusion, Villanueva (2015:127-130) argues that new public governance is now being 
institutionalised by passing of PPP Acts; and that such legislations recognise the insufficiency and lack 
of self-sufficiency of government, and acknowledges the relevance of adding on private and social 
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resources to existing public ones in order to strengthen the society and government’s capacities to tackle 
critical problems and promote relevant projects.  
In summary of section 2.4 and based on the discussion of the five theories above, two positions were 
taken: 
1. TPA is not compatible with PPP principles and practices. Reasons being that: it does not 
encourage the involvement of private sector through competitive and partnership means, does 
not allow the public servants and private sector players to innovate, minimizes the influence of 
the third sector, payments for services are either in advance or shortly after delivery but not on 
long term accrual basis, and leaves government to be the only developer and implementer of 
public policies in the provision of public services. 
2. NPM, NPS, PV and NPG are relevant PPP theories and have been used to inform the 
overall study. The study recommends more than one theory (only four) because, in our view, 
though a single overarching theory for PPPs has emerged (i.e. the NPG), public sector practices 
have not yet fully appreciated it. Actually, public sector operations currently meander in all the 
five theories (i.e. including TPA) trying to find a better fix of PPP excellence. 
2.5 THE ANALYSIS OF THE DISCUSSIONS FROM THE MAIN THEMES 
This section presents the key issues that come out of the discussions made in the previous three main 
themes above, with the aim of addressing the first objective of this study. The analysis for each of the 
themes follows below. 
2.5.1 Public infrastructure development for service delivery 
Public infrastructure, in whatever form, has an impact on social and economic development of 
communities and a country as a whole. The impact of public infrastructure can be either positive or 
negative, depending on how well or poorly it is maintained and developed. Although Africa’s 
population size is growing at an increasingly higher rate than any other part of the world (OECD, 
2015:4), its infrastructure remains the most stagnant, the least developed and inadequate to meet the 
citizens’ increasing needs. Furthermore, the annual infrastructure gap for Sub-Saharan Africa alone is 
as high as US$48 billion, a signal that there is a lot of inefficiencies in the processes of planning and 
decision-making, and weaknesses in the actual infrastructure investment strategy implementation. For 
instance, most African economies have for long neglected the maintenance of infrastructure, since they 
have specialised in corrective maintenance and seem not to value the power in preventive maintenance 
as well. Such circumstances and behaviour, not only retard productivity but also unnecessarily hike the 
costs of living, consequently lowering the overall standards of living for the continent. 
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From the discussions in subsection 2.2.3, it was established that transport infrastructure in Africa, 
particularly for the road sub sector is in a dilapidated state, yet it has a great potential to accelerate 
investment in other sectors of the economy. This implies that roads can play a very important role in 
uplifting people’s lives, more than any other infrastructure facilities on the continent.  Therefore, 
prioritizing investment and development of the road transport infrastructure, while decisively managing 
their implementation, will definitely improve not only the affordability, but also accessibility to both 
social and economic services. 
Unless African governments change from their so “seemingly fixed and slow” to “real steady and 
accelerated progress” practices in the planning, financing, building, maintenance and operating of road 
infrastructure facilities, the current transport challenges of severe traffic congestion and accidents, high 
user transport charges and vehicle operating costs, long travel times, uneven and inaccessible road 
network, low maximum speed, unsafe and inefficient movements, and increased damages, and spoilage 
and mishandling of in transit goods, will undoubtedly remain far from extinction. With the above 
analysis, it can be confidently suggested that the African road infrastructure development needs can 
best be met through PPP arrangements, and as a matter of fact, Uganda need not be the exception to 
such road infrastructure interventions. 
2.5.2 Public private partnerships for infrastructure development 
From the PPP definitions and perspectives explored in the subsections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, it is clear that 
PPPs cannot constitute a single technique for infrastructure delivery, but a phenomenon that covers 
many meanings and applications. The insinuations from literature discourse that the PPP confusion can 
be solved by having a single and over-arching PPP definition or strand, is not only illogical but also 
irrelevant, given the existence of different PPP research traditions with different knowledge clusters 
and usage (Weihe, 2008:436). Relatedly, Boardman et al. (2015:442) argued that “in scientific sense, 
there is no such a thing as a PPP model”. They justified their reasoning by the notions that: there are 
many PPP delivery options or contract arrangements which differ in terms of whether the public or 
private sectors complete a particular task or activity from initial planning through to the final 
maintenance and operations stages; the extent of financial contribution from each sector; the specific 
project to be delivered; which party bears which risks; the strength of incentives for performance; and 
how transparency, accountability and governance issues are handled.  
In fact, the misunderstanding about what PPPs are and what they are not, is because of the failure to 
acknowledge the existence and making use of the uniqueness in the different PPP perspectives. The 
uniqueness found in the different PPP perspectives can be manifested in the statements below:  
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 The third sector is a more common participant in the development PPPs than in other PPP types 
(Weihe, 2008:435). 
 Principal-principal relationship applies to urban regeneration approach while infrastructure PPP 
strand is based on Principal-Agent relationship (Weihe, 2008:435). 
 Defining PPPs as long-term contract does not apply to all PPPs (Weihe, 2008:435). For 
example, development PPPs can either have short or long-term contracts depending on the 
magnitude of the intervention being undertaken and the availability of the resources required. 
 Co-production and collaboration in infrastructure PPPs are limited, since the private actors sign 
contracts which obligate them to deliver specific services, within specific times at fixed prices 
(Weihe, 2008:435; Hodge and Greve, 2005b:6).  
 Contrary to partnership principles, formal contractual relationships expressed in many PPP 
definitions lower the degree of mutuality (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011:6). 
 
Boardman et al. (2015:446) attribute variations in the understanding of PPPs to: the distinctiveness in 
legal and policy contexts in different jurisdictions with different financing and risk sharing 
arrangements; significant cross-national differences in institutional arrangements and the nature and 
level of public accountability; the existence of multiple stakeholders with multiple objectives that shift 
over time; and  the difficulty in obtaining accurate and relevant data on cross-national policy lessons, 
institutional arrangements, and on performance standards and outcomes, that gives a chance to lazy PPP 
researchers to selectively bend PPP evaluations to their own interests of either successes or failures. 
Drawing from Khanom (2009:12-13), it can be concluded that inappropriate conceptualisation when 
defining and designing PPPs can be mitigated through:  
 recognising that there are several categories of PPP (e.g. BOT, DBFO, BOO, BOOT) with 
different governance, management and policy design requirements; 
  being precise on the common features such as the nature of cooperation, inter-organisational 
arrangements, financial arrangements and commitment; 
 being specific on the governance aspects such as decision-making process, roles and 
responsibility of different organisations/actors in both policy and contract frameworks; 
 being clear on the roles of the different policy communities and policy networks (including 
third sector);  
 being specific on the purpose (e.g. community development, poverty alleviation or 
infrastructure development);  
 setting a definite direction for different actors to achieve a PPP outcome; and  
 taking into account the political culture including the role of political parties, political 
government and bureaucrats in PPPs. 
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From subsection 2.3.3 which discusses the contribution of PPPs, it is clear that PPPs cannot fully replace 
traditional financing and development of infrastructure, but offer several benefits to governments in 
trying to address infrastructure shortages or improve the efficiency of their organizations (Eggers and 
Startup, 2006). Using Davies and Eustice’s (2005) argument, the primary advantage PPPs may offer 
over conventional procurement is the efficiency gains that privately led construction and maintenance 
may bring. Klein (2012:22) claims that using private sector financing, for instance, to develop public 
infrastructure is only superior “when governments are credit constrained and thus cannot borrow”. 
However, since governments that are not fiscally constrained such as Singapore also implement PPPs 
(Yong, 2010), it would be wrong for policy makers to think that PPPs are exclusively for raising 
finances while ignoring more noticeable benefits of value for money, good governance and improved 
service quality.  
In our view, no matter the economic and financial standing of any country, the world over the public 
sector’s engagement of the private sector through PPP arrangements is mainly to benefit from private 
financing rather than the well talked about private partner technological innovation, expertise and skills. 
This view is shared with Greve and Hodge (2013:213) who state that “finance is central to infrastructure 
PPPs”. On the other hand, the private sector firms’ involvement in PPPs is oriented towards seeking 
long-term investment opportunities that can provide them stable and predictable returns while assisting 
the public sector achieve its social and economic agenda, as long as the long-term sustainability of PPP 
projects is anticipated or assured. Furthermore, though uncommon to developed countries, emerging 
economies are known for making ambitious PPP policy promises in order to satisfy present and near 
future infrastructure needs, forgetting that the achievement of such needs follows more or less the 
learning curve of ideologies. Relatedly, public agencies in developing economies always 
overemphasize the undertaking of PPP projects to achieve the balance sheet status, while unfortunately 
increasing the unbearable current and future infrastructure investment costs. 
With specific reference to PPP challenges/risks, key lessons identified are that:  
 the project life cycle approach has the capacity to identify most if not all the PPP challenges of 
a project so as to allocate appropriate strategies for their management, unless the assessors have 
or do experience some constraints; 
 because of the differing interests of the various PPP stakeholders, it becomes difficult to 
develop consensus on a comprehensive list of PPP challenges for any project, hence 
complicating the effective management of the “real” PPP performance obstacles; and  
 where PPPs are based on revenue streams from users and the private partners have been given 
exclusive powers to set toll fees, they have always charged prices much higher than what the 
citizens willingly accept or can afford to pay.  
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All in all, PPPs should not be seen as a panacea for enhancing public value or for solving all public 
sector problems, but rather, “another form of public service provision, that attempts to achieve social 
and economic outcomes that may not be obtained by government or private sector forces acting 
separately” (Grimsey & Lewis, 2007: 58). As Reim (2009:1) posits, “experience shows, not every PPP 
delivers a better service quality or saves costs. In fact, some PPP projects even turn out to be the worst 
of all possible alternatives.” With regard to costs, for example, the private sector’s borrowing costs are 
higher than for public sector agencies (Roberts & Siemiatycki, 2015:780). Attestation to this is the 
evidence from the UK National Audit Office 2015 review, which indicates interest rates for all private 
financing deals ranging from 7-8% compared to all government borrowing that is between 3-4% 
(Romero, 2015:6). A situation that most likely makes PPPs more expensive than other delivery 
approaches if appropriate precautions are not taken. 
2.5.3 Theoretical perspectives in the governance of public service provision 
The analysis of the discussions in section 2.4 is drawn from the PPP framework developed by Stelling 
(2014), which indicates that PPPs lie between either contracting-out and private provision, or 
contracting-out and public provision. Note that, compared to contracting-out, PPPs extend more public 
service delivery responsibilities to the private sector. 
 
Figure 2.1. Public Private Partnership approaches 
Source: Modified from Stelling (2014:14) 
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Based on the marketization approach, the new public management theory is a response to the failure of 
the state in the provision of public services by involving the private sector with a wide range of 
responsibilities to create more efficient delivery solutions. In fact, PPPs that employ this approach 
promote “the less government but more market philosophy”. As a result, the responsibilities and powers 
of the public sector are minimised to a level of just making policies and overseeing the achievement of 
set performance targets by the private sector. Unfortunately, with such PPP delivery approach, there is 
a tendency by the private sector to be preoccupied with maximising profits rather than delivering 
effective public services. 
Based on the interventionist approach, the NPS and PV theories are a response to the deficiencies of 
the private sector in the provision of public services. The public servants and citizens are given more 
powers to influence the provision of public services in order to protect the overall society interests 
against cruel behaviour of some private sector players. Though the private sector still has greater 
responsibilities in the execution of actual PPP project tasks, its powers to direct the provision of public 
services are minimised, and its performance is heavily regulated and closely monitored by public sector 
managers in collaboration with the citizens. The New public service and Public value principles can do 
well in countries with some credible level of democracy, or on government projects where 
intergovernmental organisations that promote good governance are involved. Compared to the New 
public service theory, what makes the public value theory stand out is the fact that scholars have 
provided frameworks that can be used to legitimize, create and measure the provision of public valued 
services. 
Based on the structural and managerial approaches, the New public governance theory is a response to 
both the market and government failures in the provision of public services. The New public governance 
theory emphasizes joint value creation through inclusive public service delivery collaborative 
relationships. The powers of the public managers, private sector players and the elected political 
representatives are minimised since public service delivery decisions are made and implemented based 
on joint and semi-joint institutional, formal and informal organisational, contractual and non-
contractual structures through mutual managerial strategies and interactions. As a consequence, neither 
the public nor the private sector players can directly force other project actors to behave in ways that 
go against their will. 
From the deductions above, it can be concluded that the main contribution of NPS and PV over NPM 
is the view that public sector powers in the provision of public services need to be strengthened, rather 
than minimized. On the other hand, unlike NPG that is all embracing, NPM, NPS and PV focus on PPP 
projects delivering efficient and effective public services, but are less interested in inter-organisational 
collaborations. In fact, the NPM, NPS and PV subscribe to the partner co-responsibility dimensions 
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where the focus is on sharing or distribution of responsibilities, while NPG subscribes to the Partnership 
relational governance dimensions where the interest is on joint value creation and mutual decision-
making. However, according to Stelling (2014:13), though “co-responsibility and relational governance 
are separate dimensions, PPPs require both a partnership as well as autonomous and responsible 
partners since there is no partnership without partners and no partners without a partnership”.  
2.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY   
This chapter provided meaning to public infrastructure and PPPs concepts by interrogating definitions 
and various classifications that are manifested in research and policy documents. An African view was 
used to assess the impact of infrastructure on service provision from a broader public infrastructure 
setting and ended with the road sub-division. A discussion on the contribution of PPPs in the 
development of public infrastructure was undertaken, and the challenges that PPPs face in the 
development of public infrastructure were presented. Governance theories applicable to the provision 
of public services were critiqued and their relevance to PPP structures were explored. Finally, the 
analyses of the key issues that come out of the main themes of the chapter are presented. The next 
chapter will describe the key elements of a PPP governance structure required to facilitate the effective 
development of public infrastructure. 
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3 CHAPTER 3: THE KEY ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The previous chapter has shown that PPPs are vital in the development of public infrastructure, 
however, it does not negate the fact that PPP projects operate in an environment with enormous 
challenges/risks that are deterrent to their sustainability. Accruing from the fact that, “effective and 
efficient governance maintains a decisive role in PPP performance” (Liu, Love, Smith, Regan & Davis, 
2015:5), this chapter tackles objective two which seeks to provide a clear understanding of PPP 
governance, and an analysis of the key elements of PPP good governance structure that should be 
considered by the public sector in order to contain the occurrence or negative impact of potential 
challenges/risks associated with PPP projects. In fact, the challenges/risks in the PPP operational 
environment have derailed PPP project performance globally because of lack of, or inappropriate, 
safeguards. According to the World Bank (2009:40-41), for example, PPP projects in Africa 
underperform due to “common governance mistakes”, as highlighted in Table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1. Common governance problems and preparation mistakes of PPP projects 
Common Problems in Project Governance Common Mistakes in Project Preparation 
 A part-time project manager (having 
another full-time job inside the public 
authority) 
 Frequent changes in the project team 
 Lack of resources or excessive reliance on 
advisers for decision making 
 Insufficient delegation of powers to the 
project management group so that even the 
smallest decision needs to be referred 
upward 
 Interference from other bodies outside the 
governance structure  
 Poor management of the day-to-day 
resources, including the external advisers 
 A project board that is too large and unable 
to meet as required to make key decisions 
 Lack of clarity by the public authority 
regarding what it wants from the project 
 Lack of project ownership and leadership 
 Poorly resourced project teams 
 Selection of advisers on the basis of cost 
rather than quality and experience 
 Lack of effective engagement with 
stakeholders 
 Lack of understanding of and contact with 
the private sector at senior levels and poorly 
conducted market sounding 
 Expectations that the private sector will deal 
with issues, such as the acquisition of land, 
that are better handled by the public sector 
 Lack of clarity about the public authority’s 
legal powers to enter into the public-private 
partnership contract 
 Conflict between the procurement process 
and procurement regulations 
 Overly ambitious project preparation 
timetables 
 Release of incomplete project information 
Developed from World Bank (2009:40-41) 
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Having justified the relevance of undertaking research objective two, as per the descriptions above, 
the next section 3.2 discusses the understanding of PPP governance. 
3.2 THE UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE 
Governance refers to a framework that support a wide variety of mechanisms, traditions, processes, 
institutions and relationships within a PPP operational setting through which individual citizens, groups 
and organisations express their interests, exercise their rights and responsibilities, and mediate their 
differences to create opportunities and solve societal problems (Nelson & Zadek, 2000, as cited in 
McQuaid, 2010:142; Villanueva, 2015:128; Mauri & Muccio, 2012:50; Liu et al., 2015).  Overall, 
governance is about processes of making and implementing decisions, and/or choosing not to 
implement certain decisions using formal and less formal rules or guidelines to manage public or private 
sector organisation resources and affairs. This study approaches governance from the public sector 
perspective with an interest in effective management of PPPs. 
In today’s transformational society, the public sector no longer functions as a self-sustaining and 
independent actor in the formulation of policies and the provision of public services if society 
expectations have to be satisfied. The predominant plural and pluralistic nature of PPP arrangements 
dictate that multiple actors have to team up through the execution of synchronised multiple processes 
and activities for the public sector to meaningfully deliver public services. Drawing from Klijn’s 
(2010b:304) point of view, for PPP projects to translate into effective vehicles for infrastructure 
development, the role of the public sector should be to direct, but not to monopolize, the setting of goals 
and the implementation of public programmes or project processes.  
The assumption by traditional administration theorists that governance is “exclusively about 
government” is misleading, because Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003:1) make it categorically clear 
that the governance phenomenon concerns “how governments and other social organisations interact 
together, how they relate with citizens, and how decisions are made, implemented, and accountability 
provided in a complex world” (see figure 3.1 below).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 45 
 
 
Figure 3.1. How Different Sectors Interact with Citizens 
Source: Graham et al. (2003:1) 
The illustration in figure 3.1 above depicts new institutional partnership arrangements, where politicians 
and public servants are obliged to share authority with other sectors of society (civil society, private for 
profit and the media organisations) and collaboratively work with each other and the citizens to address 
social and economic needs of the citizenry. Given that the power of other sectors of society (other than 
government) has nowadays increased, and to ensure that the authority given to them is not misused, 
their participation in the delivery of public services needs to be properly regulated. Hence, who should 
be involved and in what capacity, how they should be involved and at what level in the process, and 
their contribution in decision making and implementation processes should be known, monitored and 
evaluated over time.  
Unlike the traditional public administration theory, which views governance as a coercive game of 
government, the above sentiments imply that, in PPP structures, no stakeholder is quite in charge of 
everything, as authority is spread and responsibilities are dispersed among a number of actors within 
the overall governance network (Greve & Hodge, 2010:153).  To the contrary, Xu et al. (2015:13) argue 
that, no matter the extent to which government operates in a flexible manner to steer collective action, 
governance failure may still occur given that PPP governance is premised on the usage of both formal 
and informal rules  to co-ordinate interests of different subjects that always conflict with each other. 
Subsequently, such form of governance creates uncertainties and complexities as to how PPP processes 
and actors’ behaviour have to be managed in order to deliver public services to the satisfaction of almost 
every citizen.  
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Based on the above arguments, PPP projects by their nature operate in a very fragile and unpredictable 
environment, which requires a high degree of alertness and continuous monitoring of the changing 
trends in the internal and external environment, and time after time developing appropriate strategies to 
contain the shocks therefrom.  As Verhoest, Voets and Van Gestel (2013:189-190) points out, better 
PPP performance requires collaboration and honesty among multiple actors, controlling the technical 
and political processes, and the commitment of government when discharging public functions. Unless 
such readiness and response is actioned, complexities and uncertainties can spontaneously arise, 
resulting in inefficiencies and ineffectiveness in governing PPP operations.  
The next section (3.3) analyses key elements of PPP good governance structure focussing on principles 
of PPP good governance, PPP stakeholder management, PPP critical success factors, PPP development 
trajectory, and PPP risk management. 
3.3 AN ANALYSIS OF KEY ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP GOOD 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (as cited in Rondinelli, 2007:7) 
good governance relates to “widespread participation by all citizen, decision making by rule of law, 
transparency in the actions of governance institutions, responsiveness to the needs and desires of 
citizens, equity in the treatment of citizens, effectiveness and efficiency in the use of public resources, 
public accountability, and the exercising of strategic vision in planning for development”. Essentially, 
effective public service delivery is dependent on the public, private and third sectors having transparent 
and accountable institutions with competent and skilled employees that are willing to do the right things 
in the right way. 
Building from the UNDP understanding of good governance, in this thesis good governance is being 
referred to as goals that are set out to be achieved and/or effective ways of managing processes, 
structures, strategies, principles, methods, roles and responsibilities, individual and organisational 
relationships in the political, legal, technological, ecological, social and economic environments to 
improve service delivery. Based on the fact that government must steer the governance of society 
affairs, Woods (2000: 824) emphasizes that effective public service delivery is realized when the 
existing public sector rules and institutions have allowed “markets to flourish and citizens to lead 
healthier and happier lives”. Therefore, good governance mechanisms advocate for public management 
reforms that improve the integrity of public operations through better and citizen appreciated service 
delivery performance. 
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Given the above preamble, the remaining part of this chapter makes an analysis of each of the key 
elements of an effective PPP good governance structure, as mentioned at the end of the discussions in 
section 3.2 above.  In particular, the next subsection analyses the principles of PPP good governance. 
3.3.1 Principles of Public Private Partnership Good Governance  
Principles of good governance are standards of behavior, which when complied with enable 
organizations to deliver public services to the expectations of the citizens or for the common good of 
society (Gisselquist, 2012:7). Therefore, “good governance responds to collective problems of citizens 
and fulfils their needs in an appropriate and accepted way” (Yousaf, Ihsan & Ellahi, 2016:201).  In this 
sub section, we develop a list of PPP principles and discuss how each of them can contribute towards 
effective public service delivery. 
3.3.1.1 Value for Money 
Any product acquired or service provided without direct or indirect substantial value addition to 
processes and systems, or without ameliorating the lives of the intended beneficiaries, is a complete 
waste of resources, efforts and time. The United Kingdom (UK) Treasury (2006:7) refers to value for 
money as “the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of the 
good or service to meet the user’s requirement” (See Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:92; and Mwangi, 
2016:171, for similar definitions). 
Within the public sector circles, the ideal objective is to create the best value out of all money collected 
and spent (Grimsey & Lewis, 2005: 346). For the public sector to receive the best value it is required 
to choose a suitable procurement model resulting from a value for money test that takes into account 
both financial and non-financial benefits and costs over the whole life cycle of the project (Rothballer 
& Kim, 2013:13). The Public Sector Comparator (PSC) is the value for money analysis approach 
commonly used by public agencies to determine whether to use the PPP or public procurement route. 
However, PSC as a tool of value for money analysis has had some criticisms (OECD, 2008:110; 
Grimsey & Lewis, 2005:346&354; Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011:109). Notable among the criticisms 
of PSC is, “optimism bias, that is, the excessive use of low discount rate” (Sarmento & Renneboog, 
2016:101). Therefore, to Sarmento and Renneboog (2016:101) the use of unreliable tools to measure 
value for money is one of the main PPP governance challenges. 
According to Sundaram, Chowdhury, Sharma and Platz (2016:16) the potential of PPPs delivering 
improved and efficient public services that have a bearing on social and economic transformation, over 
and above what public procurement would do, is dependent on a country’s institutional capacity to 
create, manage, monitor and evaluate PPP performance operations. Globally though, PPPs have 
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generally had a poor governance record ranging from, but not limited to: the off-the-government budget 
target, overestimation of benefits and demand, underestimation of costs, weak incentives to support 
PPP activities, and the tendency of only investing in profitable projects (such as building toll roads on 
busy routes while neglecting extending toll free roads to rural or semi-urban areas) (Sundaram et al., 
2016:16-18). Yet, the real reason for delivering public infrastructure and services through PPP 
frameworks should be for the citizens to receive improved quality and affordable services. The 
framework below illustrates how the public sector can achieve value for money through accountable 
and well-governed PPP institutional structures.  
 
Figure 3.2. Key components of Public Private Partnership Value for money 
Source: Sundaram et al. (2016:17)  
With reference to the framework in figure 3.2, public sector organisations can achieve value for money 
if: PPP projects have been selected and implemented correctly; contracts are sound enough to enable 
reasonable pricing and realistic risk allocation; comprehensive and transparent fiscal and reporting 
systems are in place; and legal, regulatory and monitoring mechanisms that support citizens’ welfare 
and sustainable development have been established and complied with. These in turn lead to reduced 
public opposition and unrest, minimised optimistic behaviour and project risks, improved competitive 
bidding, responsible accounting, fair selection and implementation of projects, and the overall provision 
of adequate and quality services (Sundaram et al. 2016:18; Grimsey & Lewis, 2005:347).  
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Given the reviews in this subsection, we conclude that sound value for money can only be achieved 
through optimization or trading off multiple objectives that drive value for money. Examples of such 
objectives include: risk transfer, whole of life costing, output specifications, competition, performance 
measurement, bankability, affordability and private sector management skills (Rothballer & Kim, 
2013:13; Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility-PPIAF, 2015). 
3.3.1.2 Dispute Resolution  
Due to the enormous complexities and uncertainties of PPP contracts, such as having a multiplicity of 
activities and processes being handled by a multiplicity of participants, it becomes obvious to argue that 
disputes are part and parcel of PPP infrastructure project executions. Although disputes are commonly 
associated with negativity, in some instances they have proved to promote open and meaningful 
discussions in identifying and addressing needs, concerns, interests and values of the various PPP 
participants for realising service delivery impacts (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe-
UNECE, 2004:5-6). In PPP dispute resolution language, such behaviour is an interpretation of using 
constructive rather than destructive conflict management styles for positive service delivery outcomes.  
Actually, using integrative approaches to resolve conflicts offers better results than relying on 
distributive means (Gad, 2012:11). Ironically, any positive outcome attained from distributive 
approaches benefits a few parties, and in the event that it becomes clear to the majority that they are 
disadvantaged in the partnership, more problems will arise than were initially thought to have been 
solved. 
As UNECE (2004:6) suggests, it is good practice to include conflict resolution mechanisms in policy 
documents and contracts before conflicts can arise in order to ensure continued service provision on 
PPP projects amidst any future stakeholder misunderstandings. Table 3.2 below provides various 
dispute resolution mechanisms that can be used to resolve misunderstandings among parties, and 
conditions under which each of them can be applied in PPP arrangements. 
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Table 3.2. A Comparison of Different Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
 
Source: Gad (2012:14). 
KEY: DRMS = Dispute resolution mechanisms. DAB = Dispute Adjudication Board. Pt = Part 
The first column from the left side of table 3.2 above provides generic determinants of dispute 
resolution, and the first row at the top of the table, provide a range of dispute resolution methods. 
Moving down in the columns of dispute resolution methods are features for each method as a benchmark 
of each generic determinant (factors that cut across all dispute resolution methods). The last row of the 
table provides the crucial issues about the application of each method in resolution of conflicts in PPP 
projects. 
From table 3.2 above, we can conclude that effective utilization of dispute resolution mechanisms 
facilitate PPP project cohesion, but deviating from their fundamental principles or failure to 
appropriately manage disputes may result in delays, lowered team spirit, increased costs and damaged 
business relationships, which not only hamper project progress but may also subsequently translate into 
premature project termination. Recent trends indicate that PPP contracts are adapting multi-tier systems 
of conflict resolution, where the aim is to start with the less expensive and less formal dispute resolution 
methods, and progressively move to the more expensive and more formal ones until the disputes have 
been resolved (Gad, 2012:18). For instance, unless alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have been 
applied without some tangible success, most PPP participants would not be tantalized to litigate their 
differences because the court systems are procedurally too slow, expensive, and with such systems “a 
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poor settlement beats a good lawsuit” (Gad, 2012:11). However, this behaviour can change if the 
judiciary is seen to be very independent, neutral and the court systems have been left to be efficient 
without any undue influence in settling cases. 
3.3.1.3 Innovation 
Although scholarly works tend to assume that innovation is a term of the private sector (Moore & 
Hartley, 2010:56), it should be appreciated that innovation is equally no stranger to public sector 
performance. According to Pestoff and Brandsen (2010:231), innovation is “a significant change in the 
process of production” or “the ability to renew the collective structure of service provision in relation 
to skills, activities or even the underlying paradigm” (Pestoff & Brandsen, 2010:227). A similar 
understanding of innovation is articulated by Walker (2006, as cited in Ysa, Esteve & Longo, 2013: 99) 
who defines innovation as “a process through which new ideas, objects and practices are created, 
developed or reinvented and which are novel to the unit of adoption”. In the public sector, for example, 
the paradigm shifts regarding the way public services have been provided over time such as centralised 
vs. decentralised systems, paper based vs. electronic-government, direct public sector provisioning, 
outsourcing, privatisation and the current PPP arrangements, are a reflection of innovative practices.  
Reference is made to privatization and outsourcing to illustrate how PPP innovation transforms public 
service delivery. With the PPP delivery model, the public sector can tap into private sector knowledge 
and expertise, and share risks and gains with private sector organisations in order to improve service 
delivery, something that is unheard of in privatization (Greve & Hodge, 2010:153). On the other hand, 
some of the PPP innovative practices over outsourcing are: bundling project activities right from the 
design to operation under a special purpose vehicle arrangement rather than having multiple contracts, 
tendering being based on output rather than input specifications, and government relying more on 
private rather than public financing for public infrastructure investment. Ysa et al. (2013:99-100) 
contributes to the debate of public sector innovation by arguing that public sector innovations fall into 
five types, as described below: 
 New products to new users’ innovation. Is the provision of new public services or public 
goods to completely new beneficiaries? 
 Expansionary innovation. Is the provision of an already existing public service to a new group 
of users, implying that the service being provided now is not new to the entire society, but to 
the current targeted beneficiaries who never had access to such services before. 
 Evolutionary innovation. Occurs when a public organisation improves an existing service to 
satisfy the needs of its old and new users. 
 Organisational innovation. The creation of new managerial practices or organisational 
features that are yet to be, or have already been, adopted for implementation. 
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 Governance innovation. Involves networks of organisations, or the collaborative 
transformation of complex social production systems, to provide better public services rather 
than focusing on changes solely within a particular organisation. It is through this perspective 
that PPPs have been viewed as a new governance arrangement for providing public services or 
developing public goods. 
 
In view of public sector innovations, Ysa et al. (2013:100) concluded that any of the five innovation 
types above can be oriented towards the development of new/improved (products/services or 
organisational features), as shown in the illustration below: 
 
Figure 3.3. Innovation Types in Public Organisation 
Source: Ysa et al. (2013:101) 
Using a retrospective representation, Moore and Hartley (2010:64-68) underpin the innovation types 
developed by Ysa et al. (2013:99-101) by suggesting five ways through which innovations in the public 
sector can be created: 
 Creating network-based production systems. Innovations should be evaluated not only on 
the basis of how an individual organisation improves productivity, but on how collectively all 
organisations in a given setting get focused on improving comprehensive society conditions. 
 Tapping new pools of financing, material resources and human energy. Irrespective of 
whether the new resources being tapped are in different forms, say, monetary/non-monetary or 
are specific to the achievement of a given or multiple objective(s), one of the best ways to solve 
society problems is by identifying, mobilizing and utilizing resources that were previously side-
lined or partially exploited. 
 Exploiting government’s capacity to encourage and summon, and redefine private rights 
and responsibilities. Government should not only rely on the use of its financial resources to 
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guide the actions of its employees or contractors but also utilise its regulatory and moral power 
to mobilize private and voluntary contributions towards making positive changes to the 
performance of public systems. 
 Redistributing the right to define and judge the value of what is being produced. Even 
when the public sector directly engages the citizens, the private and voluntary organisations in 
determining what and how public services should be/was delivered, public sector agencies 
should ensure that other players remain loyal to the government and its purposes. In other 
words, where the other players tend to drift away from the delivery of a common good, 
government should recondition their decision rights for better results. 
 Evaluating the innovations in terms of justice, fairness and community building as well 
as of efficiency and effectiveness. Irrespective of public innovations being implemented, good 
governance principles should be observed. 
 
Finally, according to the interview findings from the Catalan and Tissue Bank, Ysa et al. (2013:106-
110) established that innovations on PPP projects is enabled by two major factor categories: 
Institutional factors: The type of institutional arrangement chosen to undertaken a project has a 
substantial influence on the level of innovation within a project. For example, projects developed via 
joint ventures see one or more partners facilitate interactions with other actors, resulting in more 
innovative resolutions. 
 
Figure 3.4. Institutional Arrangements Facilitating Innovation 
Source: Ysa et al. (2013:106) 
Figure 3.5 above demonstrates that the level of public innovations is influenced by organisational 
structures (government as a sole provider, public agency buying from the market, contractual 
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collaboration, and joint venture) of service provision with their associated financial costs and other 
uncertainties. For public organisations to realise high innovation outputs, it is required to devote high 
initial financial resources to maintaining relationships with private partners. In addition, given the long-
term nature of PPP contracts, it becomes difficult to predict future circumstances with certainty, hence 
prompting greater innovation. Therefore, public organisations can effectively innovate by working 
collaboratively with private partners, which allows them entry into new markets, access to unique 
resources and capabilities, improved communication and information exchange, increased market 
power to handle government business, and reductions in liabilities of foreignness and government or 
trade barriers (Ysa et al., 2013:107). In summary, although organisational arrangement can enhance 
innovation, they can also increase costs and uncertainties. 
Leadership factors: The more collaboratively the public manager interacts with the network 
environment, the more productive the network becomes towards the delivery of public services. 
According to Ysa et al. (2013:108-110) there are three key drivers for achieving collaborative 
innovations, as explained below:  
i) Proactive personality. Refers to taking an initiative in improving current circumstances or 
creating new ones.  
ii) Managers’ networking. Refers to those informal and formal contacts that public managers 
have with other organisations. Therefore, the more public managers interact with other 
actors from their environment, the more likely they are to develop organisational change. 
iii) Entrepreneurial spirit. Entrepreneurs refers to individuals who have the ability to 
convince others to develop a change in a specific domain and are thus able to change 
organisations. Modern public management portrays entrepreneurial spirit either through 
personnel attributes (innovation, leadership, team-building, innate qualities, demographics) 
and/or situational attributes (networks of contacts, professional and community 
organisational memberships, affinity for local community). 
 
In conclusion, the above discussions signify that innovations enable public sector organisations to 
remain efficient and effective in their core operations, while responding to the diverse changing needs 
of a modern society in order to continuously meet the citizens’ aspirations (Moore & Hartley, 2010:53). 
In effect, an innovative public sector not only improves public service provision, but also facilitates the 
citizens’ confidence that the public sector is credible enough to serve community interests.  
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3.3.1.4 Participation 
In a democratic society, citizens are obliged to directly or indirectly participate not only in shaping the 
politics, but also in exercising great influence in the delivery of public services for the development of 
their nations (Yousaf et al., 2016:201; Gisselquist, 2012:16). Any failure by public agencies or private 
partners to involve citizens in public service decision-making processes discredits the legitimacy of the 
government, hence leading to diminishing public support for future government interventions (Glaser, 
2007: 92). 
According to Pestoff and Brandsen (2010:227-228) the position of citizens in the delivery of public 
services can be strengthened through four methods:  
 Representative political democracy. Where the interests of citizens as voters are taken on by 
their elected representatives through local councils or parliaments; 
 Participative democracy. Where citizens or community groups are cooperative and self-
organising for a common good, and voluntary organisations actively participate in the provision 
of  social services; 
 Consumerism. Where citizens are treated as customers and private providers always quickly 
respond to reported service delivery anomalies; and  
 Co-production. Where the citizens, private sector, and the civil society are given an almost 
equal status with government in the efforts to improve community welfare.  
In order to have constructive participation of all stakeholders in public service delivery processes, 
government needs to guarantee freedom of association and expression (Van Doeveren, 2011:309), and 
allow open competition for entrants into the PPP market unless the prevailing circumstances would 
require use of other procurement methods that are less competitive; and to also respond timeously to 
citizens’ concerns and with utmost care and due diligence. The ideals of this principle are explored 
further in subsection 3.3.3 which deals with stakeholder management with stronger emphasis on the 
roles of the key PPP players. 
3.3.1.5 Sustainable public management 
Sustainable public management relates to the creation of public service conditions and systems that are 
adaptive to current and future changes in the institutional, social, economic, ecological, technological, 
political and legal environments in order to secure lives, create and safeguard properties and other public 
resources, and support the implementation of national development programmes for citizens’ welfare 
(Dechev, 2015:235). For continued effective management of public resources in the future, 
governments need to have accurate data about the past and current trends to predict future strengths and 
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opportunities, weaknesses and threats of public service delivery in order to appropriately reform public 
institutions, policies, and administrative procedures that are transparent and sound to enlist the support 
of the citizens, the private, civil society and public sector organizations in the development of society 
(Gisselquist, 2012:7). In a nutshell, governments need to be sure about, the current and the desired 
future public service delivery status, the necessary strategies for achieving the future status, and should 
ensure the provision of the best public services on a sustainable basis (Graham et al., 2003:5). Therefore, 
shortage of such information and response has disastrous effects on the delivery of public services in 
the future. For instance, the setting in of the 2008 global financial crisis saw several PPP investment 
projects either cancelled or suspended or renegotiated due to price increases which had not been 
promptly predicted ahead of time. 
Glaser (2007:94) and Abdellatif (2003:25) perceive sustainability of public management from the 
principle of equity, whereby public service delivery institutions and processes thereof are meant to serve 
and create opportunities for the benefit of citizens as a whole, without giving any special treatment to 
the advantaged groups or marginalizing the disadvantaged groups of society. Meanwhile, Burger and 
Hawkesworth (2011:141) and Mwangi (2016:171) debate that sustainable public service delivery is 
achieved through a combination and trade-off between economy, efficiency and effectiveness - where 
economy is about minimising costs of inputs to produce the right output, efficiency refers to using the 
available resources to maximize outputs, and effectiveness means the maximisation of outcomes for 
every output delivered. Therefore, the public sector is in a position to deliver quality services and meet 
society’s needs if: the provision of public services is free from political or any other form of 
interference; the available resources are put to best use; quality standards are established; and the 
government gets fully committed to ensuring that the existing policies are correctly implemented (Van 
Doeveren, 2011:308-309). 
3.3.1.6 Transparency 
Transparency relates to the general public’s ability to freely access information and the willingness of 
government to provide reliable, comprehensive, understandable, timely, and internationally comparable 
information about the operations of public agencies, and having well-functioning systems that propel 
public and private partners involved in the provision of public services to behave ethically for the 
common good (Woods, 2000:826; Gisselquist, 2012:8). From a legal perspective, transparency is 
achieved when the citizens respect the prevailing society rules and an independent and incorruptible 
judiciary is in existence to assure the provision of public services in a fair and impartial manner (Van 
Doeveren, 2011:309-310). According to Greve and Hodge (2013:215), governments can never provide 
accurate information nor be transparent, as long as they continue to spend beyond what their nations 
can afford in order to sustain popular political support. In addition, globally, the PPP procurement 
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processes seem to be too weak to foster transparency. The World Bank Group (2016:3) reveals that, 
23% of the world’s PPP projects are tendered through unsolicited proposals, while 39% of PPP contracts 
in low-income countries are awarded on non-competitive terms. 
Although information disclosure is essential for evaluating and determining government performance, 
the common trend with PPP projects is the exclusion of the public from decision-making processes. 
Examples to support this argument are well documented. Kalpana (2014b:69) claims that PPP 
negotiations are secretly handled and decision outcomes therefrom are never disclosed to the public, all 
in the name of commercial confidentiality. Again, on grounds of commercial confidentiality, in 2000 
the UK government refused to disclose to its parliament the full details that surrounded the termination 
of contracts for 10 companies that had been providing support services to the National Health Service 
(Hood, Fraser & McGarvey, 2006: 44). Similarly, in 2001 the Australian parliament was denied access 
to a contract deed between the public sector roads authority and the private company for the M2 
motorway project in New South Wales (Reeves, 2013:85). Hood et al. (2006:44) further noted that 
“neither the public nor the private sectors display adequate transparency in either their risk allocation 
or the apparent rewards flowing from the contracts”. In conclusion, whereas confidentiality is one of 
the measures for effective information disclosure, it should never be used as an excuse for refusal or 
failure to disclose non-classified information or not to involve citizens in PPP dealings, unless such 
actions are a true reflection of the existing legal framework provisions.  
3.3.1.7 Accountability  
Accountability is the acceptance by an individual or institution to take up public service delivery 
responsibilities and thereafter be answerable to the citizens for one’s actions (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer 
& Boyer, 2010:479).  As Cheema (2007:32) asserts, accountability is therefore a pillar of “good 
governance that compels the State, the private sector, and civil society to focus on results, seek clear 
objectives, develop effective strategies, and monitor and report on performance”. Consequently, 
accountability becomes a means of detecting errors, taking corrective action, eliminating corruption, 
promoting transparency, and whose sole target is bettering performance rather than punishing 
suboptimal performance (Peters, 2007:15-19).  
Kalpana (2014b: 69) claims that PPPs have eroded public accountability as the questions of “who is 
accountable for what and to whom” remain unanswered. However, whereas the provision of 
accountability to the citizens is a cardinal role of government, the co-adoption of the private and civil 
society organisations in the delivery of public services does not take away the fact that the individual 
participating parties remain solely responsible for their actions. In fact, any actions that relate to 
exercising public powers or using public resources or providing public services demand for one’s 
accountability (Reeves, 2013:80). In addition, though accountability on PPP contracts may take any 
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dimension depending on the situation at hand, in normal circumstances the private sector is directly 
accountable to the government, the government is directly accountable to the citizens and the private 
sector, and the civil society is directly accountable to the citizens. Importantly, while the private sector 
may perform most of the PPP project tasks, the public sector remains with the final responsibility for 
project performance (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016:97).   
Like any other public service delivery model, the quality of accountability on PPP projects has always 
been disputed. Some of the scholarly contributions towards improving PPP accountability are set out 
below. Reeves (2013:82-84) recommended the use of transparent value for money analysis, competitive 
contracting through rigorous tendering processes, well drafted contract documents and effective 
contract management, and exercising the external oversight function through auditing and scrutiny by 
parliament. Peters (2007:19-21) suggested a systematic performance based accountability approach that 
has eight steps: defining outcomes, defining outputs, developing effective measurement mechanisms, 
linking programs to outputs and outcomes, defining adequate standards, defining adequate 
improvement, defining responsibility, and linking inputs to outputs. Finally, Forrer et al. (2010:479-
482) developed a framework with six dimensions that can be used to provide safeguards throughout the 
PPP project lifecycle. 
 
Figure 3.5. Public-Private Partnership Accountability Framework 
Source: Forrer et al. (2010:479) 
The extent to which the six dimensions in figure 6 above provide accountability safeguard measures is 
summarised below.  
Risk. Effective project risks management requires identifying and understanding, negotiating and 
allocating each risk to a partner that has the relevant resources, expertise, and knowledge to control it 
in order to maximize public benefit through a well-prescribed contract. Therefore, “discovering the 
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appropriate balance of risk allocation ensures a greater accountability for the services delivered and 
their conformance to public expectations” (Forrer et al., 2010:480). 
Cost and Benefits. Cost benefit analysis as a way of controlling costs and ensuring benefits realization 
should be continued as the PPP project develops and conditions change until project contract closure 
time. 
Social and Political Impact. Involvement of all stakeholders in the decision-making processes is 
paramount, since any perceived success or failure of PPP projects may result in the government gaining 
or losing support of its citizens. For instance, citizens often resist government programs because the 
opposition political parties and civil society organizations are fond of publicizing every public service 
delivery problem as a political crisis. Similarly, in the event that the ruling party loses an election, it 
may withdraw its support for future funding of PPP projects that were initiated during its tenure. 
Expertise. Specialized skills, capabilities, experiences and resources required should be well specified 
in the bidding and contract documents, and the right partners should be engaged and their performance 
continuously checked and monitored to guarantee effective accomplishment of project tasks. 
Partnership Collaboration. The level of cooperation and agility among and from each of the 
partnership members against the expected deliverable outputs should be clearly specified in the contract 
to enable effective monitoring for compliance, rewarding successes or punishing failures. In addition, 
PPP structures should promote effective leadership, consistent and clear communication, and effective 
project management as a means for building trust among the actors and ensuring performance 
sustainability. 
Performance Measurement. The partnership agreement must have a set of balanced performance 
measures that capture the expected performance behavior and outcomes, monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms, and should include practices designed to attract, motivate, retain and reward the best 
performers that meet government and citizens’ expectations. 
3.3.1.8 Networking 
PPP arrangements take place in a network consisting of the government, the market, civil society, public 
organisations, community and individual citizens that are brought together through collaborative efforts 
of interdependent and interactive resources and processes, to deliver more and better public services to 
the citizens than what one or a few actors would accomplish on their own (Xu et al., 2015:14; Walker, 
2014:25). Because the public as well as other sectors have limited or lack certain resources, implies that  
none of  them can fully achieve its objectives without utilising resources possessed by actors in  other 
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sectors (Klijn & Teisman, 2003:1). Successful networking would therefore necessitate different actors 
uniting to share values, information and other resources towards generating innovative solutions for 
achieving a collective action (Klijn, 2010b:308-309).  
However, the multiplicity of actors on PPP projects with diverse and often conflicting traditions, 
perceptions and interests complicates the smooth functioning of network based interactive processes, 
hence making the delivery of the expected public services very challenging. This view is shared with 
Klijn (2010b:307) who argues that “all actors demand a say in the decision-making process, and their 
inclusion makes decision making within governance network immensely complex”. According to 
Alexander (2013:151) the improper governance of PPP networks is as a result of: lack of information 
and knowledge about causes and effects of ineffective networking; failure to identify the actual motives 
why each of the actors joined the network so as to provide appropriate treatments; ineffective or lack of 
inter-network communication; and the deliberate efforts by some of the actors following their own 
organisation’s rules and norms while sacrificing those of the network. 
To ensure that PPP networks produce improved public services on a sustainable basis, all actors must 
behave professionally, and must also handle policy and service delivery processes strategically. 
Verhoest et al. (2013:193) suggests that good governance of PPP is incumbent upon networks 
guaranteeing: interactions based on reciprocity, collaboration, trust and loyalty; resource exchanges 
based on complementary interests; equal status and fair treatment of all actors in the network; the joint 
development of policies in a web of interdependent partners; the resolution of  conflicts based on the 
reputation of the members rather than sanctions;  the measurement of network success not only being 
based on the achievement of goals but also on how the participants are satisfied with the processes; and 
whether an agreement on joint solutions to the identified problems is achieved. However, from the point 
of equal status of actors, Osborne (2010:9) argues that “inter-organisational networks are rarely 
alliances of equals”. For instance, “government is a special actor with a monopoly over a number of 
resources” (Verhoest et al., 2013:193) such as legislative, judicial and administrative powers. While 
from the perspective of resource exchange, specifically with information sharing, Klijn (2010b:309) 
argues that some actors may use the information shared freely from other players for their own selfish 
interests and benefit. 
Whereas Verhoest et al. (2013:193) views PPP governance from networking characteristics, O’Toole 
and Meier (2010:325) perceive the performance of PPP networks being conditioned on public 
management functions within the environment; where the public sector should put efforts in managing 
the internal operations of the organisation, exploiting opportunities in the interdependent environment, 
and limiting the negative impact of the environment perturbations on the administrative system. 
Furthermore, O’Toole and Meier (2010:326) feature the roles of the public managers in PPP networks 
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to include: building support for program implementation among interested stakeholders; facilitating 
collaborative efforts at program execution with other involved organisations; protecting core production 
from threatening aspects of the organisational environment; linking or disconnecting networks actors 
from each other to improve policy execution; and using persuasion and bargaining skills to change the 
nature of the interdependent co-produced actions. 
In summary, PPP networking has the capacity to improve public services delivery only when 
interdependent actors and interactive process complexities have been successfully navigated for 
effective management, and if the public managers execute their responsibilities with appropriate skills 
to enhance social capital. Finally, the stronger the level of trust among the various members of a PPP 
network the higher the likelihood for actors being more innovative towards solving complex policy 
problems for better performance (Klijn, 2010b:315). 
3.3.1.9 Trust  
Trust is an essential building block towards the understanding of PPP governance (Verhoest et al., 
2013:195). According to Muhwezi (2010:29) trust is one’s belief that the partner will behave and act 
according to his or her promises with consistency. Scholars have operationalised trust differently but 
with many commonalities. Verhoest et al. (2013:195) refers to trust as the extent to which partners 
perceive each other as being credible, benevolent and acting with integrity. Where credibility reflects 
the partner’s skill, competencies and expertise to perform effectively, benevolence is the belief that the 
partner will do good beyond egocentric interests, and integrity is the partner’s compliance with the 
acceptable values and principles of the partnership.  While Sako (1992:10) operationalises trust in three 
dimensions of: contractual trust, which is based on the belief that the other party will fulfil its promises 
and act as agreed; competence trust, which is based on the belief that the other party is capable of 
performing well a specific task(s); and goodwill trust, which focuses on the moral commitment to offer 
preferential treatment or help whenever a need arises without taking advantage of one’s circumstances. 
From the scholarly views above, it can be deduced that trust in PPP networks is based on formal and 
informal instruments conveyed through contracts, relational interactions, speculations, faith, reliance, 
and the confidence among the participating parties and their willingness to refrain from opportunistic 
behaviour in all dealings, even when avenues for acting opportunistically show up. According to Klijn 
(2010b:313) trust is a “favourable condition for the functioning of and for the achievement of positive 
outcomes in governance networks as it reduces transaction costs, facilitates cooperation and stability in 
network relations, and stimulates learning, knowledge exchange and innovation”. Klijn (2010b:312) 
further noted that trust improves relative to the actor’s previous experiences, and that unless trust is 
unremittingly upheld, it can never be sustained. 
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Notwithstanding trust being a necessary condition for collaboration, on the contrary, Vangen and 
Huxham (2010:168) cast doubt on its effectiveness given that it is “frequently very weak” and mulled 
with “suspicion and mistrust” in most PPP transactions. As a result, PPP engagements are 
predominantly based on contract and institutional rules in order to avoid risks and uncertainties that 
come with informal and relational mechanisms. Such a trend is prompted by, among others, the absence 
of confidence based on past experience of potential partners, and having inter-organisational 
participating actors with dissimilar characteristics (Verhoest et al., 2013:195). As Klijn (2010b:309-
311) states, PPP governance networks are synonymous with risks and uncertainties, and one accepting 
to trust another partner lends himself to opportunistic behaviour, unless rational decisions have been 
made through calculative risk taking. 
Vangen and Huxham (2010:163-184) recommends several ways on how trust can be initiated, 
developed and sustained among PPP partners, which includes: forming expectations- whereby what 
needs to be achieved, who does what and in what capacity have been jointly agreed upon; managing 
risk - to avoid future vulnerabilities and opportunistic behaviour; managing power imbalances 
throughout the life of the project;  managing knowledge transfer - to enable inter-organisational learning 
in order to develop and implement innovative solutions for improved performance; and nurturing 
collaborative relationships - by managing culture and network dynamics through orderly interactions 
based on effective communication, harnessing differences (such as perceptions, behaviour, professional 
expertise, organisational systems and procedures), and building cultural awareness to avoid misaligned 
expectations and stereotyping associated problems. In summary, trust is a core coordination mechanism 
of networks which: becomes stronger as interactions among actors improve through dedicated 
networks; facilitates fluent interactions and information flow; enables actors to develop innovative 
solutions within complex networks; becomes unnecessary without risk; and its success depends on 
reciprocal behaviour of the partners (Klijn, 2010b:305-312). 
In summary, subsection (3.3.1) has identified a comprehensive list of principles of PPP good 
governance. These include value for money, dispute resolution, innovation, participation, sustainable 
public management, ttransparency, accountability, networking, and trust, and a discussion on how each 
of them should be applied for effective provision of public services through PPP arrangement was 
undertaken. The next subsection reviews and discusses PPP critical success factors as good governance 
mechanisms for public service delivery. 
3.3.2 A REVIEW OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
Critical success factors (CSFs) are core aspects of an activity where things must be done correctly or in 
which favourable results are absolutely necessary for the achievement of organisational or project goals 
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(Chan, Lam, Chan, ASCE, Cheung & Ke, 2010: 484-494; Liu et al., 2015:2). This subsection presents 
common PPP CSFs and the degree of importance of CSFs for PPP projects. 
3.3.2.1 Common Public Private Partnership Critical Success Factors as highlighted in Literature 
The critical success factors from Liu et al.’s (2015:2) publication on “life cycle critical success factors 
for PPP projects” were reworked to remove repetitive factors that appeared in the list of factors, as 
shown in Table 3.3 below. Therefore, Table 3.3 above provides a very clear, non-repetitive and 
comprehensive list of critical success factors that is user friendly for both practitioners and researchers. 
Table 3.3. Critical Success Factors for Public Private Partnerships 
Adapted from Liu et al. (2015:2) 
After presenting a comprehensive list of PPP critical success factors, the next subsection presents the 
variation in the impact of different CSFs on PPP project performance.  
3.3.2.2  The degree of importance of the various CSFs to the success of PPP projects 
To show the impact level of the various CSFs to PPP projects success, summaries of methodologies 
and results from five different publications are provided. 
Chan et al. (2010:484-494) established 18 PPP critical success factors from literature and applied them 
in China using a questionnaire survey. After carrying out factor analysis, five factor groupings were 
created based on the assumption that each of the 18 CSFs is highly dependent on only one underlying 
group factor. In addition, the criteria for a variable appearing in a particular group was that it had a 
loading value greater than 0.50, and had generated the highest value in that group factor compared to 
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any other group. The five factor groups are stable macro-economic environment, shared responsibility 
between public and private sectors, transparent and efficient procurement process, stable political and 
social environment, and judicious government control, as captured in table 3.4 below. 
Table 3.4. Public Private Partnership Critical Success Factors grouping based on  
 Promax rotation of 18 Critical Success Factors  
 
Source: Chan et al. (2010:489) 
Note that higher factor loading value for a particular factor in a group signifies its greater contribution 
to PPP project success compared to other factors in the same group. For instance, sound economic 
policy, shared authority between public and private sectors, competitive procurement process, political 
support, and government involvement by providing guarantees have the greatest contribution in factor 
groups 1, 2, 3,4 and 5 respectively (see details in the factor loading column in table 3.4 above). 
In a study by Alinaitwe and Ayesiga (2013:1-14), 32 PPP CSFs were identified from literature, and 
were applied on the construction industry in Uganda through questionnaire surveys to collect responses 
from construction companies, financial institutions and government departments. Thereafter, the factors 
were ranked according to their degree of importance. The results indicate that a competitive 
procurement process, a well-organised private sector, availability of competent personnel participating 
in PPP projects and good governance, are the most crosscutting PPP CSFs among the various PPP 
partners in Uganda. 
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From the review of literature, Aerts, Grage, Dooms and Haezendonck (2014:273-298) developed a list 
of 21 CSFs, which were subjected to a survey through a 7- point questionnaire Likert scale to determine 
the relative importance of the various factors on PPP port projects using average mean scores. The 
survey results indicate that the mean importance values among the 21 factors ranged from 6.29 to 4.25. 
Based on the results, the most important CSFs for PPP port project success are: concrete and precise 
concession agreement (6.29), clear definition of responsibilities (6.21), project technical feasibility 
(6.09), commitment of partners (6.06), and appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing (6.00). 
Meanwhile, knowledge transfer (4.25), community support (4.26), and reasonable debt/equity ratio 
(4.28) are the least important among the 21 CSFs studied. 
Li et al. (2005:459-465) examined 18 CSFs identified from literature to determine the relative 
importance of each of the factors on the performance of PPP/PFI projects in the construction industry 
in the UK, using respondents from the public and private sector organisations through a questionnaire 
survey instrument. The results indicate that the five most critical factors for successful implementation 
of PPP/PFI construction projects in the UK are: strong and good private consortium, appropriate risk 
allocation, availability of financial markets, commitment of both public and private sectors, and 
thorough and realistic cost/benefit assessment. However, the five least critical among the 18 factors are: 
social support, shared authority between public and private sector, provision of guarantees by 
government, stable macro-economic policy, and multi-benefit objectives.  
Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015:1335-1346) reviewed 57 research papers, published between 1990-2013, to 
identify CSFs for PPP projects. Regarding the criterion that a factor qualified to be of importance if it 
was appearing in at least two publications, out of 57 only 27 publications were considered for further 
analysis. Thirty-seven CSFs were found to meet the criterion, and these factors were later ranked 
depending on the number of times a factor was identified by an author(s). The number of times a factor 
appeared signified how superior that factor is compared to other factors. The results indicated that 
appropriate risk allocation and sharing, strong private consortium, political support, public/community 
support, transparent procurement, favourable legal framework, and stable macroeconomic condition 
greatly contribute to the success of PPPs. While factors such as environmental impact, reliable service 
delivery, consistent monitoring, financial accountability, employment of professional advisors, clear 
goals and objectives, good governance, well organised and committed public agency, sound economic 
policy, good leadership and entrepreneurship skills, choosing the right partner, and compatibility of 
parties, are relevant but with a very low impact. 
In summary, the above reviews have shown that each PPP CSF may have different impact levels on 
different sectors, actors, countries, and across projects. With regard to scholars, the research results may 
differ depending on the methodologies and the category of respondents used. However, the key 
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observation is that no matter the dynamics in the PPP operational environment or research pattern, CSFs 
of a strong private sector, transparent procurement, and appropriate risk allocation and sharing have the 
greatest contribution to the success of any PPP project. In conclusion, as much as all CSFs are essential 
for the successful implementation of PPP projects, some are more important than others, implying that 
the highest impacting CSFs should be accorded more attention and effort compared to those CSFs with 
lower impact on project success. The next subsection discusses the effective management of 
stakeholders and highlights the roles and responsibilities of the key PPP players. 
3.3.3 STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT 
From a PPP perspective, a stakeholder is any institution or individual that has interest and/or the power 
to influence project transactions and outcomes. As such, a shareholder affects the success of a project 
or is affected by the implementation of a project. For instance, according to Martin et al. (2013:17) PPP 
projects are unsuccessfully implemented because of lack of a sense of project ownership and 
commitment from the public. On the other hand, effective stakeholder engagement in decision making 
processes promotes a shared vision, minimises project opposition, improves investment needs 
assessment, strengthens citizens’ trust in government actions, enhances project partners’ credibility, and 
encourages commitment from politicians and citizens for public investment projects (OECD, 2015:22; 
Felsinger, 2011:20-21). In fact, full support from all the project stakeholders is a recipe for effective 
provision of public infrastructure facilities and services through faster and quality project deliveries, 
and minimised project conflicts and cancellations. 
Stakeholder involvement in PPP project decision-making processes has been associated with many 
intricacies. Felsinger (2011:20-21) cites problems relating to a multiplicity of stakeholders with 
divergent roles, interests and concerns that are difficult to reconcile and monopolistic control over PPP 
information flow by a few stakeholders. For instance, governments selectively disclose PPP project 
information in order to avoid future public uprising in case certain project targets are never realized. 
Meanwhile De Schepper, Dooms and Haezendonck (2014:1210) relate stakeholder participation 
problems to a mismatch in the application of reactive and proactive approaches of stakeholder 
management, lack of guidance on stakeholder responsibilities, accountability complexities associated 
with PPP projects, and the perception that stakeholder inclusion is “an activity that consumes substantial 
amount of resources and time”. 
Instead of take advantage of the diversity of experiences, skills, knowledge, and information as a 
valuable means of improving PPP products and processes, it would be irrational for any stakeholder to 
think that by behaving in a non-transparent and discriminatory way, and deliberately avoiding 
accountability, better results would be produced. Hence, the different roles and interests of each 
stakeholder are meant to strengthen the partnership relationship (Kalpana, 2014a:17) rather than weaken 
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it; and as Felsinger (2011:22) argues, participation of all stakeholders in PPP processes is a critical 
factor for project success. Unless all project stakeholders are known, and their roles and interests have 
been clearly identified and effectively managed, PPP projects are bound to receive a lot of resistance. 
Figure 3.7 below indicates the different interests of some of the key PPP stakeholders. 
 
Figure 3.6. Stakeholder Interests in Public Private Partnership Arrangement 
Source: Felsinger (2011:22) 
All stakeholders should be given an opportunity to actively participate in PPP processes and freely share 
their concerns about the project, and in turn accurate information about the project progress and 
transaction processes should be frequently provided to them. For instance, in Australia and the United 
Kingdom, stakeholder consultation is necessary at every stage of a PPP project (Martin et al., 2013:17). 
In order to build collective support for PPPs, Felsinger (2011:22-23) recommends creating stakeholder 
iterative communication programs customized to the local and PPP context, such as opinion research, 
stakeholder consultation, public awareness and public education. For instance, during project designing, 
potential bidders’ input should be sought (through bid conference and bidding document consultation), 
and after bidder engagement sessions, all bidders should be sent full responses relating to concerns 
raised during the meetings (Felsinger, 2011:68). On ethical and professional grounds, no stakeholder 
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should misuse his/her roles with their attendant responsibilities to satisfy individual selfish interests. 
Stakeholder interests should be advanced and met using channels and processes that promote the 
common good. Therefore, the execution of one’s duties necessitates a high level of cooperation and 
treating all partners with respect if productive PPP outcomes are to be sustained (Kalpana, 2014a:18).  
In the remaining part of this section, we provide a detailed account of the responsibilities for the public, 
private (for profit), and third (private not for profit) sectors because of their active involvement in PPP 
transactions and processes. 
a) The Public Sector 
The Public sector’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to: defining public services required and 
the availability of resources to undertake them; specifying the project priorities, targets and outputs; 
executing procurement processes; setting performance standards and monitoring performance; taking 
corrective action in case of failure of any party to comply with standards; managing community 
expectations; providing an enabling environment for PPPs to flourish, and issuing permits, licences, 
authorisations, contracts and any other documents that are within its powers for project work to be 
pursued (Kalpana, 2014a:24).  
Furthermore, due to the key regulatory role the PPP Units play in the countries’ PPP agenda across the 
world, it was decided to highlight its responsibilities here. A PPP unit is established as a point of 
coordination, quality control, accountability, and with specialised management personnel that provides 
information related to PPPs, either within a single sector or across a range of sectors. The PPP Unit 
responsibilities include but are not limited to: 
 Development of general PPP policies; 
 Development and management of the national PPP programme; 
 Issuing regulations and clarifications regarding rules, procedures and standards for PPP projects 
and project documents to public entities; 
 Issuing decisions to public entities for the purpose of ensuring proper implementation of laws 
and regulations related to PPP projects; 
 Review and approval of projects and proposed amendments to agreements; 
 Approval of the economic support to PPP projects; 
 Oversight and review of performance compliance and project execution; 
 Management of a national PPP registry; 
 Making decisions relating to the use of funds deriving from PPP appropriations; 
 Providing technical assistance and training to central and local government officials; 
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 Spearheading promotional activities for PPP projects; 
 Ensuring effective use of public resources; 
 Supporting project teams in the hiring and use of external expertise (Felsinger, 2011:52-54; 
Infrastructure Consortium for Africa-ICA, 2009:50). 
 
b) The Private (for profit) Sector 
The private sector responsibilities include, but are not limited to: providing defined services to the 
required standard; designing and constructing the infrastructure asset; raising funds for the capital needs 
of the project; focusing on the government’s objectives and responding to variations in the project 
environment; may also maintain and operate constructed facilities for some time; and return the assets 
in the specified condition at the end of the contract (Kalpana, 2014a:23).  
In addition, because of the recent trend where the public sector requires private sector to participate in 
PPPs under Special Purpose vehicle (SPV) arrangement, it was decided to highlight the responsibilities 
of the SPV here. SPV is a separate legal entity company created specifically for a specific PPP project, 
which brings together the public partner, the sponsors, financiers, subcontractors and other actors such 
as advisers to implement PPP contract tasks (Reim, 2009:4-5). PPP advisors will be covered in detail 
later in the section. The relevance of SPV arrangement is that the sponsors are protected from any 
liability as individual organisation, assets and liabilities of SPV do not appear on the balance sheet of 
individual sponsors, and since no sponsor is supposed to have more than 50% share in the SPV, the 
projects are protected from the impact of one of the sponsors running bankrupt (Kalpana, 2014a:24).  
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Figure 3.7. A Typical Contracting Structure for a Public Private Partnership Project 
 Under a Special Purpose Vehicle arrangement 
Source: Heybati, Roodposhti, Nikoomaram and Ahmadi (2011: 3513) 
The SPV structure provides two main partnership contract arrangements. The SPV company enters into 
a contract with a public contracting agency and, simultaneously, the SPV forms contracts with private 
companies that have to support project implementation and operations. The agreement under the SPV 
arrangement requires government to pay for services provided and facilities constructed (either through 
availability fees, shadow tolls or user toll payments), the subcontractors have to be paid on condition 
that they perform their tasks, the lenders provide funds in the form of loans and expect payment of the 
principal and interest from SPV, and the shareholders contribute capital and expect to be paid dividends 
in return. Importantly, the government must closely monitor the formation and operation processes of 
the SPV company in order to guard against future problems that may accrue from sure relationships 
among companies in the consortium (Sarmento & Renneboog, 2016:98). 
Another branch of the private sector worth covering here are the PPP external advisors. It is 
indispensable for a PPP project to succeed without guidance of experts from different professions. The 
cardinal role of advisers is to provide appropriate advice in their area of expertise to the project 
management group, and the team of advisers includes technical, financial, legal, environmental, and 
separate social impact and insurance advisers which may as well be required (ICA, 2009:48-49). The 
responsibilities for the PPP advisors are highlighted in figure 3.5 below. 
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Table 3.5. The Responsibilities of Public Private Partnership External Advisors 
Technical Advisers 
 Participate in the formulation of project 
strategic plans and specifications 
 Develop payment mechanisms in 
consultation with the financial adviser 
 Evaluate and advise on all technical 
procurement issues and proposed solutions  
 Undertake technical due diligence on 
bidders’ solutions 
 Carry out any site condition, planning and 
technical design work 
 
Legal Advisers 
 Advise on the legal feasibility of the project 
and the powers of the public agency to enter 
into a PPP contract 
 Advise on the appropriate procurement route 
and the suitability of all the procurement 
related documents. 
 Ensure bids meet the legal and contractual 
requirements 
 Develop the PPP contract documents, and 
provide assistance in all legal matters 
throughout the life of  the project 
Financial Advisers 
 Provide specialised advice on all financial 
matters during business case development  
 Advise on appropriate sources of funding and 
how funds can be secured 
 Evaluate and advise on financial proposals 
throughout procurement processes 
 Advise on the bankability and taxation issues, 
and interest rate and currency hedging 
matters 
 Undertake financial due diligence on the 
submitted bids 
 Assist in the negotiations with the lenders 
 
Environmental Advisers 
 Examine the potential environmental impact 
of the project 
 Identify potential environmental risks and 
how submitted bids address them 
 Advise on the mitigation measures for the 
risks identified and their impact on the scope 
and technical design of the project 
 Assist in environmental due diligence, 
including required permits and certifications 
 
Developed from ICA (2009:48-49) and European PPP Expertise Centre-EPEC (2011:17) 
The scope of work for each advisory team should be well known before the release of a bid notice and 
all advisors must be contracted through a competitive bidding process, while the evaluation criteria 
should include: the relevance of the adviser’s expertise, their understanding of project requirements and 
processes, the cost of providing advisory services, and information relating to individual consultants on 
each team. In fact, the experience of individual consultants in each advisory team combined is more 
relevant than the reputation of the advisory firm per se (ICA, 2009:47). For the public entity to minimise 
the burden of managing many advisory contracts, a lead advisor can be contracted and allowed to 
subcontract other advisors. However, ICA (2009:51) argues that in more mature PPP markets, advisers 
are generally appointed separately in order to have the most appropriate advisers in each speciality. 
In order to draw the best out of the advisory team, the public agency should openly provide adequate 
information about all the agency’s PPP processes and decisions, to enable the advisers to understand 
the project objectives and challenges to provide valuable advice (ICA, 2009:47). For the public agency 
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to effectively track the performance of advisors, regular meetings should be scheduled as a tool for 
monitoring performance and taking corrective action. Furthermore, before proceeding to another stage 
of project execution, the advisers should sign off to confirm successful completion of the current stage, 
and also verify whether the proposals and timetables for the subsequent stage are realistic and 
achievable. However, in instances where the advisers are not comfortable with the project proceeding 
to the next stage, their objections and decisions should be formally recorded (ICA, 2009:51).  Finally, 
it is good practice to pay advisers in a phased manner upon successful completion of all the tasks of a 
given project stage or activity, to avoid paying for no work done or paying for substandard services. 
c) The Third (private not for profit) sector 
The third sector is the part of the economy or society which consists of non-governmental and non-
profit-making organizations or associations such as charity and voluntary groups, civil society 
organisations, and community cooperatives.  The roles of the third sector include, but are not limited 
to: advocating for citizen’s accessibility to equal and quality services from government; co-production 
of public services alongside and in collaboration with government (e.g. donating funds for construction, 
maintenance or operation of facilities ); provision of goods and services (e.g. legal services) to 
vulnerable groups without expecting compensation; supplementing government’s oversight 
responsibilities over PPP transactions (hence reducing government’s monitoring costs); and they are 
expected to work as “a go between” to other actors (government, private for profit companies, and the 
citizens) in order to build networks of trust, reciprocity and social capital for the smooth implementation 
of PPP projects (Amirkhanyan & Pettijohn, 2013:118). 
In conclusion, all project stakeholders should be collaboratively informed, involved, consulted and 
supported through effective and transparent communication throughout all the stages of the PPP project. 
In addition, establishing appropriate management processes in identifying and addressing stakeholder 
concerns, and reconciling their differences to realize everyone’s full support for achieving project 
objectives, is critical to the overall PPP project success. The next subsection discusses PPP development 
trajectory phenomenon with a special focus on selected African countries.  
3.3.4 THE PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY 
This subsection underscores the contribution of various factors in providing a conducive environment 
for PPPs, discusses the African PPP maturity context, and highlights strategies and steps for how 
countries can achieve a level of PPP mature markets.   
The pace at which PPP systems develop is contingent on a country’s social and economic development 
needs, and the capacity and willingness of both the public and private sector institutions to devote 
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sufficient resources towards creating robust PPP environments that would speed up the development of 
public infrastructure and service delivery improvements (Nel, 2014:49; OECD, 2007:30). Although 
both developed and developing countries are good at identifying development objectives, they, 
however, remain at different levels of PPP development. In fact, whereas developing countries fail to 
meet most of their infrastructure development needs because of resource capacity constraints and poor 
governance of PPPs, the developed world has had successful PPP regimes in almost all sectors. For 
instance, the world’s mature PPP markets are found in “the United Kingdom for schools, hospitals and 
defense facilities; Australia and Ireland for roads; and the Netherlands for social housing and urban 
regeneration” (Eggers & Startup, 2006:6). Nevertheless, less developed PPP markets are better placed 
to move more rapidly and leapfrog to more advanced stages of maturity than the present mature PPP 
markets were able to (Eggers & Startup, 2006:6). Such reasoning is premised on the assertion that 
emerging PPP markets not only have the opportunity of learning from and using more innovative PPP 
approaches already developed by PPP mature markets, but they also easily attract assistance from 
multilateral organisations such as the World Bank for building capacity and funding their PPP 
transactions (Eggers & Startup, 2006:6). 
Nearly every PPP subscriber admits that creating a conducive environment through a country’s clear 
and well-developed PPP Path improves infrastructure development in a sustainable manner. 
Notwithstanding the fact that several publications have hinted about PPP conducive environments, this 
section only contains a reflection on scholarly contributions made towards the development of mature 
PPP markets. Eggers and Startup (2006:6) assert that, under normal circumstances, countries 
systematically go through three stages of PPP development to realise full PPP maturity, that is moving 
from stage one to stage three (see table 3.6 below). 
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Table 3.6. Development stages towards Public Private Partnership Maturity  
Stage One Stage Two Stage Three 
 Establish policy & 
legislative framework 
 Initiate central PPP policy 
unit to guide 
implementation 
 Develop deal structures 
 Get transactions right & 
develop public sector 
comparator model 
 Begin to build marketplace 
 Apply early lessons from 
transport to other sectors 
 Establish dedicated 
PPP units in agencies 
 Begin developing 
new hybrid delivery 
models 
 Expand and help 
shape PPP 
marketplace 
 Leverage new sources 
of funds from capital 
markets 
 Use PPPs to drive 
service innovation 
 PPP market gains 
depth, as its use is 
expanded to multiple 
projects & sectors 
 Refine new innovative models 
 More creative, flexible approaches 
applied to roles of public & private 
sector 
 Use of more sophisticated risk 
models 
 Greater focus on total lifecycle of 
project 
 Sophisticated infrastructure market 
with pension funds & private equity 
funds 
 Public sector learns from private 
partner methods as competition 
changes the way government 
operations function 
 Underutilized assets leveraged into 
financial assets 
 Organizational & skill set changes 
in government to support greater 
role of PPPs 
Source: Eggers and Startup (2006:6) 
All the conditions at each stage have to be met before moving to the next one, unless a country’s PPP 
systems have been exposed to a leapfrog effect. The majority of developing countries are still at stage 
one and a few at stage two, while the majority of the developed countries are at stage two and a few at 
stage three of the PPP development trajectory.  
The Infrascope report (2015) by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Ltd assessed the maturity of 
PPP environments in 15 African countries relating to dimensions of legal and regulatory framework, 
institutional framework, operational maturity, investment climate, financial facilities, and subnational 
adjustment factor, with weight scores of 25%, 20%, 15%, 15%, 15% and 10% respectively. Note that, 
the higher the weight score assigned to a factor, the greater its impact on PPP maturity. In this study, 
the results from the Infrascope report (2015) have been recomputed to have weighted scores per factor 
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in order to rank factors and countries according to their level of PPP maturity, as reflected in table 3.7 
below. Formula used to calculate the weighted score per factor is as follows: 
Weighted score per factor = 
𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
100
∗ 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
Table 3.7. Public Private Partnership enabling Factors’ and Countries’ Performances in 
 Africa  
Developed from the Infrascope data report (2015:12-22) 
As of 2015, apart from investment climate, the rest of the individual factors perform below average. In 
comparing the degree of PPP maturity of the individual factors, investment climate is performing better 
with a 54.1% weighted score, followed by legal and regulatory frameworks (47.9%), institutional 
frameworks (40.6%), financial facilities (40.4%), operational maturity (39.2%), and subnational factor 
(36.7%). It is also observed that the pattern of the individual factors’ contributions may not exactly be 
consistent with the total scores across countries. For instance, South Africa which has the highest total 
score of 70.7, is instead the worst performer on the dimension of investment climate (with a 6.96 score) 
among the 15 countries.  
Although Africa’s PPP maturity has been improving substantially in the recent past, its PPP 
environment is still wanting since out of the 15 countries used in this study, only four countries scored 
above average and none of the countries scored above 70.7.  In addition, Africa’s PPP maturity on the 
global scale is still lagging behind. For example, a similar study that was carried out in Asia-Pacific in 
2014, shows ten countries having scored above average and the highest scores were 91.8 and 88.1 
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(Infrascope Report, 2014:15). The Infrascope report (2015:9-11) attributes Africa’s PPP maturity 
problem to: lack of robust local hedging instruments and financing markets, and overreliance on 
external financing; lack of or improper harmonisation of PPP practices among ministry level agencies, 
and between national and sub-national levels; political distortions; lack of effective stakeholder 
engagement over tariffs, tolls and fees; slow progress in the passing of PPP laws and low speed in 
project development; for some countries  fiscal risks and public debt are not factored into fiscal 
frameworks; and many countries have relatively good PPP laws but their implementation is always 
compromised.  
From the results in table 3.7 above, we construct a PPP development curve using four PPP market 
classifications with their respective score ranges, as shown in figure 3.9 below. 
 
Figure 3.8. The PPP Maturity Curve for Selected Countries Across Africa 
Developed using raw data from Infrascope report (2015) 
The PPP maturity curve above is developed from the total scores (degree of maturity) of each country, 
which are used to determine countries’ rankings and the PPP market development category to which 
each country belongs. With reference to the figure 3.8 above, the Democratic Republic of Congo is at 
the bottom end of the maturity curve because its performance is too weak across PPP enabling factors, 
except for sub national and investment climate factors on which average performance is realized. 
Meanwhile, South Africa tops the rest of the countries and performs better than all the other countries 
on each of the PPP enabling factors, except for investment climate. South Africa’s poor investment 
climate can be attributed to xenophobic acts, violent demonstrations, continuous political unrests such 
as the past “Zuma must fall movement” and the current “land expropriation without compensation 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 77 
 
campaign” by the Economic Freedom Fighters and the governing African National Congress, 
unpredictable national currency value, and the country’s past record of racial discrimination. Generally, 
the majority of the countries lie in the emerging PPP market category but with varying degrees of PPP 
maturity. 
In conclusion, for developing countries to register tangible PPP transitioning, their governments need 
to: develop sound PPP frameworks aligned to project lifecycle processes;  understand and use 
appropriately the existing PPP innovations across the global to hedge against negative risk impacts; 
develop PPP projects that fit with in their country’s operational situation and development needs; and 
they should begin to consider using PPP transactions to put to good use the previously underutilised 
and undervalued resources such as land and buildings to secure funds for developing new public 
infrastructure facilities.  
3.3.5 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP RISK MANAGEMENT  
Risk is the possibility of adverse events occurring and subsequently causing deviations in actual project 
outcomes or threatening the successful completion of projects (Aldrete, Bujanda & Valdez-Ceniceros, 
2010:16; Manrique Millones, 2010:34; Reim, 2009:7). As such, PPP risks arise from the uncertainty 
about the future occurrence of some events and their impact on project activities (Yong, 2010:15). 
Therefore, risk erupts when vulnerable PPP conditions is exposed to a threat (Burger, Tyson, Karpowicz 
& Coelho, 2009:5). Although some scholars have perceived risk to have negative as well as positive 
impacts, this thesis only subscribes to discourses that regard risk as having negative consequences. In 
fact, this section is anchored on the argument that, a positive impact on public infrastructure 
development and service delivery is only possible when PPP risks have been appropriately managed. 
Because PPP projects are conducted within a very diverse and evolving environment, they tend to be 
exposed to numerous risks. Common risks associated with PPP projects is included in table 3.8 below. 
Table 3.8. Classification of Public Private Partnership Risks 
Risk classification  Examples of risks 
Political  Nationalization of assets, termination of concession without appropriate 
compensation, political/public opposition, corruption, poor decision 
making processes 
Commercial  Inflation, fluctuations in interest and currency exchange rates, tariff 
changes, poor financial markets and hedging instruments, restrictions on 
currency convertibility and transfer of profits, price changes, changes in 
monetary policies, construction of competing alternative facilities (e.g. toll 
free roads), inability of government to pay creditors and other services 
providers, refinancing problems   
Legal change in laws and new policy enforcement, change in contract obligations, 
inappropriate legal and institutional frameworks, Poor contracts 
supervision 
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Relationship Lack of commitment from government or private party, poor organisation 
and coordination 
Planning and 
procurement 
Improper designs and specifications, high costs and longer planning time, 
changes in technical standards, poor solution to public need, inadequate 
competition for tender, land acquisition problems, delays in project 
approvals and permits, inconsistences in documentation, lack of experience 
to effectively handle PPP processes, poor negotiation,  excessive contract 
variations and late changes to designs 
construction Inadequate cost management, construction changes, poor quality, changes 
in site conditions, construction delays, protests, delayed approvals and 
permits, non-performance by  the private party, ineffective construction 
practices, conflicting or imperfect contracts  
Operating and 
maintenance 
Delay in operation, quality defects, high costs, shortage of skilled labour 
and labour disputes, poor maintenance schedule, inadequate cost 
management, late delivery of equipment and materials, changes in citizen’s 
service preferences, lower traffic volume, lower residual asset value, lack 
of supporting infrastructure, technological system outages,  contract 
violations, fall in the demand for services, partial or non-availability of 
services 
Force majeure Unforeseen weather conditions, geotechnical conditions, wars, natural 
disasters 
Developed from Manrique Millones (2010); Iossa, Spagnolo, and Vellez (2013); Thieriot and 
Dominguez (2015); Abednego and Ogunlana (2006); Eldrup and Schutze (2013); Rothballer and 
Kim (2013:46). 
The identification of risks by classifications in table 3.8 above intimates that PPP risks arise from 
different environments.  For instance, the political, commercial and legal risks are largely triggered by 
public sector structures and conditions of a country. The force majeure risks are mainly caused by 
natural, and to a lesser extent, by man-made conditions, and tend to be outside the direct control of any 
of the PPP parties. As for relationship, planning and procurement, construction, and operating and 
maintenance, risks relate to changing conditions within the project lifecycle mainstream activities, and 
these would be  easy to control when all PPP participating parties cooperate and are committed to project 
transactions. Therefore, PPP projects risks can be comprehensively known and effectively managed 
when they are identified by the source of their cause. Whereas some of the risks such as cost overruns, 
delays, and poor quality and documentation overlap across risk classifications, the frequency and 
magnitude of their impact differs within different PPP operating environments. 
3.3.5.1 Assessment of Key Mechanisms of Public Private Partnership Risk Management 
Given that most of the sections and subsections in this chapter in one way or the other tackle risk 
management issues, this subsection therefore only limits the assessment of risk to PPP forms, 
government guarantees, renegotiations, and risk allocation and risk management strategies. 
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a) Public Private Partnership Forms 
Connolly and Wall (2013:36) cite the sharing and transfer of responsibilities through contractual 
arrangements as one of the best ways to manage project risks.  In addition to contract terms and 
conditions, in a typical PPP environment, various forms of PPPs are used to distribute project 
responsibilities between the public and private sector parties as a means of containing the occurrence 
of risks and their negative impact on public service delivery outcomes. Table 3.9 below provides a 
narrative summary of the responsibilities assumed by the private and public sector actors in each PPP 
form. 
Table 3.9. Description of Public Private Partnership Forms 
PPP Form New or 
Existing 
Description 
Design-Build (DB) New The public sector contracts a private sector 
organisation to undertake most of the design work and 
all the construction tasks of the projects at a fixed fee. 
The provision of funding throughout the project, and 
the operating and maintaining of the facility after its 
construction is the sole responsibility of the public 
sector. 
Design-Build-Maintain 
(DBM) 
New The public sector contracts the private organisation to 
carry out the design and construction works, and 
thereafter maintain the facility during its usage. The 
public sector remains responsible for all the funding 
needs and operation of the facility. 
Design-Build-Finance 
(DBF) 
New The public sector contracts the private sector 
organisation to design, construct and provide partial 
or full funding for the construction phase. The public 
sector retains responsibility over long-term operation 
and maintenance of the project. 
Design-Build-Operate 
(DBO) 
New The private sector designs and constructs the public 
facility, and is handed over to the public entity upon 
completion. Thereafter, the public sector grants 
permission to the same private company to operate the 
facility for a defined period. In addition to having full 
ownership rights, the public sector is also responsible 
for funding the designing, building, as well as paying 
the private sector company for operating the facility. 
Lease-Operate-Maintain Existing The public sector leases a public facility to a private 
organisation for a definite period. The private partner 
becomes responsible for maintaining and operating 
the facility as per the leasehold agreement. However, 
the ownership and investment decisions of the 
infrastructure remains entirely a responsibility of the 
public sector. 
Design-Build-Operate-
Maintain (DBOM) 
New The private sector assumes the responsibilities of 
designing and constructing the public facility, as 
well as operating and maintaining the same facility 
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for a specific period. The public sector remains 
responsible for all financing needs of the project. 
Design-Build-Finance-
Operate (DBFO) 
New The public sector contracts the private company to 
design, build, operate, and finance all the project 
activities for a defined period, except the 
maintenance of the project and its associated funding 
needs remain responsibilities of the public sector. 
Design-Build-Finance-
Operate-Maintain 
(DBFOM) 
New The public sector contracts a private company to 
design, build, operate, maintain as well as financing 
all the projects activities for a defined period. The 
private sector receives payment for its services from 
the government. 
Concession Existing The government grants private company exclusive 
rights to operate and maintain an existing public 
facility to provide services to the citizens in 
accordance with government performance standards. 
During the concession execution period, the public 
sector retains ownership over the original asset, while 
the private company owns any improvements made to 
the facility. However, at the end of the concession 
period, the public sector fully owns the facility 
including all the upgrades. 
Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT) 
New The government grants a franchise to a private partner 
to finance, design, build and operate a facility for a 
specific time. Ownership of the facility is transferred 
back to the public sector at the end of contract period. 
The private firm receives payment from the service or 
facility users. 
Build Own Operate 
(BOO) 
New The private sector finances, builds, owns and operates 
the public facility in perpetuity. The private sector is 
not only entitled to all the rewards but is also 
responsible for managing all the project risks. 
Developed from Eggers and Startup (2006:5); U.S. Department of Transport (2016:4-5); Sanda, 
Daniel, Akande and Adeagbo (2016:7); Lammam, MacIntyre and Berechman (2013:8-10) 
The private sector has two options of participating in PPPs. Either by using the existing public facilities 
to provide public service, where it may be mandated to improve the facility too, or to build a new public 
facility that will be used for the first time when construction is complete.  According to Poole, Toohey 
and Harris (2014:107) PPP forms are the main determinants of PPP project risks allocation and sharing.  
When the public or private sector organisations take up less or more responsibilities, so are the number 
of risks they are set to manage. This behavioural trend is illustrated in Figure 3.9 below. 
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Figure 3.9. Positioning PPP forms in a broader setup of private provisioning of public 
 services 
Source: Author 
Sloping the grid from the DB to BOO, the private sector responsibilities and risks keep increasing, 
whereas the public sector’s responsibilities and risks are greater as it moves up the grid from BOO to 
DB, and the reverse is true for both parties. However, whereas public procurement forms of DBB, and 
service and management contracts on one hand, and divestiture on the other hand involve private sector 
participation in public service provisioning, principally they are not PPP forms, due to the facts outlined 
hereafter. With DBB, facility designs are made by public employees with minimal or no  private 
consultant input, a construction firm is only contracted for construction, specifications are input based, 
and operation, maintenance, and financing of project processes are sole responsibilities of government. 
For service and management contracts, these are purely outsourcing arrangements. Conversely, with 
divestiture the public sector transfers ownership of a public facility together with its service provision 
responsibilities to the private sector through a partial or an outright privatisation sale. However, in all 
these non-PPP private sector public service provisioning mechanisms, the government should regulate 
the actions of the private sector to ensure that the appropriate public services continue to be provided. 
Apart from divestiture, it is noticeable from figure 3.9 above that the public sector transfers greater risks 
to the private sector through PPP models than through any other contracting arrangements. 
b) Renegotiation 
Apart from Guasch, Benitez, Portabales, and Flor (2014) whose descriptions are close to a definition, 
none of the available scholars in the area of PPP renegotiation has taken an interest in providing a 
definition of renegotiation. In this subsection, we paraphrase Guasch et al.’s (2014:4) descriptions to 
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refer to renegotiations as,  negotiation processes which are focused on making changes to the original 
PPP contract due to significant changes in the current risk matrix assignment and contract conditions, 
as well as changes in the project scope that were never provided for in the contract. Whereas requesting 
changes to a PPP contract is an entitlement to all parties, in practice the private sector makes 
renegotiation requests more often than public entities. 
Although there is limited scholarly writing on renegotiation, PPP infrastructure projects are a common 
setting for contract renegotiations.  The frequency of renegotiation occurrences, the ever-increasing 
investment costs associated with them, and their occurrence shortly after contract signing, not only 
manifest imprudent risk allocation, poor contract design and implementation, but also an abuse of the 
good intentions for preventing failure or cancellation of contracts upon which renegotiation processes 
were conceived (Yong, 2010:22 & 50). Between 2004 and 2006, 33% of PFI projects of the central 
government in the UK, and  55% of the PPP contracts in the transport sector between 1980 and 2000 in 
Latin America were renegotiated (Poole et al., 2014:114; Guasch et al., 2014:3). In Hungary, during 
the construction of a concert hall in Budapest city, the project’s investment increased from 175 to 827 
Million Euros after renegotiation because the original contract lacked some technical features of the 
building (Dechev, 2015:233). Similarly, on the D1 motorway in Slovakia the financial commitments of 
the public sector increased from 7.822 to 9.128 billion Euros (Dechev, 2015:234). 
Using the examples of Latin America and the Caribbean, Table 3.10 gives an overview of the likelihood 
of occurrence and the speed at which renegotiations would take place in each of the infrastructure 
sectors after contract award. 
Table 3.10. Public Private Partnership Renegotiation Trends Across Sectors 
 
Source: Guasch et al. (2014:7) 
Based on the results in table 3.10 above, on average PPP contracts are renegotiated a year after contract 
signing, and they occur in about 68 out of 100 PPP projects. Comparing renegotiation incidence across 
sectors, the most affected sectors are water and transport with about 87% and 78% of their respective 
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total PPP projects being renegotiated, as well as being the only sectors where renegotiations take place 
within a time space of less than a year (0.8 and 0.9 years respectively) after contract award.  
In a real world situation, renegotiations seem to be spontaneously happening because PPP actors 
unilaterally focus on realizing their own targets rather than looking at renegotiations as a mechanism 
for providing improved public services over time. Yong (2010:50) argues that PPP renegotiations 
occurring worldwide are based on the “opportunistic behaviour of actors to secure extra benefits rather 
than a lack of completeness in contracts”. Consequently, renegotiations are becoming a critical problem 
to the implementation of PPP projects (Guasch et al., 2014:8). There are many drivers of renegotiations 
with negative consequences on PPP project success, as listed in table 3.11 below: 
Table 3.11. Common causes and Effects of PPP contract renegotiations 
 
Developed from Marques and Berg (2011: 926-927); Guasch et al. (2014:2-12); Dechev (2015:233-
235); Perkins (2013:8-15); Poole et al. (2014:114) 
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To ensure effective risk management through renegotiations, Marques and Berg (2011:927), Guasch et 
al. (2014:12-14) and Perkins (2013:15) suggest the use of measures that prohibit opportunistic 
behaviour, and those that emphasise effective management of renegotiation processes. The prohibitive 
measures include: having a freeze period for renegotiations (with a few exceptions), affording public 
entities powers to reject aggressive and reckless bids, PPP laws providing for a “no alteration clause” 
in the risk matrix during renegotiation, increasing political costs for accepting renegotiation demands, 
having higher bid and performance requirements, and encouraging competitive bidding (in exceptional 
cases) when additional investment on a project have been proposed. The measures for effective 
management of renegotiation processes include: having bidding documents that limit ex-ante and ex-
post opportunism behaviour, the PPP Unit playing a greater role in regulating contracts, establishing 
regulatory frameworks for ensuring transparent renegotiation processes, having a panel of experts to 
handle renegotiation concerns, having clear jurisdiction over the decision to renegotiate, establishing 
compensation and conflict resolution guidelines, negotiating for a fixed interest rate for PPP financing, 
and extending the duration of the contract as adverse economic conditions persist. 
Finally, Marques and Berg (2011:927) and Guasch et al. (2014:13) propose key principles that should 
be complied with when handling  renegotiation matters, which include: preserving the value for money 
of the contract, all parties must respect the original contract and each of them must provide an account 
of contract performance, the outcome of the negotiation should not provide any extra-ordinary benefits 
to any party, the renegotiation results should not change the risk allocation matrix, renegotiations should 
never be used as a way of correcting errors (ensure you have the right contract first time), and 
renegotiations should be restricted to outcomes beyond the PPP parties’ control and predictability 
capacity.  
c) Public Private Partnership Guarantees 
Literature has provided varied understanding of guarantees. As a result, guarantees have been vaguely 
defined (Irwin, 2007:1). In this study, guarantees are defined as protective instruments used to assure 
continuation of contract implementation or service provision amidst tough conditions. Given that 
guarantees are only performed upon the occurrence of risks covered under them, they are at times 
referred to as contingent liabilities or secondary obligations to the contract (Aldrete et al., 2010:20; 
Irwin, 2007:1). Both the private and public sector actors provide guarantees to one another. On the part 
of the private sector some of the guarantees it provides to the public sector include bid security (which 
is only refunded upon successful compliance with the bidding terms), and performance bonds (which 
can be claimed by the public entity only when the private company’s performance falls short of contract 
standards). Although bid security, performance bonds and many other guarantees from the private 
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sector are critical in enabling effective management of PPP risks, the discussions of this subsection are 
customised to government guarantees. 
With the numerous risks associated with PPP projects, the majority being beyond the direct control of 
the private sector, PPP projects tend to be less attractive to private sector investors. This problem is 
further aggravated by the fact that PPP projects require heavy private sector investment, yet revenue 
from these projects comes in after long periods of frequent investment, and payment is spread over 
many years. Consequently, the government uses guarantees to make PPP projects commercially viable, 
and to safeguard private sector interests (Aldrete et al., 2010:19; Irwin, 2007:1). However, failure by 
the public sector to cautiously allocate and share risks with the private sector, may cause the government 
to find guarantees very costly to implement. Examples of government guarantees used in PPP projects 
are described in table 3.12 below. 
Table 3.12. Types of Government guarantees 
 
Developed from Fisher and Babbar (1996: 26-28) 
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The descriptions of the various guarantees in table 3.12 above  indicate that each of the guarantees is 
suitable in specific conditions, and their impact on the government’ s risk exposure and the private 
sector’s incentives to execute its duties, vary across guarantees. In addition, Fisher and Babbar (1996: 
29) noted that a combination of guarantees can be used in a single project, as long as they complement 
one another or the conditions for their use ensue. Figure 3.10 below illustrates how government risk 
exposure increases or reduces because of providing guarantees that significantly or slightly secure the 
concessionaire’s commercial interest.  
 
Figure 3.10. Guarantees and their Degree of Risk Exposure to Government 
Source: Fisher and Babbar (1996: 28) 
The four guarantees in an oval shape in figure 3.10 above are most preferred because they significantly 
incentivise the concessionaire to perform the contract with less difficulties, and at the same time causes 
minimal risk impacts to the government. Although guarantees above and those below the oval shape 
(refer to figure 3.10 above) easily attract private sector participation in PPP projects, they, however, 
pose long-term sustainability challenges. For instance, because of the high risks associated with equity, 
debt and foreign exchange guarantees, the government may fail to fulfil its commitments in the future, 
especially where many projects are being undertaken and such guarantee claims have to be effected on 
almost every project. As for revenue enhancements, the public sector may fail to undertake critical 
future investments in some geographical areas and/or make wrong investment decisions by trying to 
protect private sector interests. Meanwhile, concession extensions delay project completion with their 
envisioned service impacts, and they are, as such, not the best option when the concessionaire has 
serious financial challenges that may require quick financial solutions. 
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Government guarantees other than those cited by Fisher and Babbar (1996) (See table 3.12 above) 
include: Political risks guarantees: The government commits itself to compensate the concessionaire 
for project risks caused by or within the direct control of the contracting entity or government as a whole 
(e.g.  “currency inconvertibility and/or non-transfer; confiscation, expropriation, nationalization, or 
deprivation of project assets; political violence, such as strikes or civil disturbances, terrorism, and 
sabotage that negatively affects the project; and breach of contract, such as non-delivery by state-owned 
entities of inputs, or non-payment for outputs”) (Tsukada, 2009:156). Tax and land acquisition 
incentives: Tax incentives involve exemption from registration tax on land acquisition, exemption of 
capital equipment from import taxes and duties, exemption or paying a lower rate of value added tax, 
and exemption from or a reduction in various appropriation charges. Further, with land incentives 
government may provide land to the private sector or government may use its sovereign powers to assist 
the private investor expedite the process of land acquisition without unnecessary delays (ESCAP, 
2011:48-49). 
Key recommendations that have been made in order to improve management of guarantees include: 
 Creating a reserve fund to meet guarantee obligations as they fall due (Aldrete, et al., 2010: 
22); 
 Incorporating guarantees costs/risks in project budgets and in national government budgets for 
better accountability and resource facilitation (Irwin, 2007:121); 
 Charging fees to beneficiaries of guarantees in order to avoid applications for guarantees, 
especially on trivial matters (Aldrete, et al., 2010: 22). This is already being implemented in 
India and Korea; 
 Sharing of guarantees with  concessionaires (e.g. partial credit guarantees)  and the citizens 
(e.g. transferring  part of the guarantee costs through taxes or user fee increments) (World Bank, 
2013:6); 
 Sound advisory teams and approval processes for assuming and honouring guarantee 
obligations (Irwin, 2007:106); 
 Instituting good accounting standards and promoting modern reporting (Irwin, 2007:113-114). 
3.3.5.2 Risk Allocation and Risk Management Strategies 
The decision for the private sector to participate in the development of public infrastructure and service 
delivery is conditioned on the effective allocation of PPP project risks (Marques & Berg, 2011:925). 
The ability of the private sector to satisfy public service needs, while realizing profits, are key issues to 
consider when making risk transfers. Otherwise, PPP projects may not attract enough competition to 
enable the contracting of world-class companies.  On the other hand, the public sector should not assume 
risks that it cannot effectively control nor should it transfer to other parties risks to which it is in the 
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best position to manage. As a principle, risk must be allocated to a party that is most able to manage it 
(Reim, 2009:7), at the lowest cost possible without compromising quality. For instance, the public 
sector can best handle most of the legal and political risks, and the private sector is more suitable for 
handling most of the project design, construction, and operation and maintenance risks (Lammam et 
al., 2013:13). Lammam et al. further suggest risk sharing for those risks (such as most of the force 
majeure risks) where none of the parties is in a better position to manage them.  
Although most PPP literature tend to portray risk allocation and sharing to be between the public and 
private sector parties on the one hand, and among the public sector actors on the other hand, this same 
practice is also a reality among private sector actors themselves. Under the special purpose vehicle 
arrangement, project sponsors redistribute risks allocated to them by the public sector through separate 
contract agreements with many other private parties. For instance, project liabilities and asset 
responsibilities, and capital contributions risks are shared by shareholders; design and construction risks 
are borne by Engineering procurement and construction (EPC) contractors; project materials and 
equipment provision risks are allocated to supply contractors; operating and maintenance risks are 
assumed by operating and maintenance contractors; and project debt financing risks are allocated to 
lenders (Alfen, Kalidindi, Ogunlana, Wang, Abednego, Frank-Jungbecker, Jan, Ke, Liu,  Singh & Zhao, 
2009:39-40) . 
Effective risk allocation in PPP contracts has proven effective to reduce operational financial costs and 
increase revenue collections, to provide incentives for sound management of PPP projects, and to 
minimise the number of renegotiation applications (Marques & Berg, 2011:926). However, PPP 
projects that have regarded risk allocation as inconsequential, have their operations characterised by: 
making of untimely and wrong decisions, miscommunication, mismanagement of project lifecycle 
processes, dissatisfaction of facility and service users, adversarial relationships between parties, and 
discriminative contract documents which protect public sector interests at the expense of interests of 
other actors (Abednego & Ogunlana, 2006: 632). On the other hand, Abednego and Ogunlana (2006: 
629) suggested six principles through which satisfactory risk allocation could be achieved:  
 risks must be well identified, understood and evaluated by all parties; 
 risks must be allocated to parties with the best capability to control their occurrence; 
 parties must have the technical capability to prevent adverse effects on project outcomes even 
when risks have occurred; 
 parties must have the financial ability to sustain the consequences of risks or prevent their 
occurrences; 
 parties must be willing to accept responsibility of risk management; and  
 risks must be allocated timely. 
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Similarly, Burger et al. (2009:9-11) provide general strategies for effective management of PPP risks, 
which include: 
 Risk avoidance. Where risky activities are not undertaken (e.g. opting for public procurement); 
 Risk prevention. Where an action is taken to reduce vulnerabilities (e.g. a consortium borrows 
in domestic currency to avoid exchange rate risk); 
 Risk transfer. Where risk is transferred to another party through a contractual arrangement (e.g. 
minimum traffic guarantees); 
 Risk retention. Based on experience, risks are allocated to parties with incentives to reduce their 
negative repercussions (e.g. designs risks for engineers, and policy changes for government); 
 Insurance. Where financial cover is made to guard against any loss that may accrue from a 
negative outcome. 
 
Overall, the effective management of PPP risks requires having and executing a thorough, rigorous and 
transparent PPP risk management and review process that are shared among the entire PPP project’s 
participating teams (see details in figure 3.11 below). 
 
Figure 3.11. Risk Management and Review Process 
Source: Yong (2010:18)  
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From Figure 3.11 above, it is observable that the identification and assessment phases are for 
establishing the projects’ exposure to risks, while the allocation, mitigation and review phases are about 
managing risks to which the project operations are exposed (Aldrete et al., 2010:16). Risk exposure 
phases (identification and assessment) assist in developing comprehensive risk lists, and documenting 
the likelihood or unlikelihood of their occurrence and the magnitude (very high or very low) of their 
impact on project objectives. While risk exposure management phases assist in developing workable 
risk management strategies and proposing best ways for their implementation, and providing guidance 
on how risk performance reviews for the whole project’s activities should be carried out and corrective 
actions taken. Finally, given the long-term nature of PPP contracts, continuous reviews and updates of 
the risk management direction should be a norm, since variations in the type of risks, and risk 
occurrences and risk impact levels, are inevitable as the project progresses. 
3.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
The main intention of this chapter was to provide information on how to create and implement prudent 
and well organised PPP governance systems and processes that can facilitate effective public service 
delivery. An effort in understanding PPP governance was undertaken, an analysis of key PPP 
governance issues was made and appropriate strategies on the effective management of the overall PPP 
operations were integrated within each of the issues presented in the chapter. The study established and 
discussed the key elements for effective governance of PPP projects, which included PPP best practices 
(PPP principles), critical success factors, stakeholder management, risk management, and PPP maturity. 
The next chapter will evaluate PPP international experiences and practices in the road sub sector.
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4 CHAPTER 4: INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP EXPERIENCES 
AND ROAD SUB SECTOR PRACTICES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Global experiences and practices are critical in informing the development of public infrastructure in 
PPP emerging countries. This chapter evaluates the impact of the global financial crisis on PPP 
investments, the role of road tolls in infrastructure development, and analyses PPP road practices using 
road cases from four continents. The relevance of this chapter is to enable the Ugandan road sub sector 
to draw lessons from other countries, particularly concerning the management of PPP financial 
challenges and road development interventions. 
4.2 THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
 INVESTMENT 
Financing forms one of the key pillars for PPP investment excellence. However, on the global scene, 
PPPs have experienced three waves of financial catastrophes - the Asian financial crisis of 1997/1998, 
the Dotcom bubble of 2000-2002, and the global financial crisis of 2008. In as much as each of the three 
periods has had undesirable investment results, the Asian financial crisis and the Dotcom bubble have 
had the most dramatic ramifications on the PPP investment growth across the world. Using consolidated 
data for projects that had reached financial closure from only the energy, transport, and water and 
sanitation sectors (PPI-World Bank database, November 2015), figure 4.1 below shows PPP growth 
trends between the period 1991 and 2015. 
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Figure 4.1. Investments in Public Private Partnership Infrastructure Projects, 1991- 2015 
Source: World Bank Group (2016:8) 
From figure 4.1 above, PPP investment grew steadily from $7 to $91 billion between 1991 and 1997. 
However, because of the setting in of the Asian financial crisis, which was followed by the Dotcom 
bubble, by 2002 the PPP investment had fallen to $21.9 billion. Furthermore, although the period 2005-
2012 saw a tremendous recovery in PPP investment to a growth value of $158 billion by 2012, 
unfortunately by 2013 a 40% decline in PPP investment had been registered. Such drop in PPP 
investment can be explained by the many and expensive interventions that governments were taking to 
avert the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, which automatically reduced  direct funding  for PPP 
projects (as explained in the subsequent subsections below). 
This subsection has provided an overview of how global financial crises tilt the trend of PPP investment, 
in context of the Asian, the Dotcom bubble and the 2008 financial crises. Unlike other global financial 
crises, the 2008 global financial crisis sets a new and unique trend, where PPP investment grows steadily 
amidst stiff global financial challenges. The next subsection (4.2.1) presents a discussion on the impact 
of the 2008 global financial crisis on PPP projects. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 93 
 
4.2.1 The Impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis on Public Private Partnerships 
Prior to the 2008 global financial crisis, PPPs relied on debt financing from banks and bond financing 
(from Project companies) that was insured through monoline “wrapped” bonds (Loxley, 2012:8). The 
bank loans was medium term financing running between 15-20 years,  which had to be subjected to  
project refinancing later, while bond financing was long-term in nature and spanned over 30 years  and 
above (Loxley, 2012:9). Although these two financing mechanisms had revived PPP investment, they 
were later suffocated by the collapse of the monoline insurance “wrapped” bond markets and the decline 
of the housing market due to subprime mortgage investments in the USA in 2007, and the bankruptcy 
of the Lehman Brothers (the 4th largest US Investment Bank then) in 2008 (Connolly & Wall, 
2011:535), which sparked the 2008 global financial crisis.   
The aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) saw governments experience reductions in revenue 
collections, foreign and domestic financing, and high unemployment coupled with a drastic drop in 
individual incomes, because the private sector’s capacity to sustain PPP investment was hanging in the 
balance. During this time many banking, pension fund and insurance institutions either pulled out or 
ran out of business, and a few that remained in operation have since then redesigned and tightened their 
financing incentives for investors. Consequently, the global financial crisis of 2008 exposed the public 
and private sectors to greater vulnerabilities, which until today continue to haunt PPP investments, as 
highlighted in table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1. Global Financial Crisis Threats, Vulnerabilities and Their Effects on Public 
 Private Partnerships 
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Source: Burger et al. (2009:10) 
Burger et al. (2009:8) attribute the PPP vulnerabilities, and public and private sector negative 
consequences during the GFC, to weaknesses in the project and contract structures, and institutional 
frameworks. These weaknesses included, among others, lack of hedging mechanisms (such as 
guarantees), lack of capacity to take appropriate action upon the occurrence of “guaranteed” risks, and 
the over optimistic forecasts (such as revenue and traffic). 
This study now takes a close look at country specific GFC impacts. In the United Kingdom, between 
2008 and 2009 the number of PPP projects dropped from over 60 (valued at £8.4 billion) to 25 (valued 
at £1.6 billion) (Loxley, 2012:10). This was not only a drastic fall in the volume of projects but also in 
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the PPP financial investment capacity. In Ireland, “six social housing PPPs were cancelled, a planned 
prison project was postponed indefinitely, and a metro Project was deferred” (Greve & Hodge, 2013: 
39).  In addition, from the evidence provided in table 4.2 below, PPPs in Korea, South Africa and 
Canada were more or less affected in a similar way by the global financial crisis. 
Table 4.2. Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Canada, Korea and South Africa’s 
 Public Private Partnership 
Canada  
 Difficult to secure long-term and foreign 
financing as foreign banks withdrew from the 
domestic market 
 Lenders were no longer willing to take up 
project and refinancing risks because the 
Canadian dollar was beginning to be  unstable 
 Formerly approved PPP projects were now 
being implemented under the public 
procurement option 
 Difficulty reaching final agreements because 
of risk sharing challenges during negotiation 
 Lack of capacity by credit market to handle 
large projects that were over $500 million 
Korea  
 In 2009, a 10% reduction in annual port 
traffic was registered 
 Reduced profitability for PPP projects at 
operation stage 
 Delay to implement projects because of lack 
of funding and prolonged negotiations as 
parties are hesitate to assume risks 
 By 2008, 30 %  of the planned PPP projects 
were never implemented 
 Increased speculations of a further decline in 
future private investment 
 Increased interest rates and reduced  
accessibility to project financing 
 
South Africa 
 Reduced profitability and returns on equity 
 Increased risk aversion  of government 
 lower access to financing  
 lower demand for facilities with a usage 
charge 
 Reduction in PPP investment 
Modified from Burger et al. (2009:16) 
Amidst such stiff economic challenges, governments were expected to come up with measures for 
bailing out and supporting private sector financial recovery, protecting citizens against declining 
incomes (Burger et al., 2009:3), as well as ensuring that PPP projects continue to be executed 
successfully against all odds.  
4.2.2 Responses and Recommended Measures to Minimize the Impact of the Global Financial 
Crisis on Public Private Partnership Performance 
Several measures have been suggested and others implemented as strategies for ensuring that PPPs 
continue to excel during turbulent financial times. This subsection first presents measures that have 
been recommended by scholars, and later provides specific measures that some countries have 
implemented to contain the negative effects of the GFC crisis.  
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4.2.2.1 Recommended measures for minimising the negative impact of the global financial crisis on 
PPP projects 
In response to the GFC effects on European PPP projects, the EPEC (2009:16) recommended the use 
of up-front and forward government payments, and an increase in multilateral lending. Up-front and 
forward payments are common with availability and revenue- based projects, where up-front payments 
are used in favour of the private sector when the private sector is more financially constrained than the 
public sector, and the reverse is true for forward payments. Turning to multilateral lending, multilateral 
institutions can either provide third party guarantees (such as letters of credit) or directly fund PPP 
projects. A practical example is the European Investment Bank, which introduced a “€1 billion Loan 
guarantee instrument for Trans-European Transport Network projects in 2008, and also temporarily 
expanded its lending capacity by 40% (€106 billion) between 2009 and 2010 in order to address GFC 
problem in Europe” (Loxley, 2012:13). 
Burger et al. (2009:8-21) suggested generic, but comprehensive, measures for reducing PPP 
vulnerabilities prior to and during financial crises, as pointed out below: 
 Robust public investment planning based on project prioritization, future financial implications, 
and benchmarking with international experiences; 
 Adequate distribution of risks between the government and the private sector; 
  Sound and detailed legal frameworks, which can provide assurance to the private sector that 
contracts will be honoured by the public sector; 
 Regulations limiting aggregate government risk exposure, which should be consistent with 
existing fiscal frameworks;   
 Building the capacity of public entities to manage risks, and improve their reputation by 
minimising political and regulatory risks; 
 Financial transparency through comprehensive disclosure of PPP related risks and liabilities in 
fiscal accounts to mitigate against bypassing expenditure controls or to avoid securing private 
financing against expensive contractual obligations;  
 Providing step-in rights to government to either re-tender the project or take over project 
operation in case of contractor failure; 
 Contingent or “strip switch” measures. These are temporary measures subject to withdrawal 
the moment the economy or the private sector recover from the shock. Such measures may 
include debt-equity switch, government financing, interest rate and output based subsidies, and 
revenue enhancements. 
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4.2.2.2 Country specific responses in protecting PPP projects from the impacts of the global 
financial crisis 
In tandem with scholarly recommendations above, at the height of the GFC, governments across the 
globe took specific interventions to boost PPP attractiveness in their countries. Although all countries 
responded in one way or the other to the GFC, this subsection only focusses on interventions that have 
been taken by UK, Canada, Korea, and Ireland, as presented below. 
4.2.2.2.1  The United Kingdom 
In 2009, the UK government established the Treasury Infrastructure Funding Unit (TIFU), whose sole 
purpose was to execute the co-lending strategy in order to tackle the banking liquidity problem that PPP 
projects and private sector actors in particular were experiencing (Svigelj & Hrovatin, 2013:84; Jennett, 
2010:3). TIFU is a government funding facility within the HM Treasury, which lends directly to PPP 
projects when the private sector cannot secure enough funding from commercial banks to complete 
projects on time. Although TIFU lends on “exactly same terms as commercial banks”, it never competes 
with private sector funders for borrowers, because it “acts as a lender of last resort” (EPEC, 2009:19; 
Loxley, 2012:13). The financing role played by TIFU has restored private sector confidence, and has 
also enabled more PFI projects to be completed on time. For instance, in 2009 TIFU extended a £ 120 
loan assistance to the Manchester Waste PFI project, and in 2010 alone, 32 PFI deals valued at £4.6 
billion reached closure (Loxley, 2012:13). 
4.2.2.2.2 Canada 
The PPP Canada Corporation was established in 2008 with a PPP fund of $1.2 billion to develop private 
market and supplement private sector financing (Burger et al., 2009:18). The PPP fund provides loans 
and loan guarantees, and offers non-repayable and repayable financial contributions (Loxley, 2012:14; 
Svigelj & Hrovatin, 2013:85). Other Government funding facilities that were started because of the 
GFC by which PPP projects benefited include the $8 billion Building Canada Fund, and the $2.1 billion 
Gateway and Border Crossing Fund (Loxley, 2012:14). 
Furthermore, the government of Canada got committed to ensuring that provinces and municipals 
develop their own PPP markets, institutions and programs. For instance, the City of Ottawa established 
a PPP office, while Alberta province’s 2008 budget set aside $6 million as alternative financing for 
capital projects (Burger et al., 2009:18). In British Columbia, “milestone payments, co-financing, 
funding competitions, short-term financing, foreign exchange risk protections, and sharing of co-
financing risks for some projects were introduced”. In addition, rather than the common 90% debt and 
10% equity contribution, with the “Fort St. John Hospital and Residential care and Royal Jubilee 
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Hospital projects, equity contribution was increased to 20% for contractors” (Loxley, 2012:14). On the 
other hand, in Ontario province, procurement procedures were strengthened. For example, “a two-stage 
bidding method was introduced, where the financial proposals are submitted and evaluated before 
technical proposals. In addition, the bidders are required to provide evidence relating to stability of their 
financial proposals, and to confirm their ability to reach financial closure regardless of future credit 
market disruptions by providing required securities” (Loxley, 2012:14-15). 
4.2.2.2.3  Korea 
According to Burger et al. (2009:18) and Svigelj and Hrovatin (2013:85), the government of Korea 
introduced fiscal interventions in order to minimise the financial burden on PPP projects during the 
GFC.  These government interventions include: 
 Lower equity capital requirements on concessionaires (5-10%); 
 A higher ceiling on guarantees (50%) is provided by the Infrastructure Credit Guarantee Fund, 
specifically for large-scale projects; 
 Help in changing equity investors for some projects; 
 Compensation for the preparation of proposals to encourage more vigorous competition during 
bidding; 
 Sharing of interest rate risks with concessionaires; 
 Compensation for excess changes in base interest rates through the grading of risks at the time 
of the concession agreement; and  
 Shorter periods for readjusting benchmark bond yields. 
4.2.2.2.4 Ireland 
Prior to the GFC, PPP road projects were based on revenue based contracts, which required road users 
to pay toll fees. After the GFC explosion of 2008, the government made a change in policy. Currently, 
all the new roads being constructed in Ireland are contracted on availability-based schemes rather than 
the previous tolled systems (Reeves & Palcic, 2017:11). This implies that demand risks are now being 
shared between government and private actors, unlike the tolled road systems which almost transferred 
all the demand and traffic risks to the private sector. As a safe guard measure though, the government 
should pay a fixed fee per unit on condition that the private entity complies with the performance and 
availability requirements (Reeves & Palcic, 2017:12). 
Although the focus of discussion has been limited to four countries, similar measures have been applied 
elsewhere. For instance, like Canada and UK, government PPP Fund facilities are also active in the 
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USA, and the availability-based contracts for road PPP projects being used by Ireland have also taken 
root in Spain, Portugal and the USA. 
In summary, this section uses the GFC as a case study to generally indicate how financial risks and their 
impacts can be mitigated to ensure sustainable PPP improvements. Whereas the public sector seems to 
absorb most of the consequences to the crises, it is noted that the private sector is capable of providing 
guarantees as well. As governments take a lead role in addressing crises challenges, they should never 
give leeway to imperfect market actors to play games against public interests (Greve & Hodge, 
2013:217). In conclusion, no matter the type of crisis (whether financial, political, social etc.) PPP 
projects challenges are responded to in different ways. Common measures that have been taken include 
abandoning projects, rebranding and redesigning projects, making marginal changes to existing 
projects, tightening value for money analysis and decision making processes, maintaining the status 
quo, actors taking up new responsibilities, and sharing of responsibilities through partnership 
arrangement (Greve & Hodge, 2013: 218-219). 
4.3 TOLLING FOR ROAD INFRASTRUCTRE DEVELOPMENT 
With the prevailing revenue gaps for public infrastructure development, governments across the world 
can no longer only rely on excise duty fuel charges to meet road infrastructure development needs. 
Several supplementary financing mechanisms such as tolling, motor vehicle licencing and inspections, 
and ancillary revenues among others have been introduced. Tolling, in particular is not only being used 
as a way of recouping the costs of road construction, operation and maintenance but also as an effective 
means of managing road usage. Whereas Mbara, Nyarirangwe and Mukwashi (2010:152-157) affirm 
that tolling reduces traffic jams on previously congested routes, improves road safety and efficiency, 
and generates revenue for road infrastructure financing, they, on the other hand, acknowledge the 
presence of challenges which may override its benefits, in case decision making processes lack 
precision. Such challenges include: poor forecasting of initial traffic and revenue performances, 
payment defaults, debt restructuring, delays to maintain and upgrade roads, opposition from special 
interest groups, and it is also noted that countries without a history of road tolls often do not afford 
investing in PPP toll roads and the public is usually disinclined to pay for road usage (Mbara et al., 
2010:156-158). 
In this thesis, we refer to road tolling as the process of assessing and charging fees on vehicles passing 
on designated roadways depending on either or a combination of the distance travelled (kilometres), the 
vehicle category and the transport function each serves, road section used, time duration taken (hours), 
and time of the day or the day of the week when the road is used. Toll fees may be executed through 
manual systems where payments are made on the spot (except for shadow tolls where payment is made 
at a later time) to the toll collector at a toll gate (toll booth or plaza), or using electronic systems that 
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automatically detect and classify vehicles for billing purposes through long range global satellite 
navigation, and short range microwave and mobile communication technologies (Kelleher, 2014:73-
74; Kapsch TrafficCom IVHS Inc, 2013:7). According to Tsukada (2009:158), where a toll road is a 
general user facility, a combination of manual and electronic tolling systems should be used to serve 
the differing paying interests of the various categories of users. Globally, the majority of the countries 
use the BOT road tolling model, apart from a few countries such as the United Kingdom which apply 
the DBFO model, but with less or without the application of BOT at all.  
This subsection, at a glance, justifies the importance of tolling for road infrastructure development, 
defines the tolling concept in context of roads, and briefly describes how tolling is applied from a 
generalised point of view. In the next subsections, tolling is being discussed in relation to financing, 
demand management and global practices. 
4.3.1 Tolling as an Instrument for Road Infrastructure Financing 
In most PPP project collaborations, payment to the private sector contractor is not effected before, 
during and immediately after construction, but during the operation and maintenance of the road facility. 
The two commonly used financing mechanisms in meeting the payment demands of the private sector 
are based on user pay principle and shadow tolls. The user pay principle is at times referred to as “real 
tolls” (Brown, Pieplow, Driskell, Gaj, Garvin, Holbombe, Saunders, Seiders Jr & Smith, 2009:19) or 
“hard tolls” (Burke & Demirag, 2015:193), and these are road fees that are paid directly by the road 
users themselves. On the other hand, the shadow tolls are fees either paid fully or subsidised by the 
government based on the demand or number of users. In the UK, for example, traffic volume based 
payments depend on per kilometre travelled per vehicle in line with the toll fees structure, which keeps 
changing over time in accordance with the set index formula. In fact, as traffic bands/volumes increase, 
lower payments are made by government (and the reverse is true), but no additional returns are offered 
to the concessionaire beyond the maximum traffic revenue generated, unless the contract stipulates 
otherwise. 
Although most literature generalises shadow tolls charges to be solely determined by the traffic volumes 
on the road facility (Perkins, 2013:15; OECD, 2008:199), countries such as the UK, Portugal and Spain 
link shadow toll fees not only to traffic volume, but also to performance and availability payments 
(Brown et al., 2009:19). Availability and performance payments are “fixed unitary payments” by 
government to the private company as long as performance and availability requirements, as delineated 
in the contract, have been adhered to irrespective of demand (Dochia & Parker, 2009:3; Burke & 
Demirag, 2015:193). Whereas availability payments depend on the lane availability, asset safety 
features, road surface quality, vehicle class, and vehicle journey time reliability, performance payments 
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are based on timely maintenance works, adequate safety and traffic flow control measures, and 
proactive response to accidents and weather vagaries (Perkins, 2013:15; Burke & Demirag, 2015:193).  
The revenues from hard tolls are supposed to be sufficient to meet the private sector’s payment needs, 
together with road operation and maintenance service needs, with little or without the taxpayer’s 
financial contribution. The minimum revenue to be claimed by the private company is predetermined 
and any revenue collected above the minimum level has to be shared between the public and private 
sector organisations. However, where the revenue collected is below the projected minimum level, the 
government either increases user toll fees, lobbies for grants or provides subsidies (Burke & Demirag, 
2015:193). Taking a general perspective of tolls, whereas Rothballer and Kim (2013:32) argue that the 
majority of the citizens and politicians hate tolls especially for “previously free infrastructure”, on the 
contrary Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2009:21) state that road users are willing to pay tolls when new 
and quality roads are constructed or existing roads have been “substantially upgraded and improved”.  
For instance, the toll revenue on the Indiana toll road in the USA doubled after being upgraded and 
constructed as a PPP in 2006 compared to its previous performance under direct State management and 
ownership (Engel et al., 2009:21).  
In addition, something that is emerging, though not a universal condition for toll revenue generation, 
but worth highlighting in this subsection, are ancillary revenues. As is the practice on most of India’s 
expressways, ancillary revenues not only act as viability enhancement schemes for PPP projects to the 
private sector, but also an innovative mechanism of supplementing revenues from road tolls for 
government (Asian Development Bank, 2015:22). According to Brown et al. (2009:19) ancillary 
revenue mechanisms are commercial developments and land use arrangements along the roadways that 
provide extra funding for road development. Rothballer and Kim (2013:32) identified three ways 
through which ancillary revenues can be generated. The first one being the continuous receipt of funding 
from businesses such as retail outlets, advertising, accommodation, cross-selling, renting out space for 
fibre-optic cables along the highway, service stations, restaurants, and utility corridors. The second one 
is the buying of land before publicly announcing a PPP project, and later selling it at incremental prices 
or leasing it to real estate developers as project activities commence. The last one is where government 
subjects an added annual property tax levy to all the land within a certain distance of the enhanced or 
developed facility. 
Finally, Tsukada (2009:158) and Rothballer and Kim (2013:32) suggest key strategies for designing an 
effective toll fees structure and enforcement process to include:  
 Ensuring that newly constructed or upgraded facilities improve the quality of service, and the 
value added therefrom is appropriately communicated to the citizens; 
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 Instituting differentiated toll rates by adjusting charges according to time, location, usage, and 
vehicle category; 
 Using payment mechanisms that maximize productivity, but remain accessible to all users. For 
instance, as e-tolls are introduced, manual payment systems should continue to be used in order 
to meet the interests of the poor and those that are less adaptable to electronic systems; 
 Implementing effective payment procedures by having relevant legislation, competent  and 
professional enforcement teams, and taking necessary precautions to detect illegal usage; 
 Mitigating the adverse social consequences of user charges by providing alternative 
infrastructure facilities, and subsidies or reduced tariffs for vulnerable parties and groups at 
risk; 
 Concession agreements should provide for potential inflation by linking the level of tolls to 
either consumer price index or wholesale price index. 
This subsection provided an understanding of the various ways through which tolling supports the 
financing of road infrastructure development. In addition to the direct toll revenue payment 
approaches (i.e. real tolls, shadow tolls, and availability and performance payments), an indirect 
revenue generation approach of ancillary revenues which boosts revenues from toll roads has been 
discussed. Finally, strategies on how toll revenue contributions can be improved have been 
suggested. In the next subsection, the management of demand for toll roads is presented.  
4.3.2 Tolling as an Instrument for Transport Demand Management 
Although road user tolls provide financing for accelerating and fast-tracking road infrastructure 
development, they are, however, capable of diverting traffic volume to toll free parallel roads, which 
are usually of inferior quality, low speed, less safe and located in areas that are more sensitive to air and 
noise pollution (Kelleher, 2014:86; Rothballer & Kim, 2013:32). Other factors notwithstanding, the low 
appetite for toll roads is normally caused by the enforcement of prohibitive road user charges. For 
instance, “around 2005 the majority of the road users in Japan avoided travelling on toll roads because 
the standard toll rates had been increased to 150 Japanese Yen (JPY) plus 24.6 JPY per kilometre for 
passenger vehicles, and while the charge for large vehicles almost doubled, a situation that led to 
congestion, safety and environmental problems on non-tolled routes” (OECD, 2008:146). A similar 
example can be drawn from Zimbabwe, where the residents of Bulawayo sued and won a court case 
against government over a tollgate located on the 13.5 km peg on the Bulawayo Victoria Falls road, on 
the grounds that  they were never consulted over the introduction of toll fees in addition to lack of 
alternative routes, which forced them to pay daily toll fees as they travelled to the city of Bulawayo for 
household shopping, social interactions, business and work purposes (Mbara et al., 2010:165-166). 
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Furthermore, according to an empirical study carried out on 14 Australian toll roads by “Li and Hensher 
in 2010”, it was discovered that, on average traffic volumes fall short by 45% against projections in the 
first year of operation (Perkins, 2013:22). Relatedly, although Chung (2008:390) is cognizant of the 
fact that transport demand is difficult for any party to forecast and control, he maintains that the 
government has an upper hand over the private sector in managing traffic flow on toll roads, since it 
largely has control over town planning decisions which have a correlation with traffic volumes on most 
road networks, the provision of competing toll-free roads or suppression of competing services, and 
land use in areas feeding into toll roads. 
Summarily, in view of the above reviews, the problems of transport demand for toll roads emanate from 
poor risk identification, lack of transparency, and improper risk uncertainty rating and management. 
Table 4.3 below provides the rating continuum (more risk vs less risk) for the various risk factors that 
affect traffic volume on toll roads. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 104 
 
Table 4.3 Demand Risk Characterisation for Toll Roads 
 
Source: Perkins (2013:16-17) 
The traffic risk indexing in table 4.3 above indicates that effective demand on toll roads can be realized 
when demand related risks have been well identified, understood, analysed, assessed and managed. 
Furthermore, as Rothballer and Kim (2013:29) noted, demand risk management for toll roads should 
be emphasised at project scoping (especially for tolled corridors), and at contracting and contract 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 105 
 
implementation (especially during risk allocation and sharing). Relatedly, OECD (2008:146) singles 
out the implementation of a flexible toll fee charging scheme as one of the best ways towards improving 
the demand for toll roads. 
Taking the phenomenon of a flexible toll charging scheme a little further, from the experiments that 
were carried out on a flexible tolling system in Japan in 2003, it was observed that discounting toll fees 
increases traffic volumes on toll roads. From the experiments’ results, “a 50% toll discount increased 
traffic volume to about 195% on weekends and national holidays in Aganogawa City, while a toll 
discount of approximately 50% in Hitachi City caused about 170% increase in traffic volumes during 
weekdays. Consequently, the length of queues on non-tolled roads decreased by almost half of the 
original length” (OECD, 2008:146). Literature further indicates that, globally, frequent users of tolled 
roads are often offered discounts over occasional users, a move that further improves usage of toll roads. 
Evidence to elucidate this assertion is as follows:  Before the European Commission issued a 13% 
discount cap in 2006 for European countries, frequent road users could qualify for up to 50% discount 
in Spain and 30% in France. Furthermore, in Portugal, local residents living within close proximity of 
the tolled sections of the roads were “allowed 10 free trips” and a 15% discount on subsequent travels 
(Ricardo-AEA, 2014:43-44).  Similarly, on the African continent, particularly within the Republic of 
South Africa, local residents who live near tolled road sections without alternative travel options are 
entitled to reductions in highway user charges (Rothballer & Kim, 2013:32). 
This subsection has discussed how demand for toll roads fluctuates depending on how perceived tolling   
risks have been managed. From the presentation provided, it is clear that most, if not all, demand related 
problems accrue from road user payment fees. Therefore, effective demand risk indexing, providing 
quality road facilities and services, charging  tolls on previously free roads only after substantial 
upgrades, consultation and involvement of the public when tolling road sections and introducing toll 
fees, transparency in all toll transactions, provision of alternative routes and modes of transport, and 
having a flexible toll charging scheme have been identified as sound solutions to low traffic volumes 
and the unpopularity of toll roads to the public. The next subsection presents country specific road 
tolling practices. 
4.3.3 Global Road Tolling Practices 
Whereas before the early 1990s tolling was mainly limited to non PPP constructed roads, today tolling 
of PPP roads has become an almost obvious practice across the globe. While it is appreciated that tolling 
can be applied to both PPP and non-PPP roads, in this subsection the discussion is angled towards PPP 
toll roads. Globally, countries have had varying PPP tolling histories in the road sub sector. This 
subsection draws lessons from PPP road tolling experiences of countries from different continents. That 
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is, the UK and Portugal for Europe, South Africa for Africa, India for Asia, and the USA for North 
America (as depicted below). 
4.3.3.1 South Africa’s Public Private Partnership Road Tolling Practices 
South Africa has approximately 19704 kilometres of national road network, out of which 3120 
kilometres (kms) are toll roads (SANRAL Annual Report, 2016:27; Tolmie, 2014:2). The South African 
National Roads Agency Ltd (SANRAL) manages and funds 1832 kms of the toll roads through capital 
and money markets loans, direct foreign investments, and issuing of government guaranteed and non-
guaranteed bonds. By contrast, the remaining 1288 kilometres of the toll road network is funded and 
managed by the private sector through special purpose vehicle PPP arrangements. Any proposed toll 
road project in South Africa is assumed to be viable if: it can generate more than 15% economic rate of 
return per annum after toll-related capital and maintenance costs have been paid; if its expected toll 
revenue collections can offset at least 30% of the outstanding projects’ costs in the form of capital 
market loans; and if the cost of toll collection over the project life cycle is reasonable (Pienaar, 
2012:702). 
The country mainly uses the BOT PPP model for toll roads, but at times with a few variants (e.g. 
DBFOM), and the maximum PPP contract duration is normally 30 years (SANRAL Declaration of 
Intent 2005-2008:17). For all the PPP toll roads, SANRAL over time engages only three government 
contracted private company partners to collect and use funds from tolls to design, construct, finance, 
operate and maintain toll roads as per SANRAL’s standards. These private companies are the N3 Toll 
Concession (RF) Proprietary Limited (N3TC), the N1-N4 Bakwena Platinum Corridor Concessionaire 
(Bakwena) and the N4 Trans African Concessions (TRAC). The road toll revenue contributions are 
only based on the “user pay principle”, and toll roads are supposed to have alternative routes (SANRAL 
Declaration of Intent 2005-2008:17; Tolmie, 2014:2), though the alternative routes need not be of the 
same standard as toll roads (Persad, Walton & Wilke, 2005:39). Standard toll tariffs differ in relation 
to vehicle classification, the toll road section, and the toll collection system. In addition, on the Gauteng 
e-roads, toll discounts are provided throughout the week, except during weekdays between 06:00-
10:00hrs and 14:00-18:00hrs for class A1 and A2 vehicles, and between 06:00-8:30hrs and 16:00-
19:00hrs for class B and C vehicles when no discounts are permitted. Generally, toll discounts vary 
based on the time of the day, the day of the week, public holiday, and the vehicle class. However, toll 
discounts are only awarded on condition that toll payment obligations have been made within the 
provided grace period. Furthermore, SANRAL account holders using the Gauteng e-roads are entitled 
to certain monthly caps per vehicle (which varies depending on the vehicle class) only when the toll 
transactions have been paid within 30 days of the invoice date (SANRAL adjusted toll tariffs schedule 
2017).  
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Toll fees are collected through three systems of traditional, electronic, and open road tolling collection 
systems (Republic of South Africa, A users Guide to Tolling). Unlike before the automation of tolling 
systems, road users are now able to use a single registered e-tag account and e-tag to effect payment at 
any toll plaza across the country. Whereas a congestion charge zone is operational in a few cities and 
urban areas (Matsiliza, 2016:5), intelligent transport systems which provide real-time information on 
the flow of traffic through online platforms are being used in the provinces of Western Cape, Gauteng 
and KwaZulu-Natal, not only to reduce congestion and its associated fees, but also to improve incident 
management and safety on toll roads (SANRAL Annual Report, 2016:25). 
By law, SANRAL is mandated to regulate tolling and also to adjust toll tariffs annually based on the 
consumer price index.  In addition to having issued new toll rates in 2016, SANRAL also provided toll 
exemptions to: vehicles providing public transport services, vehicles providing emergency services, 
vehicles adapted for use by persons with disabilities, and vehicles for specific non-governmental 
organisations or non-profit organisations on the Gauteng Freeway Improvement Project on the e-toll 
roads at N1 sections 20 and 21, N3 section 12, N4 section 1, N12 sections 18 and 19, and R21 sections 
1 and 2 (Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette no. 40508). These exemptions only apply when 
the vehicle owners have fully complied with the regulations for “Exemptions from and Rebates on the 
payment of Toll 2016”.  
4.3.3.2 Portugal’s Public Private Partnership Road Tolling Practices 
 
Table 4.4. Public Private Partnership Road Tolling in Portugal 
Portugal uses real tolls and shadow tolls to generate revenues for supporting PPP projects.  By 2009, 
the country had 2,500 km under PPP contracts, of which 1,400 km (55%) were real toll roads, 900 
km (37%) were shadow tolls roads, and while only 200 km (8%) were not tolled. In fact the PPP non 
tolled and free roads are often connector roads which are built by the concessionaire as part of the 
contract requirement. Portugal relies on both traditional and electronic systems of toll collection, 
though the traditional systems seem to be phasing out as all new roads being contracted now only 
use e-toll collection systems. 
Where the traffic volumes are projected to exceed 15,000 vehicles per day, real tolls are used and the 
concessionaire may be allowed to employ congestion pricing schemes. While, where the traffic 
volumes are projected to be below 10,000 vehicles per day, shadow tolls are the most preferred. The 
real toll revenue is based on a contract cap, while the shadow toll amount is a bid variable that is 
always subject to change during negotiations. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 108 
 
On average, Portugal attains a 12% traffic growth rate on its motorway system annually. Therefore, 
as traffic on these roads increases, the real toll revenues rise while the shadow toll contributions by 
the government keep falling. With PPP toll roads where the expected traffic volumes are modest, a 
combination of real tolls, and shadow tolls (which are based on traffic volume, availability and 
service performance) are used. However, the government is considering removing shadow tolls from 
highways where the real tolls have become sufficient in meeting project financial requirements, 
especially on urban commuter routes. 
Modified from Brown et al. (2009) 
4.3.3.3 United Kingdom’s Road tolling practice 
 
Table 4.5. Public Private Partnership Road Tolling in the United Kingdom 
Apart from a few motorways (e.g. M6 Toll) that use real tolls to secure private sector financing, many 
of the national motorways in the United Kingdom use shadow tolls that are based on traffic volumes, 
service and asset availability, and performance payment mechanisms. For a fact, UK PPP motorways 
use less of the BOT, but more of DBFO-shadow toll model. Under the UK DBFO model, the winning 
bidder is one that offers the lowest toll charge per unit of traffic with better availability services and 
performance competences. 
Modified from OECD (2008) and Brown et al. (2009) 
4.3.3.4  United States of America’s Public Private Partnership Road Tolling Practices 
 
Table 4.6. Public Private Partnership road tolling in the USA 
Toll rate setting varies between States. In some States, public entities directly control toll rates, in 
others its contract provisions that determine toll rates, and some provide the maximum rate beyond 
which toll rates cannot be increased. For instance, the rate of return on investment and the consumer 
price index (or any other inflation index applicable) in Minnesota and Florida respectively, are all 
toll rate provisions that require toll increases to be built in the contracts. In a few States (e.g. North 
Carolina and Tennessee) the toll charges are supposed to be removed from PPP toll roads, the 
moment the loan (debt) which is acquired for the development of such facilities has been fully paid. 
Majority of the PPP agreements include rate of return caps to ensure that the private firms do not 
make abnormal profits at the expense of roadway maintenance, construction quality, or reasonable 
user fees, and any profits made or revenues collected beyond the cap has to be remitted to the state 
highway fund (Federal Highway Administration 1992). The collection of tolls is done in various 
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ways, ranging from traditional tollbooths to video-based collection systems. Furthermore, most 
States apply the DBFOM PPP model, but with several variants (U.S. DOT, 2016:4-5). 
Across the States, the clauses of “comparable non-toll routes” and “non-compete” routes are common 
in PPP policies or contracts. Most of the States do not promote the maintaining of “comparable non-
toll routes” when PPP toll roads have been constructed, except for a few States (e.g. Arizona and 
North Carolina). While the “non-compete” clause (which stipulates that the public entity will not 
build another facility that would directly compete with the PPP toll road) is allowed by the majority 
of the States, with the exception of a few States (e.g. Alabama, Texas, California, Florida, North 
Carolina, Texas) where this is prohibited. However, with States that do not accept “non-compete” 
clause, they instead adopt the “compensation clause”, where a State agrees to compensate the investor 
in case of reduced revenues when an alternative route has been constructed.    
Modified from Iseki, Eckert, Uchida, Dunn and Taylor (2009), U.S. DOT (2016) and Baxandall, 
Wohlschlegel and Dutzik (2009). 
4.3.3.5 India’s Public Private Partnership Road Tolling Practices 
 
Table 4.7. Public Private Partnership Road Tolling in India 
Between the year 2000-2012, 125 toll projects (14,126 kms) were constructed in India. All the 
tolled highways apply the BOT (Toll) model, where the concessionaire recovers investment by 
charging fees from the users of the road facility. In case some BOT (toll) projects become non-
viable during implementation or receive poor response from the private sector, they can be turned 
into BOT (annuity) projects. However, from 2012 the response rate for both BOT (toll) and BOT 
(annuity) has been poor that the government has had to shift many projects to the EPC model. 
The main features of the toll policy include; 
 Uniform rates of user fees are charged on all national highways having two or more lanes, 
permanent bridges, bypass or tunnel forming part of highway. 
 The amount of toll fees payable is based on per kilometre of travel and the class of vehicle 
used. 
 Toll rates are supposed to be reviewed and adjusted annually based on inflation rates. 
 Discounted user charges are levied depending on the multiple journeys made in a day, or 
on a monthly basis for residents living in the nearby areas. 
 Local residents that make short journeys are entitled to a steep discount 
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 For toll fees exempt vehicles such as government vehicles, a 10% capital support is paid 
to the concessionaire as compensation. 
Both PPP toll and non-toll roads qualify for a maximum of 40% financial support from the viability 
gap fund scheme (created in 2005), on an equal distribution of 20% for capital expenditure costs, 
while the remaining 20% is for project activities during the operations stage.  
Modified from Asian Development Bank (2015) and Haldea (2013) 
In summary, though with a few exceptions, this subsection has provided tolling practices that cut across 
countries. Some of the common practices include: using both real and shadow tolls on a country’s 
national roads, applying both traditional and electronic means for toll collection, tolling policies 
providing for alternative routes, adjusting toll tariffs on an annual basis based on either inflation or 
internal rate of return, provision of discounts, enforcement of congestion pricing schemes especially in 
urban areas, and the provision of exemptions to vehicles that serve the interests of the general public or 
vulnerable groups. On the other hand, some of the rare tolling practices include: stopping collection of 
tolls on roads whose debt repayment has been completed, shifting PPP toll road contracts to EPC 
arrangements, and barring the construction of alternative routes. 
4.4 ANALYSING CASE BY CASE PPP ROAD EXPERIENCES AND PRACTICES 
The road cases used in this section were drawn from four continents, namely Africa, Asia, Europe and 
North America. Africa is represented by road cases from Nigeria, South Africa and Mozambique; 
Europe by cases from Croatia and Norway; North America by a case from Canada; and Asia by a case 
from India. The road cases used in this subsection were purposively chosen based on the available 
information that would provide a good learning point for a country like Uganda, which is in the initial 
stages of implementing PPP road projects. 
4.4.1 The Lagos-Ibadan Expressway project in Nigeria 
From the year 1978 when the Lagos-Ibadan expressway was first constructed until 2009, no serious 
road upgrades or maintenance took place, yet the road usage capacity, travel time and road accidents 
had been increasing year in and year out (Babatunde, Perera, Udeaja & Zhou, 2013: 437). As 
government continued to be financially constrained, coupled with the emergence of the private sector 
investment interests in long term public infrastructure projects in Nigeria, in 2009 the government 
contracted Bi-Courtney Highway Services limited, a private company for 25 years, to reconstruct, 
expand and maintain the 110 Km Lagos-Ibadan Expressway at an estimated cost of 89.53 billion naira 
under BOT arrangement (Iloh & Bahir, 2013:105). 
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Although the contract was for 25 years, the concessionaire was expected to complete the construction 
works in the first four years, and later use the remaining 21 years to maintain the facility, and collect 
tolls from the road users in order to recover investment costs and realize returns. Key specific project 
assignments included increasing the road carriageways from four lanes to between six and ten as per 
the designs, construction of parking areas especially for heavy duty vehicles and rest areas for 
convenience, and provision of emergency communication equipment for the welfare and security of 
highway users (Iloh & Bahir, 2013:105). 
Unfortunately, because Bi-Courtney Highway Services limited could not secure funding to execute 
construction work on time, in 2012 the government terminated the contract (Oluwasanmi & Ogidi, 
2014:136), and subsequently contracted two private companies (Julius Berger and RCC) to continue 
with the project. However, the failure of this concession cannot entirely be blamed on the private sector, 
when the public sector to some extent also failed to competently execute its mandate. After assessing 
contract documents and contract performance, Babatunde et al. (2013: 438) attributed the failure of the 
project to: inadequate PPP knowledge, skills and capacity from both private and public sector players; 
failure to engage external technical advisers; poor evaluation, monitoring and due diligence by 
government; use of non-competitive bidding; signing of contract without designs and evidence of 
financing; failure by the concessionaire to access credit from local and international banks; land 
acquisition difficulties; poor risk allocation among the parties and; the politicization of the concession.  
4.4.2 The Lekki Expressway project in Nigeria 
The Lekki expressway was the first and largest PPP toll road in terms of financing and scope to be 
constructed in the whole of West Africa. Given that Lekki expressway is the main road in and out of 
Lagos, the biggest commercial city of Nigeria with over 21 million residents, government found it a 
priority to improve the road’s previously derelict state and highly congested stretch between Lekki and 
Epe in the Lagos State (Osei–Kyei & Chan, 2016:174). Consequently, in 2006 a 30 year BOT contract 
between the Lagos State government and Lekki Concession Company (LCC) to expand and upgrade 
49.5 km of an existing road was signed, and in 2008 the construction of 20 km of a new coastal road 
was added to the contract (Babatunde et al., 2014:146-147). The project was estimated to cost US$450 
million, and the largest financial contribution was to come from the private sector. The funding 
institutions were the Government of Nigeria, African Development Bank, Standard Bank, and a 
syndicate of local Nigerian banks (United Bank for Africa, First Bank of Nigeria, and Zenith Bank) 
(Wamwere, 2016: 29). The private companies were to receive returns on investment through direct user 
toll collections, and the user toll rates had been estimated to range between 1-2 US dollars depending 
on the vehicle category (Babatunde et al., 2014:147). 
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The Lekki Expressway project has revamped transport services with outcomes such as improved 
security, road lighting, breakdown assistance, ambulance, customer call center, and a reduction in travel 
time from about 2 hours to 45 minutes (Kenny & Lavanchy, 2013:96). In addition, the project created 
over 635 temporary and 1146 long-term jobs, provided improved flora along the road with new green 
belts, and led to the development of the Lekki Free Zone, future Lekki International Airport, Lekki 
Hydrocarbon Park, and Lekki Deep Seaport (Osei-Kyei et al., 2016:175; Kenny & Lavanchy, 2013:96). 
These successes on the project were achieved because of many factors. First, there was commitment 
from government to the project, evidenced by the provision of about US$42 million mezzanine loan by 
the Lagos State Government (Babatunde et al., 2014:146), and land titles and rights which were timely 
issued and granted to the concessionaire to avoid any  construction delays (Osei-Kyei et al., 2016:175). 
Second, the project involved more of the local content in both construction and financial investments, 
which promoted community project ownership, better handling of national/local environment related 
project risks, and gaining more citizen support for the project. For instance, the Lekki Concession 
Company which is the SPV for the project, as well as financial institutions on the project, are Nigerian 
local companies, apart from a few institutions such as the African Development bank and Standard 
Bank. Third, the project financing agencies provided better lending terms to the project. For instance, 
Standard Bank extended “a 15 years loan of 2 billion naira in local currency at a fixed interest rate of 
13.9% and also exempted the project company from principal repayments for four years” (Wamwere, 
2016: 30). 
Although the Lekki PPP toll expressway is viewed as a model road project for West African countries, 
the project has had two main setbacks which any serious implementing agency cannot underestimate. 
The first factor is the direct user tolls. The charging of direct user fees has been criticised by human 
rights activists, and resisted by local residents and other road users to the extent that protests and court 
cases have been on the rise. For instance, when the project company was planning to construct three 
tollgates within a distance of 5 Km, this was strongly fought by the public, and this left the government 
with no option but to provide alternative roads (Oluwasanmi & Ogidi, 2014:137; Amadi, Carrillo & 
Tuuli, 2014:425), even when the Nigerian laws never provided for construction of alternative routes on 
roads where toll sections existed (Solicitor, 2012:3). Furthermore, as the public ceaselessly protested 
against direct user tolls which were claimed to be exorbitant, in 2010 the government introduced shadow 
tolls which proved to be unsustainable to the extent that as early as 2013 the government had already 
reverted to direct user tolls (Osei-Kyei et al., 2016:175). As pressure on direct user tolls continued to 
mount, the government had to acquire the project concession rights through buyback arrangements at 
an expensive estimated cost of N25.3 billion (U-Dominic, Ezeabasili, Okoro, Dim & Chikezie, 
2015:71). The second factor is alleged corruption. The public complained of gross corruption due to 
contracting the concessionaire through direct negotiation processes without clear justification 
(Oluwasanmi & Ogidi, 2014:137). 
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In view of the discussions above, the project challenges arose as a result of: the devaluation of Nigeria’s 
currency which shot up inflation to 35.2% between 2008-2013, and the concessionaire being given 
powers to increase toll fees without consulting government as long as the revisions were inflation based 
(U-Dominic et al., 2015:71); hurried and unpopular project decisions by government; and weak ways 
of integrating the public into project activities, lack of competitive and transparent tendering process, 
poor planning and unrealistic project costs,  and negative public perception about direct user tolls (Osei-
Kyei & Chan, 2016:179). 
4.4.3 The N4 Toll Road project in South Africa and Mozambique 
The N4 toll road is the first cross border PPP road transport project to be constructed in the whole of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The N4 toll road network, also referred to as the Maputo Development corridor 
stretches from Johannesburg and Pretoria in South Africa to Maputo in Mozambique. In 1996 the Trans 
African Concession, a private company, was awarded a contract through an open and competitive 
tendering process, which culminated into the 1997 signing of a 30 years BOT contract to finance, 
design, construct, rehabilitate, operate and maintain a 630 Km road network on the Maputo corridor 
estimated at a cost of R3 billion (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2016:176-177; Taylor, 2000:7). The contract was 
concluded between the governments of South Africa and Mozambique on the one hand, and the Trans 
African Concession consortium on the other. The concessionaire was given three and half years to have 
completed the construction works, which was estimated to cost R1.5 billion (PPIAF, 2009:92; Taylor, 
2000:7), and thereafter collect tolls direct from the users in order to generate returns on investment and 
also  operate and maintain the road facility. It was entirely the responsibility of the concessionaire to 
mobilise funds both in equity and debt to facilitate the construction phase of the project. 
In the original contract, the N4 toll road network was running from Johannesburg to Maputo, however, 
in 2004 the contract was amended to include the distance between Pretoria and Witbank on the 
development grid (PPIAF, 2009:92), which automatically increased the concessionaire’s 
responsibilities. Out of the overall 630 Kms that were to be constructed, 56 Km were in Mozambique, 
while the remaining 574 Km were in South Africa (Farlam, 2005:12). The undertaking of the N4 road 
project along the Maputo corridor was purposely to foster economic activities between the two 
Republics. Although South Africa was more economically sound than Mozambique, the two countries 
had infrastructure investment challenges because of their respective past long apartheid and civil war 
eras. As a consequence, PPP arrangements provided the best investment option, since “Mozambique 
never had the money for road upgrades and maintenance at that time, and similarly South Africa had 
accumulated a road infrastructure gap of R37 billion” (Farlam, 2005:9). 
Notwithstanding a few weaknesses, the N4 toll road is so far the most successful cross boarder and 
inner country PPP road project in SSA. Osei–Kyei and Chan (2016:176-177) mention that the N4 road 
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project minimised complaints from road users and local residents, created jobs for local residents, was 
delivered on time as per the contract, received positive customer responses about road quality, promoted 
better and reliable service delivery, and improved economic trade and cooperation between South 
Africa and Mozambique and the neighbouring countries of Namibia and Botswana, among others. To 
Taylor (2000:7) the project not only shortened the travel distance between Gauteng and Maputo by 150 
Km, but also reduced the travel time to about four hours. Similarly the road was upgraded to a four and 
a two lane separated carriageway with lanes wide enough to accommodate large hauling vehicles 
(PPIAF, 2009:92). Furthermore, the traffic demand on the N4 road grows at 5-7% for passenger vehicles 
and 10% for freight per annum, and the concessionaire provides standby response teams to deal with 
incidents, is committed to continuous maintenance and upgrading, and provides the safest infrastructure 
facilities using the latest technology (Bhandari, 2011:8). 
The positive achievements on the N4 toll road were achieved as a result of the close cooperation 
between the South African and Mozambique governments, the concessionaire, as well as the existence 
of situational factors. Osei-Kyei and Chan (2016:177-179) particularly  attribute the project’s success 
to: the use of companies that had expertise and knowledge in delivering construction projects within  a 
local context; the tendering of projects through transparent and competitive processes; appropriate risk 
allocations and agreements; application of innovative approaches to overcome traffic congestions; 
provision of discounts to commuters and local residents; constant public consultations on toll 
increments; existence of a 24 hour  road user help line and security surveillance service; the commitment 
and goodwill of government exhibited by guaranteeing of the concessionaire’s debt and equity; and the 
cordial relationship between successive governments and the concessionaire. Furthermore, the PPIAF 
(2009:94) argues that the N4 project was a success because: 
 South Africa already had experience in PPP toll road projects; 
 the corridor between Pretoria, Johannesburg and Maputo already had an established non PPP 
route well before the project initiation; 
 South African high toll revenue collections subsidise Mozambican low road user toll revenues;  
 of the availability of an efficient axle load control system along the corridor which minimises 
road damage that would come from overloading of trucks, and; 
 Gauteng and Maputo are major economic trade centres for South Africa and Mozambique 
respectively, and at the same time the Maputo port works as an alternative exportation port to 
Durban for South Africa.   
Though the N4 project sets the scene for self-reliance by African countries when investing in transport 
infrastructure, it had some implementation challenges. To some extent the project economically 
favoured South Africa over Mozambique. In fact, all the investment firms of the project were South 
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African companies, including the Mines employees and government official Pension funds, except for 
Bouygues, a French international construction company (Farlam, 2005:10; Taylor, 2000:7; PPIAF, 
2009:91). Furthermore, there was difficulty in harmonising dissimilar laws, taxation systems, currencies 
and company reporting standards of the two countries. Specific to the legislation, South Africa had a 
mix of Roman-Dutch, English-Common, and the Indigenous-Customary laws, while Mozambique’s 
laws were aligned to the Portuguese laws (Wamwere, 2016:22). Similarly, the N4 project started 
without a well-established PPP legal and institutional framework, especially from Mozambique’s side 
(Taylor, 2000:10). 
Finally, PPIAF (2009:93-95) cites allegations about the project having benefited only big companies, 
since small scale business firms had no capacity to invest in such a heavy and long term PPP investment 
project. On the other hand, it can equally be argued that big firms were at a great risk, since the two 
governments never provided subsidies to the concessionaire in case of a fall in the expected traffic 
volumes. In fact, actual traffic volumes fell below the project financers’ expectations (PPIAF, 2009:93) 
because of the unwillingness by the majority South Africans to pay for a road which previously had 
been free of usage, and the unaffordability by  Mozambique to pay toll fees because of widespread 
poverty in the country (Taylor, 2000:9). Allegations of corruption especially during toll fees collection 
also emerged, though camera systems were later installed at toll booths to detect any fraudulent practice 
(Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2016:177).  
4.4.4 The ETR 407 Highway project in Canada 
Given that a few scholars have done research on the ETR 407 Highway, the discussions in this 
subsection about the ETR 407 are based on only two research works of the UNECE (2012), and Persad 
et al. (2005). In addition, from the publications that was reviewed, other than the 149 Capital Beltway 
in Virginia, there seems to be hardly any PPP highway project in North America that provides 
significantly different experiences from the ETR 407. 
A brief account about the 149 Capital Beltway is given hereafter. Before the 2005 PPP agreement which 
allowed a private company to add four High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes on the stretch between 
Springfield and the Dulles Toll road, the  149 Capital Beltway had eight general use lanes that never 
attracted user charges. Whereas the eight general use lanes were to remain free of user fees, the four 
HOT lanes were subjected to user fees upon completion of their construction.  Figure 4.2 below, shows 
how the proposed four “HOT” lanes were going to be configured alongside the existing general use 
lanes. 
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Figure 4.2. A pictorial of the eight “general use” and the four “HOT” lanes on the Capital Beltway 
in a 4-2-2-4 lane alignment 
Source: Persad et al. (2005:17) 
The unique lessons emerging from the 149 Capital Beltway PPP contract are as follows: Buses, vans 
and cars with more than two passengers, and emergency vehicles were not supposed to pay tolls on the 
HOT lanes; and vehicles with less than three passengers on board were to pay user fees (based on the 
number of passengers in a vehicle, the congestion levels, and the time of the day); while trucks were 
prohibited from using the HOT lanes. In addition, there were serious lapses in the PPP agreement, in 
that, until the contract amendments of 2007, the 2005 agreement never provided for handover 
requirements and maintenance standards. 
In the remaining paragraphs of this subsection, the discussion is directed towards the performance of 
the ETR 407 Highway project. The ETR 407 is a 68-mile electronic open-access toll highway in 
northern Toronto which works as a bypass to Highway 401. Between 1993 and 1997, the province of 
Ontario constructed the ETR 407 road under the DBO framework with the purpose of decongesting 
Highway 401. After the construction phase in 1997, the private company was expected to operate and 
collect toll revenues from road users for 35 years to essentially enable government to recover the US$1.6 
billion bond fund it had used to construct the road. However, after 18 months of operation, in 1999 the 
government leased the road to Cintra-Macquarie, a private company, at a cost of US$2.1 billion to 
finance, operate, manage, maintain, rehabilitate and collect tolls for 99 years. According to the lease 
agreement, the lessee was obliged to comply with all the road safety standards set by the provincial 
government, and the official government vehicles were exempted from payment of tolls.  
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In order to control traffic and revenue generation on the road, the lease agreement introduced the 
congestion relief and expansion clauses respectively. The congestion relief clause allowed the 
concessionaire to increase toll rates based on traffic growth. However, in case the concessionaire 
increased toll charges beyond 2%, the provincial government of Ontario would be entitled to some 
revenue payment from the lessee. As for the expansion clause, both the contract and the road designs 
provided for the expansion of the ETR road sections after experiencing high traffic volumes, as opposed 
to constructing a parallel free road. In addition, the laws also assured the investor’s expected revenue 
gains by denying the renewal of license plates for road users who would refuse to pay toll fees. 
Surprisingly, with such measures in place, a few years into the operation the ETR project had become 
unpopular due to: increase in litigation cases from a new government (the labour party) which was 
against tolls, congestion fees, and the conditioning of license plate renewals on toll payment; the public 
continued opposing toll rate increases by the lessee (e.g. shortly after lease signing the company 
increased tolls by 200% at peak hours); the failure of the ETR 407 road to substantially reduce traffic 
congestion on the 401 road; the contract giving powers to the lessee to increase tolls without seeking 
government approval; the provisions for the “after every five years renegotiation exercise” were making 
the lessee too powerful to accept any future change proposals by government; and like the 80 years that 
were awarded to the private contractor to collect toll fees on the 149 Capital Beltway, the 99 year lease 
contract  for the ETR 407 Highway project has been viewed as a too long time to entrust the 
management of public facility to a single private consortium. 
4.4.5 The East Coast Road (ECR) project in India 
The discussion in this subsection about the ECR project is based on only one journal article from Rajan, 
Siddharth and Mukund (2010). Notwithstanding the fact that Rajan, in particular, has widely published 
on road PPP projects in India, this publication has attracted many readers and citations. This makes us 
submit that this article was well researched and gives a good representation about what generally 
happens on PPP road projects not only in Asia but also in other continents across the world, as per the 
descriptions below.  
As the quality of ECR continued deteriorating because of inadequate government resources to maintain 
the road network, the Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN) decided to upgrade and renovate the road 
through Rehabilitate, Improve, Maintain, Operate and Transfer (RIMOT) arrangements. Subsequently, 
in 2000 the GoTN contracted Tamil Nadu Road Development Company (TNRDC) for 30 years 
(excluding one year for construction) to upgrade and renovate 113.2 Km of the ECR at a cost of 600 
million rupees (Rs). In particular, the services under the operation phase included highway patrolling, 
ambulance services, breakdown tow away service, emergency call boxes, and at the end of the operation 
period, the entire management of the road facilities would revert to government. 
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During the implementation of the project a number of drawbacks were encountered, which included; 
the government’s failure, due to political pressure, to implement the 8% annual toll increments even 
though it had been provided for in the concession agreement; a ban on sand quarrying from a river bed 
situated along the project which led to a stoppage in the movement of sand bearing trucks on the road, 
yet the sand carrying trucks were expected to contribute about one third of the projected revenue; loss 
of revenue from State Transport Corporation buses due to discounts on monthly passes which were 
surpassed by 70% to 80%, as discount rates had not been linked to the number of trips per day and yet 
each bus made multiple trips a day; and construction inconveniences to the construction team due to 
the geometric design of the road which had several curves. In addition, 167 families were displaced 
because of the acquisition of 12.5 acres of land for road upgrade, and deforestation was evident, as an 
estimated 851 trees were cut during the road upgrades. However, as a compensation mechanism for the 
lost vegetation cover, a contract provision for planting 10,000 trees was made. 
In light of the above hindrances, the project has made some remarkable progress, which include: the 
average growth in traffic has been around 11%; the road was constructed within the estimated cost and 
time; areas surrounding the ECR have had an increase in industrial and commercial investment; the 
project was able to generate cash profits within a few years after starting operation; and over time the 
project has been experiencing a steady increase in revenues. For instance, the average daily revenue 
collections increased from Rs.172, 000 in 2002-03 to Rs.210, 400 in 2005-06 and to Rs.257, 534 in 
2006-07.  
The remaining few paragraphs below highlight the factors which might have caused the project success.  
The government made the following contributions: provided detailed inspection schedules upon which 
the contractor’s regular maintenance responsibility would be assessed; ensured law and order was 
maintained; provided financial support throughout the project life cycle; and made sure that land 
acquisitions, issuance of approvals, and toll collection notifications were done on time.  
Specifically in favour of the contractor: the contract prohibited the government from constructing a new 
competing road or operating a parallel old road on a commercial basis during the concession period; 
the government was mandated to extend the contract up to a maximum of three years until the required 
contractual return has been realised, upon the concessionaire’s request, in case of failure to achieve the 
specified investment return with in the original contract period; and government is required to provide 
a 20% return guarantee on the outstanding cost of the project for the concessionaire. From the finance 
perspective: the project used conventional corporate financing, which not only avoids substantial costs 
of legal fees and incorporating a new company (i.e. SPV), but also gives the concessionaire the 
flexibility to mobilize revenue in case of financial distress; and the funds raised by the company were 
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predominantly utilized for this project, because the ECR project was the only major project for TNRDC 
at the time.  
Furthermore, given that ECR road was an upgrade project, minimal construction risks were encountered 
since no complex under-passes, over-bridges and interchanges needed to be constructed; and public 
protests were minimised because only a few inhabitants were environmentally affected or displaced, 
and frequent road users and vehicles for bona fide local residents living along the ECR stretch were 
given toll discounts. Finally, the Highways Act of 2001 encourages quick disposition of land acquisition 
litigation cases, and also gives the government more powers to easily evict road reserve encroachers. 
4.4.6 The Istrian Y Toll Motorway project in Croatia 
The discussions of this subsection are anchored on the research works of Bjørberg, Kristiansen, 
Graham, and Salaj (2015). The Istrian Y Toll motorway project was chosen because of rare contract 
features it exhibits, which included, among others, tax exemptions and refunds, and the phasing of the 
road network construction, which ultimately meant that the commencement of the toll fees collection 
had been phased too. A detailed assessment of the Istrian Y Toll motorway follows hereunder. 
The Istrian Y toll motorway is a 145 Km single and two-lane dual carriageway between the A8 and A9 
motorways, with differing toll charges for passenger vehicles ranging between Euro 1.90 and 3.70 
depending on the toll road section used.  In 1995, the government of Croatia contracted BINA-ISTRA 
concessionaire (with Bouygues a French firm as the main construction company) for 32 years to 
reconstruct and develop the Istrian Y toll motorway under a DBFMO framework until 2027. The project 
was planned to be implemented in four phases, and after the completion of the first phase in 1999, the 
concessionaire practically had 28 years within which to collect tolls, and thereafter return the road 
facility to the government at no cost. The actual construction of the project phases vis-à-vis the time 
has been as follows: 
Table 4.8. Project phases with their commencement and completion dates 
Project phase Commencement date Completion date 
1A 1997 1999 
1B 2003 2006 
2A 2008 2011 
2B 2013 Had been estimated to be 
completed in 2016 
Modified from Bjørberg, Kristiansen, Graham, and Salaj (2015) 
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Some of the project achievements so far include: increase in the real estate demand due to improved 
road network to the major cities; the development of tourism along the route because of the discovery 
of archaeological sites during the construction works; the increase in toll revenues because of the 
increase in the passenger vehicles which rotated around 1.5m and 7.2m between 1995 and 2013; the 
installation of innovative and high quality construction solutions along the motorway, which included 
48 overpasses, 55 underpasses, 18 viaducts, 3 bridges and with a number of road intersections; the travel 
distance over the Mirna Bridge was shortened by 29.7 Km and the corresponding travel time was 
reduced by 71.2 minutes for passenger vehicles; a substantial financial contribution has already been 
made by both the public and private sector partners; and  the project design caters for the future 
expansion and upgrades of the motorway.  
The above achievements may be attributed to two main viewpoints. The first being the need to ensure 
that the concessionaire remains financially sound until the end of the project, which is a result of: the 
contract giving the concessionaire rights to start collecting tolls the moment the construction of each 
project phase has been completed; the government being required to compensate the concessionaire 
with the difference in case of a fall in the targeted annual toll revenues; the concessionaire being  
exempted from income tax and all other road taxes  for 14 years; and throughout the project life time, 
the concessionaire is being exempted from Value added tax (VAT) on toll revenues and is also entitled 
to a VAT refund on construction materials.  
Furthermore, the second view point is the contract providing effective risk and conflict management 
measures, which included: the requirement for the concessionaire to acquire all the necessary permits 
before commencement of construction work; the selection of the concessionaire  through an open 
international tendering process; the government being entitled to a 30% share of excess profits from the 
project revenues, while 70% would be retained by the concessionaire; project design approval which is 
the  sole responsibility of the public partner could only be secured before the start of the construction 
work; the government was responsible for administering the acquisition and transfer of land for 
construction  purposes; the concessionaire was responsible for collecting tolls from users, while  the 
powers for setting toll rates was a mandate of the government; the contract price is expected to remain 
fixed, except for  cost overruns which have been approved by the public partner; the concessionaire 
would lose 12.5% of the construction price in case of a failure to complete a project phase on time; and 
the concessionaire has the right to cancel the contract in case of severe regulatory risks, or if the public 
partner never makes its  financial contribution within four months (including days after notice time, and 
the contract time lag within which the contribution should have been effected). 
However, the project has not fully achieved the intended objectives due to an increase in investment, 
maintenance and operation costs resulting from the high traffic volumes which are above the carrying 
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capacity of the road, and even with an increase in the passenger traffic volumes, the toll revenues are 
still below the projections because of the number of freight trucks which are far below the estimates. 
Finally, phases 2A and 2B of the project never had determined commencement and completion dates, 
since the condition for constructing these project phases was that the traffic intensity needed to average 
at 10,000 per day overall, and at least 16,000 per day in summer.  
4.4.7 The E-39 Highway project in Norway 
The discussions of this subsection are tailored to the research works of Šeba (2015), explaining that 
what makes the E-39 Highway project an exceptional PPP road case rests in: the government being 
responsible for collecting tolls; bonus payment; compensations; and the elaborate allocation of project 
risks between the public sector and the concessionaire, among others. A detailed account of the E-39 
Highway project is provided below. 
The E-39 highway stretches from Klett to Baardshaug. The project covers 27 kms, where 22 kms are 
for new road construction, while the remaining 5kms are for the old road improvement. The new road 
section consists of 10 kms of tunnels and 12 bridges. The initiation of the project was the result of the 
old road having sharp corners, poor visibility and high traffic. As such, vehicle overtaking was 
problematic, logistics costs and road accidents were on the rise, and unnecessary transport delays were 
common. Consequently, in 2003 the government contracted a private SPV company through BOT 
arrangements to improve the existing road and also add new road sections, after an open national 
bidding process. The signed contract period was 27 years, of which the first 2 years were the 
construction phase, while the remaining 25 years were the operation phase.  
Upon completion of road construction in 2005, the road was immediately opened for use, and the 
concessionaire was obliged to collect toll revenues on behalf of the Norwegian Roads agency. Two 
critical issues emerging from the E-39 PPP project are the conditions surrounding the concessionaire’s 
payment receipt, and the way project risks were allocated between the public and private partners. From 
the payment perspective, the road agency was responsible for making annual payments to the 
concessionaire based on the facility availability and the quality of services provided during the project’s 
operating phase. The facility availability payments were conditional upon the concessionaire designing 
and constructing high quality roads that require minimal maintenance, and whose maintenance schedule 
is capable of avoiding busy and congested times. At the same time the service quality  (operation and 
maintenance) payment were based on the cleanliness of the road and surrounding areas, road surface 
tests, clearing snow or salting the road, lighting of the road, the quality of the air and safety systems, 
and the time taken to replace broken assets (e.g. traffic signs). In addition, the concessionaire would 
receive a bonus payment in case of improved safety performance (e.g. reduction in the frequency of 
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accidents), and would also be entitled to a monetary compensation for wear and tear of the road in case 
heavy goods vehicles exceed the contract traffic forecasts. 
As far as risk allocation is concerned, the private company assumes more risk responsibilities than the 
public partner. The private sector is largely responsible for:  costs of compliance with changes in general 
legislation and statutory requirements; cost overruns for operations, maintenance and service 
specifications; damage to infrastructure; latent defects on both old and new road sections; and adverse 
weather conditions. On the other hand, the public partner is solely responsible for traffic and force 
majeure risks. However, the contract stipulates that latent defects beyond the end of the contract, and 
regulatory and land acquisition risks require joint responsibility, while any cost resulting from a change 
in the project scope would be incurred by whoever causes the change. 
In summary, this section (4.4) explored PPP road project descriptions, their achievements and failures, 
and factors that partly contributed to their success or failure. From the analysis of the seven PPP road 
cases above, common PPP road project experiences and practices were identified. Most PPP roads are 
largely brownfield projects executed through renovation and road upgrade arrangements, with road 
bypasses and extensions being constructed as new roads. Private and public partners usually sign BOT 
agreements, which contract duration average between 25 and 35 years. Out of the total contract period, 
the construction phase takes up 1-4 years. Whereas the financing of the construction phase is mainly 
the responsibility of the private sector (and at times with small contributions from government), the 
payment demands of the contractor for the construction works as well as the operation and maintenance 
of the road facilities are often cleared using revenues from direct user tolls.  
Globally, the construction of roads through PPP arrangements has improved road quality and support 
services, reduced construction time and road congestions, created jobs, reduced travel time and distance, 
improved road safety, enhanced mushrooming of private businesses, and facilitated community 
development. Based on the road cases reviewed in this section, the achievements from the PPP road 
projects can be attributed to: short term scheduled payments that are conditioned on the availability and 
quality of infrastructure and service, periodic growth of direct user revenue collections, extending bonus 
payments to the contractors in case of reduced road accidents, compensating the concessionaire in case 
of an increase in traffic volume beyond traffic forecasts or providing subsidies in case of a reduction in 
projected road usage, minimised complaints from road users and local residents, full commitment and 
goodwill of government for PPP projects, on time road maintenance and upgrades, and provision of 
road safety features.  
However, to a certain extent, the effective implementation of PPP roads has been limited (evidenced by 
project delays, premature contract termination, abrupt changes in contract terms and conditions, lack of 
project funding by the concessionaires etc.) due to litigation cases, allegations of corruption, public 
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protests against direct user tolls, low traffic volumes, poverty and civil wars, selective tendering 
processes, poor planning and feasibility studies, unbalanced allocation of risks between the public and 
private partners, failure to engage competent project advisors, and the irregular designing and 
implementation of contracts.  
The critical lessons that can be drawn from the roads cases discussed in this section are in the form of 
findings, recommendations and challenges. The findings are as follows: control of traffic seems to 
succeed through expansion of existing roads and charging of congestion fees rather than constructing 
new parallel non toll roads; compared to Greenfield projects, upgrading Brownfield roads greatly 
reduces costs and risks of delivering a road project; and where the costs for incorporating a new 
company are too high or where financial distress may be rumoured to occur in future, conventional 
financing is preferred to SPV financing. The recommendations include: unless small firms are 
subcontracted, they may for a long time remain disfavoured to participate in PPP investment projects; 
well calculated discounts, subsidies, contract period extensions, increase in toll rates or any other risk 
mitigation decisions should be made with the intention of avoiding project risk escalations; and 
governments should support the private sector so as to remain financially stable throughout the contract 
period. Finally, lack of PPP country experience, missing a local content in both manpower and other 
resources on PPP projects, lack of well-established or implemented legal and institutional systems for 
national projects, and lack of harmonised legal, economic, social and political countries’ agendas for 
cross border projects, are the main hindrances towards successful implementation of PPP projects in 
the road sub sector. 
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Given that each section and subsection of this chapter has been summarised, the overall summary of 
the chapter is done in a stylised manner, by just highlighting the main areas covered and findings that 
discussed in this chapter. The main areas covered in this chapter are summarised hereafter. From a 
financing perspective, the chapter has discussed the causes of the GFCs, the impact they have had on 
PPP projects, how a number of countries responded to the GFCs’ negative impacts, and strategies on 
how the globe ought to respond to such financial challenges in future have been provided. Furthermore, 
road tolling was discussed in line with the various road tolling practices countries have employed, and 
the financing potential tolling might have on road infrastructure when demand risks have been 
mitigated. The last section of this chapter provides experiences and practices on PPP road interventions 
across the globe, upon which lessons can be drawn for nascent and emerging PPP markets. 
With respect to the main findings of the chapter, a summary is made with regard to GFC, tolling, and 
PP international experiences. Regarding the GFC the findings are as follows: Though Global financial 
crises sour financing conditions, PPP investment can still grow as long as the governments take 
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formidable measures such as innovative financing, designing temporary schemes to respond to abrupt 
and rare shocks, and having both project and contract structures and legal and institutional frameworks 
that are strong and respected. It is submitted that, the learning curve syndrome led countries to 
moderately handle the 2008 GFC better than its predecessors, the Asian and Dotcom bubble crises.  
With PPP tolling, the findings include: the tolling systems are migrating from manual or semi-manual 
to full automation; direct user fees are more often used than shadow tolls; the management of tolling 
practices is best placed with government; flexible toll fees easily solve low demand for toll roads; and 
ancillary facilities are a good mechanism of supplementing inadequate toll revenues. On the other hand, 
tolling roads without enough stakeholder engagements causes continuous protests, and globally there 
is great resistance against tolling previously free access roads. 
The findings from the PPP international experiences are: The construction phase takes the shortest 
duration compared to other phases of a PPP road project, PPP road projects in the developing world 
(especially Africa) are more challenging than in the developed world, and strong/powerful economies 
can more easily influence PPP investment growth in other economies than small or weak economies 
can do to strong/powerful economies. Finally, undertaking only a few PPP projects at a time encourages 
successful outcomes (e.g. India-with ECR), and the reverse is true when a country executes several PPP 
projects at the same time (e.g. Nigeria- with Lekki and Lagos-Ibadan expressways, among others).
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5 CHAPTER 5: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROAD SUB SECTOR AND THE FUTURE 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ROAD PROJECTS IN UGANDA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
With the road network being the backbone of the transport sector in Uganda, over the past three decades 
the government has prioritized reforming the sub sector over railway, water and air transport, and other 
sectors of the economy, as already highlighted in chapter one. The most trending global reforms of the 
road sub sector is the commercialisation/marketization, co-production and co-regulation of public road 
infrastructure and services. As a background to chapter eight (which assesses the suitability of the PPP 
environment for road infrastructure development in Uganda), this chapter pays attention to the overview 
of road development in Uganda, the road reforms and their impact on road sub sector performance, and 
the state of the roads and the physical performance of the sub sector. Finally, the chapter provides a 
brief description of the pioneer PPP road projects lined up for future implementation. 
5.2 AN OVERVIEW OF ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA 
Road development programmes in Uganda are centred on facilitating growth for all sectors of the 
economy, improved quality and reduced cost of goods and services, augmented public and private 
investment, and amplified cross border trade through reduced traffic congestion, journey time, 
accidents, vehicle operating and road construction costs, and minimised losses in road asset value 
(Kagina, 2017). Uniquely, compared to other modes of transport, roads have the ability to move many 
passenger groups and goods consignments between several origins and destinations with widely 
available door-to-door collections and deliveries, and work as a modal interchange with all other modes 
of transport (Uganda Road Fund-URF, 2016:7; National Transport Master Plan, 2008-2023:41). As 
such, roads reduce the cost of doing business (Shinyekwa & Ntale, 2017:3). This is a factor that explains 
why road agencies aggressively aim at increasing stock and improving the quality of the road network 
countrywide (Draft Road Tolling Policy, 2017:2).  
However, the road sub sector continues to be troubled with vehicle overloading (increases road 
maintenance to around US$21m annually), inadequate financing, foreign firms executing 80% and 
financing 60% of road works, unsafe roads (US$0.8bn lost to accidents per annum), slow and expensive 
land acquisition processes, and weak technical and financial capacity of the local construction industry 
(Kagina, 2017). Local capacity growth may remain an unrealisable dream as long as local construction 
firms continue operating under very prohibitive national investment conditions. Unlike local firms, 
foreign firms (e.g. Chinese companies) access low interest credit, and receive commercial bank 
guarantees and government subsidies from back home, and their governments have, and effectively 
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implement, national laws that give preference to local firms’ involvement in public projects over foreign 
ones.  
Roads financing in Uganda is a composition of contributions from development partners and the 
Government of Uganda. Between the F/Ys 2008/2009-2012/2013 the annual average contribution from 
government stood at 80% and only 20% came from the development partners, as shown in figure 5.1 
below. 
 
Figure 5.1. Road Sub Sector Financing as a Share of Government and Development Partners 
Source: Bogere et al. (2014:16) 
However, between the 2013/2014 and 2017/2018 F/Ys, financing for roads increased to 36% annual 
average for development partners and reduced to 64% for government (computed from works and 
Transport Sector Budget framework papers for the F/Ys 2014/2015-2017/2018), with exceptions in 
F/Ys 2011/2012 and 2014/2015 when the development partners contributed 0% and 0.22% respectively. 
This trend contradicts the government’s ambitions of reducing dependence on donor funding (Bogere 
et al., 2014:16) in the medium and long term. Furthermore, contrary to the budget support assurances 
for the road sub sector, fund releases repeatedly fall short of the approved budgets.  For instance, in the 
F/Y 2013/2014 the road sub sector registered a deficit of 9.339% and 10.331% from government and 
development partners respectively (Ministry of Works and Transport sector Annual performance 
Report, 2013/2014:28). As a result, road performance annual targets equally get affected. Lately, the 
government has adopted foreign direct investment for financing road projects (e.g. Kampala Entebbe 
expressway), and is expediting private sector financing (from both local and foreign firms) 
considerations for PPP road projects. 
Sustainability of road development and maintenance requires concerted and harmonised efforts from 
financiers and other key stakeholders with road management complementary roles. As arrows in figure 
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5.2 below indicate, whichever actor issues guidelines or provides funding to implementing 
organisations must monitor and evaluate performance, and in turn, implementing agencies must provide 
accountability through the available reporting channels. 
 
Figure 5.2. The relationship among the key road management actors in Uganda 
Source: Bogere et al. (2014:3) 
Below is a summary of key actors (as captured in figure 5.2 above) and the roles they play towards the 
development or maintenance of roads in Uganda. The MFPED allocates funds to the sub sector from 
the national budget, controls expenditure on public roads, and oversees the implementation of PPP road 
projects through the PPP Unit. MoWT develops and oversees the implementation of road transport 
policies, sector strategic plans, programmes and projects. The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and 
the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) finance road projects under special interventions or 
programmes. The Donors supplement government funding and capacity building in the road sub sector, 
and monitor and evaluate road projects performance through the Joint Assessment Framework (JAF). 
The development and maintenance of roads is the responsibility of UNRA for national roads, KCCA 
(Kampala Capital City Authority) for Kampala city roads, Municipal councils for municipal roads, and 
the Districts for district roads (including town council, and community access roads at sub county level). 
The Uganda Road Fund (URF) finances the maintenance of public roads.  
Other key actors include the Transport Sector Working Group (TSWG) and civil society organisations 
that advocate for best practices and road reforms for the wellbeing of society and preservation of nature. 
The Public Procurement and Disposal Authority (PPDA) provides procurement guidelines for road 
projects and other general activities (excluding PPP projects), and the private sector executes most of 
the road works, including financing and consultancy services. Although not captured in the above 
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framework, the Auditor General, the Inspector General of Government (IGG), and the Parliament and 
District Accountability committees play critical oversight duties, among other stakeholders. 
5.3 ROAD SUB SECTOR REFORMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON ROAD DEVELOPMENT 
Whereas Uganda’s  road infrastructure was described as one of the best in Sub-Saharan Africa prior to 
the 1970s (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2009:2), the country’s civil strife between 1970 and 1985 elicited 
reduced transport fleets, increased transport costs, and  recorded about 55% loss of  road network 
investment due to neglected and mismanaged road development and maintenance (Kumar, 2002:2). 
Between 1986 and 1995, the road network was convalescing at a pace difficult to turn around a ravaged 
economy, until 1996 when the government in collaboration with donor agencies embarked on Road 
Sector Development Programs (RSDPs). In order to provide efficient, safe and sustainable road 
networks, the RSDPs (between 1996-2017) concentrated on developing the local construction industry 
to commercialise technical (engineering) and procurement, and on reforming the road administration 
by separating financing from procurement and implementation, and separating planning, policy and 
regulatory functions from each of the former functions (Bogere, et al., 2014:13; Kumar, 2002: ix).  
Central to the reforms was the need for the Ministry of Works and Transport to transition from being a 
planner, policy maker, regulator, procurer and constructor, to concentrating on executing the first three 
roles.  Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance was to ensure effective utilisation of funds appropriated to 
designated agencies, and update the mid-term and long-term road investment programs, in addition to 
participating in planning and financing road projects. Although a Road Agency Formation Unit (RAFU) 
was formed as early as 1998 to expedite the restructuring process, up to the end of 2007 it had hardly 
achieved much. By then, the road sub sector had “low volume of work, government spending on roads 
was low by international standards, unit costs were exceptionally high, corruption in procurement and 
quality control was widespread, lacked competition and semi-autonomous road agencies, and the local 
contractors and consulting engineers had low morale” (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2015:6). 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings, RAFU paved the way for the formation of two semi-autonomous 
agencies: UNRA in 2008 and URF in 2009 formed subsequent to the enactment of the Uganda National 
Roads Authority Act 2006 and Uganda Road Fund Act 2008 respectively.  
The next subsections (from 5.3.1 to 5.3.6) provide a detailed evaluation of the road reforms between 
1997 and 2017. 
5.3.1 The Reformed Ministry of Works and Transport 
Prior to the declaration of local government entities into District, Urban and Community Access roads 
(DUCAR) agencies and the formation of UNRA and URF, the development, maintenance and financing 
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of public roads were responsibilities of MoWT, with support from MoLGs for works and MFPED for 
financing. Today, the reformed MoWT is responsible for formulating plans and policies, setting and 
regulating standards, playing capacity building and advocacy roles, and monitoring and evaluating 
performance for the Works and Transport sector. With the road sub sector in particular, MoWT 
continually plans and coordinates national emergency responses, and extends policy and strategic 
guidance as well as political and operational oversight (in collaboration with MFPED) to UNRA, URF, 
Districts, Urban agencies, and Local Council IIIs for effective maintenance and development of public 
roads.  
Since the introduction of the roads reform process in 1998, a number of organisations and legislation 
have been established and improved under the leadership of MoWT (formerly, Ministry of Works, 
Housing and Communication). Some of the organisations created is UNRA, URF, Roads Industry 
Council (RIC), Uganda Association of Consulting Engineers (UACE), Uganda Institute of Professional 
Engineers (UIPE), Uganda National Association of Building & Civil Engineering Contractors 
(UNABCEC), and National Safety council (NSC). Legislation adopted include: Road and Safety Act 
(RSA), National Construction Industry (NCI) policy, Draft Roads Tolling policy, Draft Roads Bill (to 
replace Roads Act of 1949), Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO) bill, UNRA Act, 
URF Act, UNRA regulations, Building Control Act, Force Account guidelines, Draft Building Control 
Regulations (amended 2012), and several amendments. Other vital documents are the National 
Transport Master Plan (NTMP 2008-2023, that includes the Transport Master Plan for Greater Kampala 
Metropolitan Area-GKMA), General Specifications for Roads and Bridges, and District and Urban 
Roads Design Manual.  In effect, a sizable improvement and increase in the road network and local 
road construction companies, as well as private sector (both local and foreign) participation in road 
projects has been realized. 
However, using the envisioned responsibilities as a benchmark of the achievements, the reformed 
MoWT under-delivers on its mandate. MoWT still maintains and develops a few DUCARs and bridges 
(Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2009:14; OAG Report, 2015b:21; Odongo, 2017:6), without request and 
free consent of the designated agencies (DAs), contrary to the PPDA Force Account guidelines of 2014.  
For instance, between F/Ys 2012/2013-2013/2014, MoWT signed and executed road construction 
contracts worth UGX 50.2bn (OAG Report, 2015a:20), a role that is outside its mandate and in conflict 
with its oversight function. On the other hand, DUCAR agencies often reclassify roads from community 
to district or urban status without a ministerial instrument from MoWT (Odongo, 2017:6). Additionally, 
a few government ministries implement road programs without securing a delegation mandate from 
MoWT (Odongo, 2017:6). Examples include: Ministry of Local Government that implements 
Community Agriculture Infrastructure Improvement Programme (CAIIP), District Support Livelihood 
Programme, and the Millennium Villages project; while the Ministry of Lands and Urban Development 
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implements the Albertine Region sustainable Development projects, and the Uganda Support to 
Municipal Development (USMID) programme (Odongo, 2017:6; OAG Report, 2015c:22). The above 
cases are signs of misaligned coordination and monitoring, and duplication of roles. 
Furthermore, according to a VFM audit conducted on the effectiveness of the MoWT in regulating the 
construction sector covering three F/Ys (2012/13, 2013/14 and 2014/15), a number of construction 
standards and quality management flaws by MoWT was established, which  included: 
 Limited progress in establishing UCICO and a national construction law, and a national 
building code and regulations that would facilitate effective regulation of industry standards 
and practices; 
 Neither supported nor reviewed statutes, and professional ethics and codes of conduct of 
regulatory and professional bodies, which resulted in substandard constructions, and massive 
loss of human lives and infrastructure;  
 Never conducted research on construction materials that would have promoted innovation and 
technological advancement in the sector; 
 The ministry performed at only 55% in relation to conducting audits/inspections on engineering 
standards compliance by local government entities, and never monitored road construction 
activities for UNRA, KCCA, and Ministry of Local government; and   
 Delayed and never prioritised the review of roads manuals, standards and guidelines to match 
the skyrocketing road traffic (OAG Report, 2015c:20-23; OAG Report, 2015a:21-22). 
The same Audit report attributes most of the above challenges to diverting funds to implement different 
activities of the ministry instead of planned ones, lack of adequate capacity by MoWT to monitor 
multiple projects concurrently, and conflict of interest among public institutions and professional 
bodies. Furthermore, incompetent or negligent practitioners continue operating irrespective of their bad 
performance record, compromised monitoring and oversight functions, institutional gaps, political 
directives, and unassigned mandate to plan, coordinate and implement strategic projects of national 
importance (including emergencies). 
5.3.2 Force Account Mechanism 
The government of Uganda adopted the Force Account mechanism in 2011 as a means of maintaining 
both DUCARs and national roads. Force account refers to a situation where a public agency uses its 
own labour force and equipment or equipment of another public entity to execute construction works 
(MFPED- “Budget Monitoring and Accountability Unit” BMAU, 2015:1; PPDA Act 2003 as amended 
2014, Sec 95A (2)). With Uganda’s road sub sector, Force Account mechanism is applicable to the 
maintenance and rehabilitation of public roads (MFPED-BMAU, 2015:2). Conditions under which 
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UNRA or DUCAR agencies may use Force Account include, where the DA has the equipment and 
personnel to undertake the works, no contractor is willing to execute the works assignment, it is cheaper 
to use Force Account than procure a contractor, and during emergencies (PPDA Act 2003 as amended 
2014, Sec 95A). Given that Force Account is a method of executing construction works but not a 
procurement method, any supplies used in executing a works assignment under Force Account must 
comply with  the PPDA procurement requirements (Section 95A (3a) of the PPDA Act 2003). 
In a move to enrich the country’s capacity to execute road works through Force Account mechanism, 
the government has over time provided road equipment to DAs. For instance, the government purchased 
(from China in 2012, Japan in 2015 and 2017) and supplied road construction equipment to UNRA, 
Districts and Urban authorities for road maintenance. Largely, UNRA and KCCA utilise a combination 
of contracting out and Force Account (and less of road gangs) to maintain public roads, while DUCAR 
agencies use Force Account and road gangs (Odongo, 2017:3). For instance, UNRA spends 42% of the 
budget for road maintenance on Force Account operations, and the remaining 58% on contracting out 
(MoWT, 2015:68). It is submitted that such a trend undermines the Road Industry Council’s medium 
and long-term strategy involving the private sector constructing and maintaining not less than 80% of 
Uganda’s public roads. 
Although Force Account minimises procurement delays, reduces construction unit costs, and creates 
jobs for locals to work as road gangs, equally this mechanism has had both policy gaps and 
implementation challenges for Uganda (MFPED-BMAU, 2015:3-4). The Force Account policy gaps 
relate to: lack of well standardised and streamlined guidelines, positions of headmen and overseers (for 
supervising road gangs’ works) are not provided for in the public service structure, sharing of equipment 
is operationally inapplicable due to lack of enough equipment across DAs, and a delay to fix the problem 
of DAs recovering equipment costs (for those used by road gangs) from their wages. On the other hand, 
the Force Account implementation challenges are: inadequate equipment for both light and mechanised 
works,  inadequately trained road equipment operators, failure to appreciate the role of road gangs by a 
number of local governments,  and high labour turnover rate by road gangs because of low pay (e.g. 
about Ugx10,000 per day for a porter). Further challenges include the  incomplete set of road equipment 
by DAs, use of light equipment for heavy works, poor road maintenance and accumulated backlog due 
to weak institutional capacities (e.g. lack of technical staff), inadequate funding for Force Account 
activities,  and the use of road gangs for routine mechanised works instead of limiting them to routine 
manual works. 
5.3.3 District Urban Community Access Roads 
In line with Uganda’s decentralisation agenda, Districts and Urban local governments are responsible 
for the development, rehabilitation and maintenance of public DUCARs countrywide (Local 
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Governments Act 1997 as amended 2015; Kumar, 2002:4; Mugabi, 2004). As a way of ensuring 
effective accountability and service delivery, District Road Committees (DRCs) were established in 
2011 with an oversight role over planning and budgeting, and monitoring and evaluation of road project 
performances (Bogere et al., 2014:14). Yet apart from KCCA, districts and urban centres continue to 
have the lowest absorption rate of funds, lowest road user satisfaction levels, and the worst road 
maintenance and development performance (Achola, 2016:10; URF, 2016:7).  
Regarding the maintenance of District Urban Community Access Roads (DUCARs) network, road 
gangs are being engaged on a fixed wage per month (in a distribution of one man per 2 km for unpaved 
and 4 men per km for paved roads) to undertake routine manual works, while mechanised routine and 
periodic maintenance works are executed through Force Account (Odongo, 2017:3). Whereas 
maintenance of DUCARs has increasingly devolved to District and Urban authorities, largely and 
contrary to the Local Government Act, the MoWT over time conducts the actual rehabilitation and 
development of DUCARs (Wepener, Kruger, Botha & Tulya-Muhika, 2001:5). Notwithstanding the 
above facts, where the District and Urban authorities have capacity constraints, MoWT (including 
UNRA) are not precluded from supporting and directly participating in the maintenance and 
development of DUCAR roads (National Transport Master Plan 2008-2023:51). 
5.3.4 Uganda National Roads Authority 
UNRA is responsible for planning, designing, procuring, contracting and managing the maintenance 
and development of national roads and bridges, including axle load control, management of ferries that 
work as a link to the national road network, and protection of road reserves along the national road 
network from encroachers (UNRA Act, 2006; UNRA Regulations, 2017). The Authority reports 
through MoWT for planning and accountability purposes, and its operations must comply with UNRA’s 
requirements (Act, Regulations, strategic plan) and those of MoWT (legislation and strategic plan), as 
well as  the National Development Plan II, and the NTMP (2008-2023) which also covers the Transport 
Master Plan for Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA), among others. 
The Authority manages 519 bridges, 9 ferries and 20544 km national roads (representing 14% of the 
total road network, but carry 80% of the motorized road traffic) (Kagina, 2017; Odongo, 2017:3). As a 
result of the low funds absorption and overall poor road performance of Districts and Urban authorities, 
since 2009 the national road asset size has jumped from 11,000km to about 21,000km through 
reclassification of District and Urban roads into national roads (Odongo, 2017:5; Booth & Golooba-
Mutebi, 2015:8). As such, national roads increased just by reclassification rather than construction of 
new roads (Raballand, Macchi, Merotto & Petracco, 2009:15). Unfortunately, the quality of reclassified 
roads hardly improves, as this method of increasing the national road network was/is never matched 
with the financial and other resource requirements.  Optimistically though, in the next five years the 
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national road network quality may evenly improve, on condition that the planned investment funding 
for national roads upgrade of US$275m per F/Y from 2018/2019-2022/2023 (totalling US$1,375m) is 
made available and put to right use (NTMP/GKMA, 2008-2023:63). 
Notwithstanding the limitation in the building of Greenfield roads, a number of road rehabilitations, 
reconstructions and expansions increased in both scale and quality. For instance, the paved national 
roads increased by 30.4% (from 3,264km to 4,257km) and their fair to good condition improved from 
74% to 80% between F/Ys 2010/2011-2016/2017. Similarly, the fair to good condition of the unpaved 
national roads increased from 64% to 70% over the same period (MoWT, 2017:viii). Furthermore, the 
awarding by UNRA of 3 year maintenance contracts, as opposed to a 1 year contract,  motivates the 
contractors to reduce the tender price for re-gravelling a kilometer of a road by about 50%, because of 
the increased amount of business involved (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2015:10). Also, regardless of 
the additional bid evaluation funding involved, the Independent Parallel Bid Evaluation (IPBE) 
improved bid evaluation results and reduced the completion time of the evaluation exercises, which in 
turn “reduced the unit cost for constructing national roads from US$ 1 million per kilometre to US$ 
700,000” (National Budget Speech FY 2013/2014:23). 
On the negative side, between 2009 and 2015 UNRA had the highest number of road malpractice cases 
ever reported, which ranged from delayed contractor payment and land compensations, improper road 
designs (excessive or inadequate), completion delays and poorly constructed roads, cost overruns and 
road works quality complaints, high unit cost of construction, delayed commencement of planned road 
works, financial diversions and mismanagement, to applying different versions of ‘General 
Specifications’ for roads and bridges (OAG Report, 2010; Byaruhanga & Basheka, 2017:32; Ggoobi, 
2016:11; Aluonzi, Oluka & Nduhura, 2016:550; URF, 2015). The emanation and escalation of such 
problems was due to weak procurement rules, improper monitoring and underfunding, late fund releases 
from the source, incompetence and understaffing, inadequate due diligence and contract management 
practices, connivance and unprofessionalism, corruption, and grossly incompetent and negligent 
contractors.  
At a time when everything seemed volte-face at UNRA, a new Executive Director, Allen Kagina was 
appointed around mid-2015 to restructure, transform and restore the institution to a path of developing 
and maintaining a cost effective, safe and sustainable national road network. According to an interview 
extract from the Online New Vision of 27th June 2017, Kagina highlights achievements and challenges 
of the Authority, 2 years after assuming office, as summarised in table 5.1 below.  
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Table 5.1. Achievements and Challenges of UNRA from 2015-2017 
 
Source: Modified from the New Vision [Online] 2017  
Relatedly, a recent study on contractor monitoring and performance of road projects in Uganda, singles 
out lack of a strong internal project monitoring and evaluation mechanism in UNRA (Byaruhanga & 
Basheka, 2017:30).  In conclusion, with the rate of success attained in the last 10 years, UNRA must 
scale up its efforts like never before in order to deliver on its promise of “great roads (with first class 
20,000km of national road network) and great user experience by 2025”. 
5.3.5 Uganda Road Fund 
With the ultimate goal of having well maintained public roads at all times, the URF finances routine 
and periodic road maintenance, and advises on the preparation and implementation of an effective and 
efficient annual road maintenance programme, as well as on the controlling of vehicle overloading 
(URF Act, 2008, Sec 6). Apart from emergency works approved by the URF Board, other road 
maintenance funds disbursements to DAs must be based on the approved annual road maintenance 
expenditure programme (URF 2008 Act, sec 29(1)). According to Odongo (2017:1), emergencies are 
unplanned and urgent maintenance works (caused by severe weather, accidents, floods, etc.). 
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Designated agencies that receive funds from the URF for road maintenance activities are UNRA, 
KCCA, 121 Districts, 41 Municipalities, 214 Town councils, and 1155 Sub counties. Table 5.2 below, 
illustrates road maintenance activities funded by URF. 
Table 5.2. Matching Road Maintenance Categories with Maintenance Activities 
 
Source: Modified from OAG Report (2015d: 18) 
In addition to funding the maintenance activities in table 5.2 above, the URF financially supports 
UNRA’s operational expenses for ferries and weighbridges, as well as repairs for plant and equipment, 
and purchase of road materials for road maintenance by DAs (URF Annual Report, 2011/2012: v; URF, 
2017), among others. Based on the purpose for the release of road maintenance funds, implementing 
entities through DAs must provide quarterly accountabilities on the physical and financial progress of 
road maintenance activities to URF (OAG Report, 2015d: 18). In fact, several other institutions 
complement the financing, monitoring and evaluation functions of URF, as described in figure 5.3 
below. 
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Figure 5.3. Institutional Relationship with Uganda Road Fund 
Source: URF Annual Report (2011/2012:5) 
URF reports through MoWT (in consultation with MoLGs and MFPED) for road maintenance planning 
and implementation outcomes, while the overall operations accountabilities and policy oversight of 
URF is under the mandate of MFPED. Designated agencies receive road maintenance funds annually 
from the URF based on the condition of the roads, maintenance requirements, the length of the road 
network and traffic volume, using an approved maintenance management tool (URF Act, 2008, sec 
22(2)). The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) and a few other organisations (e.g. Uganda Police, 
KCCA and Local governments) collect road user charges. Although road user charges (fuel levies, 
international transit fees for inbound vehicles, road licence fees, bridges and road tolls, weight distance 
charges, axle load fines) should be the main source of financing road maintenance, other sources may 
include donations, funds appropriated by parliament, grants, fees from drivers’ permits, and traffic and 
road Safety fines (URF Act, 2008, sec 21(1). 
The achievements of the URF since its inauguration in 2009 range from physical and financial 
performance, to systems and capacity creation. Physical and financial successes include:  Roads 
maintenance financing reduced the roads in poor condition by about 10% and 5% in F/Ys 2014/2015 
and 2015/2016 respectively  (URF Annual Report, 2014/2015: vii; URF Annual Report, 2015/2016:ix). 
Furthermore, funding for road maintenance increased  by 284.8% (from UGX 111.242 to UGX 418 bn) 
between F/Y 2009/2010 and 2014/2015, although it later stagnated at around UGX 417 bn  between  
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2015/2016-2017/2018 (URF Annual Reports F/Ys 2011/2012-2017/2018; MFPED, 2010:177).  Also, 
funds absorption for road maintenance by DAs has substantially improved over time ( e.g. from 0% in 
F/Y 2011/2012 to 120.7% in F/Y 2014/2015 by KCCA, and from 59.3% to  85.9% by DUCARS for 
the same period) (URF Annual Reports 2011/2012 & 2015/2016). The URF on average annually 
disburses 99%, and occasionally 100% (e.g. F/Ys 2011/2012, 2013/2014, 2014/2015) of the money 
received from the Treasury to DAs for road maintenance.  
Furthermore, systems developed and which continue to be improved include; regulations, manuals, 
guidelines, computerized road maintenance management and monitoring system, standardised funds 
allocation formula, road user charges collection and management framework, risk register and risk 
management framework, and the unit costs of road maintenance harmonization frameworks. 
Additionally, compulsory performance agreements (with clear KPIs) were introduced, and are signed 
between the URF and a designated agency every time and before the release of road maintenance funds 
(URF, 2015). As for capacity building, the URF conducts training on force account application and 
specialised trainings (for accountants, engineers and auditors) to DAs, regularly undertakes research in 
road works and conducts Road User Satisfaction Surveys (RUSS), as well as regularly  monitors and 
evaluates road maintenance performance through inspections, reviews, audits and follow-ups (URF 
Annual Reports, 2011/2012-2015/2016). These have not only improved road quality but also planning 
and budgeting, road maintenance capacity and funds utilisation, reporting and accountability, and 
compliance with policies and regulations. 
Notwithstanding the numerous transformations mentioned above, a VFM Audit undertaken on 
municipalities to ascertain the efficiency of the road maintenance systems in Uganda, covering 3 F/Ys 
(2011/2012, 2012/2013, 2013/2014) reveals the following:  
 cost estimates for the maintenance works were never based on the recommended unit cost or 
URF guidelines, and, as such, actually deviated from the recommended  unit costs by 395% to 
over 100,000%  for routine mechanised maintenance in Municipal Councils (OAG Report, 
2015d:23);  
 a number of agencies never planned for routine maintenance in the three financial years audited; 
 major variations in unit costs for similar interventions across the municipalities that could not 
be explained by topography and climatic differences; 
 the formula used in allocating funds never considered the critical maintenance factors of length 
of road network, road condition and traffic volume; and 
  Municipalities provide inaccurate data to URF due to a weak monitoring and evaluation system 
(OAG Report, 2015d:38). 
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Other road maintenance challenges include “persistent weak institutional capacities of DAs to plan and 
deliver road works in time; weak oversight by District Road Committees (DRCs); extreme deterioration 
of some sections of the public road network; grey areas in force account policy implementation; poor 
coordination of agencies funding road maintenance; poor reporting and accountability of DAs; misuse 
and abuse of funds by DAs; slow procurement of periodic maintenance projects, and lack of total quality 
management systems by DAs and outdated classification of the road network”(URF Annual Report, 
2015/2016:58&59).  
According to monitoring research on the effectiveness of road maintenance programmes undertaken on 
selected UNRA stations and DAs covering the first three quarters of F/Y 2014/2015, it is suggested that 
DAs perform better at financial than physical infrastructure performance, and also, national roads 
perform better than DUCARs in both financial and physical performance (see table 5.3 below). 
Table 5.3. Agency/Road Category by Performance Rating 
 
Source: Modified from URF (2015: v) 
Despite a moderate physical performance observed in F/Y 2014/2015 (as depicted in table 5.3 above) 
that merited future improvement, the road physical performance of the combined routine and periodic 
maintenance of DAs instead declined by about 8.6% in F/Y 2015/2016 (URF Annual Report, 
2015/2016:62). 
 In fact, over 95% of the road maintenance problems underscored in the previous paragraphs arose 
because of “inadequate road maintenance financing”. Yet, if the government can operationally permit 
the URF to receive road user chargers directly from the collectors on a monthly basis (as envisaged in 
section 21(3) of the URF Act 2008), it would not only solve the late releases and inadequate funding 
from the consolidated fund, but would also drastically reduce road maintenance backlogs in the medium 
and long-term. Realistically, the annual road maintenance funding is not proportionate to the collected 
annual road user fees. A case in point is the fuel levies collected in the F/Y 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 
being approximately 501.9% and 548.9% respectively, higher than the annual budgets for road 
maintenance, as shown in table 5.4 below.   
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Table 5.4. Approved Budgets for Road Maintenance VS the Total Fuel Levies 
Financial Year 2009/2010 2010/2011 
Total fuel levies (petrol & diesel) UGX. 699.7 bn UGX.801.1 bn 
Approved budget for road maintenance UGX.116.24 bn UGX. 283.88 bn 
Source: Modified from Achola (2016:6) 
Suffice to say, the writer concurs with the reiterations of URF Annual Reports (from 2010/2011-
2015/2016), Achola (2016:12), and OAG (2016:359) that, unless section 14 of the URA Act 1991 is 
amended to allow the remitting of road user fees directly to the URF (but not to the Consolidated Fund) 
through its account with Bank of Uganda (BOU), the road maintenance financing gap will continue to 
increase, and so will the road deterioration conditions.  
5.3.6 Transport Sector Development Program (TSDP) and CrossRoads Programmes 
The TSDP and CrossRoads were distinct programmes that teamed up between 2011 and 2015 to 
facilitate efficient government expenditure on roads through sustainable road network processes and 
systems. The World Bank and European Union (EU) funded the TSDP to improve the capacity of public 
institutions in managing the road network, while the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) funded the CrossRoads programme to improve the capability and competition in the road sub 
sector. Although the CrossRoads team was not executing TSDP, it was however responsible for 
receiving reports from TSDP, and thereafter to provide accountability on the progress of the two 
programmes to the stakeholders (CrossRoads Report, 2011:16).  
Prior to the commencement of the two programmes, a number of organisations were established, and 
subsequently got involved in the transformational processes. These included representations from the 
public sector (the Reformed MoWT, UNRA, URF), civil society organisations (URSSI), and 
professional and private sector bodies (Engineers Registration Board-ERB, RIC, UACE, UIPE, 
UNABCEC).  However, most of these organisations, if not all, were in their infancy stages and with 
many operational capacity limitations. 
Based on the road network quality problem analysis conducted at the start of the programme, some 
support was extended as the implementation progressed, as shown in figure 5.4 below.  
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Figure 5.4. TSDP and CrossRoads support against Road Network Quality Problems 
Source: CrossRoads Report (2013:19) 
Note: Red (output 1) and green (output 2) colours as denoted in figure 5.3.6.1 above,  respectively 
represent areas that were supported to improve the capacity of public institutions, and the capability and 
competition in the road sub sector. According to Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2015:8-11) interventions 
that had positive outcomes, among others, are: 
 A Construction Guarantee Fund that offered financial guarantees to banks for construction 
firms to meet bid and performance bond requirements; 
 An Independent Parallel bid evaluation that improved UNRA’s procurement evaluation 
outcomes and reduced administrative review cases; 
 Business skills trainings that improved staffing, and equipment accessibility and management 
for local firms; 
 Business collaborations from international professionals improved consulting services for local 
engineers; 
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 Promoting the undertaking of road works, more by the private sector than government, 
increased market competition and resulted in reduced unit costs of construction; 
 Conducting and dissemination of Road User Satisfaction Surveys (RUSS) outcomes reduced 
accidents and improved road safety. 
 
Although many other interventions were undertaken, contrary to the targets, the programmes ended 
without setting up a National Road Safety Authority (NRSA), a Multimodal Transport Regulatory 
Authority (MTRA), a District, Urban and Community Access Roads (DUCAR) Authority, and 
developing a National Construction Industry legislation that would have led to the creation of the 
Uganda Construction Industry Commission (UCICO). Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2015:9) attributed 
the above failures to resistance and unpredictable government behaviour, most local firms preferring an 
individualistic rather than a collaborative team approach to business, and weak and low membership of 
industry associations and professional bodies to assertively demand for enactment and enforcement of 
industry laws and standards. 
In summary, it is noted that the CrossRoads programme achieved more success than TSDP. However, 
some of the achievements of the programmes have and continue to raise unsustainability concerns, 
because of the argument that, due to financing constraints, IPBEs and a Construction Guarantee Fund 
seem to have ended with the closure of the two programmes. Last but not least, as the economy 
continues to go through a meltdown (e.g. increasing inflation and foreign exchange rates), unit costs for 
construction works will continue increasing rather than reducing. Finally, the adoption and preference 
of the government of maintaining roads through Force Account mechanism, shifts a reasonable 
percentage of road works from the private sector back to public institutions. 
5.4 THE STATE OF ROADS AND ROAD SUB SECTOR PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE 
The section discusses the stock and condition of roads, the physical performance trend and user 
perceptions on the level of development of the roads in Uganda. Subsection 5.4.1 presents the state of 
public roads in the country, while sub section 5.4.2 discusses the physical performance of the sector, 
including user perceptions on the efficiency of road facilities and services in Uganda. 
5.4.1 The State of Public Roads in Uganda 
According to Odongo (2017:1), a road is a long narrow stretch with a prepared smoothed (unpaved) or 
paved surface built for passage of vehicles, people and animals. By national standards, a paved road is 
bitumen (tarmac) surfaced, while the unpaved road is gravel (Murram) or earth surfaced. The estimated 
total public road network for Uganda is 146,110km, of which 20,544km are national roads (4,257km 
paved and 16,388km unpaved). The urban roads consist of approximately 12,000km; 2,110km being 
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KCCA roads (580km paved and 1,520 unpaved), while the remaining 9890km belong to municipal and 
town councils. The district and community access roads consist of about 35,566km and 78,000kms 
respectively, and all the district roads are gravel surfaced, while the community access roads are earth 
surfaced.  
Like national roads, the unpaved urban roads are much higher in number than the paved urban roads, 
even though public sector road agencies lack an updated record on paved and unpaved roads for the 
municipal and town councils. The estimated replacement value for Uganda’s road network is US$ 6.2bn 
(an equivalent of 24% of Uganda’s GDP) (Odongo, 2017:1). Meanwhile, the road maintenance backlog 
is estimated at US$ 1.25 bn (equivalent to 51,000km of the total road network), 7000km being  national 
roads, 700km  KCCA roads, 2000km municipality roads, 3500km town council roads, 8000km district 
roads, and 30500km community access roads (Odongo, 2017:3). 
5.4.2 The Road Sub Sector Performance 
Whereas the paved national road network stock increased by 67.54% (from 2,875.6km to 4,257km) 
between F/Y 2007/2008-2016/2017, the country’s total paved road network, however, is just a paltry 
3.52% of the total public road network (Kagina, 2017). The implication is that over 96.48% of the total 
road network in the country is unpaved. Plotting the kilometres of the total paved road network against 
the total road network of a country, Uganda has the lowest percentage of paved roads regionally. For 
instance, Kenya scores 6.95%, Tanzania 8.20% and Rwanda 19.0% (Kagina, 2017). Generally, the 
condition of the road network in Uganda is improving quite sluggishly, when the aim is for the country 
to have 80% of total road network paved by 2040 (Vision 2040:14; MoWT ASPR, 2016/2017:23). 
According to the MoWT Annual Sector Performance Report (ASPR), (2016/2017:21) road condition 
is the roughness or unevenness of a road structure. Road roughness refers to road surface characteristics 
that influence the ride/drive quality, travel time and speed, road safety, fuel consumption, wear and tear 
of the vehicle, and road maintenance costs. As such, an increase in the road surface roughness can be 
caused by gradual structural surface deterioration, cracking, rutting, potholes, climate effects (Radovic, 
Jokanovic, Matic & Seslija, 2016:883), and vehicle overloading or using heavyweight trucks on roads 
purposely constructed for lightweight vehicles. 
Based on the International Roughness Index (IRI) measured in m/km; IRI ≤3.0 = Good, 
IRI>3.0≥5.0=Fair, IRI>5.0 = Poor for paved roads; and IRI≤6.0 = Good, IRI≥6.0≤8.0 = Fair, IRI>8.0 
= poor for the unpaved roads; and using the MoWT road condition rating scale (fair-good, and poor) 
adopted in 2011, table 5.5 below shows  an improvement in the national roads condition between F/Y 
2010/2011 and F/Y 2016/2017. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 143 
 
Table 5.5. The National Roads Condition between F/Y 2010/2011 and 2016/2017 
 F/Y 2010/2011 F/Y 2016/2017 
National Road Type Fair-Good (%) Poor (%) Fair-Good (%) Poor (%) 
Paved 74 26 80 20 
Unpaved 64 36 70 30 
Source: Modified from MoWT ASPR (2015/2016:xiii) and (2016/2017:21) 
Cumulatively, the fair to good condition of paved roads increased by 6% and the poor condition reduced 
by the same percent, while the fair to good condition of the unpaved roads improved  by 6% and the 
poor condition reduced by the same percentage as well. However, on average the improvement in the 
fair to good condition and reduction in poor condition for each of the road types was just 1% per year. 
Due to persistent poor road network condition (among other factors), the number of people dying 
because of fatal road accidents increased from 2954 in F/Y 2010/2011 to 3503 in F/Y 2016/2017. 
However, road fatalities reduced from 46 to 26 per 10,000 vehicles for the same period due to strict 
enforcement of road safety rules on national roads. Road safety enforcement (e.g. axle load control, 
Highway police patrols), in turn reduced vehicle overloading from 54% in 2011 to 3.7% in 2017 
(MoWT ASPR, 2016/2017:29), as well  as reduced speeding, driving under the influence of alcohol, 
reckless driving, and  poor vehicle maintenance behaviour. 
In 2016, the URF conducted a Road User Satisfaction Survey (RUSS) to establish road user perceptions 
on the quality of public roads infrastructure and services in Uganda. Using a rating scale ranging “from 
very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied to very dissatisfied” the findings suggest that 9% of the interviewees 
were very dissatisfied, 53.7% dissatisfied, 32.5% satisfied, and 4.8% very satisfied. This indicates that 
on average 62.7% of the road users are dissatisfied and only 37.3% are satisfied with the condition of 
the road network facilities and services in the country (see figure 5.5 below). The cause of a high 
dissatisfaction levels was because of narrow roads, potholes, poor drainage, infrequent road 
maintenance, dusty roads, poor road signs/markings, lack of pedestrian pathways along the motorways, 
bad driving, overloading of vehicles, high road congestion, road robberies, illegal parking, insufficient 
safe crossings, and small roundabouts. Figure 5.5 below shows the top 10 causes of road user 
dissatisfaction with the corresponding percentage response rate for each factor. 
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Figure 5.5. Top Causes of Road User Dissatisfaction with Public Roads in Uganda 
Source: Uganda Road Fund (2016:24) 
In addition, across all four regions (Central, Western, Eastern, Northern, including Kampala city) of 
Uganda, high dissatisfaction levels about the narrowness of the roads, presence of potholes, poor 
drainage and inadequate road maintenance was recorded (URF, 2016:24). Furthermore, the results of 
the study indicated high road user complaints about narrow roads and presence of potholes on both 
paved and unpaved roads (URF, 2016:23). Whereas poor drainage and dust were more pronounced on 
unpaved roads, inadequate maintenance and high road congestion were more reported on paved roads 
(URF, 2016:23). Unique to roads in Kampala city (whether national or KCCA classified) and a few 
inlet and outlet roads to the capital city, was the problem of road congestion/traffic. Evidently, the 
average vehicle travel time stood at 2.9 min/km in 2017 (from 2.4 min/km in 2014), compared to the 
2017 countrywide vehicle travel time average of 2.02 min/km (Odongo, 2017:3). 
Although the 2016 RUSS was a replica of the 2015 RUSS conducted by CrossRoads, the results indicate 
that road user dissatisfaction increased by 15.9% (from 46.8% to 62.7%) in the span of just one year 
(URF, 2016:21). Taking Uganda’s road network as a whole, the general and key priorities for road 
agencies to improve the public road network (in their order of importance as suggested by the road 
users) include widening of roads,  tarmacking roads, better road maintenance, improving road safety, 
improving drainage systems, filling of potholes, and constructing more roads (URF, 2016:43). This is 
in addition to constructing long lasting roads, creating pedestrian pathways, reducing corruption, 
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enforcing traffic rules, installing and repairing traffic lights, reducing dust, reducing speed humps, 
improving security on roads especially at night, and providing better public transport (URF, 2016:43). 
5.5 A DESCRIPTION OF THE PIONEER PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ROAD 
PROJECTS FOR UGANDA 
This section provides a brief description of the planned or ongoing PPP road project constructions 
(which are the first of their kind in the country). The Ugandan government is undertaking massive PPP 
road projects in order to decongest Kampala by reducing traffic jams in and around the city, as well as 
improving the condition of the road network in the city and along the main international border routes 
of the Northern and Southern corridors. Kampala is the country’s capital city and commercial town, 
with an estimated 1,353,189 people. Figure 5.6 below locates the current PPP road priority projects 
along Kampala capital city. 
 
Figure 5.6. A Map Showing Planned and Under Construction Public Private Partnership Road 
Projects in Uganda 
Source: Modified from Van den Broek (2013:8) 
Given that there is no published work on PPP road projects in Uganda, the presentations in this section 
are based on two UNRA documents by Kagina (2017) and Van den Broek (2013). As per Figure 5.6 
above, below is a brief description for each of the proposed PPP road projects. 
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5.5.1 The Kampala-Entebbe Expressway 
The Kampala-Entebbe Expressway (KEE) is a 51km 4-lane dual carriage toll road running from 
Kampala city to Entebbe International Airport, with a spur connecting Munyonyo through Lweza to the 
new Kampala-Entebbe Expressway (KEE). The Expressway has two stretches - the 37.23 km road 
(from Northern Bypass at Busega to Abayita Ababiri) connecting with  the existing Kampala Entebbe 
road (KER), and the 14.13 km spur road (from Munyonyo to Lweza) connecting with the new KEE. 
The KEE is a DBOM project, but with the Design-Build contract independent of the Operate and 
Maintain contract. A Design and Build contract was signed between UNRA and the China Construction 
and Communications Company Limited (CCCC) in 2011, and the Operate and Maintain contract will 
ideally be signed with a different private company after construction is complete, but before the road is 
officially open for use. The DB cost of the project is about US$ 476m, and the Government of Uganda 
finances US$ 127 of the project, while EXIM Bank of China contributes a US$ 350 concession loan (at 
a 2% interest rate).  The road user fees from the expressway will be used for loan repayment to EXIM 
Bank and for road maintenance. 
5.5.2 Kampala Jinja Expressway  
The new Kampala Jinja Expressway (KJE) is largely a 4-lane (with a few 4+4 or 3+3 lanes) dual 
carriage toll road to the south of the existing Kampala Jinja Road (KJR). KJE will cover 77km of road 
starting from Lugogo bypass at Nakawa in Kampala (branch off from Kyambogo junction, via 
Kinawataka, between Mbuya and Kireka to Butabika) to the new Nile Bridge at Njeru in Jinja. The KJE 
project is a 25 years BOT contract (excluding design and construction time) at an estimated cost of US$ 
1.1bn, and will be constructed in 2 phases. The first phase covers 33km (from Kampala to Namataba), 
and the second phase covers 44km (from Namataba to Jinja). The Government of Uganda, development 
partners and private companies will fund the project. 
5.5.3 Kampala Mpigi Expressway 
Kampala Mpigi Expressway (KPE) will be an expansion of 34 km (estimated cost of US$151) to a 4-
lane dual carriage aligned to the exiting 50 km stretch on the Kampala and Masaka road, starting from 
Busega to Kyengera, Nabbingo, Kitemu, Nsangi, Maya, Nakirebe, Katende, Kavule trading centers and 
Mpigi town. The project will be executed either as BOT (Toll) or BOT (Annuity) at an estimated cost 
of US$ 460m. The expressway is anticipated to reduce travel time between Busega and Mpigi from the 
current one hour to 20 minutes (National Budget, FY 2017/2018:16). 
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5.5.4 The Southern Bypass Expressway 
The Southern Bypass Expressway (SPE) will be a 4 lane dual carriage covering approximately 20km 
of a new standard route, providing a complete Bypass for the southern zone of Kampala City. The 
expressway will run from Butabika (at a junction of KJE) via Luzira, Kyeyitabya and connects with the 
KEE spur road in Munyonyo. The project may be executed as BOT (Toll) or BOT (Annuity) contract 
for a period of 25 years (excluding the construction time) at an estimated cost of US$ 1100m. 
5.5.5 Kampala Bombo Expressway 
The Kampala Bombo expressway (KBE) will be an expansion of a 35km (estimated cost of US$175m) 
of the existing road stretch between Kampala and Bombo to a 4-lane dual carriage, which connects with 
the towns of Luwero, Masindi, Kigumba, Arua and to the Democratic Republic of Congo and South 
Sudan. The project will be executed either as BOT (Toll) or BOT (Annuity) at an estimated cost of US$ 
460m. 
5.5.6 Kampala Outer Beltway 
Although not captured in figure 5.6 above, the Kampala Outer Beltway (KOB), also referred to as the 
Kampala Ring Road (KRR), forms a full circle around Kampala city. It is approximately 16kms East 
of Kampala city, and covers a total of 100km of road. The proposed ring road starts from Seeta in 
Mukono Town on the KJE, turns north to Bukeerere in Mukono District, then  moves west via 
Namugongo, Kira, Kasangati, Matugga, Wakiso, Buloba to Nsangi on KPE. At Nsangi, the beltway 
will connect with KEE via Kajjansi to Munyonyo, and from Munyonyo via the SBE back to KJE.  
Finally, other PPP road projects being planned in and around the Kampala city include: Kampala 
Flyover, a 50km Kampala Busunju Expressway (KBUE), a 5km Very Very Important persons (VVIP) 
Expressway, and the ongoing expansion of the Northern Bypass to 4-lane dual carriage. Note that the 
nature of particulars for the PPP projects described above vary because of the differences in the progress 
level of planning or implementation for each project. 
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The road sub sector uses more government funding than development partner funding. While road 
development relies on both development partner and government funds, road maintenance only uses 
government funding (Odongo, 2017:5). Although the annual financial contribution for road 
development and maintenance remains too small to have a significant impact on road improvement, the 
absorption of funds by DAs has improved to an acceptable level (between 80% and 99%) except for 
DUCAR (excluding KCCA) agencies which average below 60% but above 50%. Consequently, the 
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road sub sector enormously contributes to the improved financial and physical performance of the sector 
as a whole. For instance, budget sector performance improved from 74.3% in F/Y 2015/2016 to 89.5% 
in 2016/2017. Regarding physical performance, in F/Y 2016/2017 a total of 310km (77.5% 
achievement) out of the planned 400km, compared to a total of 176km (68.5% achievement) of the 
planned 332.2km in 2015/2016 were upgraded from gravel road to bitumen standard respectively 
(MoWT ASPR, 2016/2017:67; MoWT, 2015/2016:90). 
As Samson Bagonza (the Engineer in Chief at MoWT) noted, in addition to scheduled routine and 
periodic maintenance, “roads need rehabilitation and reconstruction after every 7 and 15 years 
respectively” (Patriot Magazine, 2017:22). However, limited financing coupled with outmoded road 
maintenance and development practices impede road quality in Uganda (Odongo, 2017:4). For instance, 
only 0.55% of the GDP is spent on road maintenance, instead of the recommended 0.85% (Odongo, 
2017:9). The bigger problem of Uganda, like most of the African countries, is preference for road 
development over maintenance during funds allocations. Yet no road network can significantly improve 
while treating road development and maintenance exclusive of the other, and without adequate funding 
for all of them. While the Force Account mechanism can contribute to arresting Uganda’s road 
deterioration problem in the long run, overreliance on it, however, undermines the development of a 
strong and competitive private sector for the construction industry (RIC, 2014:1). 
Notwithstanding the road reform successes achieved so far, the inflexible and bureaucratic government 
practices largely continue to have a bearing on the commercialisation and performance of road agencies.  
For instance, since 2008 the URF operates like a “first generation Fund” instead of a “second generation 
Fund”, even when it meets the requirements to operate as such. A first generation Road Fund is 
characterised by “no oversight Board, weak legal base, earmarked revenues but not linked to road use, 
the road maintenance fund is managed by the national road agency, no published financial rules and 
regulations, and is not subjected to independent technical and financial audits” (Heggie & Vickers, 
1998). As such, URF continues to receive piecemeal road maintenance funds from the national budget 
on an annual basis. Furthermore, until 2017 (for over 10 years) UNRA developed and maintained 
national roads using the UNRA Act 2006 that had no regulations. As a rejoinder, the writer concurs 
with the assertion that, “the ineffectiveness of the regulators is a reflection of the shortcomings of the 
laws that establish the institutions and define their mandates.  A combination of laws that do not 
empower institutions to act and a narrow scope of mandate render them even weaker” (OAG Report, 
2015:2). 
Finally, it is observed that the planned PPP roads have improved features (e.g. underpasses, overpasses, 
bridges, interchanges, viaducts, Greenfields) and all roads sections are 4-lane (or more on some 
sections) dual carriage, compared to the existing ordinary roads which are 2-lane single carriage. On 
the other hand though, since 2011 the PPP road projects have remained at the planning stage, with 
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hardly any project completing the planning phase or commencing construction, except for the KEE (a 
mere Design and build contract whose construction got completed in June 2018), with plans of making 
the operation and maintenance of the road a real PPP. Although there is willingness to pursue road 
development through PPP mechanisms, there seems to be a general lack of readiness that continues to 
haunt planning and implementation processes.
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6 CHAPTER 6: LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ROAD PROJECTS IN UGANDA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
Road development is a central function of a responsible government (s) (fifth Schedule, article 178 (9b), 
and sixth schedule, article 189 (16A) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 as amended 
2005). The same Constitution (Pg.17 ix-x), provides for PPPs under the auspices of government having 
the mandate to support private sector initiatives and self-reliance, and the involvement of people in the 
formulation and implementation of development plans and programmes that affect their welfare. 
Furthermore, the government must prioritize the enactment of laws that protect people’s rights and 
enable the extension of equal and balanced development opportunities to the populace across regions, 
and between rural and urban areas (The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995:17 xi-xii, as 
amended 2005). In fact, there is global consensus about existence of sound legislation before the 
implementation of any intervention being the number one best practice. 
This chapter provides a discussion of the existing legal and policy frameworks that support the planning 
and implementation of PPP investment projects and programs in Uganda. The chapter covers pure PPP 
legal and policy frameworks, and other legal and policy frameworks (which are road specific or generic 
in nature) that support PPP arrangements. 
6.2 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
CUTTING ACROSS SECTORS 
This section discusses the applicability of the PPP policy and Act (including the responsibilities of key 
stakeholders), as well as the PPP process, that are intended to enhance effective PPP outcomes. 
6.2.1 Public Private Partnership Policy 2010 
The PPP policy provides an environment that enables the public and private sectors to closely work 
together for improved public service delivery (Republic of Uganda, 2010:5). Unlike in the past, the 
private sector is now at the forefront of providing public infrastructure and related services. Among 
others, the policy proposed establishment of the PPP Act and institutional frameworks, issuing of 
regulations and operating guidelines, standardization of PPP processes and documentation, and 
instituting capacity building programmes. In effect, this move not only empowers public agencies and 
departments with skills to effectively assess projects, identify the suitable private partners, negotiate 
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and craft good contracts, and monitor and evaluate their implementation, but also removes ambiguity 
in the allocation of roles and execution of stakeholders’ responsibilities, and protects both the public 
and private entities from indiscriminate application of the PPP law. The policy, therefore, signals the 
government’s renewed commitment towards increased private sector participation and investment in 
public infrastructure and related services with the intention of accelerating public investment to meet 
the ever increasing and evolving public needs through value for money practices, streamlined PPP 
procurement and accountability processes, and with private sector working practices that are more 
effective and less bureaucratic.  
The PPP policy is applicable to all public entities that are directly tasked with the provision of public 
services (for example, government ministries, autonomous government departments, Local Authorities 
and Statutory bodies), as long as the PPP projects being undertaken fall within the public entity’s 
mandate, and also meet the country’s medium or long term overall economic and social development 
objectives and priorities (Republic of Uganda, 2010:4). For a project to qualify as a PPP, a detailed 
feasibility study should have been carried out and its results must demonstrate that:  delivering the 
project as a PPP provides a higher value for money outcome compared to conventional procurement; 
long term affordability of the government/citizens   and willingness and capacity of private parties and 
other stakeholders has been ascertained;  and, that private sector provisioning  should provide a better 
balance of economic and social benefits and costs over public sector provisioning (Republic of Uganda, 
2010:7-8). In addition, the project scope in terms of capital or contract value must be big enough to 
ensure achieving of value for money, once the project is executed. However, with small but critical 
projects, the PPP policy recommends, where possible, the bundling or aggregating of similar projects 
together in order to attain the required PPP project size (Republic of Uganda, 2010:8). 
Among the key requirements for PPP road projects are effective stakeholder consultation and public 
awareness about the understanding of PPP projects, the benefits  and costs of each project, and allowing 
the input of all stakeholders (such as service users and their representatives, staff and their 
representative, employees and their Union representatives, public servants and the general public) in 
project development and implementation, as a  mechanism of consensus building for wider PPP policy 
and project ownership (Republic of Uganda, 2010:10-11). Finally, like in any other part of the world, 
the policy clearly indicates that private financing under PPP arrangements is meant to complement 
public resources in the provision of public infrastructure and services, but not to replace the 
government’s financial contribution, nor does it substitute conventional procurement (Republic of 
Uganda, 2010:4&7). 
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6.2.2 Public Private Partnership Act 2015 
Irrespective of the sector of the economy, the PPP Act (Republic of Uganda, 2015a) applies to all PPP 
projects that fit with in Uganda’s National Development Plan priorities (sec. 2). The projects must focus 
on developing public infrastructure or providing public services through: Concessions; Operation and 
maintenance agreements; Lease, develop and operate agreements; Build, own and maintain agreements; 
Build, own, operate and transfer agreements; Design, build, finance, and operate agreements; Build, 
own, and operate agreements; and any other PPP agreement prescribed by the Minister of Finance as 
per statutory instrument (Sec. 38-45). Although the contracting authority has the right to use one or a 
combination of any of the above mentioned PPP agreements for a single project, any choice to be made 
must consider the risk allocation, financing and operating impacts of each agreement type, and such 
decisions must be guided by the PPP Act’s procedures and regulations (Sec 37). Among the critical 
operationalisation elements of the PPP Act is stakeholder management, and in the remaining part of this 
subsection a description and highlights of the responsibilities for the key PPP stakeholders in Uganda 
is provided, as per the PPP Act 2015. 
6.2.2.1 Public Private Partnership Unit 
The PPP Unit, is a unit in the Department of Project Analysis and Public Private Partnerships in the 
Ministry of Finance, and its responsibilities in broad terms are to provide technical, financial and legal 
expertise to both the PPP committee and project teams, and serve as the National PPP resource centre, 
the Secretariat and technical arm of the PPP committee (sec 11(1a&b)). In more specific terms, the PPP 
Unit: conducts civic education to promote PPP awareness and understanding, carries out capacity 
building and advises contracting authorities on PPP management processes; compiles and maintains an 
inventory of prospective PPP projects; maintains a record of all project documents; assists the PPP 
committee in formulating guidelines and standard documentation; institutes measures to eliminate 
constraints that limit project success; liaises and assists contracting authorities to implement their roles; 
and ensures procurement processes conform to the PPP Act and procurement best practices (sec 11(2)). 
Furthermore, the PPP Unit is responsible for: conducting research and gap analysis in order to 
continuously improve PPP implementation; collecting, analysing and disseminating information 
relating to PPP projects including contingent liabilities of the government; making recommendations to 
the PPP committee for action; developing open, transparent, efficient and equitable systems for 
managing  PPP project process; and monitoring contingent liabilities and accounting and budgetary PPP 
issues within relevant offices in the Ministry of Finance (sec 11(2)). 
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6.2.2.2 Public Private Partnership Committee 
The PPP Committee membership is a representation of both public and non-public officers. The public 
officers comprise of the Attorney General and permanent secretaries (from the ministries of Finance, 
Prime Minister’s office, Lands, Local government) or their representatives, a representative from the 
National Planning Authority, and the Director of the PPP unit. Meanwhile, the non-public officers is a 
four persons team with a representation from the Private Sector Foundation, Uganda Investment 
Authority, the Academia, and a retired judge (Sec. 5). Although non-public officers serve on the 
committee for a term of five years subject to one term renewal, public officers’ term of office does not 
have a time limit, since the terms and conditions of their service on the committee is at the discretion 
of the minister of finance in consultation with the public service commission (Sec. 5 (c) & 6). 
Furthermore, the non- public officers’ team is required to have at least one-third of its representation 
from either gender (Sec. 5(b)), whereas the team of public officers is not mandated to be gender sensitive 
at all. 
Among others, the committee is tasked to: formulate PPP policies; ensure that any PPP agreement 
complies with the PPP Act, and all the PPP projects meet the national priorities and PPP Policy 
stipulations;   formulate standards, guidelines and procedures for contract awards and bid documents; 
examine and approve feasibility studies; approve the organisational structure for the PPP Unit; oversee 
monitoring and evaluation of projects; authorize allocations from the Project Development Facilitation 
Fund; approve project proposals, cause and approve fiscal and any other resource accountabilities 
required; and review legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks (Sec. 7). In addition, the committee 
has powers to establish subcommittees whenever the committee deems it necessary for better 
performance of its functions, and the committee can also co-opt into the membership of the 
subcommittees, persons with knowledge and skills necessary for effective performance of the 
subcommittees (Sec. 9).   However, the committee is allowed to delegate, only in writing, any of its 
powers or functions to any subcommittee or to any member of the committee or agent when need arises 
(Sec. 8(3).  
6.2.2.3 Contracting Authority 
Contracting authority refers to a ministry, department of government or anybody established by 
government and mandated to carry out a public function (Sec. 4). The primary responsibility of the 
contracting authority is to identify, appraise, develop, procure and monitor PPP projects within its 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the contracting authority must prepare periodic reports (Sec. 27 (2)), and may 
directly participate in the financing and implementation of the project. Although the PPP Act is explicit 
about the forms of participation in project financing by the contracting authority to be monetary 
contribution to project capital, concessioning the use of assets partially or fully, and assigning the 
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contracting  authority’s asset to another party to be operated and exploited for a specified duration, 
however, with the contracting authority’s direct participation in project implementation, the PPP Act 
implicitly  indicates that “the project invitation to tender” must  define the form and level of engagement 
of the contracting authority (Sec. 12 (4)). Finally, the contracting authority or government have the right 
to borrow, guarantee or raise a loan for PPPs, only when such a decision has been approved by a 
resolution of parliament, and fulfils other prescriptions of Article 159 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Uganda 1995 (as amended 2005) (sec. 12 (4)).  
6.2.2.4 Accounting Officer 
The accounting officer is “a person designated as such under the law, to perform the functions of the 
accounting officer of a contracting authority” (Sec. 4). The functions of the accounting officer include, 
among others: to solicit for a private party for a project, to appoint the project team and any other person 
required for the implementation of the project; signs a project agreement with the private party on behalf 
of the contracting authority; takes custody of a project agreement and monitors compliance with its 
terms and conditions; and protects any  property of the contracting authority or government  placed 
under the control of a private party from  forfeiture, theft, loss, wastage or misuse (Sec. 13). 
6.2.2.5 Project Officer 
The project officer is the person appointed by the accounting officer to head and give direction to the 
project team in the execution of their project duties, manages the procurement and implementation of 
the project, and monitors the way the private party manages and executes project tasks (Sec. 14). 
6.2.2.6 Project Teams 
The project team should be composed of staff from the contracting authority, unless the required 
technical skills for the project are not available internally (Sec. 15 (3)). The projects teams are tasked 
with: identifying, screening, and prioritising projects; preparing projects; preparing and appraising the 
legal, regulatory, social, economic and commercial viability of each project agreement; ensuring that 
parties to a project comply with project agreement and provisions of the PPP Act; execute procurement 
processes, monitor implementation of the project agreement with in the contracting authority; ensure 
transfer of assets at termination is in line with the terms and conditions of the project agreement; liaise 
with all key stakeholders of the project; and oversee  management of the project in relation to project 
agreement. The project teams are also mandated to maintain a record of all project documentation and 
agreements, implement recommendations and guidelines issued by the PPP committee, and submit 
annual reports to the PPP unit, and any other reports or information as may be requested by the PPP 
unit and committee (Sec. 16). 
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6.2.2.7 Process Auditor 
The process auditor is “a person appointed as such by the Accountant General”, and is responsible for 
investigating and ensuring that the contracting authority complies with the required PPP Act provisions 
before the PPP agreement is approved by cabinet and signed by the accounting officer. 
6.2.2.8 Transaction Advisor 
The transaction advisor refers to a person with appropriate skills and experience appointed by the 
accounting officer to assist and advise the contracting authority or PPP Unit on PPP matters, which 
include preparation, accession and conclusion of a project agreement, and the financial close (Sec. 4). 
The PPP Act mandates the transaction advisor to: carry out a comprehensive feasibility study for the 
project; ensure optimum risk allocation in the PPP agreement; design and negotiate a PPP agreement 
that guarantees sustainable social benefits; and safeguard the interests of the contracting authority in the 
management and execution of the project (Sec. 18). 
6.2.2.9 Evaluation Committee 
The evaluation committee is a team of persons with appropriate skills, appointed by the accounting 
officer from the staff within or outside the contracting authority, to evaluate bids submitted for a given 
PPP project (Sec. 19).  
6.2.2.10  Private Party 
The private party is a special purpose vehicle company incorporated under the laws of Uganda, for 
purposes of implementing a specific PPP project (Sec. 4 & 20 (1)). The private party must have both 
the technical and financial capacities required to perform project tasks, and bear all the responsibilities 
and risks of financing for effective performance of its obligations under the project agreement (Sec. 20 
(3-6)).  
6.2.2.11  Minister of Finance 
The responsibilities of the Minister of Finance include that he/she: must publish the PPP agreement 
value prescribed by cabinet (Sec. 26(2)); must lay before parliament, a copy of the agreement within 
one month after agreement signing (Sec. 26 (10)); may specify the PPP agreement type to use (Sec. 26 
(6)); may by statutory instrument amend the schedule to the PPP Act (Sec. 50); shall receive annual 
reports and audit financial statements from the private party six months after the end of every financial 
year (Sec. 28 (4)); must receive periodic reports from the contracting authority (Sec. 27 (2)); and may 
by statutory instrument make PPP regulations. Equally, the minister is tasked to: monitor contingent 
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liabilities and accounts and budgetary PPP issues within the ministry of finance (Sec. 11 (p)); recruit 
and appoint the director of the PPP Unit in consultation with the ministry of public service (Sec. 10 
(3)); appoints the non-public officers of the PPP committee (Sec. 5 (2a-b)); determines the term of office 
of the PPP committee members in consultation with public service commission (Sec. 6); may by 
statutory instrument approve the undertaking of any project other than those mentioned in section 2 (1a-
j) of the PPP Act. Finally, the minister of finance must provide written approval to any transfer in shares, 
increase in share capital or changes in the corporate status of a SPV company (Sec. 20 (2)), and also 
provide a written confirmation about the availability of the required financing to the contracting 
authority, where the PPP project is to be financed by the contracting authority (Sec. 23 (4)). 
6.2.2.12  Minister of the Contracting Authority 
Similar to the minister of finance, the minister of the contracting authority must receive project periodic 
reports from the contracting authority (Sec. 27 (2)) and must provide written approval to any transfer 
in shares, increase in share capital or changes in the corporate status of a SPV company (Sec. 20 (2)). 
6.2.2.13  Cabinet 
The cabinet is responsible for, among others: prescribing the value of the PPP agreement that would 
require cabinet approval (Sec. 26 (1)); approving PPP agreements before the accounting officers can 
sign them, unless the project agreement is below the approval value for cabinet (Sec. 26 (3) &Sec. 17 
(4)); approving an amendment or variation to project agreement (Sec. 26 (8&9)); approving the use of 
direct procurement method for a project; and approving  amendments to the Schedule to the PPP Act 
(Sec. 50). 
6.2.2.14  Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Finance 
In addition to being a member of the PPP committee, the permanent secretary of the ministry of finance 
is responsible for making rules for the administrative and financial frameworks of the PPP unit, as well 
as the relationship of the unit with the departments of the ministry of finance (Sec. 11 (5)). 
6.2.2.15  Auditor General 
The Auditor General is responsible for carrying out value for money audits on PPP projects in each 
financial year, in accordance with the National Audit Act, and each PPP project must be audited right 
from inception up to when it comes to a complete end, and must report to parliament about the outcomes 
of a completed audit (Sec. 30).  
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6.2.2.16  Accountant General 
In addition to appointing the process auditor (see Sec. 4), the Accountant General prescribes the 
accounting and financial reporting rules for PPPs (Sec. 28 (3)). 
6.2.2.17  Attorney General 
In addition to being a member of the PPP committee (Sec. 5 (1a)), the Attorney General is responsible 
for clearing PPP contracts before they are awarded and signed between the private party and the 
contracting authority.  
6.2.3 Public Private Partnership Process 
For effective undertaking and management of PPP projects, the Republic of Uganda (2010:16) dissects 
project tasks into project development and project delivery stages. Whereas project development is a 
composition of project inception, feasibility studies and procurement tasks, on the other hand, project 
delivery is about implementation of project tasks post project financial close (see figure 6.1 below for 
details). 
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Figure 6.1. A summarised Public Private Partnership process for the Republic of Uganda 
Source: PPP Unit, MFPED
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Figure 6.1 above provides a more summarized version of the PPP process, highlighting the project 
stages with their corresponding tasks, and key action requirements from particular project stakeholders. 
The fundamental objectives for each of the project main tasks are set out hereafter. Project inception 
conducts a preliminary cost benefit analysis to confirm the suitability of the proposed project as a PPP. 
Project feasibility study provides a detailed viability report of the project with documents to be used 
during project procurement, the evaluation criteria and a draft contract agreement. PPP procurement 
ensures that the contracting authority attains the best deal, and signs a PPP contract with the most 
qualified private party for the project. Project implementation is focused on effective PPP contract 
management. 
However, making reference to the PPP Act, although the applicability of project inception, feasibility 
study (Sec. 21 & 22), and PPP procurement to PPPs seem a little more clear, other than the very general 
provisions about the PPP project agreement (Sec. 26) and PPP forms (Sec. 37-45), the PPP Act is very 
silent about how project implementation (mobilization, construction, operation and maintenance, and 
exit and transfer back) fits within the whole PPP arrangement. 
6.3 COMMON LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS APLLICABLE TO PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
In this section, reference is made to common legal and policy frameworks as those frameworks that are 
almost relevant to all public investment projects. In particular, the applicability of PPDA Act, 
Development Committee Guidelines, Public Finance Management Act, National Audit Act, and Land 
Act, to PPP interventions is discussed. 
6.3.1 Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 2003 
The PPDA Act 2003 as amended 2014 (Republic of Uganda, 2014a) as the law that regulates public 
procurement procedures and processes in Uganda, under section 88L (1&2) made two important 
provisions, which insinuated that PPP projects would be strictly undertaken through PPDA law. Section 
88L(1) stipulates that guidance on the applicable procurement procedures and documents has to be 
sought from the PPDA Authority, where the  procuring and disposing entity would want to use 
contracting arrangements that involve the mobilisation of private sector resources for purposes of 
financing, construction, operation and maintenance of public development projects or concessioning. 
Section 88L (2) of the same Act defines contracting arrangements, eluded to in section 88L (1), to 
“include financing by Build Own Operate (BOO), Build Own Transfer (BOT), Build Own Operate 
Transfer (BOOT) and Public Private Partnership (PPP)”.  
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However, with the enactment of the PPP Act in 2015, the PPDA Act 2003 (as amended 2014) was 
further amended by substituting section 88L (1) with a provision that removes regulatory powers from 
the PPDA Authority on contracting arrangements that involve the mobilisation of private sector 
resources for financing, construction, operation and maintenance of public development projects or 
concessioning, while section 88L (2) was in its entirety repealed (Section 52 of the PPP Act 2015) to 
annul the PPDA law from being the supreme procurement law for developing and implementing PPP 
projects. Although these changes imply that PPP arrangements have to be undertaken and managed 
under the PPP law, on the other hand the PPDA law plays a complementary role in reinforcing the 
procurement provisions of the PPP law where such need would arise.   
Section 16 (d) of the PPP Act provides that, where necessary, the procurement process for a PPP project 
can be undertaken using the PPDA Act. For instance: 
 Section 15(3)) of the PPP Act 2015 indicates that the PPDA Act shall be used to procure 
external persons with appropriate skills and experience to occupy the positions of project 
officer, process auditor or transaction adviser, where the contracting authority lacks competent 
internal staff to take up such positions. 
 Sec 24 (g) of the PPP Act 2015 states that a bidder or a bidder’s representative may be 
disqualified from participating in the bidding process, where such participant had earlier been 
disqualified by the PPDA Authority (Sec. 24 (g), among other considerations (refer to the whole 
of Sec. 24)).    
 
Finally, the PPP Act suggests that the procurement process of PPP projects must not only conform 
to the PPP Act alone, but also procurement best practices (Sec 11 (n)). In fact, no project can be 
implemented by a public agency as a PPP without prior comparison of Public procurement and PPP 
options to come to a conclusion that PPP is the most viable option (Sec. 21(3)); Sec. 22 (2d&3)). 
6.3.2 Development Committee Guidelines 2016 
Prior to the implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP) II in 2015, public investment in 
Uganda was being undermined by weak project identification, preparation, and appraisal processes, 
which caused unnecessary project implementation delays, cost overruns, and increased commitment 
fees due to limited capacity to utilise foreign loans (Republic of Uganda, 2016:iv). As a corrective 
measure, the MFPED strengthened the Public Investment Management System (PIMS) processes and 
controls for the identification and pre-investment project phases, and for the investment, operation and 
ex-post evaluation phases as well (See appendix E). The new or 2016 PIMS framework for Uganda, for 
instance, introduces four approval levels before any project is admitted into the Pubic Investment Plan 
(PIP) (Republic of Uganda, 2016:3). The first approval is for preparing the project concept which must 
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demonstrate the alignment of the project idea to the National Development Plan. The second approval 
is for preparing the project profile which must demonstrate the expected project results and how the 
stated results must be measured. The third approval is for undertaking a prefeasibility study that would 
demonstrate whether all alternative interventions have been evaluated, while the fourth approval is for 
undertaking a detailed feasibility study only for the project implementation option which contributes 
greatest to the economy. 
The PIMS provides two options, the Traditional Public Sector (TPS) and the PPP, and any public project 
must be executed as either a TPS or PPP project. Apart from the recurrent budget based funded projects, 
all conceived public projects (each with a capital that covers at least 70% of the total project cost) must 
be undertaken within the confines of the PIMS framework. However, if after the prefeasibility study 
the objectives of a given project are found to be well achieved through PPP option, the project is 
immediately transferred to the PPP Unit. Whereas from the detailed feasibility study stage onwards, the 
approved PPP project must comply with the PPP framework, on the other hand, the project found fit 
for TPS option must systematically comply with the PIMS framework until the completion of the ex-
post evaluation phase of the project. 
6.3.3 Public Finance Management Act 2015 
With the enactment of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA)  2015, the Public Finance and 
Accountability Act 2003 (which previously regulated public finance matters) was rendered obsolete 
and unusable (Republic of Uganda, 2015b, Sec. 84). Whereas each of the clauses of the PFMA 2015 
may in one way or another be purposeful to every government investment project, this study concurs 
with the EU (2016:5) assertion that the foremost relevance of the PFMA 2105 to PPP arrangements lies 
in the public debts, grants and guarantees management, and accounting and auditing of public funds. 
Because PPP financing requirements are often far higher than what governments alone can afford, as 
such most, if not all, PPP projects have to be undertaken through grants financing and external 
borrowing (secured by SPV company or government) which obviously necessitate government 
guarantees, and regulation and control for proper use. 
According to PFMA 2015, Sec. 42 (3) (Republic of Uganda, 2015b), public debts, guarantees, grants 
and any other financial liabilities of government should be managed in the context of the National 
Development Plan, the Charter of Fiscal Responsibility objectives, and the medium term debt 
management strategy. Notwithstanding section 44(3&4) of the PFMA 2015, when monetary grants and 
loans have been received by government, they should be used for the purposes for which they were 
intended to serve (PFMA, 2015, Sec. 43 (2) & 44 (1&2)), and no person nor public entity should solicit 
or receive loans or monetary grants, and/or issue guarantees, without prior approval of the minister of 
finance (PFMA, 2015, Sec. 36 (1)). It follows that the accounting and auditing procedures and controls 
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provided in the PFMA are, therefore, for protecting public funds and any other public resources 
including public debts, grants and guarantees from fraud, embezzlement and mismanagement (PFMA, 
2015, Sec. 46 (3g) & 48 (2)). 
Parts VI and VII of the PFMA 2015 respectively offer a detailed account on the management of public 
debts, grants and guarantees, and accounting and auditing of public funds (Sec. 36-44 & Sec. 45-54) 
for government projects, PPPs inclusive. At policy level, the minister of finance and the Accountant 
General respectively oversee the management of public debts and grants and guarantees, and 
accountability of public funds, while at the operational/contracting entity level these are responsibilities 
of the accounting officer.  In addition, auditing supervision and practices of audit committees or officers 
at policy level is under the leadership of the Internal Auditor General, while at the contracting entity 
level this is the responsibility of the Internal Auditor (s). Other critical players that support the 
implementation of public debts, grants, accounting and auditing decisions include the Auditor General, 
Parliament, secretary to the Treasury, and Audit Committees. 
6.3.4 National Audit Act (NAA) 2008 
Article 163 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 (as amended 2005) gives powers to the 
Office of the Auditor General, under the leadership of an appointed Auditor General, to conduct 
financial, value for money (VFM), classified expenditure, procurement, and gender and environment 
audits on public and private sector organisations involved in the delivery of government investment 
project (s) or utilising public funds (NAA, 2008:4, & Sec. 13(1)-Republic of Uganda, 2008; Article 163 
(3b) of the Constitution). Similarly, where the Auditor General finds it fit, “examines, investigates and 
reports on the expenditure of public monies disbursed, advanced or guaranteed to a private organisation 
in which Government has no controlling interest” (NAA, 2008, Sec. 18). In addition to conducting 
mandatory annual audits at the end of every financial year  (NAA, 2008, Sec. 17(3)), the Auditor 
General may carry out random financial or VFM audits, and special VFM audits and investigations to 
establish how well public monies have been spent and other public resources utilised by organisations, 
as well as the actual conduct and performance of designated officers in the execution of their functions 
on government projects against the set standards (NAA, Sec. 21 & 22; Article 163 (3b) of the 
Constitution). 
6.3.5 Land Act 1998 (as amended 2010)/The Land Tenure System 
Since roads are constructed on land, and given that this study investigates how PPPs can facilitate road 
infrastructure development in Uganda, it becomes paramount to provide a brief discussion on the Land 
Law provisions. Land in Uganda is either customary, freehold, mailo or leasehold owned. Unlike the 
previous constitutions which stated that land belonged to the government (s) (Chapter xii & Chapter xi 
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of the Constitution of Uganda 1962 and the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1967 respectively), 
the current laws state that “land belongs to the Citizens of Uganda” (Constitution of the Republic of 
Uganda 1995 as amended 2005, Article 237(1); Land Act 1998 as amended 2010, Sec. 2, Republic of 
Uganda, 1998a). This means that every person, whether as an individual or a group, has a right to land 
ownership (Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 as amended 2005, Article 26 (1)). 
One of the critical issues that seem to stall public investments in Uganda is the acquisition of land from 
landowners for infrastructure projects. Although land owners should not be compulsorily deprived of 
their land, or any interest in or right over the land, where land is required for public use or interest the 
laws of Uganda permit government to compulsorily acquire (expropriate) or possess land from the 
owners (Land Act 1998 as amended 2010, Sec. 42; Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Articles 26 
(a) & 237 (2a)). However, the admissibility of such government action is pegged on four fundamental 
conditions: 
 prompt payment  of the seller; 
 fair and adequate compensation of the seller, on the willing seller willing buyer basis; 
 Government takes possession or acquisition of the land after payment (different from the 
previous Land Acquisition Act of 1965, chapter 226, which venerates the compulsory 
acquisition of land before the land owner is compensated); 
 with government acquisition or possession, any person with an interest or right over the land 
must be allowed to access courts of law for remedy (Land Act 1998 as amended 2010, Sec. 42; 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, Articles 26 (b) & 237 (2a)). 
 
 Notwithstanding the above legal provisions, the acquisition of land in Uganda remains a blockage to 
public infrastructure development due to Government delays to compensate land owners, prolonged 
disagreements between government and land owners over the fair land value, disputes over the rightful 
owner (s) for certain pieces of private land, and persistent delays by courts of law to offset cases relating 
to land ownership or land takeover by government. With court case delays in particular, according to 
Ravet and Tumusiime (2017:2), the average time for processing a court case by lower courts in Uganda 
is 2 years, and approximately 6 years for a Supreme Court appeal case. Consequently, given that one of 
the roles of government is to regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of land (The 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 as amended 2005, clause XI (iii), Pg.17 & Article 242), 
and being aware of the amendment provisions of articles 259 and 262 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Uganda, the government has embarked on the process of amending article 26 (in particular section 2 
(b)) of the Constitution to allow government expeditiously to acquire or possess private land without 
any hindrances from land owners or purported owners for public infrastructure development. 
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The proposal seeks to: “enable Government, or a local government to deposit with court, compensation 
awarded by the Government for any property declared for compulsory acquisition; empower the 
Government or local government to take possession of the declared property upon depositing the 
compensation awarded for the property with court, pending determination by the court of the disputed 
compensation awarded to the property owner or person having an interest in or right over the property;  
empower the property owner or person having an interest in or right over the property to access the 
deposited compensation awarded at any time during the dispute resolution process; and (d) empower 
Parliament to prescribe, by law, the time within which disputes arising out of compensation shall be 
resolved” (Constitution Amendment Bill, 2017, Bill number 13, Republic of Uganda, 2017c). As per 
government plan, the above statement (in italics) will be added to article 26 of the Constitution after 
section 2.  
According to Betty Amongi (2017) - the minister of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, the 
amendment does not at all change land ownership, and government is still committed to compensating 
the land owners prior to government acquisition or possession of land (as per article 26, Sec. 2(b) of the 
Constitution), unless a land owner disputes government’s compensation value for the land. Depending 
on the behaviour of the landowner, the intention of the amendment is to enable government to access 
and start using the land for infrastructure development after, during or before compensation.  However, 
Oloka-Onyango (2017) refers to such an amendment as “illegal and unconstitutional”, and 
“amendment-by-infection”. It is implied that the alteration of a specific constitutional provision (such 
as article 26) has spill-over effects on other parts of the constitutional document. As such, Ravet and 
Tumusiime (2017:2) argue that, “if an amendment of this nature is passed into law will not only escalate 
the current procedural irregularities but will also worsen the current delays in paying the awarded 
amounts”.  
6.4 ROAD SPECIFIC LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS APPLICABLE TO PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
This section comprises of the Draft Road Toll Policy, and a combination of the National Environment 
Act with the Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects. The Environmental 
Impact Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects alongside the National Environment Act, and the Draft 
Road Tolling Policy, operationalise environmental compliance and tolling for PPP road projects 
respectively. 
6.4.1 Draft Road Tolling Policy 2017 
The Draft Road Tolling Policy (DRTP) 2017 (Republic of Uganda, 2017a) is the first of its kind in 
Uganda, and draws experiences largely from the South African and partly from Ethiopian road tolling 
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models (Republic of Uganda, 2017a:iv). Although tolling practices for South Africa and Ethiopia are 
fairly similar, there is a responsibility dissimilarity in road toll management between the two countries. 
Whereas road toll management is a responsibility of the National Roads Authority (SANRAL) for South 
Africa, in Ethiopia the same responsibility rests with the Ethiopian Toll Roads Enterprise (a public 
enterprise) which is independent of the National Roads Authority, the Ethiopian Roads Authority 
(ERA).  
In Uganda, any road category (national, urban, district and community access) qualifies for tolling so 
long as it meets the national road tolling viability requirements, as may be set out in the Tolling policy.  
Whereas the PPP Act (2015, Sec. 5a) encourages private sector participation for road infrastructure 
development, and sections 38-44 of the same Act provides for PPP forms which by their nature suggest 
road tolls to be inevitable, and while the URF Act 2008 (Sec 21 (1a, v)) notes that tolling is an effective 
means for financing road maintenance, surprisingly though, none of the two laws above makes mention 
of the implementation and operation mechanisms for toll roads. Therefore, the DRTP 2017 comes in 
handy to bridge this gap by working as a basis for the introduction, regulation, management and 
operation of toll roads. Additionally, the Government has drafted a Roads Bill, which when passed into 
law will regulate the levying, enforcement and collection of tolls, and the utilisation of funds from tolls 
to meet roads construction, operation and maintenance costs and any other obligations associated with 
road infrastructure (Republic of Uganda, 2017a:6). 
Tolling in the Ugandan context serves to promote road projects based on toll-funded borrowing, to 
motivate the private sector to finance and participate in road development services, to raise 
supplementary revenue for further road infrastructure improvement, maintenance and development, and 
as a means of decongesting  heavily congested urban centres during rush hours, among others  (Republic 
of Uganda, 2017a: iv & vi). Unless other stronger economic or social justifications emerge, tolling is 
restricted to roads and concession agreements that exhibit financial viability, high traffic volume 
forecasts, and whose resultant investments are envisioned to significantly improve road infrastructure 
facilities and services for toll payers and other road users as a whole (Republic of Uganda, 2017a: v). 
Although collected tolls should primarily be ring-fenced and dedicated to paying the costs of designing 
and construction, rehabilitation, upgrading, maintenance and operation of toll roads (v), for regional 
harmonisation, however, part of such funds can be used to support road infrastructure development in 
less developed regions of the country (Republic of Uganda, 2017a: 13). 
Operating of tolls will be executed through three arrangements, namely, PPP, direct government 
operation and management, and outsourcing to a private party.  PPP toll agreements are restricted to 
seven PPP forms (i.e. Build, (Finance), Operate and Transfer; Build, Own, Operate and Transfer; 
Formation of a private trust to finance toll concession; Finance, Operate and Transfer; Design, Build, 
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Operate and Transfer;  Design, Build, Finance and Operate; Design, Build, Finance and Transfer). With 
direct government operation and management, a designated government authority will operate tolls on 
a commercial basis with minimal private sector engagement, whereas with outsourcing arrangements, 
selected individual toll road projects will be contracted out to the private sector on a concession basis 
through competitive tendering without any financial guarantees being provided by government.  
The Policy proposes tolling to be implemented through three methods (manual, electronic and  mixed), 
and three operating systems consisting of open, closed, and shadow tolling (Republic of Uganda, 
2017a:11). The payment of tolls will apply to every vehicle that uses the toll road irrespective of its 
class, except for toll exempt vehicles which include police vehicles on duty, military vehicles on duty, 
and emergency service vehicles, and vehicles for road users living and working along the toll road 
without an alternative access route (s). The toll tariffs to be paid by vehicles will be based on the 
perceived benefits a toll road offers to each vehicle class relative to the available alternative free route 
(s). Table 6.1 below provides the vehicle classification system for Uganda. 
Table 6.1. Vehicle Classification in Uganda 
Class  
 
Type of vehicle Description 
1 Motorcycles Vehicle with two wheels, excluding tricycles.  
2 Light vehicles Light vehicles with 3 or more wheels with or without trailers 
and with no heavy axle* on the vehicle or trailer. 
3 Medium goods vehicles 
and medium buses 
Goods vehicles and buses with three or fewer than three 
axles of which one or more is a heavy axle*. 
4 Large goods vehicles and 
large buses 
Goods vehicles or buses with four or more axles of which 
one or more is a heavy axle*. 
Key: * A heavy axle is defined as an axle with more than 2 wheels 
Source: Draft Tolling policy 2017 (Republic of Uganda, 2017a:12) 
6.4.2 National Environment Act, 1995, and Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for 
Road Projects 2004  
According to the National Environment Management Policy 2014 (Republic of Uganda, 2014b:27) PPP 
cooperation has become a powerful incentive and means through which modern infrastructure financing 
and environmental management practices are improving the quality and efficiency of public services. 
As such, environmental awareness and management is synonymous with sustainable development 
(Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995, as amended 2005, Article 245). In order to meet the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 167 
 
present and future development needs, appropriate measures must be taken to minimise, protect and 
preserve natural resources and their users (people and other inhabitants) from abuse, damage and 
destruction. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda refers to natural resources as “land, air, natural 
lakes and rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, national parks, and any land that is reserved 
for ecological and tourism purposes for the common good of all citizens” (Article 237(b); clause XXVII, 
Pg. 19). 
To shape Uganda’s environmental agenda, in 1995 and 1996 respectively, the National Environment 
Act was enacted and the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) was formed purposely 
to coordinate, monitor and supervise the management of the environment for sustainable development. 
As a result, several environment related regulations (Winyi, 2014:17) have been made to operationalize 
the environmental law in order to support the country’s development path. Given that the key result 
area of any environment policy lies in its assessment criteria and processes, and because “the use of 
Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) has not yet been fully understood and appreciated by policy 
makers and resource users” (The National Environment Management Policy 2014, Republic of Uganda, 
2014b:18), this study focuses its discussion for this subsection on the EIA tool. Environment Impact 
Assessment refers to “a systematic examination conducted to determine whether or not a project will 
have any adverse impact on the environment” (The National Environment Act 1995, Cap 153, Sec. 1 
(r), Republic of Uganda, 1995). A sound EIA also involves conducting  an economic analysis on the 
costs and benefits of each identified environmental impact for developing apposite preventive or 
mitigation measures for smooth project implementation and monitoring (Environmental Impact 
Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects 2004, Republic of Uganda, 2004:50; Winyi, 2014:11). 
With regard to roads development, EIA is mandatory for “all major roads, and all roads in scenic, 
wooded or mountainous areas” (The National Environment Act 1995, Cap 153, third schedule, clause 
3 (a & b)), and any major repairs, extensions or routine maintenance of any brownfield road project 
(Environmental Impact Assessment Regulation 1998, Sec. 3 (1b), Republic of Uganda, 1998b). In 
Uganda, EIA processes and decisions are steered through: Environmental Impact Assessment 
Guidelines 1997; Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations 1998; Environmental Impact 
Assessment Reference Manual 2002; Conduct and Certification of Environmental Practitioners 
Regulations 2003; and Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects 2004. With EIA 
for road projects, environmental elements include: physical (geology, topography, soils, climate, air 
quality, drainage patterns, surface water, groundwater, water quality and soil erosion); biological (flora 
and fauna, habitats, rare and endangered species, protected areas); socio-economic (demographic 
characteristics, land uses, agricultural and economic activities, modes of transport, road networks and 
their usage, origin and destination of goods and passengers transported, a geographical area’s 
administrative structures, employment); and cultural (archaeological, historical, religious and cultural 
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features, scenic beauty and wilderness value) (Republic of Uganda, 2004:12; Kakuru, Musoke & 
Kyakuwaire, 2001:7). 
A change in any of the above environmental elements resulting from road development activities may 
have varying and enormous repercussions on the environment in terms of duration, timing, magnitude, 
spatial coverage, and possibility of occurrences (Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for 
Road Projects, 2004, Republic of Uganda 2004:12), at any point of  the road development cycle. 
Subsequently, the “impact significance” for each impact factor must be established in order to construct 
suitable impact mitigation or preventive measures. According to Kampala Capital City Authority 
(KCCA) (2016:10) significance of impact is a combination of impact severity and impact likelihood; 
where impact severity is a combination of (duration, timing, magnitude, spatial coverage), and impact 
likelihood is about (the possibility of an impact occurring), as illustrated in table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2. Impact Significance Options 
 
Source: KCCA (2016:10) 
From table 6.2 above, impact significance options range from negligible, minor, moderate, major or a 
combination of some of these options. The meaning attached to each of the impact significance options 
is as follows: “Major” shaded red  (impacts are unacceptable, signifying that mitigation measures must 
be implemented to reduce or stop the significance);  “Minor- moderate” and “moderate” shaded orange 
(impacts are tolerable, demonstrating that efforts must be made to reduce the impact to levels that are 
as low as reasonably practical); and “Negligible”, “Negligible-minor”, and “minor” shaded yellow and 
white (impacts are acceptable, implying that the impacts identified may not justify implementing 
mitigation measures) (KCCA, 2016:11). A detailed account of road activities with their potential 
impacts and mitigation measures at every project phase has been provided in Appendix F. 
As a rule of the thumb, EIA should be conducted prior to project licensing and construction (Kakuru et 
al., 2001:7; Winyi, 2014:31; Ecaat, 2004:iii; also see figure 2 below), but should also be integrated in 
the overall road development process for effective project planning, construction, operation and 
maintenance (see figure 6.2 below). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 169 
 
 
Figure 6.2. The Environment Impact Assessment Process for Road Projects 
Source: Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects 2004 (Republic of  
   Uganda, 2004:23) 
In consultation with the lead agency and NEMA, the developer is responsible for conducting the EIA 
and meeting costs involved (Winyi, 2014:14). Throughout the EIA process, the developer prepares 
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necessary documents and reports, and submits them to the lead agency for review, as well as to NEMA 
for both reviews and approval decisions. However, where the lead agency is the developer of the project, 
it automatically assumes the responsibilities of the developer and directly deals with NEMA on EIA 
matters. Note that the outcome of every screening category is the issuance of a certificate of approval 
by NEMA to the developer. Whereas screening category I and II may be completed in a reasonably 
short duration because of the minimal rigor required, category III and IV are very rigorous and may 
take more time to execute since they, respectively, require conducting partial and full environmental 
impact studies. A detailed screening criterion for road projects or activities and outcome decisions for 
each screening category is provided in table 6.3 below: 
Table 6.3. Road project environmental screening 
 
Source: Modified from the Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects 
  2004 (Republic of Uganda, 2004:20-21) 
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As already alluded to, EIA must be integrated in the overall road project life cycle.  Although the EIA 
process for road projects in figure 6.2 above over-emphasizes meeting environmental concerns during 
the planning activities of a project, on the other hand it is submitted that environmental outcomes from 
the EIA should equally be closely followed up in the implementation, operation, and maintenance stages 
of the project, if EIA schemes are to have positive significant impacts on road projects. Figure 6.3 below 
provides a two-in-one integrated EIA and road project life cycle process.  
 
Figure 6.3. Integration of Environment Impact Assessment with the Road Project Cycle 
Source: Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects 2004 (Republic of    
  Uganda, 2004:15) 
Whereas conventional environment policies seem to view EIA to end at a point when project 
construction is about to commence (see figure 6.2 above), the exceptional features of the above “EIA 
and road project lifecycle integrated process” in figure 6.3 is that project stakeholders recognise the 
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implementation of environmental mitigation measures, and management of environmental monitoring 
and auditing, as being part and parcel of the EIA process for road projects. In addition, in agreement 
with article 26, section 2(bi) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, the integrated process in 
figure 6.3 above indicates that compensation payments or resettlements for land and property owners 
should be made prior to the commencement of road construction. According to the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Guidelines for Road Projects (2004:43) “the project developers are responsible for 
compensation processes, while road authorities are specifically responsible for effecting 
compensation”. Alongside road project developers, other key stakeholders involved in the 
compensation and resettlement processes are the Ministry of Water, Lands and Environment, and the 
Office of the Prime minister, for compensation and resettlement purposes respectively (Republic of 
Uganda, 2004:46). 
In conclusion, the EIA is both a project planning and implementation management tool that: identifies 
negative and positive impacts of a project; determines whether adverse impacts can be mitigated; 
assesses the alternative projects or activities given the impact significance of the proposed project; 
recommends preventive or mitigation measures, and determines whether a proposed project or policy 
should be implemented or modified; and ensures that the suggested measures and recommendations are 
implemented. Amidst the aforementioned strengths of the EIA tool, critics cynically argue that 
protection of natural resources have been favoured over socio-economic factors by managers and 
practitioners (Tsunokawa & Hoban, 1997:8). For instance, in 2015 the World Bank suspended funding 
(over UGX.800bn) for Ugandan road projects based on allegations of sexual abuse by male contractors 
on female employees and minor girls, and  general mistreatment of workers by contractors on the 
66.2km Kamwenge Fort portal road project in Western Uganda (Daily Monitor, 30th November 2016:3). 
Tsunokawa and Hoban (1997:8) argue further that, save for project site impacts and those impacts that 
directly impede project implementation, actual EIAs normally overlook broader local community, 
regional and sector environmental impacts, and their future development plans. Yet globally, 
environmental laws and policies provide for such environmental requirements (KCCA, 2016:9; 
Republic of Uganda, 2004:10).  
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Constitution as the supreme law of the land provided the opening remarks in the introduction 
section of the chapter. The applicability of the Constitution was integrated in the discussions for most 
of the other legal and policy frameworks. From the review made, we observe that the Constitution of 
the Republic of Uganda not only provides for road development, but also PPP modalities (refer to the 
summary in section 6.5 and details in the whole of chapter 6).  
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Taking stock of the several aspirations made in the PPP policy in 2010, by the end of this study a lot 
had been achieved but much more remained unaccomplished. The PPP Unit and PPP Committee have 
been created, and the PPP Act was enacted. However, PPP frameworks lack regulations and operating 
guidelines, standardised processes, documentation are almost non-existent, and no clear or well-
structured PPP capacity building programmes exist, among others. Furthermore, although the PPP Act 
seems to be a well thought through law, it however downplays the need for clear and detailed 
procurement (apart from procurement methods), construction, operation, and maintenance processes. 
In addition, from the PPP Act provisions, it is observed that the ministry of finance seems to overshadow 
PPP operations. 
Although the Draft Road Tolling Policy and the Draft Roads Bill pave the way for operation and tolling 
of PPP roads, however, without transforming these frameworks into full policy and laws respectively, 
the operations and maintenance activities of the road projects will definitely be curtailed. In fact, 
historically Uganda’s public sector is slow at expediting policy or law enactment processes, no matter 
the urgency. Notwithstanding the government’s delays in compensating landowners, the current land 
acquisition system favours landowners over government’s efforts to accelerate public infrastructure 
development.  Furthermore, although the PPP system is a different procurement law from the PPDA 
Act, the PPDA law, however, not only plays a complementary role to PPPs but also works as one of the 
indispensable benchmarking standards for choosing to undertake a public project as a PPP over other 
options. With environmental considerations, a credible EIA model is one that makes a trade-off between 
ecological and social, economic and technological, political and legal factors, and their impacts on the 
PPP project cycle in its entirety. 
Finally, although the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is mentioned in the PPP Act as the applicable 
law for PPP dispute resolution, and notwithstanding the existence of PPP guidelines for Local 
Governments (developed between MoLG and UNDP), these were excluded in the discussions of this 
chapter on the following accounts. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act is too generic and the writer’s 
view inadequate to effectively address complex PPP disputes, while the PPP Guidelines for Local 
Governments lack a clear link between it and the PPP Act 2015.
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7 CHAPTER 7: RESEARCH METHODOLODY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Based on the research problem, question, and objectives, this chapter presents and justifies the 
methodology adopted to collect and analyse data, and to report findings that emanate therefrom with 
the aim of constructing a suitable public private partnership governance model for developing road 
infrastructure in Uganda (refer to sections 1.3-1.6 of chapter one). Since the success of any research 
largely depends on research methodology (Babatunde, 2015:82), a suitable research design and 
approach, data collection methods and procedures, and data analysis and findings reporting style had to 
be used. Detailed narrations on how the aforementioned methodological applications were utilised to 
undertake and accomplish the tasks of this study, are provided in the subsequent sections of the chapter. 
Furthermore, this chapter presents the analysis of the demographics features of the respondents based 
on the interviews conducted.  
7.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH 
The study adopted an exploratory research design, and a qualitative research approach was used for 
both data collection and analysis. Exploratory design became suitable because this study begins from 
what is unknown to the researcher in order to discover what is known by the respondents or hidden in 
the documents or literature. With the objective of gathering detailed information about the phenomena 
under study a qualitative research approach was automatically found more appropriate than other 
research approaches. In agreement with this choice is Strydom (2014:152), who argues that most 
exploratory studies use qualitative approaches to collect data. One of the advantages of qualitative 
research over other research approaches is the fact that the respondents’ personal feelings, thoughts, 
examples and experiences about a phenomena or the situation under investigation enriches the research 
outcome (Yilmaz, 2013:313). In addition, with qualitative research more extensive data is collected and 
reported. This is possible because findings from qualitative studies are largely shaped by the 
respondent’s viewpoint, contrary to other research approaches, for example, quantitative research 
(Krefting, 1991: 214).   
7.2.1 Exploratory Research Design 
According to Brink and Wood (1998:312) and Brink (1996:11), exploratory studies examine new or 
less researched areas to identify new knowledge, new understanding and meaning, and to explore 
factors related to the topic. This is corroborated by Robson (2002:59) who argues that exploratory 
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design enables the effective assessment of a phenomenon in a unique way to establish what is happening 
around it for new insights. Concisely, the study employed exploratory research design to: 
 Satisfy the researchers’ curiosity and desire for better PPP understanding; 
 Test the feasibility of undertaking more extensive PPP studies; 
 Develop the method to be employed in any subsequent PPP study; 
 Explicate the central PPP concepts and constructs of a study; 
 Determine priority for future PPP research; and  
 Develop new assumptions about (PPPs) an existing phenomenon (Itanyi, Ewurum & Ukpere, 
2012: 11112).  
 
In advancing the above aspirations, research was conducted around one research question and six 
research objectives (refer to section 1.4 and 1.6 respectively). For each of the six-research objectives, 
the researcher examined relevant factors in detail to arrive at an appropriate description of the reality of 
the existing situation (Brink & Wood 1998:283-286), the outcome of which necessitated the 
construction of a suitable public private partnership governance model for developing road 
infrastructure in Uganda. Because no such study has been conducted in Uganda, its novelty dictated the 
use of exploratory research philosophies.  A key advantage with exploratory research design lies in its 
flexibility and adaptability to change. This is emphasised by Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009:140) 
who argue that, when conducting exploratory research, one must be willing to change direction as new 
data may appear and trigger new insights. However, the flexibility inherent in such studies does not 
mean absence of direction to enquiry (Adams & Schvaneveldt, 1991, as cited in Saunders et al., 
2009:140), but implies that the focus is initially broad and gradually becomes narrower as the research 
progresses. Given that this research was conducted on a new and developing procurement framework, 
a great sense of flexibility was inevitable. In fact, before the end of this study in 2018 many PPP policy 
and operational issues had taken place.  
7.2.2 Qualitative Research Approach 
Qualitative research approach refers to the type of research which “relies on text data rather than 
numerical data, and analyzes the data in its textual form rather than converting it to numbers for 
analysis” so as to generate meaning out of it (Carter & Little, 2007:1316). Also, qualitative data may 
appear in graphical or pictorial forms (Yilmaz, 2013: 315). Relevant methods of accessing qualitative 
data include interviewing, literature review and documentary analysis (Kitto, Chesters & Grbich, 2009: 
243; Strydom, 2014:152), and these are explored further in section 7.3 below.  
Like any credible research, this study was undertaken within the philosophical dimensions of ontology, 
epistemology, axiology, rhetoric and methodology. By definition,  ontology is about “what knowledge 
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is”; epistemology is “how knowledge is known”; axiology is “what value goes into knowledge”; 
rhetoric is “how knowledge is written about”; and methodology are “the processes of studying or 
discovering knowledge” (Yilmaz, 2013:315-316; Awodele, 2012:97). Given that this study purely takes 
a qualitative research stance, philosophical underpinnings of qualitative research, as advanced by 
Yilmaz (2013), were adopted. 
Table 7.1. Explanation to Qualitative Research Philosophical Underpinnings 
 
Source: Yilmaz (2013:316) 
Although, methodologically, table 7.1 above indicates that qualitative research takes up the inductive 
logic phenomena, however, in order to fully interrogate the data for more sound results an abductive 
logic phenomena had to be applied. Abductive logic is a type of data collection or analysis that combines 
both inductive and deductive logic in a single research. According to Given (2008:71), inductive logic 
methodology approaches data collection or  analysis without a pre-set list of factors, while deductive 
logic methodology approaches data collection or analysis from prior studies, relevant literature, research 
questions (hypotheses), and the researcher’s own experience with and knowledge of the phenomenon. 
A description of how inductive, deductive and abductive methodological approaches were used in this 
study is now provided. Objectives 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (i.e. chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) applied deductive logic as 
these were literature review or documentary analysis based. Objective 6 (i.e. chapter 8- the empirical 
study) applied inductive and deductive logic to generate findings and discuss findings respectively. 
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Chapter 9 (i.e. the aim of the study) used abductive logic since this chapter relied on findings from all 
the aforementioned objectives of the thesis.  
7.3 RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook (1965) and Saunders et al. (2009), emphasize the reviewing of 
existing and relevant literature, the interviewing of persons with practical experience of the problem, 
and the analysis of “insight-stimulating” examples and documents as the main methods of data 
collection for exploratory studies. In this study, the analysis of insight examples relates to road cases 
(from other countries) discussed in chapter four, and these had to be drawn from literature. The 
aforementioned three data collection methods were employed on the premise that no single data 
collection method can adequately treat all problems of a discovery or testing (Mouton & Marais, 1990: 
206). Accordingly, the deployment of a wide range of interconnected methods provided a better fix of 
the problem or subject matter under investigation (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994: 2). Provided in subsections 
7.3.1-7.3.3 below, is an elaborate description of how each of the three data collection methods was 
applied. 
7.3.1 Literature review 
De Vos (1998:360) states that literature review usually consists of examination of selected empirical 
research, reported practice and identified innovation relevant to the particular concern under study. This 
method was found relevant because a lot of research has been conducted on PPPs. Accordingly, the 
study gathered information from journal articles, conference proceedings and books that discussed the 
PPP phenomena and PPP road examples (cases).  
Given that data had to be collected from different literature sources, the theoretical sampling technique 
was used. According to De Vos (1998:254) and Coyne (1997:625), theoretical sampling is a process of 
data collection where the researcher simultaneously collects and analyses data to decide what data to 
collect next and from where. The application of theoretical sampling techniques became very 
resourceful in providing answers mainly to objectives 1, 2, and 3, as well as to a lesser extent with 
objectives 4 and 5 of the study (refer to section 1.6). 
7.3.2 Documentary Analysis 
Patton (2002:307, as cited in Ndoziya, 2014:103) suggests that documentary analysis “provides a 
behind-the-scenes look at the program that may not be directly observable and about which the 
researcher may not ask appropriate questions without the leads provided through documents”. 
According to Bogdan and Biklen (1998), recent researchers have become interested in the analysis of 
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documents themselves. In the context of this study, documentary analysis relates to documents or 
research papers that are non-academic or researches from non-research based organisations or cites. 
Since very few empirical and conceptual studies have been conducted on PPPs in Uganda, documentary 
analysis became a very vital method for accessing additional information. As was the case with the 
literature review method, the collection and analysis of data collection were concurrently executed 
under this method.  
Furthermore, like the literature review method, the documentary analysis method was undertaken using 
the theoretical sampling technique (refer to subsection 7.3.1 above). With this method, data was 
collected from newspaper publications, public sector documents, magazines, organisations’ websites, 
public private partnership conferences (non-academic) and reports. The majority of the information 
came from internet/online sources and a few were acquired manually (i.e. in a hard copy) from 
organisations. Apart from soft copy documents accessed from the websites of several organisations 
across the globe, hard copy documents were collected from organisations in Uganda. Only documents 
that contained information on the PPP regime or road sub sector performance in Uganda qualified for 
use. Documentary analysis was the main data collection method used to answer objectives 4 and 5, 
handled in chapter 5 and 6 respectively. Where it became necessary relevant literature was used to 
supplement information from documentary analysis. Objective four examined the impact of road sub 
sector reforms on road infrastructure performance in Uganda, while objective 5 discussed the legal and 
policy frameworks that support PPP projects and programs in Uganda. The findings generated from the 
two aforementioned objectives/chapters became the basis for investigating objective 6, which is about 
“the suitability of the PPP environment for developing road infrastructure in Uganda”. 
7.3.3 Interviewing 
Interviewing is a way to collect data as well as to gain knowledge from individuals (Kvale 1996:14). 
Compared to other data collection methods commonly used with empirical studies (e.g. surveys), 
interviewing became the preferred choice for this study because it allows intense probing of the 
respondents for deeper meaning and understanding of the phenomena or situation under study (Boyce 
& Neale, 2006:3). While interviews may take different forms (Coleman & Briggs, 2007), for this study 
the researcher interfaced with respondents in a one-on-one conversation using a semi structured 
interview guide (see appendix A). This approach led to collection of more comprehensive information 
about people’s understanding of the PPP phenomena, as well as their perceptions about its suitability 
for road infrastructure development in Uganda.  In addition, the one-on-one interview approach (unlike 
focus group) led to the collection of more trustworthy information as the majority of the interviewees 
felt secure and shared information freely.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 179 
 
Prior to the conducting of interviews (between August and October 2017 in Uganda) critical preparatory 
activities first had to be completed. A brief description of the main preparatory activities is provided 
hereunder.  Preliminary contacts with potential respondents were conducted to establish the possibility 
of getting enough and credible respondents. An interview guide was developed, and pre-tested for 
reliability. Application for University ethical clearance was made and approval subsequently received. 
Lastly, introductory letters requesting relevant organisations to allow their employees to participate in 
the interviews were delivered.  Upon completion of the aforementioned tasks, actual interviews had to 
commence, and respondents were drawn from the private sector, public sector, civil society 
organisations, intergovernmental organisations, and academic institutions. The private sector was 
represented by Wilsons Group (U) Ltd, Kampala Associated Advocates, and Agaba and Muhairwe and 
Company Advocates. Civil society organisations were represented by Uganda Road Sector Support 
Initiative, and Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment. Intergovernmental 
organisations were represented by the International Finance Corporation. Academic Institutions were 
represented by Makerere University and Kyambogo University. The public sector was represented by 
the Ministry of Works and Transport, Ministry of Finance, planning and Economic Development, 
Electricity Regulatory Authority, Uganda National Roads Authority, Uganda Road Fund, Kampala 
Capital City Authority, Uganda Police, Public Private Partnership Unit, Public Procurement and 
Disposal of Public Assets Authority, and the National Planning Authority.  
A total of 30 people were interviewed, and a person’s participation in the study was conditioned on PPP 
knowledge and experience, and good understanding of road sub sector operations in Uganda. As such, 
respondents were selected purposively/conveniently or both, and the researcher used his knowledge of 
the population to hand pick the right respondents. According to Polit and Beck (2010), purposive 
sampling is often used when researchers want a sample of experts. Equally, the snowball method as a 
convenient sampling approach, with which early sample members are asked to refer other people that 
meet the eligibility criteria (Polit & Beck, 2010) was employed. A sample size of 30 respondents was 
found adequate since most qualitative studies usually use between 20-30 respondents (Mason, 2010). 
After all, increasing the sample size beyond this level would no longer contribute to new evidence 
(Ritchie & Lewis, 2003:83). 
 As already highlighted in this subsection, an interview guide was used to collect responses on research 
objective six, “the suitability of the PPP environment for developing road infrastructure in Uganda”. A 
set of three questions organised in parts one, two and three of a single interview guide was utilised and 
wholly applied to each of the 30 respondents during data collection. Part one provided questions about 
personal information of the respondent with a reflection on the main phenomena of the study. Part two 
provided questions on the general understanding of PPPs in line with road infrastructure development 
and strategic implementation of PPP road programs. Part three provided questions on the PPP operating 
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environment for road infrastructure development with specific interest in the legal and institutional 
frameworks, PPP road projects’ operational potential, investment climate and financial facilities. 
Detailed interview guide questions can be accessed in the appendix A. For the entire 30 interview cases, 
the respondents were contacted well before the actual interview, and subsequently reminded a day 
before its commencement (Holloway, 2004:75). In order to ascertain that a respondent was never forced 
to participate in the study, he/she had to sign a consent form before the interviewing session could 
officially commence. With the exception of one interview (refer to subsection 7.5.3), all the interview 
proceedings were audio tape recorded and brief notes had to be taken as backup. The majority of the 
interview sessions took an hour while a few lasted as long as two hours. At the end of the interviews, 
all the recorded voices had to be transcribed into word for data analysis purposes.  
7.4 DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
The Thesis utilised two data analysis techniques distinctively; systematic review for chapters based on 
literature review and documentary analysis (2, 3, 4, 5, and 6), and content analysis for interviews based 
chapters (8). Systematic review is a qualitative analysis method that brings together and integrates 
findings from existing studies to interpret and provide better understanding of the phenomena or 
intervention under study (Thomas & Harden, 2008; Harden, 2010: 1-2). Content analysis is a method 
that “condenses and describes collected data based on the data’s context in order to create knowledge 
and new insights, represent facts and provide a practical guide to action. Usually the outcome of the 
analysis are concepts or categories of findings for purposes of building up a model, conceptual system, 
or conceptual map” (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008:108). As for this study, the focus was to develop a model, 
that is, “the public private partnership governance model”. While systematic analysis was undertaken 
using manual applications, content analysis was undertaken through electrical applications. Given that 
systematic review (analysis) was conducted simultaneously with collection of data (literature review 
and documentary analysis), as already discussed in subsections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 above, this section 
therefore limits itself to the analysis of data from the interviews. 
In the analysis of data from interviews, ATLAS ti, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS), was used. While ATLAS ti can be used for literature review and documentary analysis as 
well, for this study it turned out unfeasible because by the time the researcher received training on how 
to use the software (ATLAS ti), literature and documentary analysis based chapters had already been 
written. Upon completion of transcribing the interview voices (as already highlighted in subsection 
7.3.3. above), all 30 transcripts were uploaded into ATLAS ti software for analysis. Advantages of 
using ATLAS ti lie in its ability to store and retrieve with ease voluminous data/documents of a project 
in a single environment, and the capacity to meaningfully and in a faster manner analyse qualitative 
data (Ngalande & Mkwinda, 2014:3) than with manual applications. Critical to the analysis of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 181 
 
qualitative data, according to Bogdan and Biklen (1998:145) the researcher must have the skill to work 
with and organise the  data, break it into manageable units, and synthesise it and search for patterns to 
discover what is important that needs to be learnt and told to others. Therefore, the main task of the 
researcher was to make sense of the amount of data collected by reducing the volume of information, 
identifying significant patterns and weaving them together in a unified and insightful way in order to 
report on what the data revealed (Best & Khan, 1993:203; Polit & Beck, 2010). 
Accordingly, after uploading the transcripts into ATLAS ti software, each of the 30 transcripts was 
assigned a unique identifier (name). The unique identifiers were in the form of numbers ranging from 
1-30, which had to be randomly assigned. The numbers were used for confidentiality reasons, in order 
that the names of the respondents could not be disclosed. However, each of the numbers had to be linked 
to a particular sector to which the respondents belonged, in order to establish after data analysis if the 
responses from the various sectors had similarities, differences, or both. Provided in table 7.2 below are 
the unique identifiers with the corresponding sectors from which each of the respondents was drawn. 
Table 7.2. Matching Respondents to Their Sectors Via Unique Identifiers 
Source: Author 
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The relevance of table 7.2 above is for citing quotes/verbatim from respondents, as used in chapter 
eight. A citation for any quote must have three layers as generated from the ATLAS ti system. Provided 
for purpose of illustration, is a citation from chapter 8; “P5, 14:26”. Where P (P5) is the page where the 
quote is picked in a given transcript, 14 is the transcript number (unique identifier), and 26, is the 
frequency position of a single factor (finding or code) in a transcript based on the ascending order 
principle. 
Subsequent to the assigning of unique identifiers, actual data analysis had to start. Each transcript then 
had to be read and re-read independently several times for the researcher to familiarise himself with the 
issues that came out of each transcript; and thereafter the data for each transcript had to be independently 
coded based on the key issues identified in the transcript. Upon completion of coding all 30 transcripts, 
coded data had to be categorised into sub themes and later themes based on the commonalities in the 
codes from all the transcripts (Michelle, 2007:103). Therefore, the findings had to emerge from the 
frequent, dominant or significant themes/sub themes inherent in the raw data. In a summarised version, 
the outcome of the analysis was seven themes (findings) which include PPP understanding, PPP 
motivations, PPP challenges, PPP readiness, PPP prospects, PPP critical success factors, and PPP best 
practices. A detailed presentation and discussion of the aforementioned findings is provided in chapter 
8.  In the presentation and discussion of the findings, text (word), pictorial and table formats were used 
(refer to section 7.5 below, and chapters 8 and 9).  
Finally, the findings from literature review and documentary analysis chapters were benchmarked with 
findings from the interviews to construct a suitable public private partnership governance model for 
developing road infrastructure in Uganda. Thereafter, a discussion on how the developed PPP 
governance model works was provided (refer to chapter 9). In the next section (7.5) demographic 
features of the respondents based on Part one questions of the interview guide (as already highlighted 
in subsection 7.3.3 above) are presented.  
7.5 DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS 
This section contains an analysis of demographic information of the respondents relating to gender, 
current job positions, academic qualifications, and PPP experience. 
7.5.1 Job and Professional Stance of the Respondents 
This subsection presents the number of people interviewed per profession and sector, their academic 
qualifications, and the positions respondents held in their organisations at the time of participating in 
the study. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 183 
 
Table 7.3. Job Position of the Respondent and Profession Type 
 
Regarding academic qualifications, all the respondents had master degrees as their highest qualification, 
with an exception of five respondents from the public sector (four PhDs and one Doctorate of Business 
Administration). A few of the respondents had two master degrees, and many with either professional 
body certifications, postgraduate diplomas or ordinary certificates. While none of the respondents from 
civil society and intergovernmental organisations had professional body certificates, all 3 of the private 
sector and 20 out of 24 of the public sector respondents were certified or registered members of 
professional bodies both within and/or outside the country.  
All the procurement participants were certified procurement professionals with the Chartered Institute 
of Purchasing and Supplies (UK), as well as registered members of the Institute of Procurement 
Professionals in Uganda (IPPU), and only one of them was a certified PPP specialist. All the Engineers 
were members of the Uganda Institute of Professional Engineers Registration Board, and with few of 
them doubling as registered professional highway or civil Engineers in South Africa or UK. All the 
three lawyers interviewed were members of the Uganda Law society, apart from two of them who were 
also members of the East African Law society and IPPU.  The respondent from the Finance and Audit 
field was a chartered member of the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) and 
Certified Public Accountants of Uganda (CPA-U), while the public relations respondent was both a 
member of the Public Relations Association of Uganda and the Institute of Corporate Governance. Out 
of the nine economists interviewed, only one respondent was a member of a professional body (a PPP 
specialist with the Institute of Public private Partnership-USA). From the above description, it is clear 
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that, whereas massive training and certification in other fields has taken root, there is a serious shortfall 
in PPP training and professionalization. For instance, out of the 30 respondents, only two were certified 
PPP specialists, four had attended short course certificate trainings, while the rest of the respondents 
had neither formal training nor certification in PPPs. 
7.5.2 Work Experience of the Respondents 
This subsection presents public private partnership experience of the respondents in years, either as 
practitioners or as researchers. 
Table 7.4. The profession of the Respondents and Their Work Experience 
Profession Category Work experience of the respondents in years Total 
5-10 11-15 16-20 
Engineering 4 2 2 8 
Procurement 6 0 2 8 
Economics 7 2 0 9 
Legal 1 2 0 3 
Finance and Audit 1 0 0 1 
Public relations 0 0 1 1 
Grand Totals 19 6 5 30 
Table 7.4 above indicates that PPP experience of respondents from the Engineering profession is 4, 2, 
and 2 in the 5-10, 11-15 and 16-20 years’ experience bracket respectively. The PPP experience for 
respondents from the procurement discipline is 6 and 2 in the 5-10 and 16-20 year bracket. The PPP 
experience for respondents from the Economics profession is 7 and 2 in the 5-10 and 11-15 year bracket 
respectively. The Legal respondents’ PPP experience is 1 and 2 in the 5-10 and 11-15 year bracket 
respectively. The Finance and Audit, and Public relations respondents were in the PPP experience 
brackets of 5-10 and 16-20 respectively. Overall, 19, 6 and 5 of the respondents fall in the 5-10, 11-15, 
and 16-20 years PPP experience ranges respectively. Whereas all the 30 respondents were 
knowledgeable about the operations of the road sub sector in the country, PPP experience with road 
projects, however, was limited. Apart from road sub sector agencies (UNRA and MoWT), PPP Unit, 
MFPED, PPP Committee, intergovernmental organisation, and a few respondents from PPDA and the 
Academia, the rest of the respondents seemed sceptical and less informed about the progress of PPPs 
in the road sub sector in Uganda. Based on the most cited PPP examples by interviewees during data 
collection, the interviewer noted that PPP experience is more in the Energy sector (especially electricity 
distribution, and power plant construction and maintenance), housing, and railway sectors than roads. 
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7.5.3 The Gender of the Respondents 
This subsection presents the number of respondents based on their gender. 
Table 7.5. The gender of the respondents and their frequencies 
Organisation category Number of respondent per gender  
Male Female 
Private 2 1 
Civil Society Organisation 2 0 
Intergovernmental 
Organisation 
1 0 
Public 22 2 
Total 27 3 
Table 7.5 above shows that 27 of the participants were males and 3 females. The small number of female 
participants was not surprising given that Uganda has very few female PPP practitioners compared to 
males. The unbalanced gender parity for PPPs may be associated with the inadequate self-reliance, 
confidence and risk taking behaviour by females. For instance, when the government embarked on 
professionalising public procurement in the early 2000s few females were interested in joining the 
profession. However, as the profession started to mature more females penetrated the market, and 
currently female and male public procurement practitioners are almost of equal number in the country. 
Secondly, apart from the private sector female respondent, the researcher’s experience during data 
collection is that women felt more insecure and more hesitant to share information compared to their 
male counterparts. Out of the four key female PPP public sector officials contacted, only two 
participated in the study. However, one of the female interviewees would always remind the interviewer 
to pause the recording system whenever she felt that the succeeding response, according to her, was 
sensitive. Meanwhile, the other female interviewee completely refused tape recording, however she was 
kind enough to have provided enough time (2 hours instead of 1 hour) and papers for the interviewer to 
write down the responses.  As for the two females that hesitated to participate in the study, they equally 
generously recommended the interviewer to other PPP experts, and also provided some relevant PPP 
documents to enhance the study. In summary, the differences in gender behaviour may not be unique 
to this study as corroborated by Buchan, Croson and Solnick (2008:466) who assert that “men trust 
more than women, and women are more trustworthy than men”. One can therefore argue that although 
males more speedily agree to share information than females, females are, however, likely to provide 
information that is more accurate when they decide to participate in a study. 
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7.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
An elaborate description of the research design, data collection methods, and data analysis used for the 
study has been provided. In addition, the procedures and processes on how the aforementioned research 
methodological applications were taken and executed was discussed. Finally, a presentation and 
analysis of demographic characteristics of the respondents that participated in the study was also 
provided. Therefore, having presented and analysed the demographic features of the interviewees in 
this chapter, the next chapter presents and discusses the findings that emanate from analysis of the data 
collected during interviews on the “suitability of the PPP environment for developing road 
infrastructure in Uganda”.
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8 CHAPTER 8: EMPIRICAL STUDY: PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE 
FINDINGS 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter responds to objective six of the study, which investigates the suitability of the PPP 
environment in Uganda for road infrastructure development. To answer the aforementioned objective, 
the study conducted interviews with selected PPP practitioners and experts from the public and private 
sectors, the academia, and civil society and intergovernmental organisations knowledgeable about road 
sub sector operations in Uganda (See subsection 7.3.3). The collected data was transcribed and 
subsequently analysed using Atlas ti software to develop findings, as already described in section 7.3.3 
and section 7.4. Note that, this chapter does not capture findings about the demographic characteristics 
of the respondents because they appear in section 7.5 of the previous chapter. 
The findings in this chapter emanate from the recurring themes developed out of data analysis. The 
study anchors data analysis in the ideas located in the interviewees’ responses themselves (Green, 
Willis, Hughes, Small, Welch, Gibbs & Daly, 2007:546), rather than using interview questions as a 
basis for developing findings. This approach was adopted because, when dealing with multiple 
questions and voluminous qualitative data (especially with semi structured or unstructured interviews) 
as is the case with this study, the analysis of data would create coherence in the reporting of the findings 
when done in a logical rather than chronological manner since findings often overlap within responses 
to questions. As such, the creation of themes and the structuring of the presentation and discussion of 
the findings in this chapter is primarily data driven. Upon completion of coding and categorizing data 
during the analysis exercise, seven relevant and recurring themes were developed. These consist of PPP 
understanding, motivations, challenges, readiness, prospects, critical success factors and best practices. 
Findings indicate mixed signs of favourable and unfavourable PPP environments but with unfavourable 
outweighing the favourable factors, the road sub sector being in the initial stages of PPP planning and 
implementation, and finally, the PPP knowledge and exposure among the public, private and civil 
society organisation sectors and among the citizens, for both the lower and the elite classes is very low. 
The aforementioned themes with their respective findings are presented and discussed concurrently in 
this chapter using literature from chapters 2-6, as well as new but relevant information, as provided in 
the subsequent sections. Given that the frequency of a factor in qualitative research may not necessarily 
represent its relative importance over others, the study captures all the factors relevant to the study no 
matter the number of times each appears in the transcripts. Furthermore, the study does not segregate 
the presentation of the findings according to the different sectors used during data collection because of 
strong commonalities in the responses provided by the respondents. Reasons that explain the cause for 
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commonalities in the data are set out hereafter. Firstly, the majority of the respondents were from the 
public sector (See tables 7.2 and 7.3). Secondly, apart from a respondent who during her entire career 
worked with the private sector, the rest of the respondents from the private and civil society organisation 
sectors had for long worked for government before switching sectors. Lastly, the orientation of 
intergovernmental organisations is mainly about supporting government initiatives, and so are their 
employees. Given these scenarios, no doubt the opinions of interviewees from the other three sectors 
could not deviate much from those of the public sector respondents. However, regardless of the 
differences in sectors of the respondents, the findings take note of any significant divergences in the 
data.  In the next section, the study presents and discusses findings about the understanding of PPP from 
a Ugandan context. 
8.2 THE UNDERSTANDING OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FROM THE 
PRACTITIONERS’ PERSPECTIVE 
The respondents associated PPPs with long-term legal and contractual relationships, partnerships, a new 
procurement modality and a change in public service delivery responsibilities. For example, the 
expected changes in service delivery responsibilities included participating parties sharing benefits and 
risks, and the public sector providing clear revenue streams for private sector to realize returns. 
Furthermore, the private sector must contribute funds and directly get involved in public investments, 
should assume substantial project risks and handle some of the functions previously performed by 
public agencies, and may use public assets to provide public services.  Like the respondents, theory 
(refer to subsection 2.3.2.6) and practice express PPPs as a procurement. From practice, for instance, 
the PIMS for Uganda treats public investments under two procurement options, that is, either PPP or 
PPDA (refer to subsection 6.3.2 and a pictorial framework in Appendix E). Similarly from theory, 
Otairu, Umar, Zawawi, Sodangi and Hammad (2014:191) argue that PPP is an “exceptional form of 
procurement” because of its strong focus on “risk management, value management, integrated design 
and construction, life-cycle costing, and collaborative relationships”. 
Whereas the respondents had fair understanding of PPP arrangements as per the aforementioned 
findings, on the other hand findings show two serious concerns. Firstly, only 4 out of the 30 respondents 
perceived PPPs from a partnership lens. Secondly, while the PPP policy (Republic of Uganda, 2010:6) 
refers to PPPs as “medium to long-term contractual and commercial arrangements… ”, none of the 
respondents defined PPPs with a medium term undertone. In fact, the same ambiguities are prevalent 
in the legal frameworks. A few examples to manifest this are provided. The PPP policy and the PPP 
Act do not incorporate partnership terminology in the PPP definition. Furthermore, while the PPP policy 
states that PPPs range from medium to long-term contracts, on the other hand the PPP Act is non-
committal on the contract span of PPP projects.  Because PPPs should be durational longer than 
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conventional procurement contracts, and partners must closely work together to share power, skills, 
assets, risks and rewards (Hodge & Greve, 2017:57; Pârvu & Voicu-Olteanu, 2009:191), therefore, 
specificity and clarity about the longevity and partnership nature of PPP contracts, whether in practice 
or legislation, becomes paramount. 
In conclusion, the fair understanding of PPPs by respondents alluded to above cannot be generalised to 
the entire population because the study collected data only from experts and people knowledgeable in 
PPPs. Actually, findings in subsequent sections of the chapter show a general lack of PPP understanding 
among the public and private sector players, as well as the citizens. The next section presents and 
discusses the reasons that would justify adoption of PPP mechanisms to develop road infrastructure in 
Uganda. 
8.3 MOTIVATION FOR PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP ADOPTION 
Large infrastructure deficits, especially in the road sub sector in Uganda causes inadequate service 
delivery to the citizens (Mawejje & Munyambonera, 2017:2; Mawejje & Okumu, 2016:455). According 
to the World Bank Group (2012), PPPs have the potential to unlock infrastructure gaps, improve 
operational efficiency and growth, and reduce poverty. This section, therefore, presents and discusses 
findings on the motivations for PPP road development in relation to social welfare, government 
financial constraints, private sector potential, and road development problems. 
8.3.1 Social welfare and Government financial constraints 
Across the world, governments anticipate mammoth society benefits from PPPs (Alinaitwe & Ayesiga, 
2013:1). Uganda’s PPP policy (2010:5) articulates the objectives of PPPs to be cost effective delivery, 
good quality services, clear customer focus, enhanced service diversity, enhanced incentives, better 
asset utilisation, and delivery of more projects and wider economic benefits. Willems and Van Dooren 
(2016:200) argue that public infrastructure with high budgetary and social impacts, such as roads, are 
best suited for PPPs. Like the aforementioned assertions, the study findings equally indicate that the 
government motive for PPP road projects emanates from the social welfare and government 
financial/economic constraints. 
8.3.1.1 Social welfare 
Respondents suggest that the government would want to improve people’s livelihood by improving 
road transport services and systems for road users, the private contractor making profits, and the PPP 
roads providing opportunities for improving social and economic systems of communities for the 
residents (along or in the area where the road is situated). On the other hand, although Rouhani, Geddes, 
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Gao and Bel (2016:94) indicate that road toll fees have the potential to pay off all the road development 
costs for the public sector, the respondents insist that the private sector can only recover its investment 
costs through cost sharing between the government of Uganda and the direct road users. 
8.3.1.2 Government financial constraints 
All the respondents stressed that PPPs are emerging as a priority because the government is financially 
constrained. In support of this general view, two respondents argue that, the traditional financing 
sources such as donations have drastically declined, the grants have completely dried up, government 
financial resources are insufficient, loan financing  from multilateral institutions (like WB, DFDB) is 
also limited. (P1&2, 27:3); and because, the government has no funds, they think taking that route they 
can get funding? (P2, 19:3). The financial constraint factor is exacerbated by a huge fiscal deficit and 
increasing public debt. While the domestic revenue increased from UGX.2.6 trillion in FY 2006/2007 
to UGX.13 trillion (a 17% average annual growth rate) in FY 2016/2017,  the national budget, however, 
would be financed without borrowing if the government collected UGX.30 trillion annually  in domestic 
revenue (Minister of Finance, Matia Kasaija, as cited in Patriot Magazine, 2017:6). This implies that 
the government has an annual gap of UGX.17 trillion in domestic revenue. Similarly, between 2006 
and 2016 the country’s public debt increased from US$2.9b to US$8.7b (5.5 external and 3.2 domestic 
debt) (National budget, 2017/2018:40).  
Consequently, the government perceives PPPs as an easy way to finance road development (especially 
through direct user tolls) because, according to findings, it can reduce strain on the national budget, 
reduce direct government borrowing, and minimise advance payments to contractors.  Therefore, 
alternative means of financing through PPPs would enable cash strapped governments, like Uganda, to 
deliver high quality public infrastructure without increasing public debt/taxes or constraining national 
budgets (Siemiatycki, 2013:4). Note that pressure on public sector budgets, debts and taxes is minimised 
if the repayment of private sector finance is entirely pegged on direct road users without government 
subsidies or guarantees. However, because of high levels of unprofessionalism especially corruption in 
most countries, advancing PPPs for budgetary pressure reliefs without continuous monitoring by 
qualified and committed authorities may lead to inadequate application of PPPs (Mihai, 2012:509).  
Regarding the advance payments factor, the government spends a lot of money on advance payments 
to contractors as a requirement for road constructions to commence under conventional procurement. 
According to the PPDA (contracts) regulations (2014:464, Sec. 44(3)) an advance payment up to a 
maximum of 30% of the contract price may be allowed. Surprisingly though, even when government 
makes prompt advance payments, contractors still fail to complete road construction on time  (Aluonzi, 
Oluka & Nduhura, 2016:550). However, with the PPP modality, advance payments can be minimised 
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if not completely avoided. This position is affirmed by a respondent who states that, you can actually 
deliver a PPP solution without putting money ahead to the contractor. (P2, 20:7). 
In summary, PPPs seem the best alternative for Uganda given the financing limitations discussed above, 
however, they will become vital when the private sector is able to extend better long-term financing 
compared to other options available to government and/or can secure the necessary financing faster than 
government could afford (Alinaitwe & Ayesiga, 2013:2). 
8.3.2 Private sector potential 
According to the respondents, PPPs are appealing to government because the private sector: is more 
innovative than the public sector, assumes substantial project risks, has a reliable and adequate financing 
source, aims at providing efficient and innovative products, has a flexible operating environment, has a 
wide range of skills, and practices customer service excellence. As such, the government of Uganda 
would want to tap into the private sector’s expertise and advanced delivery and financing mechanisms 
to deliver better quality infrastructure services timely and at competitive costs (PPP Policy, 2010:3; 
Ong’olo, 2006:13). In Canada, for example, the majority of the governments boast of PPPs constantly 
delivering innovative and high quality infrastructure projects, within budget limits (Siemiatycki, 
2015:356). Unlike government, the profit motive seems to drive the private sector to aim for public 
service delivery excellence. Backing this notion are two similar views from two respondents: The 
private sector ensures project risks are properly managed so that profits are made and losses avoided. 
(P2, 17:6). For example, the private sector is cautious about project timelines, because any project 
delays causes cost overruns and reduces profits on their part. (P2, 14:8). 
Furthermore, respondents suggested that while the private sector complements government efforts, the 
private sector on the other hand finds public infrastructure a more viable source of investment. 
According to Siemiatycki (2013:5), for example, pension funds and insurance companies are searching 
for long-term investment opportunities that can provide them stable and predictable returns. In fact, the 
growing interest of the aforementioned financing institutions in PPP projects emanates from the need 
to match their long-term liabilities or obligations with long-term investments, as well as to diversify 
their investment portfolios (Li, Abraham & Cai, 2017:406) 
8.3.3 Road development problem 
The whole of chapter five discusses road development in Uganda, and key areas of reference for this 
subsection are figure 5.5, and subsections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 of chapter five. Based on the interviews, 
findings suggest that road development in Uganda is entangled with high costs, a gap in road physical 
stock and quality, and time lags. The aforementioned findings are unpacked as follows.  
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Regarding the high cost problem, findings indicate that the government finds it expensive to manage 
road facilities, difficult to put a stop on cost overruns, and the financing for road maintenance has never 
been adequate.  According to Byamugisha and Basheka (2016:9), between July and December 2014 
only 650 km and 20 km national roads received routine and periodic maintenance respectively, against 
the target of 3000 km and 100 km respectively; furthermore, only 678 km of national unpaved road had 
periodic maintenance against a plan of 2225 km. This is a sign of poor prioritization of road 
maintenance, as well as the government having many competing needs against a small financial 
resource envelope. (P1, 14:5). On the other hand, cost overruns have been predominant in the 
construction of road projects due to unprofessional behaviour between government and private sector 
officials. For instance, the construction of a single lane kilometer for the KEE project cost US$ 2.315m, 
yet it costs between US$ 800,000 and US$ 900,000 to construct a double lane kilometer for a highway 
with similar pavement structures in other East African countries (Auditor General, 2015, as cited in 
Mawejje & Munyambonera, 2017:15).   Such construction costs are extremely high by international 
standards.  
With reference to the road stock and quality gap problem, findings suggest poor road maintenance, a 
huge deficit in paved roads, substandard roads, and a huge road backlog countrywide as a result. As of 
2017, only 3.52% of the total road network in the country was paved (see subsection 5.4.2). This implies 
that 96.48% of the total road is unpaved, hence in a very low quality state. What is worrying though, is 
that even the few paved roads constructed, have often been criticized by the citizens as being in a “bad 
state” or to have “developed potholes” a few months into their usage (Byaruhanga & Basheka, 
2017:32&39).  Furthermore, Uganda lacks a maintenance or repair culture.  For example, a respondent 
noted that, setting aside funds for road maintenance does not happen, and if it happens, whenever there 
are budget deficits it is normally the maintenance budget that is cut (P2, 19:5).. In order to increase 
road maintenance financing, and the quantity and quality of road infrastructure, fundamental changes 
and reforms must then take place within the public transport sector (Paget-Seekins & Walters, 
2016:277).  
Finally, regarding the time lag problem, the findings indicate that the government would want to reduce 
the current prolonged travel time on ordinary roads, as well as construction delays. Regarding prolonged 
travel times, for example, the average vehicle travel time increased from 2.4 min/km in 2014 to 2.9 
min/km in 2017 for Kampala (refer to subsection 5.4.2). Meanwhile, with construction delays, for 
example, the construction of the Northern By-pass road took “more than 5 years instead of two and half 
years” (Alinaitwe, Apolot & Tindiwensi, 2013:33), and nationally road construction delays 
approximately cost the taxpayer over UGX. 2.5bn every month (Byaruhanga & Basheka, 2017:32).  
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In summary, this section indicates that government financial constraints, physical road development 
problems and private sector potential are the main factors steering the impulse for PPPs in the road sub 
sector in Uganda. The next section presents and discusses PPP challenges for developing road 
infrastructure in Uganda. 
8.4 CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Although there was a specific question that targeted challenges, the respondents raised PPP challenges 
on almost every question of the interview guide. Based on the analysis outcomes and for better 
presentation and discussion of findings, PPP challenges were organised in nine themes. The themes are 
macro-economic, financial, government, legal, land, perception/misconception/myths, political, project 
planning and management, and national labour/private sector challenges. Each theme is further 
organised into related subthemes, as presented and discussed below.  
8.4.1 Macro-economic challenges 
Findings link macro-economic challenges to Uganda’s unfavourable global credit rating and poverty 
levels. By definitions, credit rating refers to the likelihood of a country to timely service its debt or meet 
its payment obligations in the future (Haque, Mathieson & Mark, 1997:10), and poverty is a situation 
where an individual’s consumption set is severely constricted or is below a certain level (e.g. the poverty 
line) (Goedhart, Halberstadt, Kapteyn & Van Praag, 1977:504). A study on the effects of country risk 
and conflict on infrastructure PPPs, Araya, Schwartz and Andres (2013:9-10 &17) established that 
country credit ratings are a reliable predictor of PPP investment levels in developing countries, but also 
noted that poorer economies attract less private sector participation in public infrastructure 
development. In fact, the lower the credit rating of a country the lower its creditworthiness, and the less 
command over resources of an individual the lower his/her purchasing power and welfare, and the 
reverse is also true. 
Several factors determine credit rating and poverty, however, interviewees mentioned a few deemed 
specifically applicable to Uganda’s situation. Findings associate credit rating risks with depreciation of 
the local currency, inflationary pressure, foreign exchange risks, and low domestic revenue; while 
poverty is associated with a high unemployment rate and low per capita income.  Given that domestic 
revenue is already presented in section 8.3.1 above, in this subsection discussions on credit rating 
challenges, therefore, will be limited to inflation, local currency and foreign exchange risks. According 
to Moody’s country credit rating of August 2017, Uganda’s creditworthiness was predicted to be highly 
speculative (B2 rating). Evidence shows that inflation progressively increased from 3.08 in 2014 to 
5.42, 5.46 and 6.4 in 2015, 2016 and 2017 respectively (UBOS, 2017:1; National budget, 
2017/2018:10). Furthermore, the foreign exchange rate (in US dollar) increased from UGX. 2575 to 
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3618.70 between F/Y 2013/2014 and 2016/2017), translating into a 40.5% depreciation in the local 
currency value (National Budget 2017/2018:27; National budget speech, 2013/2014).  
As a stopgap measure to the foreign exchange problem alluded to above, the MFPED issued a policy 
circular in 2016 directing public entities to ensure that all domestic contracts are awarded and paid in 
the local currency. Unfortunately, in a way government still pays for foreign exchange instabilities 
because potential bidders assess the volatility of the foreign exchange and factor that into their bid 
prices. In agreement with the findings, but without segregating macro-economic factors, KPMG 
(2017:2) attributes Uganda’s high credit risk rating to low per capita income (refer to section 1.1), a 
small economy, deteriorating debt affordability (partly due to growth in non-concessional borrowing), 
weaker competitiveness compared to “B2” peers (e.g. Kenya), institutional weaknesses, and a rise in 
domestic political risks.  
Additionally, whereas the average poverty line statistics show a great reduction in poverty (see section 
1.1),in real terms and by international standards, however, the majority of Ugandans are still very poor, 
since the biggest share of the national income is possessed by a few people. This is reverberated by a 
respondent who states that, the biggest part of the Ugandan population is in the low-income bracket, 
and this may affect revenue stream, which is the lifeline of PPP (P4, 27:10). In addition, notwithstanding 
the fact that the government has recently taken strides in industrialising the economy in order to create 
more jobs, there is still widespread unemployment in the country (National budget F/Y, 
2017/2018:131). In summary, macroeconomic challenges will affect the bankability of PPP projects, 
and may deter private sector participation, if not attracting only mediocre private companies. 
8.4.2 Financial challenges 
Financing institutions are important reagents in the mobilisation and allocation of scarce financial 
resources for desired development activities (Nannyonjo, 2002: ix), not only for Uganda, but other 
countries as well. Following the interview responses, the study categorises financing institutions as 
commercial banks, capital markets, pension markets and insurance markets. A presentation and 
discussion of the PPP challenges under the four financing institutions is provided below. 
8.4.2.1 Local Commercial Banks 
The respondents described the local commercial banks as too weak because they lack financial capacity 
and are less liquid, charge high interest rates on loans, and demand prohibitive collateral securities. 
Although commercial banks possess about 75% of the total financial assets in Uganda, the country’s 
formal financial sector remains one of the least developed in SSA (Musinguzi & Katarikawe, 2001:20). 
The implication is that financing institutions in Uganda generally have capacity challenges. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 195 
 
 Information from government documents indicates that the average interest rates on loans from 
commercial banks always rotated around 20.1% to 24.6% from 2013 to 2017 (National budget F/Y, 
2017/2018:206; BOU, 2017:23). From a respondent’s perspective, if you go to a bank, by the time you 
get a loan out you are at about 30% interest. Yet, our profit margins are usually between 10-15% (P12, 
12:54). This implies that commercial bank borrowers make investment losses since they earn between 
10 and 15% profit but pay about 30% in loan interests.  Globally, these are one of the highest interest 
rates on borrowers. In light of the aforementioned interest rates problem, local companies cannot 
compete favourably with foreign firms because of the high costs of financing. For example, the 
dominant foreign road construction firms in Uganda, the Chinese companies, are able to get loans at 
or under 2% interest (P13, 7:56).  It is noted that the discrepancy in interest rates information between 
respondents and government reports, as already highlighted in this paragraph, is due to a number of 
reasons. Key among them are that commercial banks are at liberty to charge varying interest rates (but 
must remain within BOU thresholds), varying official loan processing fees on clients, and the common 
complaints about the hidden lending costs by banks, as well as the illegal payments from borrowers as 
tokens for bank officials to process loans faster than usual.     
From the liquidity perspective, Kamukama and Tumwine (2012:42) conducted a study on the liquidity 
threat to Uganda’s commercial banks, and established that the liquidity position of commercial banks 
was deteriorating. They, for example, indicated that between July and December 2011 commercial 
banks had experienced a 15% decline in the number of loan transactions due to the deteriorating 
liquidity trends. Meanwhile, with the collateral security aspect, Kasirye (2007:12) conducted research 
on rural capital markets in Uganda, and established that unfavourable collateral security requests, such 
as a preference for land with title deeds over land without titles, reduced chances of a household 
accessing a loan by 10%.  Indeed this seems unrealistic because about 80% of the land in Uganda does 
not have title deeds. In summary of this subsection, at the moment the local commercial banks are 
inadequate to directly participate in road PPPs on their own and/or lend at fair rates, and for private 
companies to profit from projects of this nature. 
8.4.2.2 Capital markets 
Capital markets are a section of financial markets where long-term securities (in financial or property 
mode) are traded either through physical or electronic exchanges. In Uganda, the Uganda securities 
exchange is the only market licenced by the Capital Market Authority where private, public and 
government entities trade equity and debt stocks/securities. Like other countries, banks dominate the 
capital market in Uganda. Examples of such stocks, among others, are bonds, shares, asset 
securitization, loans, debentures, treasury bills, commodity futures, mortgages and leases.  
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The study findings indicate that capital markets in Uganda are too weak financially and have very few 
long-term financing stocks/securities options for both investors and borrowers. Such capital markets 
status delivers minimal benefits, increase national budgetary costs, and reduce private sector investment 
(Kitabire, 2006:100). For instance, a respondent who was investing in securities markets expressed his 
dissatisfaction as follows: I have shares in Stanbic bank but when I look at the money, it does not grow 
(P15, 1:99). In contrast with Uganda’s situation, South Africa has had successful PPP road projects 
partly because of a well-capitalised stock market that is worth almost twice the country’s output 
(Hassan, 2013:1). It is, therefore, posited that well developed capital markets in a country, as Kahn 
(2006:70) argues, contributes to financial market deepening, finances fiscal deficits, and minimises 
foreign exchange risks because of borrowing in domestic currencies.  
In many respects, the capital markets in Uganda have a long way to go in order to participate effectively 
in PPP projects. Firstly, few entities (only 17) are listed on the Uganda securities exchange, and 
secondly, their total capitalisation is as low as US$ 1.1bn (KPMG, 2017:2). Thirdly, between F/Y 
2014/2015 and 2015/2016, and between June 2016 and June 2017, their respective equity turnover 
reduced from UGX. 310bn to UGX. 188.17bn, and from UGX. 204.3bn to UGX.117.5bn (BOU, 
2017:43; BOU, 2016:29). In the same periods, their share volumes also reduced from 1848.1m to 
1030.6m, and from 1230.7m to 1111.1m respectively (BOU, 2017:43; BOU, 2016:29). All these 
examples are manifestations of capital market underperformance and underdevelopment. Borrowing 
from Mugume (2007:16), it is reiterated that capital markets in Uganda, given their current form, cannot 
have a tangible impact in providing long term financing for PPP road projects.  
Finally, in a book titled Africa in the World Economy, in a chapter investigating capital market 
development in Uganda, Kitabire (2006:100) points out four important considerations of revitalizing 
the capital markets business in Uganda. These are, increasing the number of financing institutions 
holding long-term liabilities to join the supply side, increasing investor competitiveness for long-term 
securities, prioritizing capital markets where there is need for financing fiscal deficits, and reforming 
the pension market and expanding the microfinance sector for more participation. 
8.4.2.3 Pension and Insurance markets 
In contrast to the practice in the developing world, the pension and insurance markets are becoming 
some of the largest financiers of PPP projects for the developed economies. Uganda is a good example 
of a developing country whose pension and insurance sectors have not shown interest in PPPs, amidst 
the emerging PPP investment opportunities in the country. In this regard, a number of reasons may 
explain the behaviour of Uganda’s pension and insurance sectors. Based on the interviews, findings 
suggest that both the insurance and pension markets are generally too weak and immature to invest in 
PPPs. The respondents justified their position by highlighting that both the pension and insurance 
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companies have limited financial capacities and lack enabling laws for PPP investment. Note that, on 
the issue of financial capacity, while all the respondents stated that insurance companies have financial 
limitations, on the other hand, the pension market received mixed responses (only three respondents 
insisted that the sector lacks financial capacity). This is explored further in subsection 8.6.2.2. 
Furthermore and specific to the pension market, the findings suggest that there is a lack of a well-
liberalised pension market, and that the private pension scheme market was under a monopoly of a 
single firm, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF).  
While BOU (2017:45&46) states that insurance companies have been good at risk assessment and 
mitigation, it also acknowledges that fraud and cyber risks are emerging threats to the insurance sector. 
Turning to the pension sector, the NSSF in particular has had critical governance challenges in the past. 
To mention but a few cases: the purchase of land at inflated prices and without following procurement 
procedures (e.g. Land at Nsimbe and Temangalo), the irregular sale of bonds a few weeks from 
maturity, the buyout of loans that caused financial losses (e.g. from Uganda Clays Ltd), the 
embezzlement of funds by managing directors (e.g. Chandi Jamwa and Leonard Mpuuma), and conflict 
of interest and political interference in the operations of the Fund (Asiimwe, 2013:133&134; 
Rwakakamba, 2014). This is corroborated by a respondent who argues that, subscribers may highly 
resist NSSF financing PPP road projects because the past long-term investments were tinted with fraud 
and loss of members’ money (P18, 23:50). 
Generally, the pension markets in Uganda are infiltrated by “poor governance, fraud, technical 
incompetence of trustees and key officers, inefficient administrative systems, poor quality of data and 
inadequate proficiency of Fund managers” (BOU, 2017:45). While it is agreed with Mugume (2007:16) 
that the pension system in Uganda is very weak at long-term financing, it is also submitted that, so is 
the insurance sector. No matter the challenges discussed above, the writer argues in favour of the 
pension and insurance sectors as having the potential to enable PPP investment (if well managed) 
compared to other financing institutions of the economy.  Figure 8.1 below shows the financing 
institutions in Uganda. 
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Figure 8.1. Total Assets for Financing Institutions in Uganda as at December 2016 
Source: BOU (2017:46) 
Notwithstanding the financial standing of institutions in figure 8.1 above, and based on the Ugandan 
situation, pension funds and insurance companies can be better PPP investors than local commercial 
banks and fund managers. This argument is based on two fundamental grounds. On the one hand, the 
pension fund (NSSF) holds more stable long-term liabilities than commercial banks, because under 
normal circumstances NSSF pays off clients when they reach the age of 55 years, while banks heavily 
hold depositors’ money that can be withdrawn by the client a few hours after the time of deposit. On 
the other hand, insurance companies practice better corporate governance principles than fund 
managers. Unlike insurance companies, fund managers tend to be micromanaged because their 
membership are individual organisations or association specific. 
8.4.3 Government challenges 
Based on the views of the respondents, this study further sub-grouped government challenges into 
unprofessionalism/unethical conduct, limited PPP capacity of PPP Unit and PPP Committee, and 
limited PPP capacity of public sector road agencies. 
8.4.3.1 Unprofessionalism/unethical conduct 
A study conducted by Sabiiti and Muhumuza (2012:2039 & 2040) on the trends, challenges and 
opportunities of public procurement in Uganda, shows that between FY 2007/2008-2010/2011, the 
PPDA Authority arbitrated 88 procurement cases because of unethical practices, lack of 
professionalism, and incorrect application of the procurement law by both bidders and public officers. 
Likewise, the application of the PPP law in Uganda today seems to follow the same cycle. Based on the 
interview responses, findings indicated lack of creativity in public entities and non-compliance to 
principles of good governance, as elaborated on below.  
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The findings link lack of creativity to inflexible and bureaucratic public sector systems. This problem, 
according to the respondents, is partly attributed to failure by the government to reward innovative 
practices. In return, the commitment of public officers towards government interventions becomes 
undermined. For example, a respondent narrates that, a man leaves a jacket on the chair for one week, 
and just dodges to engage the private sector (P15, 20:64). Such behaviour not only frustrates potential 
investors but also leads to late release of funds (which causes delays to projects and payments to 
contractors). The findings also suggest that lack of commitment has caused imitation syndrome by the 
government, and overreliance on the private sector for project initiation, as reflected in the following 
two quotes respectively: Uganda is just experiencing the bandwagon effects. If other countries are 
doing it, we also end up doing it, and because the World Bank is promoting it, then it is taken to be a 
suitable practice for Uganda. (P2, 18:5); and, Most of the PPP project concepts have always come from 
the private sector themselves because government has not been proactive (P6, 15:20). Whereas 
imitation and multilateral involvement (such as World Bank) may pose challenges, they can also, 
however, extend opportunities when implemented in context of a country’s situation. In fact, standards 
for multilateral organisations have proved effective worldwide, especially to countries that lack or have 
weak standards in certain aspects of public interest. 
Furthermore, findings link non-compliance to principles of good governance with bribery and 
corruption, compromised competition and transparency, and limited honesty by the citizens. Regarding 
corruption and bribery, both the private and public officers directly perpetuate this problem, as indicated 
in the following two verbatim respectively: …someone brings in a project and really you see its not 
national interest that is coming first, but what will be their "cut" or benefit (P10, 12:48); and ...private 
companies provide bribes to public officers in order to win tenders (P5, 22:27). From the competitive 
principle perspective, competition in both project procurement and financing has been a challenge (e.g. 
with the KEE project), as reflected in a statement from a respondent that contractors are never 
selected...through international competitive bidding, and the source of financing is not secured through 
logical competitive means on certain projects (P8, 16:32) [sic]. In fact, of late foreign investors have 
competition prohibitive demands. For example, Chinese companies insist on using Chinese financing 
and road construction models (P11, 27:38); and, road projects where the government of China provides 
loan financing, it would normally want these projects executed by Chinese companies (P1, 17:3). Such 
conditions not only undermine competition but also the ideals of pure PPP models. 
Like the principle of competition discussed above, transparency has not been any better: Sometimes 
government is very secretive. …when we are seeking for information about PPPs from responsible 
people, they think the information is confidential. Countries that have had successful PPPs, even PPP 
contracts are public documents. But here a whole parliament begs to access a contract signed between 
the government and private partners (P2&8, 19:36). However, the transparency problem seems 
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universal, as McGrath, Cisarova, Eger, Gallop, Kalmar and Vera (2008:16) argue that “even countries 
with more developed freedom of information culture, information about PPPs is hard to come by” (also 
refer to subsection 3.3.1.6). Practically though, keeping project information secret may cause PPP 
opposition from the public because, when people begin to speculate, even wrong information around 
projects ends up being believed by the public (P12, 23:34). Finally, the general dishonesty by citizens 
especially during data collection for PPP considerations is becoming a big hindrance, as evidenced by 
a respondent who argues that, my experience with Uganda is that few people will tell you what they 
think. They will look at you and ask what does he want, and they will exactly give you the answer they 
think will make you happy (P4, 12:17). Accordingly, this affects effective decision-making since wrong 
information will be relied on, for example, when determining the viability of implementing a proposed 
project either as a conventional or PPP project. 
In summarising this subsection, the findings presented and discussed above suggest that the private 
sector players, public officers, citizens and the government as a whole are ethically not doing enough, 
as far as PPP support is concerned. 
8.4.3.2 Limited capacities of the PPP Unit and PPP Committee 
According to Regan (2012:2) the PPP Unit must have personnel with a good understanding of 
commercial and capital market issues and with experience and technical skills across disciplines, and 
must work collaboratively with PPP implementing agencies to deliver PPP policy objectives. Actually, 
given the mandate of the PPP committee (refer to subsection 6.2.2.2), the above requirements likewise 
apply to the PPP committee. Based on the response from the interviewees, though, Uganda’s context 
seems to be in direct contravention of Regan’s dogmas.  
Findings show that Uganda’s PPP Unit is inexperienced, understaffed and with too many skills gaps, 
and lacks public visibility. Additionally, whereas the PPP committee membership is fully constituted 
(as per the law), on the other hand findings indicate that the committee generally lacks the required 
skills set and experience to do its job effectively. Accordingly, such problems have contributed to 
delayed PPP approvals, processes and project implementation. On the PPP Unit visibility challenge, an 
example from respondent is provided as follows: When the ministry of Defence (MOD) advertised for 
a transaction adviser for the PPP housing project for Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF), the 
PPP Unit wrote to MOD informing them that they had not registered the project with the Unit, and that 
they could not proceed without first meeting that legal requirement (P7, 1:53). This implies that the 
MOD may not have been aware about the existence of the PPP Unit nor its roles. In fact, the limited 
awareness about PPP structures and systems is not only a problem to the public sector but to the private 
sector as well. 
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Finally, on the understaffing and skills gap of the PPP Unit respondents stated that, the PPP Unit is 
very weak because it has a team of only three employees inclusive of the acting Director. This staff 
cannot ably serve the PPP needs for the various entities in the country, because they are overwhelmed 
with administrative work (P9, 2:40; P8, 22:37) [sic]. Secondly, contrary to section 10 (3) of the PPP 
Act (2015) which states that “the Director and staff of the PPP Unit shall be competitively recruited and 
appointed”,  all the staff of the PPP Unit had been employed on a secondment basis from MFPED 
departments. This means that the PPP Unit never even had a single staff member of its own. Regarding 
the PPP skills, the PPP Unit lacks very good financial and legal analysts, and depends on the assistance 
of development partners for most of its work (P3, 13:13), among other skills. In concurrence with a 
respondent’s view, this study concludes that, the PPP Unit which should be the center of PPP 
technocrats on the government side, three years down the road from the time of its creation, is still 
limping and cannot do its work effectively. (P9, 26:30). 
8.4.3.3 Public Sector Road Agencies possess limited PPP capacity 
According to McGrath et al. (2008:16) capacity within contracting authorities, whether in terms of 
trained and knowledgeable human resources and/or perfect systems, remains highly essential in the 
development of PPP programmes and projects. In Uganda’s case, neither staff nor system capacities 
would be factors to rely on for PPP road projects, because they are either non-existent or too inadequate. 
Based on the interviews, the study established a number of PPP human resource, PPP structures and 
systems, and risk management capacity challenges, as summarised in figure 8.1 below. 
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Table 8.1. Public Private Partnership Capacity Challenges for Public Sector Road Agencies 
 
Source: Author 
The above challenges manifest a lack of internal capacity to structure attractive projects, procure, 
negotiate, and manage PPP contracts by government, which contribute to the ongoing slow progress of 
PPP road projects in the country. Evidence from a respondent indicates that, UNRA is still structuring 
the KJE road project, yet they should have procured the SPV Company by now (P4, 13:16). Provided 
below is a brief discussion on each of the three categories of findings highlighted in figure 8.1 above. 
On the human resource challenge, whereas a few people have made personal efforts to attain PPP 
academic qualifications and to attend a few government organised PPP workshops, there is still 
microscopic PPP capacity in road agencies. For instance, UNRA (an agency responsible for 
construction of national roads) and the MoWT (that supervises the transport and works sector), do not 
have the prerequisite knowledge, competences, skills, technology and exposure (P5, 16:18; P5, 8:19) 
[sic]. Actually, government adopted the PPP model before building capacity and to date has not done 
enough to train existing staff, nor create the necessary awareness about PPP structures, processes and 
procedures provided for in the PPP laws. Although road agencies largely outsource consultants such as 
transaction advisers to bridge the gap, however, without internal capabilities to check the validity and 
viability of their advice, project success is crippled. 
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With the PPP structures challenge, contracting authorities have not yet formed committees or teams 
responsible for project screening, preparation, and for handling internal project approvals, in addition 
to lack of  a PPP Sub-Unit or cell whose role would be to coordinate PPP processes at the road agency 
level. Furthermore, while the PPP Act (2015, Sec. 29) provides for the creation of a Project 
Development Fund to finance project preparation activities, this has not been formed yet. Lack of such 
a fund has serious PPP implications, as a respondent explains: we do not have ready and well-prepared 
projects that can attract private sector investment because we lack funds to do so (P4, 2:22). [sic]. ). As 
for technological capacity, it is not only a problem to the government but also to the national private 
sector. For example, with the 1.5 km suspension bridge that was constructed in the middle of a swamp 
on KEE, we could not get people with the required technology locally (P14, 26:49) (See figure 8.2 for 
pictorial evidence). 
Finally, regarding the risk management challenge, the government often gets bad deals because of poor 
risk allocation and management. To begin with, as the government of Uganda plans to introduce PPP 
toll roads for the first time, massive sensitization and creation of awareness for people to embrace road 
toll payment becomes critical. Otherwise, short of changing people’s mind-sets, PPP toll road projects 
may turn out to be unviable to both the government and the private sector. Evidence is drawn from a 
respondent who says, I hate paying tolls, but with a justification, for example in a terrible jam, I would 
be willing to pay UGX. 2000 to and from Kampala and Jinja. (P7, 9:23). This implies that people with 
similar behavioural traits would only use a toll road during emergencies, because the distance and 
payment amount referred to is about 154kms for almost half a US dollar. Furthermore, provided below 
are summaries for three PPP projects that in one way or another have been poorly structured, negotiated, 
and/or whose contracts have been poorly drafted or managed. 
The KEE project 
The company to undertake the operation and maintenance contract will be very different from the 
company that executed the design and build contract. The government fully financed the designing and 
construction phase of the project through government revenues and a bank loan. At the end of the project 
construction phase the government must fully pay the construction company, yet loan repayment will 
have to continue into the maintenance and operation phase. Based on the structuring of the project (refer 
to subsection 5.5.1), as a respondent explains, if there are any design or construction issues, the 
government is likely to still foot the bill because the operation and maintenance company will not accept 
to be in charge of those risks (P3&4, 19:13). This signifies a poorly conceptualised project and drafted 
contract, which has serious future cost implications to the government of Uganda compared to the 
private sector partners. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 204 
 
The Motor Vehicle Inspection project 
In 2015 the MoWT contracted Societe Generale de Surveillance (SGS) to build vehicle safety inspection 
facilities and subsequently inspect motor vehicles on behalf of government. This project had many PPP 
loopholes, which include: provision of an exclusive contract to a single firm to inspect vehicles 
throughout the country, unspecified recovery financial amount and expiry time for the contract, and the 
contract gives the company discretionary powers to revise vehicle inspection fees based on consumer 
price indices published by UBOS. Not surprisingly, in February 2018 the parliamentary committee on 
physical infrastructure recommended for contract termination citing conflict of interest and fraudulent 
practices.  
The Kalangala Infrastructure Services Project  
The project combines the provision of road, ferry, tap water and electricity services for Bugala Island 
community in the Kalangala district. A respondent explains one of the recent problems in the 
management of this project as follows. By the time we (MoWT-as the managing public entity) 
negotiated last year inflation was down and we thought we were going to pay UGX.15bn to the private 
partner, but because of an increase in inflation this year, we are now going to pay UGX.27bn for exactly 
the same amount of service (P3, 15:8). As such, the project was becoming expensive to government 
partly because the private partner effectively considered inflation at negotiations and contract 
formulation, something the government on its part underestimated. 
8.4.4 Land challenges 
Given that Uganda’s land issues were discussed in detail in subsection 6.3.5, the discussion of land 
challenges in this subsection is therefore limited to the interview outcomes. The respondents 
unanimously cited land acquisition delays as a hindrance to PPP road projects and ordinary roads as 
well. The interviewees associated land challenges with causes and effects of land acquisition delays. 
Similar to the land issues discussed in subsection 6.3.5, findings suggest causes of land acquisition 
delays to include land disputes, land litigations and prolonged court procedures, exaggerated land values 
and expensive compensations, delayed land compensations, and a weak land tenure system. 
Other critical land acquisition concerns in Uganda, but hardly mentioned by the respondents, include 
encroachment on road reserves and lack of land titles by some land occupants (which delays the land 
verification exercise). Furthermore, crooked behaviour has cropped up where people rush to buy or 
develop land on corridors proposed for government projects, expecting higher pay from government, 
while some landowners deliberately decide not to turn up for land valuation exercises and only emerge 
during road works to then demand exorbitant rates. The aforementioned land challenges not only delay 
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projects (in terms of commencement, halting construction works and creating extended completion 
time), deter private sector investment or participation, but also disrupt businesses, livelihood, and the 
social fabric (for the displaced people and contractors as well).  
Using the examples of KJE and KEE, the two road expressways have partly had implementation 
frustrations because of land acquisition challenges, as provided in the following narratives. Lack of 
enough money has created delays in the structuring of KJE, as affirmed by a respondent who states that, 
because the government does not have all the money required to pay for the entire land at once, we are 
structuring the KJE project in a phased manner based on the portions of land we have so far acquired 
(P3, 22:14). Likewise, delayed land payments for KEE have hiked land compensation values to more 
than double, as a respondent says, with the 2009 land valuation for KEE we had budgeted to pay $100m 
but it’s now about $250m because many people were not compensated on time (P14, 16:63). Relatedly, 
land disputes among people prohibit government from effecting land compensations, even when it has 
the money to do so. For instance, ….the King of Buganda (through the Buganda land Board) and the 
family of the former king Daudi Chwa are fighting over land ownership on one of the stretches of 
KJE….and because each of them claims to be the true land owner, the government cannot proceed with 
compensation to secure right of way (P3, 6:7). Finally, many projects are never completed on time 
mainly due to disputed government land valuations by landowners, for example, KEE should have been 
completed in 2015 but construction is still ongoing simply because people disputed land values and 
went to courts, and others exaggerated their land values (P8, 27:26). 
Drawing from the above discussions, it is noted that land challenges result mainly from land ownership 
uncertainties, and compensation disagreements between government and landowners. While 
compensation disagreements occur more often than land ownership problems, land ownership conflicts 
are, however, more complicated to solve on the part of government because government is just a third 
party to the conflict. Finally, land acquisition for government projects in Uganda is complicated because 
land belongs to individuals and not government, and landowners must be compensated prior to project 
implementation, yet government rarely avails the money in time. 
8.4.5 Legal challenges 
The World Bank (2012:114) defines PPP legal frameworks as laws, regulations and rules, and 
procedures used to control whether, or how, PPPs can be implemented. Hence, PPP legal frameworks 
enable governments to develop, enter into and manage PPP contracts. Like the World Bank, it was 
acknowledged in chapter six that PPP legal frameworks are not only limited to PPP dedicated/specific 
laws, but also include other relevant general laws and provisions. However, apart from one or two issues 
raised by a few interviewees, findings indicate that responses on PPP legal matters were generally PPP 
legal framework specific, as presented hereafter. While the PPP Policy (2010) and PPP Act (2015) 
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provide for PPP regulations and guidelines (refer to subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), the findings show that 
PPP regulations and guidelines are non-existent. Similar to chapter six findings (section 6.5), the 
interview findings  show PPP legal challenges in relation to gaps in the PPP Act, lack of critical policies, 
lack of PPP regulations, and lack of PPP guidelines. Particulars for each of these legal challenges are 
presented and discussed below. 
The findings regarding the PPP Act gaps include lack of institutional independence of the PPP Unit, the 
Act giving too many powers to MFPED over contracting authorities, and the Act causing bias and 
conflict of interest. Illustrations to these challenges are as follows. Regarding the lack of independence 
of the PPP Unit, because the PPP Unit lacks autonomy (refer to subsection 6.2.2.1), the bureaucratic 
systems of government are crippling its efforts to develop PPPs. On the issue of too much powers of 
the MFPED, the concern is that the MFPED approves most of PPP processes and decisions, yet most 
of the work for project conceptualisation, feasibility, design, procurement, negotiation etc. are executed 
at contracting authority level.  This is supported by respondents who assert that, I think the PPP Act 
gives MFPED too many roles, yet it does not have enough expertise (P10, 16:47), and ….there should 
be shared responsibility between the PPP Unit in MFPED and contracting authorities (P6, 16:27). On 
the aspect of bias and conflict of interest, for example, the PPP Unit which offers technical guidance to 
contracting authorities is the same institution that provides approvals at the various stages of project 
preparation and implementation; and the PPP committee which is advised by the PPP Unit approves 
decisions of the PPP Unit (See PPP Act, 2015, Sec. 7(g &i) & 11(1b, 2h&i)). 
Findings on the lack of critical policies include lack of a sound arbitration and conflict resolution 
window, lack of a road tolling policy, and lack of a contractor financing policy. On the issue of lack of 
an arbitration and conflict resolution window, PPPs are prone to many unnecessary and expensive long 
court litigations because the PPP Act does not provide for an administrative review mechanism through 
which bidding complaints can be addressed. Regarding the road tolling policy, the government has not 
yet put in place a tolling system, yet as a respondent explains, the construction of KEE is expected to 
be completed in 2018 (next year) and thereafter go into the PPP phase of operation and maintenance 
through tolls (P10, 22:47). Meanwhile with the lack of contractor financing policy, for example, UNRA 
has been using the contractor financing model at a very low scale because of policy constraints,  and 
this is evident as a respondent says, we have written to and requested MFPED to assist the road agency 
formulate a policy that supports contractor facilitated financing (P7, 7:33). 
The findings also indicate that there is lack of PPP regulations and guidelines, which have delayed the 
implementation of PPP road projects precisely because the PPP Act has not been operationalised. In 
fact, the enactment of PPP regulations and formulation of PPP guidelines have taken longer than 
expected, and a respondent ponders, what are people doing down there?  (P9, 19:39). The regulations 
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should have come out within one year after the enactment of the PPP Act in August 2015 (P11, 19:45). 
Yet, most of the PPP projects the country has tried to undertake have not been able to move forward 
(e.g. KJE), because without guidance of regulations many times they get stuck (P4, 24:15).  
Findings on the PPP regulations related examples include ambiguous prequalification requirements, 
lack of a reward mode for unsolicited proposals, and lack of social compliance standards for roads. On 
the prequalification requirements, a respondent finds the process cumbersome as he argues, why should 
potential private partners be required to prepare concession documents (including concession 
agreement) during prequalification, yet many things are meant to change during competitive dialogue? 
This is painful and just a complete waste of time (P5, 8:18). Regarding the social standards, a respondent 
indicates that, Uganda has no standards/policy on social safe guards for the road sub sector. We are 
just using World Bank /IMF standards (P13, 16:60). Furthermore, examples of PPP guidelines related 
issues include: lack of a toll fees setting formula, PPP value threshold system, PPP standard forms, time 
limits for project tasks, PPP bidding documents, PPP contracting documents, PPP committee guidelines, 
and lack of public sector comparator model. In summary, because of the above challenges, among 
others, there is a general lack of well-streamlined PPP processes and procedures, as well as a lack of 
understanding and application of PPP law across the spectrum (public, government officials and private 
sector players). 
8.4.6 Perception Challenges 
The findings presented in this subsection are partly the interviewees’ PPP perceptions (in their own 
right) and the perceptions of other people (not interviewees) as presented by the interviewees. During 
the analysis it emerged that the respondents raised perceptions oriented towards the citizens/users, 
public agencies, and private sector as shown in table 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 below. Each of the tables provides 
stakeholder category perceptions with corresponding evidence from the transcripts, and where 
necessary, chapter(s) (including sections/subsections) references that clarify the views from the findings 
are included.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 208 
 
Table 8.2. Citizens/User Oriented Public Private Partnership Perceptions challenges (PPP 
misconceptions) 
 
Source: Author 
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Table 8.3. Public Agencies Oriented Public private Partnership perceptions Challenges (PPP 
misconceptions) 
 
Source: Author 
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Table 8.4. Private sector Oriented Public Private Partnership Perceptions 
 
Source: Author 
Whereas the PPP perceptions above are fundamentally/ideologically wrong, however, in practice they 
may be (or seem) true because of the current PPP environment and management practices in the country. 
Note that, weak PPP systems, environments, poor management practices, and project performances can 
force a government or private company to overturn or undermine PPP principles. For example, the 
government may increase fuel prices in case actual toll revenue collections fall far below the 
projections, and further, the private sector may take advantage of the weak PPP systems of government 
to inflate bid/contract prices. Based on the aforementioned findings, it is concluded that the 
misconceptions/myths, whether in terms of PPP fundamentals or Uganda’s PPP practices, or the actual 
wrong implementation of PPPs in the country, mainly arise from a lack of PPP capacity building and 
awareness, among other factors (as captured in this chapter).  
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8.4.7 Political challenges 
Politics is visible worldwide in public sector projects, and in fact, politics drives road projects and road 
projects drive politics as well. Whereas constructive politics leads to PPP success, on the other hand 
misguided politics distorts their performance. Pointing to misguided politics, Koppenjan (2015:32) 
emphasizes that political challenges are one of the most critical factors that refrain the private sector 
from investing in public projects. In the context of Uganda and based on the findings, political 
challenges are associated with both political unpredictability and political interference. 
Findings indicate that political interference include politics defining PPP projects, determining which 
road to be constructed and where, influencing the financing of projects, political directives, political 
appointments for public sector top executives, and limited analytical skills/capacity of some politicians 
for technical work. Although politics can never be divorced from public service delivery, the excesses 
of the political class, however, limit institutional independence. Because politicians make unrealistic 
manifestos and promises when campaigning for political offices, they at times dictate construction of a 
road where or when it may not be socially and economically viable (P8, 15:28; P13, 22:59). For 
instance, a respondent indicates that, the structuring of KEE was never a PPP, but the word PPP was 
introduced later to sell the project for political reasons (P12, 20:46). Technocrats in Uganda succumb 
to political pressure because top executives who supervise other technocrats in public entities are 
politically appointed, and likewise, political appointees (the ministers) supervise the top executives. 
Consequently, a respondent poses the question, if I give you a job and I say to you, this is my project, 
and you know that I can sack you if you do not deliver, what do you do? (P6, 3:36). Borrowing from 
Ntayi (2013:36), these are signs of the employer’s coercion and sanctions that may force employees 
with serious economic, employment and retirement uncertainties to comply with unethical demands 
even when they have sound moral identities. As such, political decisions prevail over technocratic 
decisions, and political programs have become the fast track into the work of technical staff without a 
lot of due scrutiny. 
Furthermore, recently every government proposal or project in Uganda seems to be politicised by 
legislators. For example, regarding the Constitution Amendment Bill (2017) for land acquisition by 
government (See subsection 6.3.5), a respondent argues that, a group of politicians is going around 
saying that government will forcefully take people's land. …...of course, the politicians are misusing 
the whole thing in order to gain some political capital (P3&4, 7:15).  
The direct meddling of politicians in technical work, as a respondent observes ...has led to policy 
implementation reversals, because they say this today and say something different tomorrow (P2, 
14:11). An example of this is the substituted and repealed section 88L (1&2) of the PPDA Act (2003, 
as amended 2014) which ideally had given the PPDA Authority powers to regulate PPPs under the 
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Public Procurement Law (refer to subsection 6.3.1). In addition, findings indicate that a number of PPPs 
(especially housing projects) have been frustrated by politicians who sign MOUs with private 
companies secretly, well before project initiation or conducting of feasibility studies by contracting 
authorities. Examples of projects that have fallen victim to this behaviour include the Naguru and 
Nakawa housing estates where the private investors pulled out of the arrangements before construction 
could commence, and the Kingdom Hotel project whose progress has been too slow. To remedy the 
situation: politicians and public officers must enforce rules without individual economic interests, 
succumbing to political interference or soliciting bribes; private firms must respond to market signal 
but not to unethical promises from politicians and must desist from offering bribes to either politicians 
or technocrats so as to receive preferential treatment (Brett, 2008:343). 
On the other hand, findings about political unpredictability include differences in ideologies, change of 
political leadership, lack of trust in the private sector by some politicians, and limited political will 
towards effective enforcement of policies. It was noted from the interviews that some politicians have 
no confidence in the private sector because they perceive it as a sector whose only motivation is profit 
and, hence, a cause of the costly government projects. Differences in ideologies create disagreements 
regarding government investment projects, while a change in political leadership may affect project 
sustainability (whether at national or ministerial levels).  For example, a respondent indicates that, there 
is always slowness in some areas of service delivery every time ministries change political leadership 
(P8, 1:57), while another states that, Uganda has never had a successful transition of power (meant 
from one president to another). So the private sector may be sceptical whether in case of change of 
political leadership the new governments would gladly take on the responsibilities and commitments 
made by the current government (P9, 7:43). However, with the KJE project this may not be a big issue, 
because according to a respondent, UNRA is proposing to avail a partial political risk guarantee to the 
private sector provided by a reputable institution, such as the African Development Bank (P9, 6:30).  
In conclusion, whereas Willems and Van Dooren (2016:200) argue that PPP contracts with specialised 
private actors avoid the electoral politics pitfalls of short-sightedness, instability, and political 
selfishness to improve value for money, however, based on the findings and discussions above, these 
political ills are still rife in Uganda. According to scholars of procurement governance in Uganda, like 
Ntayi (2013:42), and Basheka, Tumutegyereize and Sabiit (2012:1811), the high political risks are 
attributed to a syndication of politicians and politically affiliated groups of public sector employees who 
decide to cooperate in order to act unethically.  
8.4.8 Project planning and management challenges 
Project planning and management aspects relate to the extent to which PPP project processes are 
managed. Although there are various PPP project processes (refer to subsection 6.2.3 and 9.4.7), in this 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 213 
 
study the findings lean towards the formation stages of projects because PPP road projects in Uganda 
are in the initial stages of project development. Based on the findings, project planning and management 
challenges are associated with project data, planning, procurement, and project lifecycle cross cutting 
issues, as presented in table 8.5 below. 
Table 8.5. Project Planning and Management Challenges 
 
Source: Author 
Provided below is a brief description of each category of findings reflected in table 8.5 above.  
Regarding the Project data findings, data to support PPP decisions is very limited, and even the little 
data available may not meet the reliability test because of the volatility of the economy. Secondly, with 
Project procurement finding, competitive bidding has been threatened partly because certain groups of 
investors hate being subjected to competition - a case in point are the Chinese companies that have the 
money and the willingness to invest in Uganda's PPP roads but never want to be engaged in competitive 
tendering processes (P4, 22:19). In addition, respondents seemed disappointed that PPP negotiations 
habitually take a longer time than public procurement, however, excessive negotiation time lags can be 
avoided by having streamlined negotiation processes and experienced negotiators. 
With respect to the Project planning findings, a case study of the KEE project is used to approach this 
factor. On the issue of project scope, the road design and alignment slightly changed during construction 
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because of geographical uncertainties (e.g. a rock) and some landowners demanded exorbitant prices, 
which prompted the channelling of some stretches of the road to more favourable pieces of land. In 
terms of poor long term planning, the road has few inlets and outlets that make it less flexible in usage. 
For example, the road passes in Kakungulu estate but people there cannot access it. ….and the moment 
you are on one side of the road, you cannot come out to another side (P9, 1:62; P9, 1:63) [sic]. 
Similarly, the road lacks connecting and access roads that are free of traffic to and from Kampala city. 
For example, accessing KEE from Kampala city center or connecting to Kampala city center from KEE 
in Busega you have to move on the existing Kampala-Masaka road that is highly congested (P6, 
23:24).  However, when coming from Jinja or from the direction of the Northern bypass road, it is easier 
to connect to KEE at Busega because of the newly constructed road stretch that links the two roads. 
Regarding the project life cycle cross cutting findings, the progress of PPP road projects is being 
frustrated because the PPP law partly introduces bureaucratic management systems and complex PPP  
processes. For instance, the initial studies for KJE were done in 2009 but up to this day we neither have 
a contractor nor do we have the right of way. (P1, 3:4; P2, 3:39). Finally, PPP projects seem expensive 
in the short run when compared to conventional projects, partly because they are costly to structure, 
conduct feasibility studies, and engage transaction advisers (P13, 26:47), among others. In fact, the 
lack of PPP local capacity worsens the situation because imported consulting or labour is extremely 
expensive. 
8.4.9 National labour/private sector challenges 
Whereas interview questions largely targeted the PPP capacity of the private sector (whether 
international or local), the responses on capacity challenges, however, turned out to be associated with 
only the local private sector. In a study about PPP implementation in the construction industry, 
Alinaitwe and Ayesiga (2013:9) establish that having a well-organised private sector that has competent 
personnel and with capacity to expand and compete favourably with international firms, is among the 
first five critical success factors for PPPs in Uganda. However, findings for this study indicate that the 
Ugandan local private sector generally has not yet amassed the necessary capacity to take up PPP tasks 
in the country. The findings link local private sector challenges to work behaviour, capacity, 
government failures, and company formation processes. Below each of aforementioned challenge 
categories are presented and discussed in detail. 
The findings on work behaviour include poor attitude towards work, undisciplined labour force (e.g. 
theft and corruption), laziness of the labour force, limited commitment of contractors, and shoddy work 
by contractors. The unethical behaviour attributed to the local labour is expounded as follows. It is 
common to find unqualified, unskilled and inexperienced local companies responding to a call for bids 
(P2, 23:7). This escalates procurement corruption as firms fight to win tenders at all odds, and 
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consequently delivering substandard work. Furthermore, the laziness of the local labour was described 
thus: the local labour force is very excited with money, and once they are paid, they easily get distracted 
from delivering on the project (P9, 7:42). The incidence of theft and corrupt behaviour by some local 
labour, was illustrated by two respondents as, Ugandan (local) drivers are suspected of siphoning fuel 
from construction company trucks during construction works (P8, 5:31), and it is common to find 
someone on government side illegally working as an adviser to private operators (P8, 18:35) that do 
business with government. 
Due to the aforementioned challenges, even the well-established foreign companies already working on 
government projects in Uganda, and which would have subcontracted the local private companies, are 
hesitant to do so because they have less trust in the local labour. While the respondents collectively 
agreed that the behaviour of the local labour has been improving over time, however, one respondent 
partly tends to justify the unethical behaviour of the local labour by stating that, the pay offered to the 
Ugandan (local) labour is never commensurate to the efforts, and this subsequently affects their work 
morale (P12, 22:53). 
The findings on the capacity of the local private sector  include lack of capacity building (by the local 
private firms themselves), lack of technical skills, lack of equipment, lack of financial capacity, lack of 
organised labour groups, limited PPP experts, and a weak road construction market. Given that most of 
the local private sector capacity challenges are broadly discussed in subsection 8.4.2 above, the study 
therefore highlight only a few issues here. While a respondent seemed to argue that the country lacks 
specialised competencies when he stated that, we do not have bridge specialists and hydrologists in the 
country (P8, 6:28), there is, however, a general lack of PPP capacity for the road industry, as reflected 
in the view of a respondent who says, the consultants that are helping us on PPPs are all foreign 
companies or individuals (P5, 30:21). Among the main reasons for the slow progress in the development 
of road projects in Uganda, is the lack of a local private sector that has formal PPP business capacities 
and competencies. Therefore, to achieve efficient PPP delivery in the country, the local private sector 
needs to invest in building capacity of its personnel, and developing a well-organised, collaborated and 
regulated PPP private sector business intelligence (Alinaitwe & Ayesiga, 2013:9) alongside government 
efforts. 
The findings on government failure include government not having decisively supported local content, 
weak policies and systems to enforce local content, and laxity in effecting expatriate labour restrictions. 
Uganda has a number of local content policies promoting the use of local labour, goods and services. 
These include the National Development Plan II (NDP II), the Buy Uganda Build Uganda Policy-
BUBU (2014), the reservation and preference schemes provided for in the PPDA Act, (2003 (as 
amended 2014)), and the PPDA reservation schemes guidelines of 2018.  However, their impact on the 
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use of local private sector labour remains a big challenge because of low enforcement by the authorities. 
Also, it seems the public sector has not taken an interest in fully utilizing the few available PPP 
competencies in the country, as a respondent claims that, I realize that the majority of the people at the 
center of PPPs lack competencies, while the competent ones are not participating in PPP processes 
(P4, 11:14). 
Related to the above, whereas findings show that Uganda has local capacity problems, on the other 
hand, as a respondent argues, we have not been stringent enough on the use of local personnel by 
contractors, because even where we have capacity, we have left it at large to the private sector to carry 
out a market assessment and determine which labour they can get in Uganda or from overseas (P10, 
6:35). Supporting this view is a respondent who argues that, you find a Chinese company having 
Chinese driving the company trucks, holding flags to direct cars on the roads, and opening gates. Do 
we need such people from China or India? Even the so-called work permit fees, they are not deterrent 
enough to keep these petty workers away because they involve small moneys for anyone to afford (P12, 
25:42).  
Lastly, findings indicated that the processes for forming a company specifically for a PPP project, is 
very problematic. According to section 20 (1) of the PPP Act (2105) a private party involved in PPPs 
must be a SPV company incorporated under the laws of Uganda. Globally, this is a complicated and 
tedious process to meet and comply with (see subsection 3.3.3), though in the case of Uganda it is even 
worse because of lack of a well organised, coordinated, and mature local private sector. 
In summary, section 8.4 has presented and discussed findings on PPP challenges for road infrastructure 
development under the themes of macro-economic, financial, government, land, legal, political, project 
planning and management, and private sector (local labour). Below is a snapshot of the findings for 
aforementioned themes, and what appears in brackets for each of the nine themes represents findings at 
the middle level of data analysis. These are macro-economic (poor credit rating and high poverty), 
financial (commercial banks, pension and insurance sectors, and capital markets), government 
challenges (unprofessional conduct, PPP Unit and PPP committee human resource gaps, limited PPP 
capacity in road agencies), PPP misconceptions (by citizens/road users, private sector, and road 
agencies), Political (political interference and unpredictability), Project planning and management 
(project data, project planning and project lifecycle cross cutting issues), and Private sector-national 
labour (unethical behaviour, lack of technical and financial capacity, government insignificant support 
for local content, and complex processes in forming an SPV company). In the next section, a 
presentation and discussion of the findings about Uganda’s readiness to undertake and execute PPP 
road projects is undertaken. 
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8.5 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP READINESS FOR ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPEMENT 
Notwithstanding the PPP challenges discussed in section 8.4 above, the findings show a few signs of 
PPP readiness for road infrastructure development, as will be presented shortly. Actually, the general 
PPP environment of Uganda is at stage one of the PPP development maturity curve (refer to tables 3.6 
and 3.7, and figure 3.9). Based on the interview responses, the study organises PPP readiness factors 
for Uganda under government efforts, private sector potential, and road sub sector efforts. 
8.5.1 Government Efforts 
The findings associate government efforts with political environment, financial support, PPP structures 
and processes, legal system and support to PPP committee, as presented and discussed below. 
8.5.1.1 Political environment 
The findings indicated that PPPs are beneficiaries of political support, and political stability and security 
in the country. The impact of political support for PPP road projects to succeed should not be underrated 
given that political manifestos must feed into national programs. Investments in Uganda seem to enjoy 
political support, as manifested in two statements often made by President Museveni, as a respondent 
states: public infrastructure must be prioritized, constructed on time and at the cheapest cost (P8, 
21:30), and, if anyone is caught frustrating an investor I will deal with him (P10, 15:32). In fact, at one 
time the president directed the Minister of Investment to withdraw a $80,000 premium on plots of lands 
in the industrial area of Namanve as a way of incentivising investors (Patriot Magazine, 2017:29). This 
magazine quoted the minister having said, “president Museveni said to me: Anite, you either scrap the 
$80,000 premium or I scrap you”. Specific to road infrastructure, PPP road projects seem to receive 
collective interest and support from all political groups (both ruling and opposition parties). A 
respondent attributes the unanimous political support for PPP road projects to the fact that…roads serve 
all people no matter their political affiliation (P8, 8:25). However, political disharmony comes in when 
public projects are being or have been mishandled (P8, 21:30). [sic]. Also, as already discussed in 8.5.7, 
politicking can become a stumbling block to government investment efforts. 
Furthermore, the findings indicated that Uganda enjoys political stability and security, and this is very 
important in attracting PPP investors, as argued by a respondent stating that, the private sector is very 
sensitive to a country's political environment when it comes to investment (P8, 17:35). According to 
Brett (2008:351), the Museveni government programmes of political reconciliation and 
democratisation, and economic reconstruction, since 1986, not only improve political support for the 
regime and political stability but also encourage investment in Uganda. 
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8.5.1.2 Financial support 
Findings suggest that the government extends some funds to UNRA for capacity building, there is 
availability of a budget for land acquisition, and government makes a financial contribution towards the 
construction of PPP roads. A respondent indicates that, Ministry of Finance already has a budget for 
paying for the right of way for KJE (P3, 8:9), while another states that, government has promised to 
contribute some funds towards the construction of KJE in order to make the project bankable and also 
avoid future social uprising (P14, 22:65). While having approved budgets for land acquisition and 
promises to fund part of the construction of KJE is a good sign, however, the realization of such monies 
for implementation has always been a serious constraint to the Ugandan government. In fact, the land 
fund that should be availing money for land acquisition (as per section 41 of Land Act of 1998) is 
neither operational nor capitalised, and the domestic revenue which government would use to fund PPP 
roads is very limited, unless government uses loans from direct borrowing. These are important 
financial issues that government needs to urgently address in order to realize tangible progress in the 
implementation of PPP road projects.   
8.5.1.3 Public Private Partnership structures and processes 
Findings show that there is emerging capacity in public agencies, existence of a number of PPP 
structures, improving PPP processes, availability of some data for making PPP decisions, and 
government is committed to approving PPP road projects. These are explained hereafter. Out of the six 
PPP road projects proposed by UNRA (see section 5.5), the government has so far approved two 
projects (KEE and KJE) for implementation (P2, 22:5), and while data for PPP planning is limited, 
however UNRA accesses and utilises data from Bank of Uganda (on financial sector performance), 
IMF (on global economic indices), MFPED (on national GDP), NSSF (on Pension fund performance) 
and Uganda Bureau of Statistics (on inflation ) to develop PPP financial models (P7, 7:35; P6, 6:19). 
Additionally, PPP processes are fairly streamlined because, as a respondent explains, when a 
contracting authority registers a project with the treasury or PPP unit, it can track the progress of  the 
project,…and the PPP committee always sits to give approvals for whatever stage of PPP project 
preparation. (P6, 27:20) [sic]. 
The majority of the PPP structures, as proposed by PPP law (refer to subsection 6.2.2), are in place save 
for a few (such as project officers and project teams) at the contracting authorities level. While a few 
contracting authorities, for example, KCCA set up a PPP office with a mix of skills, and headed by a 
PPP officer, (P7, 29:24), however, the functionality of PPP structures, whether at contracting authorities 
or regulatory and supervisory bodies, generally remains a huge challenge in the country. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned challenges, it is noted that since the enactment of the PPP Act in 
2015 the PPP environment has slightly improved. For example, a respondent explains that, at least now 
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there is some sanity because we have a sense of direction on how to treat PPPs, some initial capacity 
has begun to be built, and a number of us now have relative understanding of PPPs (P3, 27:5). [sic]. 
8.5.1.4 Legal system 
The findings suggest that the available laws that support the implementation of PPP projects include a 
draft roads tolling policy, a good PPP policy document, a vibrant judicial commercial system, a fair 
compensation system, sound environmental laws, the PPP Act, and a sound and already tested PPDA 
law. Specific to the fair compensation system, for example, the Guidelines for compensation assessment 
under Land Acquisition (2017:10) for the Republic of Uganda, provide that land and property owners 
must be compensated and the compensation should not put them in a worse situation than they were in 
before the displacement. In summary, because the aforementioned laws and those never mentioned by 
the respondents, but relevant to PPP operations in Uganda, were discussed in detail in the whole of 
chapter six, reference can be made therefrom. 
8.5.1.5 Public Private Partnership Committee 
Based on the findings, the PPP committee is fully constituted with 10 appointed members, as stipulated 
in section 5 of the PPP Act (2015), plus an Acting Director of the PP Unit who works as a secretary to 
the committee. Furthermore, the PPP committee has started holding meetings to consider projects 
submitted for approval, and the members of the committee are paid retainer fees as remuneration for 
services rendered. Whereas subsection 8.4.3.2 above indicates that the PPP committee lacks adequate 
PPP skills and experience, however, a respondent argues that, the PPP committee membership 
composition is the best any one could have gotten in the country (P9, 26:31). However, a respondent 
from the public sector (P4, 3:40) questions whether consideration of the academia and gender parity 
(refer to subsection 6.2.2.2) are relevant for PPP committee competencies. Such prejudiced view calls 
for awareness creation among public officers about the strength of the opinions from and having such 
contested teams on the PPP committee for appropriate PPP decision making.  
8.5.2 Private sector potential 
Findings suggest high interest levels from the local and foreign private sector, and availability of artisan 
skills among the locals for PPP road projects. The willingness of the private sector to participate in PPP 
road projects is promising, for example, as a respondent states, KJE has attracted so many private sector 
players who would have loved the project opened to the market like yesterday (P13, 22:62). Actually, 
from the market sounding exercise for KJE conducted by UNRA, a respondent says, over 200 potential 
bidders showed up and close to 20 called in via teleconferencing, and these included both foreign world 
class profiled and local contractors (P10 & 11, 7:46). Furthermore, because project feasibility studies 
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conducted by UNRA comply with the equator principles (these are standards adopted by financial 
institutions for ensuring that environmental and social risks are assessed and well managed in project 
finance), as such, UNRA attracts financing from donors and gains community confidence for PPP road 
projects (P8, 7:38). 
8.5.3 Road Sub Sector Efforts 
The readiness of the road sub sector in implementing PPP projects was manifested in PPP process 
enablers and compliance with environmentally friendly requirements, as described below. 
8.5.3.1 Public Private Partnership process enablers 
UNRA contracts reputable transaction advisers, conducts global market sounding campaigns and public 
awareness meetings about proposed PPP projects, conducts willingness to pay and thorough feasibility 
studies, and receives advice on PPP procurement matters from both the PPP Unit and the PPDA 
Authority. To illustrate these findings, first, the government engages International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) the private arm of the World Bank as the transactional adviser for KEE and KJE to 
fill the PPP skills and expertise gaps (P1, 14:4), and the PPDA Authority has been instrumental in 
guiding on document preparation for procuring transaction advisers (P1, 24:2). In addition, UNRA 
sensitizes communities and key stakeholders (e.g. parliamentarians) about the proposed PPP projects, 
especially KJE and KOB, and, according to a respondent, UNRA has demonstrated to the people the 
impact of the projects and convinced the affected people to accept the current inconveniences for 
realisation of greater benefits in the future (P7, 7:36). All the above initiatives are geared towards 
quality services and infrastructure, as well as public acceptability of PPP road projects. 
8.5.3.2 Environmentally friendly compliance 
UNRA has improved environmental compliance, has an internal team of sociologists and 
environmentalists, and blasts rocks on quarrying and road construction sites upon securing a police 
license. Explanation of these highlighted findings follows hereafter. UNRA ensures that contractors 
prepare environmental and social plans, monitors their compliance with employees’ welfare, and 
ensures environmental and social protection. For example, as a respondent states, UNRA sensitizes 
communities about HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases along road construction sites, and has 
recently instituted about a UGX. 5m penalty on every invoice placed by a contractor that fails to comply 
with social and environmental standards (P8, 7:37). Such awareness initiatives and penalties improve 
compliance levels of the different stakeholders.  
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Finally, whereas traditional roads would be constructed by filling stones and soil into a swampy area, 
however, with PPP road projects environmentally friendly means are being used. For example, at 
Nambigirwa on the KEE a 1.5 km suspension bridge was used over a swamp, as a respondent narrates, 
they dug and planted pillars in the swamp to hold the bridge and the swamp was reinstated after 
erecting the bridge (P9 & 10, 1:64). Provided below are 2 pictorials for environmentally friendly (see 
figure 8.2) and non-environmentally friendly (figures 8.3) roads constructed in swampy areas in 
Uganda. 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Suspension bridge at Nambigirwa          Figure 8.3. Road on a swamp at Katonga 
Source: Author 
Figure 8.2 represents the environmentally friendly practice of a bridge constructed above the swamp on 
the KEE PPP road, while figure 8.3 represents the non-environmentally practice of a road constructed 
directly on a swamp on the Masaka-Mbarara ordinary road. 
In summary, section 8.5 has presented and discussed findings about PPP readiness exhibited for the 
development of road infrastructure in Uganda under the themes of government efforts, private sector 
potential and road sub sector support. The government efforts findings included the political 
environment, financial support, PPP structures and processes, legal system, and PPP committee 
capacities. The private sector potential findings comprised of high interest in PPP projects by both 
foreign and local companies, and availability of artisan skills in the local market. The findings on road 
sub sector support included PPP process enablers, and improving environmentally friendly compliance. 
In the next section, the study presents and discusses findings relating to PPP opportunities for road 
infrastructure development. 
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8.6 PROSPECTS FOR AND OF DEVELOPING PPP ROAD PROJECTS  
According to Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017:113) PPPs is an innovative procurement approach with good 
future prospects for the construction industry globally. Notwithstanding the PPP challenges described 
in section 8.4 and building from the PPP readiness factors in section 8.5, this section presents and 
discusses opportunities attached to the development of road infrastructure in Uganda through PPP 
mechanisms. From the findings, the PPP prospects have been organised in groups of citizen 
support/benefit, public road agencies, global partners, PPP Unit performance and support from other 
public entities and the private sector, viability of toll revenues and legal factors. Provided below is a 
detailed account of findings for each of the groups highlighted above.  
8.6.1 Citizen support/Benefit 
Findings regarding citizen support for PPP road projects include a reasonable number of people willing 
to pay tolls, the government’s commitment towards ensuring property and landowners get compensated, 
and providing alternative free access routes to toll roads. Equally, the respondents (findings) argue that 
citizens envisage PPP projects to decongest GMKA roads, to create employment, and to foster improved 
quality roads countrywide because PPP projects will act as a benchmark for ordinary road projects. 
Regarding the willingness to pay factor, for example, UNRA conducted a willingness to pay survey for 
the KJE in 2015 and results indicated that, 43% of the public was willing to pay road tolls at an average 
fee of UGX.70 per kilometer (P14, 7:59), and similarly, by 2017, before the opening of KEE for public 
use, some people were already illegally using the road and making illegal payments to the people 
guarding the construction site (P12, 6:39). Given these two examples, as long as PPPs provide better 
road services, the willingness to pay among road users may be high because Ugandans generally quickly 
get excited over new things, and like good facilities and looking unique. Meanwhile, on the issue of 
alternative free access routes, the government so far promises the existing (old) roads running parallel 
to the proposed PPP roads to remain free of access. Cited by a respondent, such alternative roads include 
Kampala-Entebbe road, Kampala-Jinja road, and Kampala-Mpigi road (P8, 27:25). 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned opportunities, public resistance may ensue because tolls restrict 
road usage, the public lacks PPP exposure for roads, and politicians may incite the public against tolls 
(as this has become a common practice with most government investments). As such, stakeholder 
analysis and creating awareness for the public to appreciate the relevance of direct user tolls, is 
paramount. Actually, in the 1980s and earlier 1990s, Uganda had a few tolled roads (e.g. Masaka road 
had a tollgate at Lukaya) but government later disbanded them because, people were not eager to pay 
tolls since they were already paying taxes, and it remained the same old roads, the same potholes and 
the same business capacity (P1, 10:6; P3, 20:14). 
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8.6.2 Opportunities for Public Road Agencies 
Findings associate opportunities for the Public Road Agencies to the bundling of project tasks and 
benefits from private sector participation, and the local pension and insurance market’s potential, as 
presented and discussed below. 
8.6.2.1 Bundling of Project Tasks and Private Sector Participation Benefits 
Findings suggest that the combining of projects tasks into a single or very few contracts will reduce 
project risks and contract management challenges, improve road maintenance, reduce tendering costs 
and procurement timelines, and create synergy in skills and expertise for PPP projects. Notwithstanding 
the challenges of forming and operating a SPV (already highlighted in subsection 8.4.9) as a 
requirement for bundling of tasks, on the other hand such arrangements can facilitate effective delivery 
of PPP projects. Firstly, bundling of project tasks transfers most of the project responsibilities to the 
consortium of companies, giving government an opportunity to concentrate on project monitoring and 
contract management, and secondly, it motivates contractors to develop better road designs to avoid 
construction problems, and to construct quality roads to avoid high road maintenance costs in future. 
This is in agreement with Hoppe, Kusterer  and Schmitz ( 2013:145&146) who argue that a contractor 
responsible for both construction and operation of a project, becomes inclined to invest more during the 
construction phase so as to minimise  costs in the subsequent stages of the project.  
In addition, findings suggest that  greater private sector involvement in PPP road projects will ensure: 
timeous road financing, sustainable road maintenance, construction of roads earlier rather than later, 
minimisation of construction and maintenance cost overruns, efficient and quick delivery of 
infrastructure, payments to contractors spread over a long period, and government negotiation capacities 
and technological advancements improvement.  
8.6.2.2 Local Pension and Insurance Markets Potential 
Findings indicate that NSSF (the only private pension firm) has financial capacity (from majority of 
respondents), and most of the local insurance companies have reinsurance policies (from a few 
respondents). Notwithstanding the fact that the local insurance market lacks financial capacity, some 
interviewees seem to argue that reinsurance can reinforce the financial capacity of insurance companies 
to invest in PPP road projects. For instance, a respondent states that, when a local insurance company 
gets a big business, it contacts international insurance companies like AIG in Japan or USA to issue a 
second cover (P22, 16:96). However, reinsurance may become expensive to government since the costs 
for inter-insurance company collaborations may indirectly be borne by the insured. 
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From the pension market perspective, apart from three respondents (as highlighted in 8.4.2.3), the 
remaining 27 respondents stated that NSSF has the financial capacity for PPP road project investment. 
Evidently, NSSF collects a lot of money every month, but lacks good areas for investment (P13, 7:58). 
Actually, NSSF’s total financial contributions from subscribers stood at UGX.917bn in 2017 increasing 
from 785.5bn in 2016 (a 17% increment), and monthly average contributions grew by 18.5% (from 
UGX.65bn to UGX.77) in the same period (NSSF, 2017). Sustainability of the financial performance 
of NSSF between 2016 and 2017, as shown above, may be attributed to the improved and high 
compliance rate of 3% (from 77%-80%) and growth in the number of employers and registered 
members by 14% and 9% respectively. Meanwhile, NSSF seems interested in PPP road projects, as 
reflected in the statement that…recently NSSF indicated to UNRA that it would invest, for example, in 
KJE once the financing structure of the project is clear (P13, 7:58). [sic]. However, such a view implies 
that NSSF can only invest in PPP road projects when government is able to guarantee the subscribers’ 
money and returns throughout the contract time of the project. 
In conclusion, whereas opportunities, raised in subsections 8.6.2.1 above and this subsection, would 
facilitate effective development of PPP road projects, there are, however, potential obstacles from 
contracting authorities. These include unclear viable avenues for investment recoupment by the private 
sector, lack of internal PPP capacity that may cause government to absorb most of the project risks, 
unrealistic procurement timelines, unclear institutional oversight functions in the road sub sector, 
selective PPP sensitization, and underestimation of procurement roles. Provided below are illustrations 
from respondents to explain some of the aforementioned obstacles: 
1. The constructing of KEE is about to be completed, and we expect the road to be opened in 2018, 
but I do not see them preparing us. We need to know if the road will be paid for by direct users, 
and how much will the toll charges be? (P6, 26:19; P5, 23:20). 
2. I would love to see a relationship between PPPs and procurement…because largely what PPPs 
go through is procurement (P5, 21:18). 
3. Most PPP projects are never completed within the time lines and the blame usually goes to 
procurement yet the problem is failure to involve procurement from the start (P13, 16:57). 
4. …it is not yet clear which government entity will oversee toll fees management; could it be URF, 
UNRA or MoWT?, and which one will oversee the implementation of operation and maintenance 
contracts; could it be UNRA or MoWT? (P10, 28:31) or URF. 
8.6.3 Opportunities from and to the Global Partners 
Whereas respondents unanimously were unhappy with government employing foreign labour on 
national PPP projects, on the other hand 29 out of 30 respondents indicated that, currently Uganda has 
no option since it lacks local technical and financial capacities, in addition to the poor attitude of the 
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local labour towards work. The findings on the opportunities from and to the global partners were 
associated with foreign private sector capacity, benefits to foreign companies, and intergovernmental 
organisations’ support. Provided below is a detailed presentation and discussion of each. 
8.6.3.1 Foreign Private Sector Capacity 
Findings indicated that foreign companies would dominate PPP road projects because of their superior 
capacity in PPP financing, experience, technology, and ability to access low interest loans compared to 
the local private firms. Consequently, local companies cannot compete favourably with foreign 
companies because they generally lack PPP competencies. This is manifested in the following verbatim 
statements: transaction advisers for KJE are from IFC Kenya (P2, 18:6), the cost of money in China 
and America is very low compared to the cost of money in Uganda (P10, 21:37),….no Ugandan 
company can execute a one billion (USA) dollar project (P5, 13:17), local contractors lack trained and 
skilled personnel (P9, 7:41), and…when we run adverts for road construction projects it’s usually 
foreign firms that respond with bid submissions. (P5, 30:20). [sic]. Therefore, the participation of 
foreign companies would fill the PPP gaps within the local private sector environment.  
8.6.3.2 Benefits to Foreign Companies 
Because Uganda is a liberalised economy, according to the findings it operates an open revenue 
repatriation policy that allows foreign investors to repatriate their money freely without any 
encumbrance as long as they pay taxes. In fact, there is no law that stops people from repatriating their 
funds (P10, 18:47; P9, 24:31) in Uganda. While an open revenue repatriation policy immensely 
motivates foreign investors because they can reinvest revenue generated in Uganda in more stable 
economies, however, to the citizens of Uganda this stagnates growth and the quality of life because 
locally generated revenue would be used to boost employment and income levels of other countries 
(Singh, 2015). Furthermore, findings indicate that foreign investors could benefit from the fact that 
national labour is cheaper than foreign labour, which would minimize their operational costs. This is 
supported by respondents who argue that, local labour already has good artisan skills and is trainable 
and willing to learn (P14, 20:61), therefore,…you are better off training a Ugandan to thereafter work 
for you than fly in a German, maintain him around, and pay him per day (P13, 2:49). [sic]. Contextually, 
the training of the local labour should not only target improving the locally available, but also locally 
missing, technical skills. 
Furthermore, findings suggest that the government is now committed to and prioritises quick issuing of 
investment licenses and work permits, especially for foreign investors. For instance in FY 2015/2016 
out of the total licensed projects, 69.7% were for foreign investors (National Budget, 2017/2018:70). In 
an effort to realize such aspirations, the Uganda Investment Authority in 2017 launched an online 
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electronic business portal called “Digital One Stop Centre” that integrates a number of government 
services, inclusive of work permits and licenses, which enables investors to access and receive services 
faster and at a time and place of their convenience (National Budget, 2017/2018:113).  
8.6.3.3 Intergovernmental Organisations’ Support 
Findings show that Uganda receives assistance from multilateral organisations, specifically for PPP 
development, in the form of capacity building, advice and financing. The PPP support coming from 
multilateral organisations mainly targets the PPP Unit and UNRA. With the PPP Unit, the development 
partners are primarily interested in building capacity of personnel and regulatory frameworks, as a 
respondent narrates that, the PPP Unit enjoys advisory and training services from PPIAF, WB, EU, 
DFID; and the African Legal Support Facility (a branch of AFDB) reviewed and improved the 
feasibility study for KJE project, and is also developing a PPP toolkit for the government (P9, 
22:41&44). [sic]. For UNRA, the interest of multilateral organisations is to build human resource 
capacities, as well as provide partial financing towards the construction of PPP roads. Evidence from 
respondents indicates that, AFDB is providing financial support for 8 years to UNRA to procure 
consultancy services and build its own PPP capacity (P5, 6:18; P7, 7:31), and the EU has earmarked 
money to support the construction of KJE project (P9, 22:44). 
Actually, even with the declining aid contributions, the development partners still fund more than 35% 
of Uganda’s annual roads development budget (see section 5.2). Given that governments can raise 
financing without necessarily having to increase taxes, aid remains key to the development of 
economically poor countries. However, Wescott (2009:144) argues that, even with strict accountability 
requirements from the donors, without effective management by governments, aid/donations are 
capable of eroding public governance.  Wescott cited a number of problems that may be associated with 
aid. Among others, these are: diversion of government scarce skills, corruption and conflicts over the 
control of aid funds, undermined accountability to the citizen, high transaction costs, fragmentation and 
weak coordination of donor projects, moral hazards, soft budget constraints, failure to integrate aid 
funds in the national budgeting processes, and uncontrolled future claims on recurrent budgets in order 
to maintain donor investments. 
In concluding subsection 8.6.3, and notwithstanding the PPP prospects raised therein, the findings also 
indicate that PPP road projects have been poorly governed and tolls highly resisted in other countries, 
especially in developing countries (refer to section 4.4), and there is predominantly poor traffic growth 
forecasts and too many contract renegotiations globally. From the discussion of section 8.5, the future 
of PPP road projects in Uganda may not be any better, and a respondent endorses this assertion as he 
says, until we are up to speed with design and management of project processes, we will fall into the 
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same trap (P3, 3:13). Consequently, such unpleasant PPP happenings in other parts of the world and in 
the country may deter foreign investment in PPP road projects in Uganda. 
8.6.4 Public Private Partnership Unit Performance and Support from other Public Entities 
According to the section 11 of the PPP Act (2015) the PPP Unit has several roles (refer to subsection 
6.2.2.1), but findings suggest that the PPP Unit generally performs very few of its mandated functions. 
The few functions that the PPP Unit has executed include assisting contracting authorities to secure 
transaction advisers, providing PPP advisory and organising training services, and facilitating a few 
study tours for key public sector personnel to countries already implementing PPPs for lesson drawing 
purposes. For instance, a respondent explains that, the PPP Unit has organised and conducted many 
trainings for UNRA staff; and recently organized an excursion for the PPP committee and staff of 
UNRA handling PPP projects to study how PPP roads are working in South Africa (P11, 26:40). 
Regarding the underperformance of the PPP Unit (refer to subsection 8.4.3.2), findings suggest that this 
has to do with poor facilitation by the government and structural problems (as will be expounded 
below). On the other hand, findings indicate that the PPP Unit receives technical support from the 
Privatization Unit and has managed to secure office space from government. The Privatisation Unit 
becomes relevant to the PPP Unit due to its experience, because, before the formation of the PPP Unit, 
it was the public entity responsible for PPP (concession) projects in the country. Secondly, for about 2 
years (from the time of its inception) the PPP Unit lacked office space as it had been temporarily 
accommodated at MFPED headquarters. The lack of a permanent and clear address and enough office 
space, respectively affected their visibility and staff establishment expansion. 
Notwithstanding the above opportunities of, and support to the PPP Unit, and given that challenges of 
the PPP Unit have been extensively discussed in subsection  8.4.3.2, this study just highlight a few to 
illustrate obstacles to PPP Unit performance. The obstacles include that the PPP Unit does not make 
timely approvals, lacks autonomy, lacks logistical support, lacks sufficient funding, and is understaffed 
and the few staff available are even employed on secondment basis. Evidence and explanation of these 
obstacles are depicted in the views of two respondents: 
1. The PPP Unit is not detached and is easily compromisable, not fully funded, and is 
overloaded with work because of understaffing. Recently the PPP Unit secured Offices but 
even the office tools were borrowed or just given by other departments of government. There 
are things the Unit would have loved to do but they cannot do them because they lack 
resources (P7, 20:28). 
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2. When you send a project to the PPP Unit, they wait for more projects from other contracting 
authorities to then sit and consider all the submission at once, yet the urgency attached to 
each of the projects might not be the same (P7, 29:23). 
 
Finally, while secondment of staff is a good practice and is meant to buff up the already existing team, 
however, in the case of Uganda the MFPED seconded staff when the PPP Unit did not even have a 
single staff member of its own. Actually, by the end of the interview sessions for this study in November 
2017, the staffing status of the PPP Unit had not changed. 
8.6.5 Opportunities for the Private Sector 
Since the private sector in this subsection relates to both local and foreign companies, and for purposes 
of avoiding duplication it needs to be noted that the prospects discussed in 8.6.3.2 also apply here 
although the factors therein suit foreign companies, apart from Uganda’s liberal economy and the 
electronic business portal (Digital One Stop Centre) which benefit both local and foreign private sectors. 
In addition, the findings suggest that the private sector stands to benefit from PPP road projects because 
the government is responsible for land compensation and securing the right of way, has been honouring 
guarantees and subsidy payments in other sectors (e.g. energy), has always prioritised subsidy payments 
in national budgets, and is fast-tracking the provision of tax and land incentives to investors. Illustrative 
evidence from respondents indicates that the government subsidizes the cost of hydropower (P17, 
26:59), for many years has been footing the bill for shortfalls in the targeted revenue for electricity 
distribution by UMEME (P5, 19:24), and recently (2017) waived corporation income tax on Bujagali 
Limited (a company responsible for the Bujagali hydropower plant) (P17, 26:59) [sic]. Equally, the 
government has promised to set aside some money every year from the national budget for securing the 
right of way for KJE project (P10, 22:45) [sic]. Such examples provide precedents about government’s 
commitment to its contractual obligations and continued support to investor financial welfare and risk 
minimization. 
Furthermore, findings show that the structuring of the current PPP road projects caters for local content 
and there is a prospect for syndication among local commercial banks, as well as between local and 
international banks. Regarding the local content aspect, for example, KJE is structured in such a way 
that 30% of the project must be subcontracted to or executed by local companies, and project contracts 
will ensure progressive growth of local labour in ranks overtime (P10, 8:33; P9, 7:40). With respect to 
syndication of banks, two local Banks (Stanbic and Standard Chartered based in Uganda) already fund 
PPP projects alongside foreign financing institutions or banks in the energy sector and air transport sub 
sector in Uganda. For example, Kabale Airport is being funded by Standard Chartered-Uganda 
alongside UK Export Finance, while Bujagali and Karuma (energy) projects are funded by Stanbic and 
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Standard Chartered banks alongside IFC, among others (Meyer, Eberhard & Gratwick, 2018:81; 
P9&10, 14:41). Such examples demonstrate renewed incentives by the government for the local labour 
generally, but also prospects for syndication of local banks to improve their financial capacity for PPP 
road project investment. 
In conclusion though, the prospects mentioned above may be riddled by bottlenecks of  environmental 
problems, low pay of the local compared to foreign labour, too many and unviable unsolicited proposals, 
and suspicion that many private companies would be  unwilling to enter into reasonably long term 
contracts because of Uganda’s volatile economy. For instance, with the unsolicited proposals problem, 
a respondent argues that we have had many and unnecessary unsolicited PPP proposals that tend to 
enlist political support.  ...our only relief is the PPP law...otherwise in the absence of the law they were 
a nuisance (P2&3, 27:4). Regarding the environmental problems, although the laws of Uganda clearly 
state that roads must be watered and protective gear used during construction to minimise dust pollution 
to communities, and to ensure safety and health of workers, the implementation of such laws, however, 
is limited. Evidence from a respondent indicates that, roads are watered when a road inspector is 
coming or a big person is on site; and construction companies rarely provide protective gear to 
employees, but even the employees that happen to have protective gear, they never use them claiming 
that they cannot breathe properly (P13, 20:52) [sic]. Still on the environmental aspect, Uganda is one 
country where people dump and litter garbage and waste anywhere and everywhere, including 
passengers, consequently blocking road drainage systems and making roads filthy. Such concerns and 
problems emanate from poor law enforcement and poor sensitization, and should not be underrated 
because they have a big bearing on service quality, as well as the bankability of PPP road projects. 
8.6.6 Legal Framework Opportunities 
Given that chapter six discusses the legal and policy operating frameworks, and subsection 8.5.1.4 
presents findings on the readiness of the legal system for PPP road project investment, the discussions 
in this subsection, therefore, are limited to legal framework opportunities in the context of interview 
findings. The legal framework opportunities, according to the findings, relate to PPP Act safeguards, 
on-going development of legal frameworks by government, and other government support initiatives. 
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 below present findings on PPP Act safeguards available, and legal frameworks under 
development respectively. The section for comments in both tables captures supporting information 
from respondents, or section of the PPP Act/Policy, or Thesis reference, or researcher’s contribution, 
or both, to the listed findings. 
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Table 8.6. PPP Act Safeguards as Opportunities for PPP Road Investments 
Source: Author 
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Table 8.7. Work in progress Legal Frameworks as Opportunities for PPP road Investments 
 
Source: Author 
Furthermore, respondents reported other government support interventions, which included: the BUBU 
policy initiatives (which is about using Ugandan labour and materials) and supporting frameworks as 
already highlighted in subsection 8.5.8; the tax waivers and exemptions, which include selective 
corporation income tax waivers (refer to subsection 8.6.5 National budget (2017/2018:94)), and 
exemptions on importation of vehicles and heavy equipment for registered contractors of government 
projects (P9, 24:35). Finally, the government provides logistical, financial and technical support 
towards the development of PPP legal frameworks (P7, 17:34).  
In conclusion, while findings suggest a number of opportunities from the legal frameworks, a couple of 
factors may, however, bog down the anticipated opportunities. These include the existing uncertainty 
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about the public agency responsible for tolling (see subsection 8.6.2.2), the poor structuring and 
constitution of the PPP committee, failure of the PPP Act to provide for land acquisition and 
renegotiations, and the current weak PPP laws and structures that are already frustrating investors (refer 
to subsection 8.5.5 for more obstacles). Examples of projects being frustrated and delayed because of 
weak legal and structural systems include the KJE (for land acquisition and procurement of SPV etc.) 
and KEE (for tolling of the expressway) for the road sub sector, as well as the Uganda Peoples Defence 
Forces (UPDF) and the Justice, Law, and Order Sector (JLOS) housing projects. Actually, according to 
a respondent, some funders had come with money to invest in the JLOS PPP project, but they lost 
interest and went away (P7&8, 1:55). Finally, on the poor structuring and constitution of PPP 
committee, a respondent explains that, the PPP committee was detached from practical operational 
requirements of the key contracting authorities. It has no representation from MoWT, and Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Development. Yet these are the agencies that would design, implement and propose 
the highest number of PPP projects. The PPDA Authority too was not represented, yet you cannot 
isolate PPPs from public procurement because that is where the procurement expertize comes from 
(P10, 16:44)2. [sic]. 
8.6.7 Viability of road toll revenues 
Findings link road toll revenues in Uganda to road user and private sector (SPV) opportunities. 
Regarding the road user outlook, findings suggest that toll roads will enable quick response to 
emergencies, be safer because of minimised road accidents, allow faster speed and shorter travel times, 
be cheaper than using ordinary roads because of minimised vehicle maintenance and fuel consumption 
costs effects, and tolls will incentivize the private sector (SPV) to provide better services. The payment 
of road tolls, therefore, becomes worthwhile to road users. Pointing to KEE, two respondents argue that, 
the cost of missing a flight is far much higher than the cost incurred in toll fees (P6, 26:19)2, therefore, 
people faced with such dilemma would not hesitate to use a fast moving road and pay tolls (P3, 20:11). 
Furthermore, another respondent states that travelling from Kampala to Jinja using KJR (refer to 
subsection 5.5.1), you need a minimum of 2 hours because of the poor road condition and traffic jam. 
Yet if you used the proposed KJE, it would on average take you less than an hour because the design of 
the road permits vehicles to travel at 120 kilometers per hour, and is gentle, wide and safer. Moreover, 
the road will have a full time operation and maintenance contractor on site to clear up any incidents 
and provide first aid (P14, 7:60). [SIC]. In effect, the above two examples suggest that PPP road users 
in Uganda will receive better road services by saving on travel time and fuel, and reducing road 
accidents and wear and tear of the vehicles,  as well as travel related fatigue, inconvenience and business 
losses. 
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On the other hand, findings confirm that PPP toll roads will be viable to the private sector because of 
the strategic location of the proposed PPP roads, the anticipated high toll revenues, the continuous 
increases in vehicle purchases, fast growing commercial businesses, and high traffic congestion on 
ordinary roads. Actually, the strategic location factor seems to explain all the aforementioned 
opportunities. Firstly, all the current proposed PPP roads are to be constructed in urban areas in and 
around Kampala, the only capital and city in Uganda (see subsection 5.5.1); where the businesses 
community is flourishing and the elite class lives (P12, 6:40). Secondly, the construction of KJE and 
KEE has been given first consideration by government because of their superior location over the rest 
of the proposed PPP road projects.  While KJE will be located on the northern corridor that carries huge 
exports and imports to and from Mombasa for Uganda and other neighbouring countries (mainly 
Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo), KEE leads to Entebbe international airport, the only 
airport in Uganda and moves many passengers including cargo in and out of the country.  The above 
scenarios imply that the private sector might generate reasonable revenues because of the already 
existing high travel patterns, the high domestic and international trade, and the exposure and capacity 
and need for faster movement by certain classes of people. 
In conclusion, PPP toll roads pose opportunities to both the road user and the SPV companies, as 
discussed above. However, the viability of the proposed PPP roads may be affected by the following 
factors: the uncontrolled or regulated provision of alternative free access routes that may reduce traffic 
volume on toll roads; the bad PPP experiences (refer to subsection 8.5.3.4) which are likely to reduce 
public and investor support; the uncertainty by the public about toll fees to be charged (refer to 
subsection 8.7.2.2); the many PPP road proposals within the same geographical area with few vehicles, 
and finally, the uncertainty about traffic volumes because very few Ugandans own or have access to 
private vehicles (P8, 24:30) and the volatility in traffic volumes because road traffic is only high during 
a few hours of the morning, afternoon, and evening (P14, 26:48). 
In summary, section 8.6 has presented and discussed findings about prospects for developing road 
infrastructure through PPP mechanisms under the six themes of citizen support/benefit, public road 
agencies, global partners, private sector, viability of toll revenues and legal factors. Public road 
agencies, legal frameworks, global partners, and legal frameworks findings (i.e. prospects) were further 
sub-grouped as opportunities to and from global partners comprised of foreign private sector capacity, 
benefits to foreign companies, and intergovernmental organisations’ support. Public road agencies 
opportunities included bundling of project tasks and private sector participation benefits, while legal 
framework opportunities included PPP Act safeguards and work in progress frameworks. Furthermore, 
findings for each of the themes in this section was counter-argued with potential and visible obstacles 
to future prospects. Finally, the next section presents and discusses findings on the PPP CSFs for 
developing road infrastructure in Uganda. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 234 
 
8.7 CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS 
This section identifies and groups CSFs based on the PPP challenges, PPP readiness inadequacies, and 
obstacles to current and future PPP opportunities raised in this chapter, as well as factors directly 
mentioned by respondents as critical to the planning and implementation of PPP road projects in 
Uganda.  Given that the public sector has the ultimate responsibility of ensuring public projects are 
delivered within time, quality and cost requirements, the CSFs presented in this section become focal 
pointers towards effective planning and implementation of PPP road projects (Maseko, 2014:132). 
Unlike most studies that impose generalised factors from literature on different environments (as 
evidenced in subsection 3.3.2), the PPP CSFs suggested in this chapter are more country and road sub 
sector specific because they originate from the respondents themselves through interviews. However, 
given the methodological inadequacies that may be associated with any study (as already highlighted 
in subsection 3.3.2.2), the whole of subsection 3.3.2 would be relevant to consider for Uganda’s PPP 
environment since it provides a concrete discussion and full list of common PPP CSFs from across the 
globe. The findings associate CSFs for PPP road development in Uganda to capacity building, risk 
assessment and management, tolling management, legal system, right of way, negotiation, investment 
climate, stakeholder management, and participation of the local private sector. A detailed presentation 
and discussion is provided below. 
8.7.1 Capacity building 
Inadequate and insufficient human resource and structure capacities continue to hamper the planning 
and implementation of PPP road projects in Uganda. To demonstrate the magnitude of this problem, 
views from two respondents are presented. One argues that, many public officers are willing to push 
the PPP agenda but they fear to make mistakes because they have limited competencies and capacities 
(P3, 8:12) [sic]. This is corroborated by another respondent who states that, the way PPP projects are 
being developed here, you realise people are just swimming in unknown waters. They are scattering 
things as they go, and this drags PPP processes (P4, 30:15). In order to remedy this situation, this study 
provides a list of capacity building related CSFs gathered from the entire group of respondents below. 
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Table 8.8. Public Private Partnership critical success factors as a requirement for capacity 
building 
 
Source: Author 
8.7.2 Risk assessment and management 
Based on the premise that project risks at times emerge because PPP CSFs issues are never addressed 
well (Wang, 2015:687), effective risk assessment and management therefore becomes critical to the 
execution of PPP road projects in Uganda. For example, a respondent states that, we usually go wrong 
on feasibility studies (P3, 21:9), while another indicates that, unless government signs performance 
based contracts, private companies will be sluggish in performance (P7, 23:27)2.  Specific to feasibility 
studies, as Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017:118) assert, the profitability or viability of PPP projects is 
dependent on thorough and detailed feasibility studies. Tables 8.9 and 8.10 below provide macro and 
meso, and project and organisation level CSFs, respectively, as gathered from respondents.  
Table 8.9. Public Private Partnership Political and Financing (Macro and Meso levels) CSFs as 
a requirement for risk assessment and management. 
 
Source: Author 
Note that funding from development partners is vital because either money comes in as a grant, or at 
much lower interest than any private company would provide. Furthermore, political engagements with 
citizens on national PPP agenda becomes vital because politicians have popular support and trust from 
the communities they represent. 
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Table 8.10. Public Private Partnership project and organisation (micro level) CSFs as a 
requirement for risk assessment and management 
 
Source: Author 
While respondents suggested transfer of substantial project risks to the private sector (as captured in 
table 8.10 above) because of the current enormous capacity limitations by government, however, doing 
this without a lot of intellect may seem attractive in the short run but may turn out to hurt public interests 
in the future (Wang, 2015:693). Therefore, government must take sound precautions. In addition, 
having road projects packaged in sizeable lots ensures that structured projects do not become too small 
nor too large for the private sector to afford or participate in. Finally, an intensive discussion on PPP 
risk management was undertaken in subsection 3.3.5, though not specific to Uganda, but the issues 
therein are vital in shaping the PPP transition in country. 
8.7.3 Tolling management 
While tolls are key to the sustainability of PPP road projects, however, because road infrastructure has 
for long been provided by government, the recent private sector provision of road infrastructure through 
direct user tolls, especially in Africa, often attracts negative perceptions and protests from the public 
(Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2017:118). Consequently, the projected traffic volumes upon which private sector 
returns mainly accrue become difficult to attain. Wang (2015:693) and Osei-Kyei and Chan (2017:119) 
attribute low traffic volume on toll roads to inaccurate traffic predictions, economic downturn, 
improvements on competing free access roads, and locating toll roads in communities dominated by 
low income earners who cannot afford paying user fees repeatedly. On the other hand, using a Ugandan 
example, a respondent argues that, KEE may have high vehicle traffic from Kampala to Entebbe 
International Airport and back, because air transport passengers can afford paying tolls (P9, 30:42). 
Overall, there was consensus among the respondents that direct road user tolls in Uganda would only 
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be viable in the GKMA. Note that sections 4.3 and 4.4 discuss tolling practices and PPP road 
experiences across the globe, and these provide key lessons for a PPP emerging nation like Uganda. In 
fact, these two sections (4.3 and 4.4) provide much more than what the respondents provide in this 
empirical study. Table 8.11 below provides CSFs as per the responses of the interviewees. 
Table 8.11. Public Private Partnership critical success factors as a requirement for Road Tolling 
Management 
 
Source: Author 
While respondents had mixed responses (that is, yes or no) on toll exemptions, this study recommends 
provision of very few and unavoidable toll exemptions (as highlighted in table 10 above) because the 
majority of the interviewees supported toll exemptions. For example, a proponent for toll exemptions 
argues that, government vehicles, ambulances, NGO vehicles, and vehicles for all international 
agencies (e.g. UN, UNHCR etc.) should be exempted. These are here for our good, so why charge them 
(P15, 25:49). Meanwhile, an opponent to toll exemptions argues that…..if you think the political class, 
cabinet ministers are VVIP to be toll exempt, then State House should meet their bills, otherwise me 
and you will pay on their behalf through tax hikes (P22, 20:92). Finally, automating tolling systems 
becomes relevant for Uganda because it would assist government not only to easily match toll revenues 
remitted against the cars that will have used the road in the reporting period, but also enables faster 
movement without unnecessary stoppages to pay toll fees at tollgates. Note that explanations of the rest 
of the CSFs (highlighted in table 8.11) can be drawn from sections 4.3 and 4.4 (as aforementioned).  
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8.7.4 Legal System 
Effective legal and regulatory environments not only support and guide the implementation of PPP 
projects per se, but also smoothen partnership relations (Wang, 2015:693). However, given the PPP 
legal matters discussed in this chapter and in section 6.5, it is clear that the PPP legal system in Uganda 
is incomplete and with gaps. As such, this makes the implementation of PPP projects unrealistic and 
unachievable. Table 8.12 below provides legal related CSFs gathered from respondents that can 
improve the operating environment. 
Table 8.12. Public Private Partnership critical success factors as a requirement for legal system 
strengthening 
 
Source: Author 
Note that private interests must be closely monitored and regulated (as highlighted in table 8.12 above) 
because some private companies have in the past evaded, and others under-declared, their revenues in 
order to dodge or pay less in taxes. For instance, in 2010 Heritage Oil and Gas Ltd never remitted $405m 
to URA after selling the company’s 50% interests in oil blocks to Tullow Uganda Ltd. This culminated 
in international court cases and, according to a respondent, the private parties are usually interested in 
arbitrations just to make money (P8, 8:27). Furthermore, the PPP law should be backed by other laws, 
which either need to be developed or amended. For instance, the Roads Act that was developed in 1949 
is not only outdated but also does not provide for road rolling, the tolling policy is non-existent, and the 
land acquisition system for government investment projects must be improved. 
8.7.5 Right of Way 
In addition to discussions in this chapter, refer to subsection 6.3.5 and section 6.5 for a detailed account 
about the land problem in Uganda, especially regarding government investment projects. Land for PPP 
roads has become too problematic; for example, even after officially opening KEE for public use on 15 
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June 2018, land compensations were still ongoing. Table 8.13 below provides CSFs drawn from the 
views of the respondents. 
Table 8.13. Public Private Partnership critical success factors as a requirement for smoothing 
land acquisition 
 
Source: Author 
8.7.6 Negotiation 
Negotiations oil the processes of allocating and sharing of project responsibilities, risks, costs and 
benefits among participating parties (Glumac, Han, Schaefer & Van der Krabben, 2015:67). Therefore, 
the ability by both the public and private sector parties to negotiate well is a key facilitator for excellent 
project performance expectations. However, as already captured in this chapter, the government of 
Uganda has had bad PPP deals simply because neither does it have internal negotiation capacities nor 
does it recruit external skilled negotiators. Like in Uganda, a study conducted by Maseko (2014:137) 
on CSFs for PPPs in South Africa, establishes that poor negotiations by government emanate from fraud 
and corruption, lack of a clear vison and strategy, poor or non-existent intellectual property management 
strategy, lack of skills transfer, lack of skilled personnel, unconducive legal frameworks, lack of 
decisive PPP transformation, and political bias and interference. Subsequently, this prompts costly and 
unnecessary renegotiations for the government (Carbonara et al., 2015:180). Refer to subsection 
3.3.5.1b for a detailed account on renegotiations. Given the above arguments, the government must 
therefore negotiate well for project success (as is the practice with private sector players) or else 
underestimate the power of negotiations and continue to register unprecedented project failures. Table 
8.14 below provides CSFs expressed by the respondents. 
Table 8.14. Public Private Partnership critical success factors as a requirement for effective 
negotiations 
 
Source: Author 
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8.7.7 Investment climate 
Notwithstanding a few PPP readiness factors discussed in section 8.5, largely the PPP investment 
climate in Uganda is moderately poor. As such, it is no surprise that President Museveni often cautions 
MDAs to provide a conducive environment to investors, for example, URA to provide a favourable tax 
regime, Registration Bureau to quicken the registration process, Ministry of Lands to provide more 
flexible land leases, and Bank of Uganda to manage the fiscal system to control the errant skyrocketing 
dollar rates (P10, 7:62). Note that an intensive discussion on PPP investment challenges and measures 
taken across the globe is provided in section 4.2, and referring to it is vital because it avails enormous 
lessons for Uganda’s current and future PPP situations. Table 8.15 below provides CSFs based on the 
responses of the interviewees. 
Table 8.15. Public Private Partnership critical success factors as a requirement for improving 
the investment climate 
 
Source: Author 
Because some of the CSFs captured in table 8.15 above seem to appear for the first time in this study, 
this study casts light on them as follows. The Uganda Development Bank should lend to private local 
firms at very low interest rates to boost their competitiveness over foreign firms. The PPP viability gap 
fund should support (in the form of grants) economically/socially justified projects which would be 
financially unviable without government involvement. The project development fund should provide 
funds to facilitate preparatory and planning processes of projects. Finally, the writer agrees with Wang 
(2015:693) that governments should introduce innovative financial tools to supplement private 
investments and increase project viability, and in Uganda’s case, ancillary facilities and services (as 
suggested in table 8.15 above) is proposed as one such innovation.  
8.7.8 Stakeholder Management 
The numerous parties and tasks embedded in PPP arrangements make PPP projects much more complex 
than other procurement systems to synergise the diverse interests of stakeholders and build up effective 
long-term relationships among them (Zou, Kumaraswamy, Chung & Wong,  2014:265 & 272). As such, 
prudent and professional management of stakeholder interests and influence remain paramount to PPP 
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project success. Given that subsection 3.3.4 broadly discusses stakeholder management in a PPP setup, 
the information therein is worth considering for an emerging PPP economy like Uganda. Table 8.16 
below provides CSFs based on the opinions of the respondents. 
Table 8.16. Public Private Partnership critical success factors as a requirement for effective 
stakeholder management 
 
Source: Author 
8.7.9 Participation of the Local Private sector 
Respondents predominantly mentioned local content as a critical sustainability mechanism for PPP 
projects, especially in terms of future national capacity, rather than continuing to rely on foreign 
companies with their associated costs. While there was agreement that Uganda cannot do without 
foreign companies because of the current local capacity inadequacies, however, foreign firms are 
blamed for having no interest in transferring technical skills to the locals. This is exhibited by  
respondents who argues that,….Ugandans are left to be flagmen or ladies on construction sites, and 
the cycle continues, that after 10 years the same foreign companies come back to reconstruct or 
maintain the road  (P14, 23:37) because foreign companies never mentor our technical staff (P8, 15:26) 
to be able to take over from them in future. 
Whereas domestic developers could not execute all PPP projects because of an enormous lack of local 
capital and expertise (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2017:119), the interest of Ugandans is, however, in the locals 
doing all the work where local capacity is available, as government and the local private sector take 
decisive measures to developed more capacity. Furthermore, while the majority of the respondents 
castigated the local labour for gross indiscipline and having a poor attitude towards work (refer to 
section 8.4.9), however, one respondent argues that the problem is lack of supervision; Just like the 
Chinese will give you a bad road if not supervised. But improve on your supervision the local labour 
will definitely give you an excellent road (P18, 19:65). Table 8.17 below provides CSFs based on the 
suggestions of respondents. 
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Table 8.17. Public Private Partnership Critical Success Factors as a Requirement of Local 
Labour Empowerment 
 
Source: Author 
In summary, section 8.7 has presented and discussed findings of PPP CSFs for PPP road development 
in Uganda under the themes of capacity building, risk assessment and management, tolling 
management, legal system, right of way, negotiation, investment climate, stakeholder management, and 
participation of the local private sector. Note that risk assessment and management CSFs were further 
sub grouped under political and financing, and project and organisation findings. The next section 
presents and discusses findings on the PPP best practices for road development in Uganda. 
8.8 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP BEST PRACTICES 
Based on the interview responses, this section presents best practices for PPP road infrastructure 
development in Uganda. Note that PPP best practices universally apply to all PPP projects globally no 
matter the PPP project type, the geographical jurisdiction of the project or a country’s PPP maturity 
level.  While compliance with best practices may depict a poor or good trend, the respondents, however, 
tended to limit PPP best practices to PPP problematic issues in the country. The findings include: 
Benchmarking from PPP road experienced countries, especially to draw lessons for developing 
interconnections with other modes of transport, and project success as a whole; Due diligence, 
especially on the reputation record of companies by conducting background checks about their 
experience and overall capacity before engagement; Competition among bidders, especially for 
procurement processes; Accountability through engagement of and reporting to stakeholders and audit 
trails, and clear separation of regulatory and technical responsibilities; Practising democracy and good 
governance, fairness, openness and transparency, innovation, sustainability, trust, value for money, 
balancing PPP success outcomes, and commitment. Table 8.18 below provides clarity on some of the 
best practices aforementioned using verbatim from respondents. 
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Table 8.18. Best Practices and Corresponding Verbatim from Selected Respondents 
 
Source: Author 
In conclusion, because this section entirely relies on views from respondents, it provides limited PPP 
best practices in both number and explanation. However, subsections 3.3.1 and 9.4.7 fill the gap because 
they provide a well-synthesised presentation and discussion of PPP best practices (captured as PPP 
principles and PPP project process best management practices respectively) from literature. The two 
subsections (3.3.1and 9.4.7) not only explain factors already raised by the respondents but also provide 
a detailed list of PPP best practices that would deliver PPP success to any government. 
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8.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The study set out to investigate the suitability of the PPP environment in Uganda for road infrastructure 
development. The findings have shown mixed signs of favourable and unfavourable PPP environments, 
though the unfavourable outweigh the favourable factors. Findings position the road sub sector in 
Uganda in the initial stages of PPP planning and implementation trajectory, with government efforts 
currently focused on the first two of the pioneer PPP projects, KEE and KJE. Contextually, PPP 
knowledge and exposure among the public, private and civil society organisation sectors and among 
the citizens, for both the lower and the elite classes, is very low. While there is enough justification 
(motivations) and opportunities (prospects) for undertaking road infrastructure development through 
PPPs, however, the challenges and obstacles are enormous against meagre readiness levels. Actually, 
both governance and financial perspectives at macro, meso, and micro levels in the planning and 
execution of PPP projects in the country, raises great concerns over the future of PPP programs in the 
road sub sector. To remedy the current worrying PPP performance status, the study provides PPP CSFs 
and best practices tailored to the road sub sector in Uganda, but also makes references to other general 
all-inclusive sectors’ PPP CSFs and globally PPP acceptable practices.
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9 CHAPTER 9: A SUITABLE PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE 
MODEL FOR DEVELOPING ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE IN UGANDA 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
With a public sector viewpoint, the study ultimately sought to develop a suitable PPP governance model 
for developing road infrastructure in Uganda. The motivation for setting this goal accrued from four 
fundamental strands. Firstly, globally the successes and failures of PPP projects compete neck and neck. 
Secondly, PPP projects have had serious governance problems in all sectors in Uganda. Thirdly, slow 
progress surrounds the planning and implementation of Uganda’s PPP road network projects. For 
instance, since 2009 to date none of the first two PPP road infrastructure projects (KJE and KEE) 
prioritized by the government has yet procured a PPP SPV contractor or a PPP operation and 
maintenance provider respectively (refer to chapter 8 and section 5.5 for details). Fourthly, previous 
studies provide PPP models that partially address PPP governance dimensions.  
In developing a suitable PPP governance model for Uganda, the study made use of the extant PPP 
governance models, and findings from literature and documentary analysis and empirical study chapters 
of the Thesis. The study guarantees the credibility of the developed model by customising information 
from extant PPP models, and literature and documentary analysis chapters to the empirical study 
findings. To realize the model development objective, the chapter is organised in four sections of: a 
summary of theory and practice chapters, a summary of extant PPP governance models, construction 
and discussion of the suitable PPP governance model for developing road infrastructure in Uganda, and 
the contribution of the developed Public Private Partnership governance model. 
9.2 A SUMMARY OF PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE 
FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND DISCUSSION OF A SUITABLE PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR UGANDA’S ROAD SUB SECTOR 
In the overall study, PPP theory and practice are represented by chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, 6, 8 respectively. 
Provided in the next two subsections is the type of investigation and major finding (s) for each of the 
aforementioned chapters.  
9.2.1 Investigations and overarching findings from Theory 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 used information mainly from literature search and reviews; and the outcomes of 
these processes are summarized as follows. 
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Chapter 2: Explored the understanding and contribution of infrastructure development and public 
private partnership. Three major findings emerge from the chapter. Firstly, a typical PPP road project 
consists of both hard and soft infrastructure services, and combining such services to engage a single 
consortium, or very few private sector contractors, becomes ideal. Secondly, while many scholars 
define PPPs by integrating three fundamental concepts of contractual, project functions and partnership 
orientations, some perceive them differently ideologically or depending on the interventions of the 
project, or the interests of the beneficiaries. Finally, although PPP infrastructure could have a greater 
impact on economic and social development, this remains limited because the public sector in practice 
promotes less co-regulation, co-production, co-responsibility, and relational governance. 
Chapter 3: Explored the key elements of an effective PPP governance structure for infrastructure 
development. Findings indicated that the PPP operating environments are very complex, intricate and 
with many uncertainties. Therefore, key PPP elements identified in this chapter for effective governance 
of PPP projects included: promoting best practices (PPP principles) in all PPP systems, structures and 
processes; effective implementation of critical success factors; effective management of stakeholder 
interests and influence; effective PPP risk management; and continuous improvement of the PPP 
maturity factors. 
Chapter 4: Investigated the international public private partnership experiences and PPP road project 
practices to draw lessons for Uganda’s road sub sector. Three major findings emerge from the chapter. 
Firstly, regardless of a country’s level of development, PPP road projects experience both positive and 
negative outcomes. Secondly, governments in collaboration with other stakeholders respond 
appropriately to avert the effects of economic and financial predicaments on the progress of PPP 
projects. Finally, apart from a few exceptions, countries across the globe have similar tolling practices. 
9.2.2 Investigations and overarching findings from Practice 
While chapters 5 and 6 used secondary data mainly through documentary analysis, chapter 8 utilised 
primary data by interviewing selected respondents, and the outcomes of these processes are 
summarized as follows.  
Chapter 5: Examined the impact of road sub sector reforms on road infrastructure performance in 
Uganda. The findings showed that while the road network would reduce the costs of living and doing 
business in Uganda (refer to sections 1.2 and 5.2), ordinary road infrastructure remains underdeveloped 
and PPP road projects experience slow progress because of lack of resource capacities and compromised 
governance systems and practices.  
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Chapter 6: Discussed the legal and policy frameworks that support PPP road investment projects and 
programs in Uganda. The chapter’s findings indicated that although a number of legal and policy  
frameworks to support PPP interventions are available, some of the critical legal and policy frameworks 
are either non-existent, outdated, and having major gaps/inadequacies or both. 
Chapter 8: Empirically investigated the suitability of the PPP environment in Uganda for road 
infrastructure development. The study applied a holistic investigation and data analysis approach on the 
PPP environment in Uganda with a focus on the road sub sector, and established PPP understanding 
levels, motivations, challenges, readiness levels, prospects, critical success factors, and best practices 
that may support or derail PPP investment programs or projects. Overall findings indicated the existence 
of both favourable and unfavourable PPP environments for road projects in Uganda, though the 
unfavourable outweigh the favourable factors. Figure 9.1 below provides abridged findings under each 
of the aforementioned factors/themes, and detailed findings for each theme can be accessed in chapter 
8. 
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Figure 9.1. A Pictorial Summary of the Theme and Sub-Theme level Findings from the Empirical 
study chapter. 
Source: Author 
Given that the empirical study covered almost all the spheres of the PPP operating environment, and 
because effective data collection and analysis was undertaken (refer to chapter 7), it provides detailed 
and more accurate information for developing a comprehensive model that can significantly address 
most of the PPP governance issues for road infrastructure in Uganda.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 249 
 
9.3 A SUMMARY OF EXTANT PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE 
MODELS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND DISCUSSION OF A SUITABLE PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR UGANDA’S ROAD SUB 
SECTOR 
This section presents key issues emerging from eight extant PPP governance models relevant for 
developing a suitable PPP governance for Uganda’s road infrastructure. The eight extant PPP 
governance models consist of three for risk management, three for critical success factors, one for 
financial and economic management, and one for stakeholder management, as presented in subsections 
9.3.1, 9.3.2, 9.3.3 and 9.3.4 below. The study used more than one extant model because no single 
previously developed PPP governance model could address the majority of the PPP governance issues 
discovered in theory and practice.   
9.3.1 Public Private Partnership Critical Success Factors Models  
This subsection presents three PPP critical success factors models and describes how each of them 
enhances PPP project success.  Of the three models, one is by Chan et al. (2010) while the other two 
are by Liu et al. (2015), as explored below. 
Chan et al. (2010:492) developed a five-factor groupings model for PPP CSFs and showed how each 
of the five factor groups relate to one another. Chan et al., suggested that a transparency and efficient 
procurement process group (with 3 factors), a shared responsibility between public and private sectors 
group (with 4 factors), and a judicious government control group (with 1 factor) should be executed in 
a systematic order within the project lifecycle. Meanwhile, a stable macroeconomic group (with 6 
factors), and a stable political and social environments group (with 4 factors) have to be continuously 
considered in all the project lifecycle stages because of their crosscutting impacts on PPP performance. 
In summary, whereas Chan et al.’s (2010) idea of CSFs groupings within a project life cycle is a great 
innovation, their model, however, limits CSFs to only ex ante project processes, yet a real project 
lifecycle should include both ex ante and ex post CSFs.  
Liu et al. (2015:4) developed a project success logic model (figure 9.2 below), which introduces a dual 
factor consideration of product and project management factors that provides a balanced view about 
CSFs and results for PPP project success. In fact, scholars have concentrated more on CSFs for PPP 
product success and hardly mention CSFs for PPP project management success. Yet focusing on having 
the final PPP product per se without proper management of project processes (project management), 
not only curtails the achievement of PPP outcomes or goals (product), but also affects the effective use 
of inputs and production of right outputs. Figure 9.2 below confirms that project success is achieved 
through effective management of both product and project management factors. 
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Figure 9.2. Project Success Logic Model 
Source: Liu et al. (2015:4) 
Examples of product CSFs include good governance, trust, accountability and transparency, while those 
for project management CSFs include effective evaluation for PPP initiation and planning, effective 
negotiation frameworks, and effective safety management and health control (refer to subsection 3.3.2). 
By identifying and evaluating the performance of both product and project management CSFs based on 
a project lifecycle perspective, the project success logic model supplies a holistic approach. 
Furthermore, using the analogy of project management success as demonstrated in figure 9.2 above, 
Liu et al. (2015:5) developed a PPP project life-cycle CSFs phased evaluation model. The model 
emphases a “phased-based” measurement evaluation, which aims at monitoring and assessing the 
performance of a PPP project as it progresses (Liu et al., 2015:4-5), as opposed to the conventional 
“product-oriented” measurement which only evaluates the performance of an already completed 
project. Liu et al. (2015:4) argue that “the ‘product-oriented’ evaluation cannot effectively assist project 
managers to control and improve processes designed for the delivery of an asset”. Hence, the need to 
evaluate PPP performance using a “phased-based” lifecycle measurement approach.  
9.3.2 Public Private Partnership Risk Management Models 
Covered in this subsection are three different but interrelated PPP risk management models by Awodele 
(2012), Soomro and Zhang (2013b), and Carbonara, Costantino, Gunnigan and Pellegrino (2015). 
Provided below is a description of how each of the models developed by the aforementioned authors 
enhance PPP project success.  
Awodele (2012:259) developed a model for managing risk in privately financed market projects in 
Nigeria. The model integrates generic risk management processes within the PPP systems and project 
processes for Nigeria. The model affirms that effective identification, assessment, allocation, 
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monitoring, evaluation and management of PPP project risks is realizable when done systematically 
and matched with PPP project processes and tasks, and PPP structures and systems of a country.  
Soomro and Zhang (2013b:11) developed a cause and effect model for PPP risk failures in the transport 
sector along the PPP project life cycle phases, and demonstrates that each risk cause/driver has an 
intermediate or ultimate effect, or both. For example, improper demand forecasting at the pre-tendering 
phase causes low traffic demand at project operations, and the same factor of low traffic demand at the 
same phase of project operations causes low revenue generation, which finally cause concessionaire 
insolvency (Soomro & Zhang, 2013b:11). This implies that some risks are closely associated. The 
model further indicated that a single risk could occur or affect different phases or tasks within a phase 
of a project. As such, risk identification and mitigation become complex processes that require robust 
management approaches and commitment of the right, and enough resources.   
Finally, Carbonara et al. (2015:168-170) identified common exogenous and endogenous PPP risks at 
individual project phases and those that cut across the motorway project lifecycle phases, and 
subsequently developed mitigation measures for each of the identified risks using a step by step 
approach. A combination of the risk identification and mitigation frameworks by Carbonara et al., 
makes what our study terms as “exogenous and endogenous PPP risk identification and mitigation 
model” (refer to table 2.4). Whereas the model emphasizes identification and management of both 
internal and external risks unique to each phase, as well as risks that are universal to all phases of the 
project life cycle, unfortunately it assumes that the identification and mitigation of each risk can be 
done independent of other project risks. However, the cause and effect PPP risk failures model 
developed by Soomro and Zhang (2013b: 11) fills this gap. 
9.3.3 Public Private Partnership Financial Model 
Only one extant financial model by Kurniawan, Mudjanarko and Ogunlana  (2015) was used, because 
Kurniawan et al.(2015)’s model seems more comprehensive and simple to understand and apply 
(especially for new PPP adopters like Uganda) compared to other financial models developed, say by 
Khmel and Zhao (2016: 143), and Kumar, Jindal and Velaga (2018:4-18). By definition, PPP financial 
models are tools for assessing the viability of new projects based on both economic and financial project 
assumptions to facilitate and support contract negotiations, bidding processes, appraisal reporting, risk 
allocation and sharing, tariff adjustments and project performance monitoring and evaluation 
(Kurniawan et al., 2015: 124&128). Though serving different stakeholder interests and project 
purposes, financial models are very vital at project pre-proposal, contract negotiation, financing 
mobilization, construction, and operation stages, as demonstrated in table 9.1 below. 
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Table 9.1. Key Users of Financial Models and Their Interests within the PPP project Lifecycle 
 
Source: Kurniawan et al. (2015:127) 
For the public or private sector to execute the financial modelling task well, it must employ or appoint 
a competent financial advisor responsible for collecting relevant information in order to develop and 
utilize financial models. Highlights of information provided by key stakeholders include: fiscal 
incentives, loan and revenue guarantees, and tariff cap by government; project costs  and management 
costs by SPV, construction costs by EPC; operation and maintenance costs by the operator company; 
and project financing information by lenders (Kurniawan et al., 2015:127).  
A standard PPP financial model utilises input worksheet assumptions, calculation of worksheet 
formulas and output worksheet assumptions to build economic and financial feasibilities for projects 
(see figure 9.3 below). The information/assumptions that feed into the input worksheets originate from 
stakeholders, projects documents and other relevant sources, and such information includes project 
timelines, economic indicators, technical data, cost of capital, loan commitment, project tenor and grace 
periods, loan type, interest rate and fees, repayment structure, target of equity, tax information, and 
working capital and reserves. The calculation worksheet formulas or formats utilize information from 
input worksheets to produce outputs. To conduct calculations, formulas or formats for use include 
income statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements, debt service coverage ratio, loan life cover 
ratio, net present value, interest rate of return and return on equity. Finally, the output worksheets extract 
information from calculation worksheets and use pro forma financial statements, and any other 
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information from the calculation worksheets, to visualize the economic and financial viability of the 
projects. In summary, the three financial outputs of revenues, net profit and internal rate of return would 
be enough to provide an appropriate strategy for setting and adjusting unit prices or costs periodically 
(Kurniawan et al., 2015:128). 
 
Figure 9.3. An Example of a Typical Public Private Partnership Financial Model 
Source: Kurniawan et al. (2015:127) 
The economic and financial feasibilities from the modelling exercise mainly address value for money 
interests of the public sector against projected expenditure and profitability or return on investment 
interests of the private sector. As such, financial models must harmonize the expectations and 
preferences of the various PPP project stakeholders, especially prior to financial closure. Furthermore, 
a continuous update of the model is unavoidable as the project progresses since stakeholders’ interests, 
as well as the conditions within the project-operating environment, change over time. However, 
common criticisms of financial models is that they are prone to a number of errors and are hard to 
understand because of the complex financing transactions involved and the diversity of stakeholders’ 
interests in PPP projects (Kurniawan et al., 2015:124).  
9.3.4 Public Private Partnership stakeholder organisations capability enhancement Model 
Stakeholder organisation capability enhancement model was the only stakeholder management model 
used because it is easily adaptable to all stakeholder governance issues and sets standards for 
progressive factor improvement. Babatunde (2015) developed a PPP stakeholder organizations 
capability enhancement model (SOCEM) for Nigeria by applying PPP CSFs on the capability maturity 
model (CMM). The CMM, as used by Babatunde, is a five level assessment tool, represented as follows: 
Level 1-Ad hoc, level 2-Repeatable, level 3-Defined, Level 4-Managed, and level 5-Optimising. In 
order to generate robust predictions and make sound recommendations for project improvement, the 
assessment of any factor must systematically and in an ascending order go through all five levels. The 
meaning attached to each of the levels of the CMM is provided as follows. Level 1-Ad hoc. The 
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organisation capabilities are very immature and often characterised with difficulty in retaining talented 
individuals, chaotic processes, unpredictable project results, and the success of projects depends on 
individual efforts within organisations. Usually, organisations that would have recently adopted the PPP 
model, fall under this level. Level 2-Repeatable. This represents a slight improvement in capabilities 
compared to the ad hoc level. Possibilities of predictable project outcomes start to emerge, formal 
processes are introduced, and project commitments, resources, trainings, responsibilities and project 
activities are assigned and undertaken based on organisation policy. However, all the aforementioned 
processes and tasks are executed with a single unit/departmental direction instead of an organisation 
level focus. Level 3-Defined. An organisational management framework with standardised processes, 
systems, and methodologies able to capture and share best practices is established. Further, the 
organisation develops various workforce competencies in order to deliver on the organisation and 
business strategies with consistency across the organisation to achieve competitiveness. Level 4-
Managed. Quantitative analysis tools and databases are developed to facilitate performance predictions 
that would enable sustainable capabilities and effective management of project processes and activities.  
Level 5-Optimising. This is the highest level of capability maturity, where organisations focus on 
continuous improvement through incremental and innovative processes, empowering individuals to 
improve processes under their control, and capturing lessons learned for corrective action using 
established feedback loops.  
For demonstration purposes on how the SOCEM works, the study randomly choose and present only 
one (1) out of the 14 CSFs applied by Babatunde (2015). The SOCEM fitted findings from the 14 CSFs 
within the CMM as per the different stakeholders’ opinions (through interviews), and provides 
standards for improving each of the CSFs along the different levels of CMM. Findings and standards 
for improvement for the selected CSF (political support) is presented in the respective upper and lower 
rows across the CMM levels in table 9.2 below. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 255 
 
Table 9.2. Stakeholder organization capability enhancement Model for Public Private Partnership infrastructure 
      projects in Nigeria 
 
Source: Babatunde (2015:206, 214 & 216) 
SOCEM model becomes a useful tool for identifying and assessing strong and weak PPP operational factors, and 
provides a roadmap and guidelines on the priority areas at different capability maturity levels that would facilitate 
continuous improvement in organization processes in order to achieve PPP program and project sustainability.  
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9.4 CONSTRUCTION AND DISCUSSION OF A SUITABLE PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR ROAD INFRASTRUCTURE 
DEVELOPMENT IN UGANDA 
This section presents and discusses the public private partnership governance model suitable for road 
infrastructure development in Uganda. Construction of a suitable PPP governance model (figure 9.4 
below) was based on the findings from both PPP theory and practice presented in the entire Thesis, as 
summarised in sections 9.2 and 9.3 above. As already mentioned in section 9.1, to create robustness in 
and credibility of the model, the findings from the extant PPP governance models (section 9.3), 
literature review (chapters 2, 3, 4), and documentary analysis (chapters 5, 6) were customised to the 
findings from the empirical study (chapter 8) to construct a suitable PPP governance model for 
developing road infrastructure in Uganda. The model consists of four main components, as depicted in 
figure 9.4 below. The first and the second components represent PPP best practices and critical success 
factors, and macro level assessment and management respectively, while the third and fourth 
components represent meso and micro assessments and management, and PPP project outcomes 
respectively. The aforementioned denotations of first, second, third and fourth components of the model 
represent the systematic order in which the model components would be executed under normal 
circumstances, as elaborated in the next paragraph. However, because the PPP environment is never 
static, the model therefore caters for back and forth movements of processes, as symbolised by the 
arrows in the model. 
Fundamentally, the developed PPP governance model advances the need for comprehensive 
assessments of the PPP environment of a country, and effective management of PPP systems and project 
processes based on the conducted PPP assessment outcomes. The starting point of the model is to have 
PPP best practices and critical success factors established. Next, is to create assessment and 
management systems/frameworks for the overall PPP environment (macro, meso and micro) levels. 
Then follows conducting of assessments and management for all the other components of the model 
based on the available assessment and management systems, best practices, and critical success factors 
by beginning with macro, and later the meso and micro level components. At the macro level, it begins 
with establishing government’s motivation for PPP adoption, and proceed to assess the PPP operating 
environment and managing challenges identified therein, as well as creating PPP understanding among 
stakeholders in order to create or improve PPP readiness. To further improve PPP readiness at the macro 
level, is promoting of partnership thinking among stakeholders and continuously improving PPP 
maturity, as well as managing any obstacles that would be caused by stakeholder interests, influence or 
both.  Assuming that a reasonable level of PPP readiness has been identified or created at the macro 
level, it then proceeds to assess and manage meso and micro level PPP components. With meso and 
micro level assessments and management, it starts with the PPP project idea generation component, 
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proceed to the public investment management system (PIMS) component, and then the advanced PPP 
project management processes component, and ensure that risks within the overall project life cycle are 
effectively managed. 
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Figure 9.4. Public Private Partnership Governance Model for Developing Road Infrastructure in Uganda 
Source: Author
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In summary, the above model demonstrates at a glance that effective assessments and management of 
macro, meso and micro level PPP components (factors) would result in the realisation of PPP project 
outcomes that match the expected PPP road development and sustainability goal. In efforts to make the 
model more user friendly to the recipients, a discussion on how each of the components of the model 
works will be provided. Note that the relevance of the extant PPP governance models will be captured 
in a separate subsection (in 9.4.1 below) because no comprehensive discussions (other than the 
summaries provided in section 9.3 of this chapter) prior to this chapter have been undertaken in the 
thesis. On the other hand, because the theoretical and empirical chapters of the thesis were discussed 
comprehensively prior to this chapter, and in order to avoid duplication of work, reference to the 
aforementioned chapters or their relevance to the developed model will be integrated in the discussions 
of the individual components of the model. 
9.4.1 The relevance of the discussed extant public private partnership governance models to 
the developed model  
The contributions of the discussed extant PPP governance models (in section 9.3) to the advancements 
for the developed PPP governance model are provided below.  
Critical success factors models. Chan et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2015:5) in their critical success 
factors models make key observations towards better performance of PPPs, which suggest that: A 
phased approach to evaluation of projects enables risks or errors to be identified early and corrected 
with ease, rather than to wait to evaluate when the project has come to a complete end. Product (goal 
and purpose) CSFs must be matched with project management (inputs, processes and outputs) CSFs. 
Critical success factors must be assessed and managed using a project lifecycle approach. Critical 
success factors with similar characteristics produce greater impact when managed as a single group. 
Lastly, CSFs must be networked because of the causal effect relationship they have with themselves 
and PPP projects at large. It is the view of this study that the aforementioned contributions advanced by 
Chan and Liu for critical success factors, equally apply to and make PPP best practices effective for 
project success. 
Stakeholder organisations capability enhancement model. The model advances the need to track 
progressive PPP improvement of personnel, organization or country based on formally set measurement 
standards of performance at different levels of the factor (s) maturity curve. Though Babatunde (2015: 
206, 214 & 216) applied the SOCEM on CSFs, generally the model applies to all aspects of a PPP 
environment (e.g. best practices, risks and challenges, prospects and obstacles, motivations and 
readiness factors, among others) as long as the focus is on achieving continuous improvement. 
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Risk management models. Carbonara et al. (2015), Awodele (2012), and Soomro and Zhang (2013b) 
through their risk management models make the following contributions.  It is good practice during the 
assessment and management of project risks to identify both internal and external risks at every stage 
of the project and provide mitigation measures for each of the risks, rather than generalising (Carbonara 
et al. (2015:168-170), as the saying goes, no one size fits all. Actually, even risks that cut across the 
project lifecycle can never have similar remedies because the magnitude of their impact varies across 
the different stages or tasks of the project. In addition, project implementation should never proceed to 
the next stage of the project lifecycle, or next task within the same project stage, unless effective risk 
assessment and management happens in a predecessor stage or task (Awodele, 2012:259).  Failure to 
take such a stance has negative effects or produces more risks in subsequent project phases or tasks 
within the same phase (Soomro & Zhang, 2013b:11). As such, reluctance by one party to execute its 
responsibilities affects another partner’s targets or performance, hence the need for all parties to a 
project to execute their tasks collaboratively. Finally, like advanced by Awodele (2012:259), no doubt 
the effective management of PPP risks largely depends on how well risk assessment and management 
frameworks are suited to a country’s PPP structural and legal systems and the project lifecycle 
processes, as well as the level of their effective usage.  
Financial model. A financial model, as advanced by Kurniawan et al. (2015), provide both economic 
and financial quantitative assessments, and supplements qualitative assessments in order to determine 
project viability as a PPP. For any serious PPP project, financial models become inevitable since they 
form the central focus for conducting and preparing pre-feasibility, and detailed feasibility studies and 
reports, respectively. The main contributions of financial models to PPP projects include: mutual 
agreement and risk sharing between public and private sector players; minimize renegotiations; ensure 
timely and effective bidding, negotiation and project evaluation processes; and enable making of 
appropriate financial decisions and sound predictions of project performances, both in the short and 
long term.  
In summary, the extant PPP governance models suggest complementarity for PPPs and, therefore, 
fitting the philosophies of each extant model into the ideals of the developed model, would address PPP 
governance anomalies rather than becoming a mere theoretical advancement with less practical impact. 
In the next subsections, 9.4.2 to 9.4.7 below, is a discussion of the applicability of each of the 
components of the developed PPP governance model towards realising PPP road development and 
sustainability goals in Uganda.  
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9.4.2 Applicability of the PPP best practices and critical success factors components of the 
model 
In the initial stages of PPP adoption, be it at national, sector/sub sector or contracting authority level, 
the assistance of consultants must be sought to establish the best practices and critical success factors 
together with frameworks or guidelines of their continued assessment, management and improvement. 
For purposes of creating sound and credible PPP critical success factors and best practices in both 
factors and frameworks, the contracted consultants must work alongside a nominated and appointed 
special technical team. The composition of the special technical team should be balanced to represent 
the interests of, or receive professional input from, the national public sector, private sector (both 
national and foreign), civil society, intergovernmental organisations (both from the African continent 
and outside Africa), and the academia. 
Based on the above assertions, prior to any assessments (from macro-micro levels) of the other 
components of the model, both the PPP best practices and critical success factors must be known and 
frameworks/guidelines for their application and management formulated.  This is because all the other 
components of the model use PPP best practices and critical success factors as benchmarking standards 
for their assessments and management. Neither the best practices nor critical success factors should be 
used in isolation of the other because they all influence the performance of one another towards 
realization of PPP project outcomes. 
Key reference sections and subsections of this thesis relevant to the discussion in this subsection include  
sections 8.7 and 8.8 which respectively provide critical success factors and best practices for improving 
the governance of PPP road projects and agenda for Uganda, and subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 which 
respectively provide  detailed discussions on principles of PPP good governance (best practices) and 
critical success factors which provide general  insights on how best to manage PPP projects. In 
conclusion, it is argued that from the results of the assessments, those best practices and critical success 
factors with low compliance and performance rates respectively, as well as critical success factors with 
greater impact on PPPs must be accorded more attention during PPP implementation for better 
performance.  
9.4.3 Applicability of the PPP Assessment and Management component of the model 
The macro, meso, and micro environments refers to PPP processes, systems, structures, capacities and 
decisions that have national, sector or sub sector, and contracting authority or project level impacts 
respectively. PPP national level decisions are mainly the preserve of parliament and cabinet; sector or 
sub sector level decisions are handled by ministries or committees or bodies overseeing and supporting 
the management of PPP operations in PPP contracting agencies, while micro level decisions are handled 
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internally by contracting authorities (refer to chapter 6). The assessment and management of macro, 
meso, and micro environments must be guided by both PPP best practices and critical success factors. 
The assessment systems, frameworks and criteria for all the components of the model, and how the 
processes thereof have to be conducted and managed at macro, meso and micro levels, must be 
available. Unfortunately, for Uganda, PPP assessments and management capacities and support (human 
resources, financing, logistics, structures, and legal frameworks) at all levels of the public sector are 
inadequate (refer to chapter 8). 
9.4.4 Applicability of the Government’s PPP motivation component of the model 
On condition that best practices and critical success factors have already been established, the starting 
point at the macro level is to establish whether the sector or sub sector of the economy under study 
would be appropriate for PPPs. To earmark a sector or sub sector as suitable for PPPs, it is important to 
determine government motivations through preliminary assessment and management processes and 
seek agreement from key stakeholders. As such, for a sector or sub sector to adopt PPPs as one of the 
procurement modalities for undertaking investment projects, government motivations should be very 
clear and technically convincing, rather than following the dictates or selfish interests of those with 
great influence over government decision making processes. For example, although political support 
seemingly exists (refer to 8.5.1.1), no doubt political manipulations largely define and negatively affect 
PPP projects in Uganda (refer to 8.4.7). A project should only proceed to conduct a detailed assessment 
of the PPP operating environment when the PPP motivations/drivers have been justified. Specific to 
Uganda’s road sub sector, refer to figure 9.1 and section 8.3 for highlights and a detailed discussion of 
PPP motivations respectively. 
9.4.5 Applicability of the PPP operating environment component of the model 
The PPP operating environment includes legal and regulatory, policy and institutional, political, 
economic and financial, social and eco environment, technical and technological factors. The main 
purpose of conducting a detailed assessment of the PPP operating environment is to establish whether 
there is a reasonable level of PPP readiness that would enable planning and implementation of PPP 
projects with less difficulty. Note that operating environment referred to in this subsection, based on 
the model depictions, is macro in nature, and therefore necessitate macro level assessments and 
management. The extant models discussed in section 9.3 become candidate tools of assessments and 
management. The most relevant for this level is the stakeholder organizations capability enhancement 
model since it has the capability to rank or determine the level of PPP maturity for any environmental 
factor across all assessment and management levels. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 263 
 
Based on the findings from the empirical study, Uganda’s PPP operating environment is too weak with 
many challenges, and lacks PPP knowledge and awareness among many of the stakeholders (refer to 
sections 8.2, 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6). Therefore, management of PPP challenges and creation of PPP 
understanding becomes necessary for the improvement of the operating environment, which in turn 
would improve PPP readiness levels. 
9.4.6 Applicability of the PPP readiness component of the model 
PPP readiness is all about availability of sound and sufficient systems, frameworks, structures and 
resource capacities (e.g. human and financial) required to carry forward the PPP agenda. Assessment 
and management outcomes from the operating environment (macro level) becomes a basis for 
ascertaining the suitability of the PPP agenda at a national, sector or sub sector level. The empirical 
study findings indicated that the road sub sector in Uganda has very low PPP readiness capacities (refer 
to 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6). To improve PPP readiness, promote partnership thinking, continuously improve 
PPP maturity factors, and effectively manage stakeholder interests (own benefits) and influence 
(power/support) to minimise obstacles to the realization of PPP prospects (as shown in the model). 
Both practice and theory emphasise partnership thinking in PPP arrangements (refer to 8.2 and 2.3.1 
respectively). As per the public governance theories discussed in 2.4 and 2.5, partnership thinking 
interactions among PPP stakeholders begin to occur, develop and mature within the theories of new 
public management, new public service and public value, and new public governance practices 
respectively. Again, theory and practice suggest PPP maturity and stakeholder management 
considerations necessary for sustainable PPP management. Subsection 3.3.3 elaborately discusses how 
the general but pertinent stakeholder governance issues in PPP setting should be managed, and Table 
8.18 of subsection 8.7.8 highlights PPP critical success factors of stakeholder management for PPP road 
projects in Uganda.  Subsection 3.3.4 discusses PPP maturity, established Uganda’s PPP environment 
maturity level being below the average of 50%, and this matches with findings of the empirical study 
in chapter 8. Based on the empirical study, the suggested critical success factors (in 8.7) and best 
practices (in 8.8) would close some of the aforementioned gaps at the macro level. In return, this would 
improve the PPP operating environment at the macro level, as well as assure effective planning and 
implementation of PPP projects at the meso and micro levels, on condition that project risks are well 
managed. 
Notwithstanding low readiness levels of Uganda’s road sub sector to plan and implement PPP road 
projects, as established in chapter 8,  less developed PPP markets have the opportunity to leapfrog to 
more advanced stages of maturity (Eggers & Startup, 2006:6) because they can easily learn from and 
adopt more innovative PPP approaches from already developed PPP mature markets (See section 3.3.4). 
Based on this assertion, therefore, the whole of chapter four becomes very relevant for Uganda to draw 
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lessons from, both in the form of successes and failures of countries that have and still engage in PPPs 
in order to manage PPP initiatives better.   
9.4.7 Applicability of the Project lifecycle components of the model 
Meso and micro levels focus on the assessment of PPP project life cycle processes, structures, capacities 
and decisions, and the management of project risks therein. Actually, the central focus of meso and 
micro level assessments and management is to minimise or do away with both internal and external 
risks in the entire project lifecycle. In order to effectively control and mitigate project risk occurrences 
and their negative impacts within the project lifecycle, sound PPP structures, systems, processes and 
capacities must be created and employed at these two levels. Only external bodies, committees, and 
ministries, mandated by law to directly get involved in the planning and implementation processes for 
projects of contracting authorities, such  as Sector Working Groups (SWGs), PPP Unit, MFPED, and 
MoWT among others, must make meso level assessments and decisions. Meanwhile, contracting 
authorities must undertake all micro level assessments and decisions within the legally set up structures, 
such as accounting officer, project officer, project teams and internal auditors, among others. However, 
for effective decision-making, collaborations and correspondences must take place across meso and 
micro levels of assessment and management. Refer to section 6.2 for details about key stakeholders at 
meso and micro levels together with their responsibilities. 
The whole of chapter 8 has demonstrated lack of capacity by organisations at both meso and micro 
levels to manage PPP project processes effectively. Although no real PPP road project has yet 
contracted a SPV to undertake construction, the current experience with KJE and KEE projects as per 
chapter 8 findings suggest multiple risks ahead for PPP road projects. Given that PPP road projects are 
still in the planning phase of the project lifecycle, assessment beyond this phase provided limited 
information during interviews. However, Uganda can learn from the road cases, tolling practices, and 
management of financial hard times for PPP road projects by other countries, as provided in chapter 
four. Furthermore, subsection 2.3.3 provides PPP challenges/risks and mitigation measures at every 
stage of the project lifecycle, which Uganda should use as a guide to assess risks on the on-going and 
future road projects. Finally, section 3.3.5 discusses critical governance issues in the management of 
PPP risks that are worth considering as the country focuses on promoting PPP projects in the road sub 
sector. 
After explaining the relevance of risk management and how it fits into the model, and how project risks 
ought to be governed, we now focus on the main components of the PPP project lifecycle. The 
developed PPP governance model summarizes the PPP project life cycle into three parts: project idea 
generation, public investment management system (of Uganda), and the advanced PPP project 
management processes (refer to figure 9.4 above). Note that a combination of project idea generation 
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and public investment management system forms what is termed as the preliminary PPP project 
management processes, which makes up the PPP project identification and development process phase, 
as presented in subsection 9.4.7.1 below. The advanced PPP project management processes consist of 
the detailed PPP project preparation process, the PPP project procurement process, and the PPP project 
implementation process phases, as per the presentations in subsections 9.4.7.2 to 9.4.7.4 below. The 
aforementioned four PPP project management process phases practically provide a firm base upon 
which project responsibilities are distributed and tasks executed to deliver public infrastructure facilities 
and services.  
Given that Uganda lacks detailed and comprehensive PPP project management processes, this study 
uses PPP project management processes developed by EPEC (2011) alongside the existing Uganda PPP 
legal frameworks to suggest project tasks and PPP project process best management practices the 
Ugandan government should utilise to develop or improve PPP project processes and systems. Uganda’s 
PPP legal frameworks mainly used in this subsection include the PPP Act, and the Development 
Committee guidelines for the approval and review of public investment Plan (PIP) projects. Provided 
in subsections 9.4.7.1 to 9.4.7.4 below is a discussion of the four PPP project management process 
phases of the project lifecycle of the developed model in their chronological order of execution. Each 
of the four phases consists of two stages, and each with key steps, tasks and PPP project process best 
management practices. 
9.4.7.1 Public private partnership project identification and development process Phase 
PPP project idea generation starts the project lifecycle assessment and management processes. The 
generation and development of the project idea must be based on the national development programme 
and sector or sub sector specific infrastructure development plans. After a contracting authority has 
identified a project idea and prefers implementing it as a PPP, it must then comply with the PIMS 
standards. Project selection and assessment of PPP option stages respectively meant for developing of 
a project concept note and project profile, and conducting a prefeasibility study form the main processes 
of this phase (refer to Table 9.3 below). From the time of project idea generation to the point of project 
prefeasibility study, project proposal assessments must strictly be undertaken within the existing public 
investment management system (refer to section 6.3.2, and Appendix A). After conducting 
prefeasibility study assessments, an appropriate decision out of the following three options must be 
made; either to recommend the project proposal as a PPP or an ordinary or a rejected project. While a 
rejected project comes to a complete stop, the PPP project proposal is channelled to the advanced PPP 
project management processes, as the ordinary project proposal continues to be implemented under the 
PIMS frameworks as a public procurement project.  
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Table 9.3. Stages of the Public Private Partnership Project Identification and Development 
Process Phase 
 
Source: Modified from EPEC (2011:9) and Development Committee Guidelines (2016)  
Based on information already presented, the main purpose for this phase is to develop a potential project 
idea, and thereafter conduct preliminary assessments to establish the viability of executing a proposed 
project idea as a PPP amidst other options (e.g. public procurement). Separately provided below are the 
main PPP project process best management practices for both the project selection and assessment of 
PPP option stages.  
PPP project process best management practices for project selection stage. The contracting 
authority must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the project idea has the potential to solve an 
existing problem or exploit an opportunity that would positively and significantly impact national 
development plan targets. The project specifications for the PPP option should be output based, while 
project specifications for the public procurement option should be input based. The processes used by 
the contracting authority or private company (for unsolicited proposals) to develop the project idea into 
a PPP project proposal must comply with the country’s established and approved PIMS and the PPP 
Act.  
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PPP project process best management practices for the stage of assessment of PPP option. 
Conduct value for money assessment via a public sector comparator approach. Collect enough 
information and conduct rigorous data analysis to determine willingness to pay. Conduct effective 
traffic volume forecasts. Ascertain source of funding and plan to secure project funds prior to 
commencement of the construction phase. Allocate and develop effective measures of risk management. 
Ascertain the most applicable private sector revenue repayment mode (direct user fees or shadow tolls 
with or without subsidies). Ascertain the contracting authorities’ PPP resource capacities.  Project 
assessments and prefeasibility study recommendations (for either unsolicited proposal or project 
proposal originating from a public entity) must comply with the PPP Act provisions and the 
Development Committee Guidelines (2016). Develop a preliminary financial model. 
9.4.7.2 Detailed Public Private Partnership Project Preparation processes 
The purpose for this phase is to conduct detailed feasibility studies, and prepare and acquire all the 
required resources (documentation, human, finance, etc.) to later conduct procurement processes (refer 
to table 9.4 below). A PPP project proposal only becomes accepted as a PPP project upon preparation 
and approval of a detailed feasibility study. Short of that, the project proposal should either be 
transferred back to the public investment management system to be implemented as a public 
procurement project or rejected.  
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Table 9.4. Stages of a detailed Public Private Partnership Project Preparation process phase 
 
Source: Modified from EPEC (2011:15) 
Separately provided below are the main PPP project process best management practices for both the 
“getting organised” and “before launching the tender” stages. 
PPP project process best management practices for the stage of “getting organised”. Develop a 
detailed and refined financial model. Appoint credible and experienced advisors (technical, financial, 
legal, insurance, regulatory risks, and environmental and social impacts). Have all the necessary 
approvals ready. The contracting authority should have secured enough financial resources to execute 
the preparation and procurement phase. Availability of a credible and well-resourced team for project 
preparation and procurement management. Realistic project procurement timetable should have been 
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developed (document development, stakeholder consultation, government approval process, bidding 
process and private sector interface). 
PPP project process best management practices for the stage of “before launching the tender”. 
The requirements and scope of the PPP project should be clear and fixed. All material environmental 
and planning approvals should have been identified and obtained. Site and land acquisition issues 
should have been resolved.  The contracting authority should have the powers to award the PPP contract 
and enter into a long-term contractual arrangement. An updated value for money assessment for the 
proposed investment should have been done. Project risks and potential risk allocation should have been 
assessed. The plans to publicise the launch of the project should have been agreed upon and finalised.  
A project information memorandum should have been prepared. The bidder qualification and bid 
evaluation criteria should have been developed. The scope of the project should justify the contracting 
authority’s periodic payment required (availability-based PPPs) or tariffs should be realistic and 
affordable to users (revenue-based PPPs). Government or parliament should have approved all proposed 
budgets and payment obligations by the contracting authority. Evidence of sufficient commercial 
interest from contractors, operators, lenders and investors should justify tender launch. A draft PPP 
contract should have been prepared, including the project specifications, service standards, payment 
mechanism and proposed risk allocation. 
9.4.7.3 Public Private Partnership Project Procurement Process phase 
The purpose for this phase is to initiate procurement and conduct bidding processes, negotiate with best-
evaluated bidders and subsequently sign contracts with the most competent private sector partners that 
can deliver the desired value for money to the government. Prior to the actual undertaking of 
procurement processes, the detailed feasibility studies must have been approved and thorough 
preparation capacity created to handle the entire procurement processes effectively. Provided in table 
9.5 below is a summarised account of the stages, and key steps and tasks of the procurement phase.  
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Table 9.5. Stages of Public Private Partnership Project Procurement Process Phase 
 
Source: Modified from EPEC (2011:26) 
Separately provided below are the main PPP project process best management practices for both the 
bidding process and contract and financial close stages. 
PPP project process best management practices for the stage of bidding. The institution responsible 
for awarding and managing the bidding process should be known. The pre-qualification documents 
should enable bidders to present information about themselves and should clearly set out the evaluation 
criteria. All the pre-qualification processes should comply with legislation standards. The pre-
qualification evaluation criteria should include all relevant features related to the capacity of the bidders 
to deliver and their awareness of the PPP project. The invitation to tender document should include a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 271 
 
draft PPP contract (with clear payment mechanism and penalty regime), output requirements, and all 
other essential components of the PPP project (minimum technical, environmental, legal and financial 
requirements). All the critical bidding process requirements (a code of conduct, communication with 
bidders, audit trails and meetings, consortia changes and bidders’ due diligence) should be considered 
and implemented. The evaluation criteria and processes should be established, and evaluation teams 
and committees should be appointed before the submission of bids. Companies should bid as a 
consortium (SPV) to undertake the majority of the project activities (design, financing, construction, 
operation and maintenance), if not all. 
PPP project process best management practices for the stage of PPP contract and financial close. 
A negotiating team should be assembled and empowered to make PPP contract based decisions. The 
public agency and the negotiating team should have agreed on the negotiating strategy.  The legal 
advisers should have evaluated the marked-up draft PPP contract proposed by the bidders (based on 
risk allocation and value for money targets). Financial advisers should have assessed affordability, 
project costs, sources and costs of funding and project bankability. Negotiation results that vary 
substantially and materially from the bid offer should be open to challenge, as they may be less 
favourable or could have resulted in the selection of a different bidder. All the legal and administrative 
requirements of contract award should be complied with, and the final PPP contract should still be 
affordable and able to deliver value for money. 
9.4.7.4 Public Private Partnership Project implementation process Phase 
This phase addresses the common issues the contracting authority and contracted private parties may 
face during project implementation (construction, operation, maintenance, asset return/handover) up to 
the time of PPP contract expiry. The obligations for each of the parties to the contract should be clearly 
spelled out and relevant contract implementation and termination safeguards created. Provided in table 
9.6 below is a summarised account of the stages, and key steps and tasks of the PPP project 
implementation phase. 
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Table 9.6. Stages of Public Private Partnership Project Implementation Process Phase 
Source: Modified from EPEC (2011:35) 
Separately provided below are the main PPP project process best management practices for both the 
contract management and ex post evaluation stages. 
PPP project process best management practices for the stage of contract management. If possible, 
the same advisers that were used in the procurement phase should be engaged in contract management 
(but issues of availability, potential engagement, required budget and conflict of interest should first be 
addressed). Experienced advisers should be consulted to assist the contract management team to address 
sensitive changes to the PPP contract (refinancing, renegotiations). A contract administration manual 
should be available to match contract terms with contract management procedures, allocation of 
responsibilities and timetables. Guidelines to the contract administration manual should be developed 
to enable users to monitor contract performance. Payments to the PPP Company should be effected as 
per the PPP contract requirements. Continuous review and monitoring of project risks should be 
undertaken. Clear procedures for continuous monitoring of operational performance amidst trying to 
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manage contract changes should be in place. Mechanisms for ensuring continued value for money 
achievement after contract changes should be developed. Criteria and procedures for asset management 
and maintenance practices should be developed and agreed upon. A communication strategy on how 
regular reviews and updates will be provided to the PPP Company, users and other relevant stakeholders 
should be developed.  
PPP project process best management practices for the stage of ex post evaluation. The primary 
focus of ex post evaluation should be agreed upon (may include the behaviour and effectiveness of the 
institutions and individual parties, the effectiveness of the procurement option, effectiveness of 
negotiations and contract award, the effectiveness in the performance and management of the PPP 
contract or all the issues in the PPP process phases). Information needs for ex post evaluation should 
have been identified and included in the PPP contract. The availability of instructions, resources, and 
high-level support should be accorded to the contract management team in order to acquire the 
necessary information for an ex post evaluation assessment. A timetable for ex post evaluation should 
be developed and approved, and meaningful data on performance should be obtained timely and used 
to inform current and future PPP processes. 
9.4.8 Applicability of the PPP project outcomes component of the model 
Overall, the purpose of the above PPP governance model is to facilitate positive project outcomes for 
PPP road development and sustainability in Uganda. Based on the presentation and discussions in the 
whole of this section (9.4), the effective use of the developed model will guarantee: road user/citizen 
satisfaction, affordability, minimised cost overruns, improved quality and quantity of road stock, 
improved road accessibility, road longevity/durability, reduced travel time and traffic jam, business 
profitability, reduced project delivery time, improved environmental and social compliance, delivery of 
road infrastructure faster rather than later, improvement in road serviceability (maintenance, operation), 
improved social welfare, added employment opportunities and improvement in employability, reliable 
road development and maintenance financing, and improvement in road safety.  
9.5 CONTRIBUTION OF THE DEVELOPED PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
GOVERNANCE MODEL 
The developed PPP governance model bridges the gaps in both theory and practice. Theoretically, 
previous PPP governance models partially address governance issues of PPP projects. For instance, the 
extant models discussed in this chapter each limited itself to a single PPP governance aspect e.g. risk 
management, critical success factors, financial modelling, and stakeholder management (refer to 9.3).  
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While from practice (based on the empirical study for this Thesis), in many respects, the undertaking 
of PPP roads projects in Uganda currently contravenes common PPP fundamental principles. 
Attestation to this assertion include the following examples, among others. Undertaking of PPP road 
projects without PPP regulations and guidelines. Toll revenue collection, for example, for KEE has not 
yet commenced because of lack of a tolling policy and a supporting road law. Road construction works 
commence before fully securing the right of way and compensating landowners. Government adopted 
PPPs for the road sub sector before building capacity and staffing of road agencies and PPP overseeing 
bodies (e.g. PPP Unit), and to date little has been done in this regard. It is not surprising that consultants 
are handling most of the PPP work that should ideally be earmarked for public officers.  Furthermore, 
PPP awareness remains very poor among the public and private sectors, as well as the civil society and 
the citizens countrywide. Finally, about seven PPP road projects are being planned around a single main 
town (Kampala) against limited traffic volume. 
Distinctively, this study develops a comprehensive PPP assessment and management governance 
model. Although the model was developed for the road sub sector of Uganda while using information 
mainly from PPP road projects, the flexibility embedded in the model makes it fit for replication in 
other sectors/sub sectors, and both developing and developed countries. Secondly, the model is easily 
adjustable to accommodate any other PPP governance variable that future researchers or practitioners 
may consider have been left out, or in the event that new issues in the PPP discipline emerge. Thirdly, 
most extant models, as exemplified by those used in this chapter, have been found to be useful PPP 
governance tools to enhance the usability of the developed model. Fourthly, the simplistic manner in 
which the model was designed makes it user friendly, even to less technical people. Lastly, and most 
importantly, the model provides a holistic PPP project environment assessment and management 
framework (the first of its kind) for Uganda’s road sub sector, with a potential of solving the current 
and future PPP road governance issues.  
9.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A suitable PPP governance model for developing road infrastructure in Uganda was constructed. The 
model has been developed in such a flexible manner that other sectors/sub sectors, mainly within the 
Ugandan economy, would use the same model but suited to their unique environments. Reference was 
made to extant models and all the theory and practice chapters of the Thesis in the construction of the 
model, to ascertain its robustness. Upon development of the model, a discussion on how each of the 
components of the model works, or what makes the model relevant to PPP project governance 
outcomes, was provided. Important to note about the PPP project life cycle component of the model, is 
that PPP best management practices were provided for each project stage.  Further, the contribution of 
the model to both theory and practice was highlighted and justified. Finally, the users of the model must 
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appreciate that the model is not static. Therefore, continuous update of the model components or 
factors/status as assessments and management are undertaken, and project planning and implementation 
progresses, becomes inevitable since new issues may come up in due course. 
The next chapter presents the conclusion, recommendations and areas for further research.
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10 CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding the fact that the road network carries over 90% of Uganda’s total passenger and cargo 
traffic, and despite several road reforms that the government has introduced in the past, the country’s 
road infrastructure remains poor and underdeveloped. Given that PPPs are assumed to unlock such 
infrastructure gaps (World Bank Group, 2012; Aigbavboa, Liphadzi & Thwala, 2014), this study 
therefore set out to investigate the suitability of Uganda’s PPP environment for developing road 
infrastructure (chapter 8), and thereafter developed an appropriate PPP assessment and management 
governance model for Uganda (chapter 9). 
In order to situate Uganda’s PPP road infrastructure perspective into the existing theory and practice, 
five chapters (2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) had to be discussed prior to chapters 8 and 9. Chapter 2 investigated the 
understanding of public infrastructure and PPPs; chapter 3 contained the key elements of an effective 
PPP governance structure; chapter 4 discussed PPP road experiences and practices; chapter 5 
investigated the evolution of Uganda’s road sub sector and the future PPP projects; and chapter 6 
provided the legal and Policy frameworks applicable to PPPs in Uganda. Apart from chapter 9 (which 
relied on findings from chapters 2-6 and 8), the data collection methods used for the rest of the 
aforementioned chapters are provided in table 10.1 below.  
Table 10.1. Matching Thesis chapters with data collection methods used 
 
Source: Author 
The next subsection presents the contribution of the research and the experience of the researcher as the 
study progressed. 
10.2 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
The contribution of this study is three fold. That is, theoretical, methodological and practical in nature. 
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10.2.1 Practical contribution 
This is the first broad based study conducted on Uganda’s PPP environment. The study provides 
relevant information on PPP government motivations, PPP understanding, PPP challenges, PPP 
prospects and obstacles, PPP readiness capacity, PPP critical success factors, and PPP best practices in 
and for Uganda, especially for road infrastructure development. Such information facilitates the various 
stakeholders (public sector, private sector, multilateral organisations, civil society, and the citizens/road 
users) to make informed PPP decisions.   
Subsequent to the aforementioned discoveries from the interviews, a benchmark to literature, extant 
PPP governance models, and to the global PPP road practices and experiences was made to develop a 
suitable public private partnership governance model for developing road infrastructure in Uganda. The 
developed model (figure 9.4) is the first public private partnership assessment and management 
governance model in Uganda; and on a global scale, this may be the first comprehensive PPP 
governance model. For example, Yakubu and Anigbogu (2016:53) attempted to develop a PPP 
governance model (for Nigeria’s housing sector)  that takes into account the PPP operating 
environment, however they never delineated the macro, meso and micro environments, and limited the 
model to only PPP risk management (see figure 10.1 below).  
 
Figure 10.1. A Public Private Partnership Model for Managing Housing Development Projects 
Source: Yakubu & Anigbogu (2016:53) 
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10.2.2 Theoretical contribution 
The theoretical contribution consists of PPPs as a procurement model, appropriate theories for 
advancing PPP practices, and PPP critical success factors vs PPP best practices, as presented below. 
10.2.2.1 Public private partnerships as a procurement model 
Several studies have viewed PPPs from urban regeneration, policy, infrastructure, development, 
language game, moral regeneration, and financial perspectives (see subsection 2.3.2). Apart from a few 
scholars that incorporate the word procurement into PPP definitions (Willems & Van Dooren, 
2016:203; Otairu et al., 2014:191), no study has previously advanced the procurement management 
perspective. Contributing to the existing theory, this study has added a new PPP perspective of 
procurement management (subsection 2.3.2.6), and throughout the research, this study employed the 
procurement management perspective. In this Thesis, it is argued that the other PPP perspectives 
mentioned above feed into or are components of the procurement management perspective. For 
example, to prove that the financial perspective is part of the procurement perspective, no financing can 
be provided by the private sector through PPP arrangements unless they have been procured to provide 
such. Furthermore, while one may argue that procurement is just a single phase within the PPP project 
life cycle process (refer to section 9.4.7) to qualify as an overarching PPP perspective, such thinking in 
all respects would be null and void due to the following positions. Literally, procurement processes 
begin as early as project identification and development because the procurement team must be involved 
in project specifications development (refer to section 9.4.7). Furthermore, procurement processes end 
as late as the end of the project implementation phase (not at financial close) because the outcomes of 
the procurement phase must be followed through into the contract management and ex post evaluation 
stages of the PPP project (refer to section 9.4.7).  
In fact, because existing theoretical and empirical studies have neglected the advancement of the 
procurement management perspective, practice has equally disregarded it. For this reason PPP 
operations, together with PPP Units, have globally remained under the direct control of the ministry of 
finance/treasury, yet public procurement (an alternative to PPPs) operations are managed under semi-
autonomous powers. This largely cripples PPP progress in many countries, Uganda inclusive. Finally, 
the study clarified that while privatization is a service delivery model, it does not qualify as a public 
procurement option, nor as an equivalent of PPPs, as some scholars seem to suggest.  
10.2.2.2 Appropriate theories for advancing public private partnership practices 
Unlike the commonly used and generic theories for PPP studies, this study presents theories appropriate 
for PPP governance from a public sector perspective (refer to Section 2.4). The study considered the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 279 
 
most relevant theories of public sector governance, and concluded that traditional public administration 
theory is unsuitable for PPP arrangements, though often applied in real practice. The study, therefore, 
recommends four theories, namely new public management, new public service, public value and new 
public governance, as the most appropriate theories for effective governance of PPP operations. These 
theories advance networked systems that bring together all stakeholders (both major and minor ones) 
to collaborate on a common cause through co-regulation, co-production, co-responsibility, and 
relational governance practices. Actually, networking behaviour shows up in new public management, 
develops from new public service to public value, and matures with new public governance. Although 
new public governance dogmas are difficult to achieve completely in the real world, it is, however, the 
most rewarding theory ensuring high-level sustainable PPP practices and management.   
10.2.2.3 Public private partnership critical success factors Vs Public private partnership best 
practices 
While previous studies have treated PPP critical success factors and best practices (principles) as the 
same (refer to subsection 3.3.2), this study has demonstrated how different the two terms are in meaning 
and application (refer to sections 8.7 and 8.8). Critical success factors are core aspects of an activity or 
process in which favourable results are necessary for project success, while best practices are principles 
or standards of behaviours. A brief explanation of the distinctiveness of the two terms is provided 
hereafter. While some critical success factors are unique/specific to particular projects, even those 
critical success factors that are generic in nature, differ in their application from project to project 
depending on the operating environment. In contrast, PPP best practices are the same and universally 
apply to all PPP projects globally, irrespective of the PPP project type, the geographical jurisdiction of 
the project or a country’s PPP maturity level. In summary, any attempt to handle best practices the same 
way as critical success factors would definitely produce compromised results. 
10.2.3 Methodological contribution 
Based on the experience of the researcher as the study progressed, the study makes three methodological 
contributions.  
10.2.3.1 Literature review as a data collection method 
Although rarely used and acknowledged in research as a data collection method, this study confirms 
and finds literature review a very useful method of data collection, especially when data is collected 
from empirical and published (journals) research, because such sources provide more trustworthy and 
insightful information. 
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10.2.3.2 Sample size for in-depth interviews 
Although this study used 30 respondents, it was observed during data collection and analysis that with 
in-depth interviews data saturation may be reached after interviewing between 10-15 respondents, not 
the sample size of 25-30 as suggested by Dworkin (2012:1320). However, this is only possible on 
condition that a good interview guide has been developed, and both the interviewers and interviewees 
are knowledgeable in the subject under study, as well as experienced in conducting interviews and 
responding to interview questions. Studies that draw respondents from various categories, choosing an 
equal number of respondents for each category would be the best option to provide balanced responses 
in the data set. For example, since this study had five categories of respondents (i.e. private sector, 
public sector, civil society, intergovernmental organisations, and the academia) three interviewees from 
each category would have sufficed (5*3 = 15). 
10.2.3.3 Data analysis for qualitative studies 
The study discovered that, unlike quantitative studies, analysis of qualitative data begins as early as data 
collection and ends late into or after the discussion of the findings. The reason for this is that, grouping 
and regrouping, subgrouping and re-subgrouping of findings, and naming and renaming of codes (the 
minutest factors/findings) in qualitative studies continue even into the discussion of the findings.  
10.3 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The presentations in subsections 10.3.1- 10.3.7 below are in line with the research objectives.  
10.3.1 Understanding and contribution of public infrastructure and public private partnerships 
In the whole of this subsection, public infrastructure is viewed in the context of public roads and PPP 
phenomenon because PPP road infrastructure was core to this study. A summary of the findings for this 
objective is presented under four themes, as depicted below.  
10.3.1.1 Understanding of public road infrastructure 
A typical road project consists of both hard and soft infrastructure services, and what is ideal in a real 
PPP environment is to combine such services to engage a single consortium or very few private sector 
contractors. This implies that many and small contracts must be avoided, and physical road 
infrastructure should not be viewed in isolation of support services.  
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10.3.1.2 Understanding of public private partnership phenomenon 
Although stakeholders perceive PPPs differently ideologically or depending on the intervention of the 
projects, fundamentally a combination of three main concepts - contractual, project functions and 
partnership orientations - define PPPs. Therefore, PPP knowledge and awareness creation among the 
various stakeholders by the government and other partners is essential, especially for countries 
intending or newly implementing PPPs.  
10.3.1.3 Contribution of public private partnerships (road projects) 
Although PPP road projects improve social and economic welfare, they at the same time pose negative 
spill over effects on stakeholders and the economy as a whole. Therefore, the PPP operating 
environment must be well managed in order to realize the full potential of PPP road projects.  
10.3.1.4 Theoretical underpinning 
After review of several theories, PPPs were found not suitable under traditional public administration 
practices, instead they (PPPs) work well in environments that promote co-regulation, co-production, 
co-responsibility, and relational governance. Therefore, the need arises for governments to change from 
the traditional way of doing things to more innovative public service delivery practices. 
10.3.2 Key elements of an effective public private partnership governance structure 
Because PPPs operate in a multifaceted setting and are intermingled in various mechanisms of 
procedural, corporate, contract, democratic, intergovernmental, socio-cybernetic, and network 
governance, their operating environments become very complicated to manage. After review of relevant 
literature, the study established key elements for effective governance of PPP projects to include PPP 
best practices (PPP principles), critical success factors, stakeholder management, risk management, and 
PPP maturity. These are summarised as follows. 
10.3.2.1 Promoting PPP best practices 
PPP best practices provide behavioural standards for organisations, professions and individuals in order 
to respond to the collective problems of the citizens and to fulfil their needs in an appropriate and 
acceptable way. In this study, PPP best practices were found to include value for money, dispute 
resolution, innovation, participation, sustainable public management, transparency, accountability, 
networking, and trust; and these must guide PPP decision-making for all stakeholders, as well as 
implementation of PPP tasks across PPP projects. 
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10.3.2.2 Effective implementation of PPP critical success factors 
Findings were drawn from both practice and research perspectives. Based on practice, each of the PPP 
critical success factors may have different impact levels on different sectors, actors, countries, and 
across projects. Therefore, the critical success factors with a greater contribution on project success 
should be accorded more attention and effort compared to those with a lower impact. While from a PPP 
scholar’s perspective, research results may differ depending on the methodologies and the category of 
respondents used.  Notwithstanding the dynamics of the different PPP operating environments or 
research patterns, it was observed that the critical success factors of a strong private sector, transparent 
procurement, and appropriate risk allocation and sharing deliver the greatest contribution to the success 
of any PPP project.  
10.3.2.3 Effective management of stakeholder interests and influence 
Findings indicated that PPPs have a multiplicity of parties with divergent roles, interests and concerns, 
and behavioural traits that disrupt project ownership and commitment among stakeholders. Therefore, 
establishing appropriate management processes for identifying, engaging and addressing stakeholder 
concerns, and reconciling their differences to realize full support, is critical to project success. 
10.3.2.4 Effective PPP risk management 
Generally, PPP projects are exposed to numerous risks, and to comprehensively understand and 
effectively manage PPP risks, they must be identified from their sources. It is implied that a positive 
impact on road infrastructure development is possible when PPP risks have been appropriately 
managed. 
10.3.2.5 Continuous improvement in PPP maturity 
Creating and developing robust PPP environments is dependent on a country’s social and economic 
development needs measured against the capacity and willingness of the various stakeholders to devote 
sufficient resources in order to speed up road infrastructure development and improvements. According 
to Infrascope report data (2015), like many African countries, Uganda lies in the emerging PPP maturity 
market category with a below average PPP maturity score of 45.1% (see Table 3.7 and figure 3.9). The 
implication is that Uganda generally has a weak PPP environment. Therefore, great effort should be put 
into improving the PPP operating environment in the country. 
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10.3.3 International Public private partnership road experiences and practices 
An investigation of international PPP experiences and PPP road project practices was conducted in 
order to draw lessons for Uganda’s road sub sector. Lessons were drawn from bad economic and 
financial times, tolling policy practices and PPP road cases. 
10.3.3.1 Lessons from bad economic and financial times 
Governments, in collaboration with other stakeholders, respond appropriately to avert the effects of 
economic and financial predicaments on the progress of PPP projects. Some of the effects of economic 
and financial difficulties on PPP projects included reduced profitability and returns on equity, increased 
risk aversion of government, lower access to project financing, lower demand for facilities with a usage 
charge, reduction in PPP investment, postponement of implementing projects, increased interest rates, 
lack of capacity by credit markets to handle large projects, and challenging risk sharing and prolonged 
negotiation processes. This acts as a revelation for Uganda to create robust structures, systems and 
resource capacities beforehand for both internal and external current and future eventualities. 
10.3.3.2 Lessons from tolling policy practices 
Apart from a few exceptions, countries across the globe have similar tolling practices. Such similar 
tolling practices include using of real or shadow tolls on PPP roads, integrating both traditional and 
electronic means for toll collection, tolling policies provide for alternative routes, adjusting toll tariffs 
on an annual basis based on either inflation or internal rate of return, provision of discounts, 
enforcement of congestion pricing schemes especially in urban areas, and the provision of exemptions 
to vehicles that serve the interests of the general public or vulnerable groups. Therefore, as Uganda 
develops tolling systems, there is no need to reinvent the wheel, but rather borrow from frameworks of 
other countries and fit them into the local context. 
10.3.3.3 Lessons from public private partnership road case experiences 
No matter the level of development of a country, PPP road projects experience both positive and 
negative outcomes. Positive outcomes result from short-term scheduled payments based on the 
availability and quality of infrastructure or service, periodic growth of direct user revenue collections, 
bonus payments to the contractors in case of reduced road accidents, on time road maintenance and 
upgrades, provision of road safety features, minimised complaints from road users and local residents. 
Furthermore, other factors playing a role is compensating the concessionaire or providing subsidy 
payments by the government in case of an increase in traffic volume beyond traffic forecasts or a 
reduction in projected road usage respectively. Meanwhile, negative outcomes  result from litigation 
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cases, corruption, public protests against direct user tolls, low traffic volumes, poverty and civil wars, 
selective tendering processes, poor planning and feasibility studies, unbalanced allocation of risks 
between the public and private partners, failure to engage competent project advisors, and irregular 
designing and implementation of contracts. Hence, the need to assess Uganda’s PPP operating 
environment and apply appropriate measures used elsewhere to achieve PPP success, as well as mitigate 
PPP failures for road projects. 
10.3.4 Evolution of Uganda’s road sub sector and the future public private partnership projects 
Road infrastructure in Uganda remains underdeveloped because of a lack of resource capacities and 
compromised governance systems and practices, as provided in the summary of findings below.  
10.3.4.1 Road reforms 
Since 1996, road reforms have over time marginally improved road infrastructure in Uganda because 
of: inflexible and bureaucratic practices of government; misaligned coordination and monitoring, and 
duplication of roles of government bodies; corruption; contractor and internal staff technical 
incompetence, and infighting within and across government institutions. These issues have not only led 
to haphazard commercialisation of road infrastructure development operations, but have also frustrated 
efforts by road agencies to improve overall sub sector performance. To avoid PPPs falling into similar 
traps, government must change its public service delivery style. 
10.3.4.2 The current road sub sector performance 
The road physical performance since 2011 has been increasing by 1%, and as of 2017, only 3.52% of 
the total public road network was paved. Inadequate financing and mismanagement of public funds 
mainly cause such an insignificant improvement and performance of road infrastructure in Uganda. 
Therefore, the involvement of the private sector through PPPs would provide more financing and 
minimize public financial mismanagement to undertake and deliver more and better roads. 
10.3.4.3 Public private partnership road project proposals 
Although the proposed PPP roads have improved features compared to the existing ordinary roads and 
the government seems enthusiastic about their execution, the planning and implementation of these road 
projects has been too slow. This is attributed mainly to a general lack of PPP readiness capacities by 
the government, the citizens, as well as the local private sectors. Therefore, creation of structural and 
human resource capacities, and soliciting for stakeholder support become paramount for Uganda.  
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10.3.5 Legal and Policy frameworks applicable to public private partnerships in Uganda 
Whereas a number of legal and policy  frameworks that support PPP interventions are available, some 
of the critical legal and policy frameworks are either non-existent, outdated, and with major 
gaps/inadequacies or both. However, without a sound and complete legal and policy framework, 
planning and implementation of such projects cannot yield tangible results. As such, missing legal 
frameworks must be created and existing ones improved. 
10.3.6 Suitability of Uganda’s public private partnership environment for developing road 
infrastructure 
Based on the interview data, results from the data analysis exercise explained Uganda’s PPP 
environment for road infrastructure development from the dimensions of PPP understanding levels, 
motivations, challenges, readiness levels, prospects, critical success factors, and best practices that may 
support or derail PPP investment programs or projects. Details and summaries of findings under the 
aforementioned PPP dimensions are found in chapter 8 and figure 9.2.2.1 respectively. Provided in the 
next paragraph is the interpretation of what each of the aforementioned PPP dimension represents. 
PPP understanding established the PPP awareness and knowledge capacity levels in the country. PPP 
motivations establishes justifiable reasons why the government of Uganda should spearhead PPPs for 
road infrastructure development. PPP challenges established the factors impeding the smooth planning 
and implementation of PPP programs. PPP readiness established the strengths within Uganda’s 
operating environment to aid effective PPP processes. PPP prospects proposed stakeholder incentives 
or obstacles to the future development of PPP road infrastructure. PPP critical success factors 
established the key factors upon which the success of PPP road projects in Uganda would depend. 
Lastly, PPP best practices provided PPP fundamental principles Uganda must adhere to in order to carry 
forward the PPP agenda within globally acceptable standards. Overall, findings indicated the existence 
of both favourable and unfavourable PPP environments for road projects in Uganda, though the 
unfavourable outweigh the favourable factors.  
10.3.7 A suitable public private partnership governance model for developing road 
infrastructure in Uganda 
Using mainly primary data from interviews, a suitable PPP governance model for road infrastructure 
development in Uganda was constructed. To ensure credibility of the model, findings from the interview 
data took note of the findings from all the other objectives of the Thesis. The model focuses on the 
assessment and management of the entire PPP environment in Uganda in order to facilitate PPP road 
infrastructure development and sustainability. Importantly also, the model allows for such flexibility 
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that other sectors can make use of it, as well as other countries in Africa and beyond. Therefore, the 
developed model becomes a relevant guide in the governance of PPPs in all sectors in Uganda, as well 
as in other countries. Finally, in contrast to the previous PPP models that address a single or very few 
aspects of PPP governance, the developed PPP governance model proves to be comprehensive in nature. 
Actually, this study has established that most of the extant PPP governance models become tools for 
enhancing the developed PPP assessment and management governance model.   
10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Note that all the “PPP critical success factors” and “PPP best practices” in sections 8.7 and 8.8 
respectively, and the “PPP project process best management practices” raised under subsection 9.4.7 in 
each of the phases of the project lifecycle form the biggest part of the recommendations for this study.  
Therefore, the recommendations covered in this section are either appearing for the first time or 
providing clarification to the already captured recommendations in the aforementioned sections and 
subsection of the preceding chapters. Presented in subsections 10.4.1-10.4.4 below are additional 
recommendations. 
10.4.1 Public private partnership legal, institutional and regulatory recommendations 
 
10.4.1.1 Make PPP definition very clear and partnership component for PPPs visible 
What constitutes a medium or long-term contract should be defined in the PPP Act or regulations. 
Furthermore, the partnership dimensions of PPP arrangements must be emphasised in the PPP Act, 
regulations, guidelines and contract documents to avoid ambiguity. 
 
10.4.1.2 A proposed relationship between privatization, public procurement, and public private 
partnership 
Unless government is planning to phase out privatization in the near future, the study recommends 
privatization as the third option after PPP and public procurement in the application of the PIMS, since 
all three options happen to be heavy public investment options and involve private sector participation. 
In addition, the PPDA, the PPP Unit and the Privatization Unit should be merged to form a single public 
entity but with three distinct directorates to address PPP, public procurement and privatization 
respectively. Against this backdrop, leaving the three entities independent of each other creates parallel 
systems or structures, which may indirectly force such public institutions to compete against each other, 
whereas they should be complementing one another. Therefore, little success may be achieved if the 
status quo continues. 
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10.4.1.3 Make the Public Private Partnership Unit a semi-autonomous entity 
The PPP Unit may not operate to full capacity as long as it remains under the direct control of the 
MFPED.  For instance, unlike UNRA, PPDA, URA, and UIA (semi-autonomous entities), URF which 
is directly controlled by MFPED has had operational challenges (refer to section 5.3.5). While most of 
the PPP Units across the world directly operate under the Ministry of Finance, however, the bureaucratic 
nature of public systems in Uganda would necessitate a semi-autonomous status for the PPP Unit. 
10.4.1.4 Clarity of the PPP law and formation of PPP regulations, guidelines and standard 
documents 
Regarding clarity of the PPP law, the PPP Act should be clear on whether the PPP project officer and 
team are ad hoc or permanent positions in terms of PPP project operations; that is, the contracting 
authority should either have a specific team and officer for each PPP project or a single team and officer 
for all the PPP projects collectively. Furthermore, the regulatory and technical responsibilities of the 
PPP Unit and PPP committee should be distinct and clearly separated. Meanwhile, critical issues 
regarding formation of PPP regulations, guidelines and standard documents are that,  government must 
fast-track development of PPP regulations, guidelines, standard bidding and contract documents, road 
tolling policy, PPP dispute resolution schemes (e.g. procurement administrative review mechanisms), 
and PPP threshold values for determining the most suitable procurement method for a PPP project. 
10.4.1.5 PPP Act should provide for renegotiations and land acquisitions 
Law or policy provisions for renegotiations become unavoidable because of the long-term nature of 
PPP contracts, which makes renegotiations likely to occur many times during the lifetime of the project. 
As for the land provisions, a bad public procurement precedent has been set in the past. In 2008, NSSF 
purchased 435 acres of land in Temangalo without following public procurement procedures. The 
argument by the defendants then was that “land was an investment but not a procurement”. Such ill-
motivated interpretation was put forward because land had not been provided for in the PPDA Act of 
2003. Subsequently, in the 2014 amendments of the PPDA Act 2003, land was provided for and defined 
as a procurement therein. As a precautionary measure, the PPP laws must provide for land acquisition 
and renegotiations. 
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10.4.1.6 PPP legal framework must be explicit on how the local government entities (Districts, Town 
councils etc.) fit within the country’s PPP system. 
As it stands, the public private partnership guidelines for local governments of Uganda (developed by 
Ndandiko and Ibanda on behalf of UNDP and MoLG) seem to have been disregarded during the 
development of the 2015 PPP Act. Does this suggest that Uganda’s PPP system is centralised? 
10.4.2 Road tolling recommendations 
Inflation adjustment measures should be incorporated into PPP policies and contracts, and these should 
protect the interests of the concessionaires as well as those of the road users and the citizens as a whole. 
Government should encourage local commercial banks, insurance companies and pension markets to 
syndicate locally and with international counterparts as a means of promoting local content, as well as 
progressively building internal capacity and experience for future PPP projects.  Government must 
avoid constructing many alternative transport modes or roads parallel to the toll roads, because this may 
reduce the projected traffic volume. Finally, during non-rush hours, toll fees should be lowered so that 
PPP toll roads are kept busy to generate enough toll revenues. 
10.4.3 Project planning and management recommendations 
The best and less risky PPP format which the government should think of employing to develop road 
infrastructure is the  design, construction, finance, operate and maintenance (DBFOM) model, unless 
there are strong justifications for undertaking a project on a different basis. Government must set aside 
funds for structuring PPP projects, conducting feasibility studies, engaging transaction advisers, and for 
training and exposure of PPP staff. Given the current resource capacity constraints, the government 
must avoid simultaneous execution of many PPP projects. Lastly, one way to avoid unnecessary PPP 
processes and delays, is that the team that approves feasibility studies should be the same one to approve 
a project for public procurement option, or to provide a rejection decision, without having to send a 
project proposal to another team to conduct further evaluations (as is the case with the PIMS of Uganda). 
However, this requires that the approving team for the feasibility studies must be very knowledgeable 
in both PPPs and public procurement. 
10.4.4 Cultivate cordial relationship between the PPDA Authority and the PPP Unit 
The PPP Unit must benchmark and work closely with the PPDA Authority to establish strides taken by 
the Authority to attain the current level of success, and the challenges it has not effectively solved, and 
the reasons thereof, so as to draw relevant lessons therefrom. This becomes important to the PPP Unit, 
partly because the PPDA Authority has been in operation for about 15 years compared to the 3 years of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 289 
 
the PPP Unit, and because both PPP and public procurement are procurement options. As such, they 
share many common features, since the operating environment is similar to some extent.  
10.5 CONCLUSION 
The study has demonstrated that the PPP environment in Uganda for road infrastructure development 
is promising, though with enormous obstacles that require urgent attention. Actually, the PPP challenges 
and obstacles outweigh the available capacities and anticipated benefits.   However, Uganda has the 
advantage of leapfrogging through the PPP maturity trajectory, since it can draw meaningful lessons 
from countries that have conducted PPP projects well before Uganda’s PPP intentions (refer to the 
whole of chapter 4).  
While no country in the world has ever, or would ever, adopt PPPs after attaining 100% PPP maturity, 
for Uganda to proceed and steadily implement PPPs it must first comply with the minimum globally 
acceptable standards. Based on the findings, the foremost intervention of government must be to 
develop sound and adequate legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as PPP human resource capacities 
within government entities. With a view towards arresting the prevailing situation, this study has 
developed a suitable public private partnership assessment and management governance model. The 
model was developed purely from the outcomes of the investigations of this research, and a detailed 
description of how the model works was provided. While the developed model together with its 
descriptions fit the PPP environment for the road sub sector well, the model equally applies to other sub 
sectors and sectors of Uganda, as long as sector/sub sector specific PPP operating conditions are 
considered.  
Finally, in addition to the developed model, PPP critical success factors, PPP best practices, PPP project 
process best management practices, and recommendations have been provided. Suffice to say, the 
aforementioned outputs of this study are meant to enhance road infrastructure development in Uganda 
through PPP good governance traits.  
10.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Emanating from the PPP practices in Uganda, and how the research was conducted, provided below are 
three main categories of limitations of the study. 
10.6.1 Road sub sector and legal framework limitations 
The study conducted research on a sub sector (roads) where no PPP road project has concluded the 
procurement phase, nor started on the construction phases. Secondly, the study partly conducted 
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research on new and evolving PPP laws of Uganda of which usage is currently limited and its suitability 
not yet fully tested.   
10.6.2 Research methodological approach and instrument limitations 
The study only applied a qualitative research approach for both data collection and analysis, and 
therefore missed out on the advantages of combining qualitative and quantitative approaches into a 
single study. Secondly, because the design of the interview guide never considered profession specific 
expertise, the study assumed that each interviewee had to be knowledgeable in every PPP aspect of the 
investigation. As such, each respondent had to respond to all questions, including those outside their 
specific profession or those they never had good knowledge of. 
10.6.3 Data collection limitations 
Despite the researcher’s efforts to involve all the relevant sectors in the collection of primary data, the 
participation of intergovernmental organisations and private (for profit) sector companies in the 
research interviews, was extremely low. As a result, findings from the highly represented sectors may 
have overshadowed responses from the less represented sectors. 
10.7 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Areas for further research are drawn from the main findings of the study. These include: To replicate 
the current study for the housing, health and energy sectors; To replicate the current study, while taking 
the private sector perspective; To conduct a quantitative study based on the developed model; To 
investigate the impact of the third sector (intergovernmental and civil society organisations) in the 
governance of PPP arrangements; To use a case study approach and investigate the governance of PPP 
road projects in Uganda. Finally, each of the themes of the empirical study (i.e. PPP understanding, PPP 
motivations, PPP challenges, PPP readiness, PPP critical success factors, and PPP best practices) can 
be treated as independent research topics. 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Part One: Personal Profile of respondents 
Section A: General information 
1.1.1: Current organisation. 
1.1.2: Designation.  
1.1.3: Academic qualifications. 
1.1.4: PPP experience (in years). 
1.1.5: Membership to professional bodies. 
 
Part Two: General Understanding of PPPs in Uganda’s Road sub sector   
Section A: Positioning PPPS in the development of road infrastructure in  
  Uganda 
2.1.1: What is your understanding of the term PPP? 
2.1.2:  How have PPPs progressed in the road sub sector in Uganda? 
2.1.3: What have been the motivations for developing road infrastructure through PPP      
       arrangements? 
2.1.4: Explain the general perceptions in the country about the current PPP program for road 
       infrastructure development? 
2.1.5: Are there any significant challenges affecting the implementation of PPP road projects?  
2.1.6: To what extent are PPPs likely to address Uganda’s road infrastructure development     
        needs? 
 
Section B: Strategic implementation of PPP program in the road sub sector 
2.2.1: What best practices need to be complied with if PPPs are to facilitate effective    
        development of road infrastructure in the country? 
2.2.2: If there was one thing the road sub sector needs to change or do for effective    
       implementation of the PPP program, what should that be, and why? 
2.2.3: In your view, what lessons can the road sub sector in Uganda draw from the international 
       PPP road project experiences? 
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Part Three: PPP Operating environment for road infrastructure development in 
              Uganda 
Section A: PPP legal framework 
3.1.1: What PPP guiding laws and policies are in place; and how do they facilitate the   
        implementation of road infrastructure projects under PPP arrangements? 
3.1.2: What structures are in place to enable systematic planning and assessment of road project 
       proposals to decide whether they are worth being executed as PPPS? 
3.1.3: What forms of conflict resolution schemes are available; and how do they address PPP 
       project management issues? 
3.1.4: From your experience, have you identified any gaps in the existing PPP legal framework, 
       and practices? 
 
Section B: PPP institutional framework 
3.2.1: Has the government established a clear and strong PPP institutional framework supported 
       by committed, competent and well-resourced institutions? 
3.2.2: What capabilities do public agencies have in order to effectively deal with abrupt or  
        critical PPP contract changes? 
 
Section C: Road sub sector PPP project operational potential 
3.3.1: Does the road sub sector have comprehensive PPP road infrastructure development plans? 
3.3.2: How are public concerns and interests being safe guarded on PPP infrastructure projects?  
3.3.3: How successful has been the allocation and management of risks between the public and 
       the private sector for the national-level PPP projects in recent years? 
3.3.4: To what extent would you be contented with foreign investors executing most of the PPP 
       road infrastructure projects? 
3.3.5: From your experience, do private or public sector organisations find difficulty in using 
         national labour as part of the PPP projects implementation teams? 
3.3.6: How do you view the public sector’s behaviour towards the need to strike a balance   
       between achieving public service delivery objectives and delivering profitability to  
        private sector partners? 
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Section D: Investment climate 
3.4.1: What is the influence of politics on the development of road infrastructure through PPP 
        mechanisms? 
3.4.2: Do you think the government provides a favourable environment in which the private    
       sector can contribute to road infrastructure development?  
3.4.3: Does the private sector demonstrate sufficient interest and capacity in ensuring that PPP 
       road projects deliver value for money? 
3.4.5: Does the public sector have a robust revenue stream needed for the private sector to     
        recover its up-front capital expenditure and make some profits? 
3.4.6: Do you think road end-user charges alone can be enough to meet all private sector  
       payment demands? 
3.4.8: How is repatriation of profits by overseas investors being treated; and are there any   
       restrictions on the use of expatriate personnel? 
 
Section E: Financial facilities 
3.5.1: How can you describe the behaviour of the public sector in fulfilling payment obligations 
       for PPP contract projects?  
3.5.2: How can the government make the charging of user fees a viable source of income for 
       concessionaires? 
3.5.3: What incentives does government provide the private sector for road infrastructure    
       projects? 
3.5.5: How dependable are the insurance and pension markets in providing useful risk reduction 
       products for PPP road projects? 
3.5.6: How available and favourable are the financial conditions for developing road          
       infrastructure through PPP arrangements? 
3.5.8: How should the usage of the roads be managed to avoid low revenue collection?  
Thank you very much for your participation 
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APPENDIX B 
 
STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
TITLE OF THE RESEARCH: Public Private Partnership for Road Infrastructure  
 Development in Uganda                                                        
REFERENCE NUMBER: SU-HSD-004341 
RESEARCHER: Mugarura Jude Thaddeo 
ADDRESS: School of Public Leadership 
CONTACT: 0752960610; mugarurajude@yahoo.com 
 
Please append your signature on this consent form if you choose to participate in the study. Two copies 
of this form are being provided, one is for you to sign and return, and the other is yours for filing.  
I have read and understood the information above and agree to participate in the study. I know that my 
participation is voluntary and I’m free to refuse or withdraw from this study at any time. In case you 
have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact Ms Maléne Fouché 
[mfouche@sun.ac.za; 021 808 4622] at the Division for Research Development. You have the right to 
receive a copy of the Information and Consent form. 
 
Signature: 
Name: 
Date: 
 
If you are interested in the results of the study, provide your address details in the space below, so that 
I can send you a copy of the findings when the study is completed. 
 
Address………………………………………………………………………………………… 
              ………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Yours sincerely 
 
Mugarura Jude Thaddeo 
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APPENDIX C 
 
STELLENBOSCH UNIVERSITY 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Dear Respondent 
 
Research Topic: Public private partnership for road infrastructure development in   
                     Uganda 
 
The following information is being provided to assist you consider participating in the research 
being conducted as part of my doctoral degree studies in public and development management, 
supervised by Dr. Zwelinzima Ndevu in the School of Public Leadership at Stellenbosch 
University in South Africa. 
 
The study investigates the current and future PPP environment prospects in order to develop a 
suitable PPP model for road infrastructure development in Uganda. Your participation in this 
research will provide useful information on PPPS and subsequently contribute to road 
infrastructure development in the country. You do qualify to participate in the study because 
of your multi-disciplinary experiences and knowledge in PPPS either as a public, private, 
intergovernmental organisation, and civil society organisation practitioner or researcher. 
 
The purpose of this engagement is to seek your opinion on the availability and suitability of 
the legal and institutional frameworks, the investment climate, the financial facilities, the 
organisation and project operational capacities, and any other information you find relevant in 
order to develop road infrastructure through PPP mechanisms. It is expected that the interview 
sessions will last for 60-90 minutes and will be conducted at a place of your convenience. 
 
Please kindly be informed that the interview proceedings will be tape recorded to enrich field 
notes and enable accurate reporting. Besides myself, be assured that the recorded tapes will not 
be availed to any other audience, and all the data therein will be handled with the strictest 
confidentiality it deserves. From your part, in case you choose to record the interview 
proceedings, I advise and request that you keep the same level of confidentiality with any other 
audience thereafter. Otherwise the researcher shall not be held accountable for any 
shortcomings resulting from your failure to comply with this requirement.  
 
Attached is the University’s ethical clearance letter that permits this study to be undertaken.  
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 331 
 
Signature: 
Mugarura Jude Thaddeo 
PhD candidate 
Contact: 0752960610; mugarurajude@yahoo.com 
 
Signature: 
Dr. Zwelinzima Ndevu (Supervisor) 
School of Public Leadership 
Stellenbosch University 
Contact: +27824194756; zwelinzima@sun.ac.za 
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APPENDIX E; Public Investment Management System 
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